In re L.L. CA4/2

CourtListener 10305049CalctappDec 27, 2024

Full text

Filed 12/27/24 In re L.L. CA4/2
See dissenting opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.L., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E082173

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1900526)

v. OPINION

B.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.

Dismissed in part; reversed in part with directions.

Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar,

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I. INTRODUCTION

B.L. (Father) is the father of L.L. In February 2023, the Riverside County

Department of Public Social Services (the department) filed a petition pursuant to

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300 et seq., on behalf of L.L., alleging that

(1) Father had committed acts of sexual abuse against L.L., and (2) Father was unable to

adequately supervise, protect, or provide for L.L. On August 25, 2023, the juvenile court

held a jurisdictional hearing, sustained the jurisdictional allegations against Father, but

set the matter for a further hearing to consider disposition. At the same hearing, the

juvenile court granted a request by L.L.’s mother (Mother)2 to issue a restraining order

against Father.

On September 19, 2023, Father filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal the

“jurisdictional finding pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300[,

subdivision] (b) and 300[, subdivision] (d)” as well as the restraining order. On appeal,

Father argues that (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings should be reversed for

insufficient evidence, and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it issued a

five-year restraining order in favor of Mother. We conclude that Father is entitled to

reversal of the restraining order but that Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings

should be dismissed.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

2
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother and Father are the parents of L.L. They were previously involved in a

juvenile dependency proceeding in Los Angeles County, which resulted in the issuance

of family law orders granting Mother physical custody of L.L., providing Father with

visitation rights, and providing for shared legal custody of L.L. In January 2023, a social

worker interviewed L.L. at school in response to a referral received by the department.

During the interview, L.L. made statements that the social worker believed suggested

Father was touching L.L. in an inappropriately sexual manner, as well as causing physical

injury to L.L. during visits. As a result, the department detained L.L. from Father3 and

filed a petition pursuant to section 300 et seq. on L.L.’s behalf.

At the detention hearing, Mother requested the juvenile court issue a restraining

order against Father naming Mother and L.L. as protected persons. In response, the

juvenile court issued a temporary restraining order but set the matter for a hearing.

The department filed a first amended petition, which alleged jurisdiction pursuant

to section 300, subdivision (b), as the result of Father’s inability to adequately supervise,

protect, or provide for L.L., and pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d), as the result of

Father’s alleged acts of sexual abuse. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional

hearing over the course of multiple days in which the parties presented the live testimony

of numerous witnesses, including Father, Mother, L.L.’s older sibling, multiple social

workers, multiple medical experts, a staff member from L.L.’s school, and a professional

3 L.L. remained in Mother’s physical custody.

3
visitation monitor. At the conclusion of the hearing on August 25, 2023, the juvenile

court found true the jurisdictional allegations of the amended petition, granted a five-year

restraining order in favor of Mother and L.L. against Father, and set the matter for a

future dispositional hearing.

On September 19, 2023, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, at which

time the department recommended that the juvenile court terminate the dependency

proceeding upon the filing of family law orders granting Mother sole physical and sole

legal custody of L.L. with Father holding only the right to supervised visits with L.L.

Father did not object to the department’s recommendation.4 As a result, the juvenile

court made a dispositional order formally removing L.L. from Father’s physical custody

and indicated its intent to terminate the dependency proceeding upon the filing of formal,

written family law orders submitted by the parties, which would include an order granting

Mother sole legal and sole physical custody. That same day, Father filed a notice of

appeal, purporting to appeal from the “jurisdictional finding pursuant to Welfare and

Institutions Code section 300[, subdivision] (b) and 300[, subdivision] (d),” as well as the

restraining order issued by the juvenile court on August 25.

On September 29, 2023, the juvenile court entered formal, written family law

orders and dismissed the juvenile dependency proceeding.

4 Instead, Father requested only minor changes to the proposed order, such as
specific terms for visitations and a provision granting him access to L.L.’s education and
medical records.

4
III. DISCUSSION

A. We Dismiss the Portion of the Appeal Challenging the Jurisdictional Findings

The primary issue raised in Father’s appeal is a challenge to the jurisdictional

findings made by the juvenile court. Specifically, Father challenges each of the findings

as unsupported by substantial evidence. We conclude that this portion of Father’s appeal

must be dismissed.

Assuming we have appellate jurisdiction to reach the merits of Father’s challenge

to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings5, the record shows that the issue is now

moot. “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment

which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in

issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation] A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render it

impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any

effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation] [¶]. . . This rule applies in the dependency context.” (In

re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.)

5 Generally, “ ‘ “[o]ur jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of
appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.” . . . We have no jurisdiction over an
order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.’ ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75.)
And the notice of appeal in this case is far from clear. The notice purports to appeal from
the “jurisdictional findings” and the restraining order issued on August 25, 2023. While
Father also checked a box indicating an intent to appeal from an order made under
“Section 360 (declaration of dependency)” that included “[r]emoval of custody from
parent or guardian” with “review of section 300 jurisdictional findings,” the juvenile
court made no order pursuant to section 360 because it expressly declined to declare a
dependency in this case.

5
In this case, the record shows that 10 days after the filing of Father’s notice of

appeal, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction and entered family law

orders (alternatively referred to as “exit orders”6). As is widely recognized, “[a]n order

terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order

moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163.) This includes appeals

seeking to challenge erroneous jurisdictional findings. (Id. at pp. 164-165; In re N.S.

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 57, 60 [appeal challenging jurisdictional findings rendered

moot by juvenile court’s subsequent order dismissing dependency jurisdiction]; In re

D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 273, 278, 283 [dismissal of juvenile dependency renders

appeal from jurisdictional findings moot absent a “specific legal or practical consequence

that would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings”].) In In re D.P., our

Supreme Court clarified the appropriate test to determine whether appeal of a

jurisdictional finding is moot, explaining that the question of mootness turns on

“[w]hether or not a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that

would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings.” (14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)

Here, Father has not identified any legal or practical consequence that would be

avoided by reversing the jurisdictional findings in this appeal. Notably, while the

6 Section 362.4 “authorizes a juvenile court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding
custody and visitation upon terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child.” (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112; § 362.4, subd. (a).) The exit order is filed in any
pending family law case involving the parties or, if no family law case is pending, it can
form the basis of a new family law case. The order is enforced by the family court and is
subject to modification or termination based on the family court’s own statutory authority
and procedures. (Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169-1170.)

6
juvenile court removed L.L. from Father’s physical custody at the time of the

dispositional hearing, the order that now governs Father’s custodial rights is the exit order

entered at the time the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction. While both orders purport

to remove L.L. from Father’s custody, these are different orders.7 The exit order cannot

be set aside based solely on an appeal from a dispositional order challenging jurisdiction.

(See In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [“[T]o the extent an appellant

argues . . . that the challenged jurisdiction finding resulted in an adverse juvenile custody

order and seeks to have that custody order set aside, in addition to the appeal from the

jurisdiction finding, an appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding

custody is necessary for [an appellate court] to be able to provide effective relief.”].)

Thus, because reversal of the jurisdictional findings would not result in reversal of the

exit order, Father has not shown what legal or practical consequence could be achieved

by reaching the merits of his claim.

Additionally, while Father asserts in a conclusory fashion that reversal of the

jurisdictional findings could result in an award of joint physical and legal custody, Father

has not suggested on appeal how the jurisdictional findings he seeks to reverse served as

7 A dispositional order of removal is issued pursuant to section 361, while an
order determining custody made at the time the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction is
issued pursuant to section 362.4. (§§ 361, 362.4.) In fact, the juvenile court specifically
noted at the time of disposition that its intended family law order granting Mother sole
physical and sole legal custody of L.L. was intended to be a different order than its
dispositional order removing L.L. from Father’s custody.

7
the basis of the exit orders now in effect.8 The custody determination made as part of an

exit order “does not require a finding of detriment under any circumstances” and is,

instead, based upon the juvenile court’s determination of what is “in the best interest of

the chil[d], considering the totality of the circumstances.” (In re J.M., supra,

89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113, 115; In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094.) The

status of a parent as “ ‘offending’ ” or “ ‘nonoffending’ ” may be relevant, “but not

necessarily outcome determinative,” and “does not categorically disqualify [a parent]

from custody or otherwise limit the court’s ability to issue orders necessary to further [the

child’s] best interest.” (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 209.) In fact, the

decision to terminate jurisdiction is based upon a determination that “terminating

jurisdiction [is] appropriate because the dangerous conditions justifying assumption of

jurisdiction under section 300 no longer exist[s] . . . .” (In re J.M., at p. 114.)

Thus, there is no basis for this court to presume that the juvenile court considered

the jurisdictional findings in assessing the best interests of L.L. when fashioning the exit

orders now in effect.9 And Father has not presented any substantive argument explaining

8 The fact that jurisdictional findings are necessary to assert dependency
jurisdiction cannot alone be the basis for concluding that a subsequent dependency order
is “based on” the jurisdictional finding. If that were true, an appeal from a dispositional
order challenging jurisdiction could be used to collaterally attack and unravel any other
separately appealable order subsequently issued by the juvenile court.

9 In fact, the record shows that the family orders were based upon the stipulation
of all parties—including Father. At the outset of the dispositional hearing, counsel for
the department represented that counsel held a conference prior to the hearing and
“father’s counsel . . . indicated that father would be submitting on the case closed and the
family law orders,” but would make a request for modification of the visitation and
[footnote continued on next page]

8
why we should draw that conclusion. Given this record, even assuming we have

appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of Father’s challenge under a liberal

construction of his notice of appeal, Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings are

now moot, and dismissal of this portion of Father’s appeal would still be the appropriate

disposition.10

B. Father Is Entitled to Reversal of the Restraining Order

Father also challenges the juvenile court’s issuance of a restraining order in favor

of Mother pursuant to section 213.5. Specifically, Father argues that (1) substantial

evidence does not support the issuance of a restraining order listing Mother as a protected

person, and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion by providing that the term of the

restraining order would last for five years. We agree with Father that the juvenile court

abused its discretion by providing that the term of the restraining order would last for five

therapy provisions of the proposed order. Consistent with this representation, Father’s
counsel stated that he understood that the family law order would involve granting
Mother sole legal custody, and requested only modifications related to the terms of
visitation, authorization for cojoint therapy, and access to records. Finally, the proposed
written family law orders were jointly submitted to the juvenile court by all parties.

10 While we have discretion to reach an otherwise moot challenge to jurisdictional
findings (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 284-287), Father has not suggested why the
exercise of such discretion would be appropriate in this case. Reversal of the
jurisdictional findings would not appear to alleviate any perceived stigma, since the
record shows that jurisdictional allegations involving sexual abuse were already sustained
against Father in a prior juvenile dependency proceeding. Father has not appealed from
the family law orders now in effect and has not suggested which aspects of the family law
orders he believes should be reversed or modified. And the jurisdictional findings were
not necessary for issuance of the restraining order that Father has challenged on appeal.
(See In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 670 [It is sufficient to show that the restrained
person “disturbed the peace” of the petitioner to support issuance of a restraining order
under section 213.5.].)

9
years and, as a result, need not reach Father’s alternative arguments challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the order.

“Section 213.5 governs the issuance of restraining orders by the juvenile court.

Thereunder, the juvenile court may issue . . . an order ‘enjoining any person from

molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, . . . battering, harassing, telephoning,

. . . contacting, . . . coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of . . .

any parent . . . of the child [who is the subject of dependency proceedings], regardless of

whether the child resides with that parent, . . . upon application . . . .” (In re S.G., supra,

71 Cal.App.5th at p. 670.)11 “Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5 does not

require ‘evidence that the restrained person has previously molested, attacked, struck,

sexually assaulted, stalked or battered the [petitioner or person to be protected].’

[Citation.] It may be sufficient to show that the person be restrained ‘disturbed the peace’

of the petitioner [citation], meaning he or she engaged in conduct that destroyed the

petitioner’s ‘ “ ‘mental or emotional calm.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 671.)

“A restraining order under section 213.5 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”

(In re A.M. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) However, “ ‘[t]he abuse of discretion

11 While section 213.5 refers to the issuance of a restraining order upon the filing
of petitions under section 311 by a probation officer, the Court of Appeal has clarified
that the juvenile court also has authority to issue protective orders pursuant to this
provision following the filing of a petition under section 300 by a social worker. (In re
H.D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 814, 818-820; In re Lilianna C. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 638,
646 [noting that the statute contains a drafting error and it is a “long-standing and
consistent reading of section 213.5” that the statute “empowers juvenile courts to issue
restraining orders to protect the dependent child even when it is a social worker who files
the initial petition”].)

10
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect

of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for

substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of

the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (In re Miguel R.

(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165, quoting Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43

Cal.4th 706, 711-712.)

Here, it is undisputed that the juvenile court issued a restraining order against

Father for a term of five years. As the department concedes on appeal, section 213.5

expressly provides that “[a] restraining order granted pursuant to this subdivision shall

remain in effect, in the discretion of the court, no more than three years . . . .” (§ 213.5,

subd. (d)(1).) The issuance of a restraining order beyond the maximum term permitted

by statute constitutes an act in excess of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction12 and, as a result,

an arbitrary and capricious application of the law to the facts of the case. Given this

conclusion, reversal of the restraining order is required regardless of whether there was

substantial evidence in the record to support issuance of the restraining order at the time

it was made, and we need not reach Father’s alternative argument regarding whether

substantial evidence supported issuance of the order.

12 “A court acts in excess of jurisdiction ‘where, though the court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no “jurisdiction”
(or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act
without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.’ ” (In re Jesusa V. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 588, 624.)

11
We are left only with the question of the appropriate disposition in this case.

Generally, “[i]f the record affirmatively shows the trial court misunderstood the proper

scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to exercise

informed discretion with awareness of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.”

(F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 26.) Thus, contrary to the department’s

suggestion, we do not believe that modification of the juvenile court’s order on appeal to

provide for a term of three years is an appropriate disposition.13

We could reverse the order and direct the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing

pursuant to section 213.5. However, the record in this case shows that the juvenile court

has already terminated dependency jurisdiction; and, as a result, the case has proceeded

beyond the point where a restraining order pursuant to section 213.5 is typically issued.

(§ 213.5, subd. (a) [An order under the statute may be issued only “until the time that the

[dependency] petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated.”].) In the usual case,

“once the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction, the family court assumes jurisdiction

over restraining orders issued in the juvenile court” (Garcia v. Escobar (2017)

17 Cal.App.5th 267, 271; § 362.4), and the family court has the authority to renew or

13 This is particularly true where, as here, the juvenile court did not explain its
reasoning in issuing the order beyond a general comment that a restraining order was “an
appropriate order” “based on the evidence [it] heard,” without specifying a term. The
term was only specified in the written order filed after the hearing, such that the parties
had no opportunity to argue an appropriate length of time for the order. The juvenile
court made no comments, and thus we have no reason to believe that the juvenile court
intended to select the maximum term permissible for a restraining order.

12
modify any prior restraining orders. (Garcia, at p. 267; Priscila N. v. Leonardo G.

(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1208; Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).)

As recently explained in In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, the dismissal of the

juvenile dependency proceedings does not necessarily prevent a reviewing court from

issuing a limited remand directing the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing pursuant to

section 213.5 because an appellate court has general authority to reverse an order and

direct further proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure sections 43 and 906. (Id. at

p. 668.) Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that a limited remand to the juvenile court to

conduct a new hearing under section 213.5 is appropriate in this case. Notably, no party

has requested a remand for the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing under section

213.5. In fact, Mother has not made herself a party in this appeal. And we discern at

least one significant reason why she would not: unlike the juvenile court, the family

court does have authority to issue a restraining order for a period of up to five years.

(Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) Thus, Mother can obtain the very protection she was

originally granted in the juvenile court by making a new request in the family court,

whereas remand to the juvenile court for a new proceeding under section 213.5 could

never result in that relief.

Absent a request for a new hearing by any party, we see no reason to remand the

matter to the juvenile court with directions to conduct a new hearing pursuant to section

213.5. This is especially true where the party protected by the restraining order has a

superior means to obtain the protection she was originally granted and has not requested a

13
remand to obtain a new order under section 213.5.14 Instead, we believe the appropriate

disposition is to reverse the restraining order and remand with directions to vacate the

order. And we leave to the parties whether to seek renewed protection in the family court

proceedings as they deem appropriate.

IV. DISPOSITION

The portion of the appeal challenging the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings is

dismissed. The juvenile court’s restraining order issued on August 25, 2023 is reversed,

and the matter is remanded with directions for the juvenile court to vacate the order.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.

I concur:

CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.

14 For this reason, we find In re S.G. distinguishable and decline to adopt the
disposition reached in that case. In that case, both the restrained and protected party were
parties to the appeal and presumably asserted their interests with respect to a desired
disposition. (In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 657.)

14
[In re L.L., E082173]

RAPHAEL, J., concurring and dissenting.

Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings in this dependency case is not

moot, so I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion.

I

Father hotly contested the jurisdictional allegations. The court heard 10 witnesses

spread over seven court days and received many documents into evidence. On August

25, 2023, the court found jurisdiction over the case under Welfare & Institutions Code

section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d).1

A parent cannot appeal directly from a jurisdictional finding in a dependency case.

Rather, they must wait for the dispositional order. “A dispositional order is appealable,

and review on appeal encompasses the court’s jurisdictional findings.” (In re G.C.

(2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1126.)

On September 19, 2023, less than four weeks after it assumed jurisdiction, the

court held a dispositional hearing. This would be the last time the parties appeared in

dependency court. At that hearing, the court found section 361, subdivisions (c)(1) and

(c)(4) applied and removed physical custody of the child from Father. As the parties had

an active family law case, the court said it would terminate the dependency case when the

parties filed orders reflecting the court’s custody ruling. A minute order that day

reflected all the court’s rulings, including its order removing physical custody of his

1 Code citations are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.

1
daughter from Father and its order that the dependency action is terminated upon the

filing of the custody order.

Father appealed the same day. The notice of appeal said he was appealing from

the September 19, 2023, hearing, and he checked boxes to indicate he was appealing the

declaration of dependency and the removal of custody. He checked another box to state

he sought review of the jurisdictional findings. He attached the September 19, 2023,

minute order that reflected all the rulings from the dispositional hearing that day.

A few days later, the parties filed, and the court signed, a form custody order that

reflected the court’s custody ruling at the dispositional hearing. This is sometimes

referred to as an exit order or a family law custody order. That order did not itself state

that the dependency action was terminated. There were no further hearings, orders, or

other judicial actions in the dependency case.

II

This dependency case is not moot if “review of the jurisdictional finding can grant

the parent effective relief.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277.) Just about two years

ago, in In re D.P., our Supreme Court made clear that we can still grant effective relief in

this case, so it is not moot.

An appellate court can still grant effective relief in a dependency case that has

terminated in trial court, so long as a dependency order “continues to impact a parent’s

rights.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In particular, “when a juvenile court’s

finding forms the basis for an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights — for

2
instance, by restricting visitation or custody — that jurisdictional finding remains subject

to challenge, even if the juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)

Because the jurisdictional findings here led to an order removing custody from

Father, this appeal was not rendered moot by the end of the dependency. In this appeal,

Father challenges the jurisdictional findings that were entered after a long, contested

court trial. Because of the jurisdictional findings, the trial court had the ability to declare

the child a dependent of the court and remove custody from Father. Father asks for

reinstatement of the joint custody he had with mother before the dependency case. Father

has challenged a jurisdiction ruling that led to an adverse custody ruling that “continues

to impact” his rights. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)

The trial court’s termination of the dependency does not moot the appeal because

“review of the jurisdictional finding can grant the parent effective relief.” (In re D.P.,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) That is, “reversal of the jurisdictional finding calls into

question the validity of orders based on that finding.” (Ibid.) Were we to hold that

insufficient evidence supported the jurisdictional findings, we would order reversed not

only those findings, but also the orders that removed custody from Father, as the trial

court had the power to issue those orders only if it had jurisdiction. (See, e.g., In re I.S.

(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 918, 933 [“Because we conclude that the jurisdictional findings

must be reversed, the dispositional order removing I.S. from Mother’s custody also must

be reversed”].) The appeal is not moot.

3
The crux of the majority opinion’s reasoning is that Father had to appeal not just

from the dispositional order (which enabled him to challenge the jurisdictional findings)

but also from the exit order (which, purportedly, is a separate custody order that would

render the dispositional challenge ineffective to change custody.) (Maj. opn., ante, at p.

7.) For instance, the majority says the “exit order cannot be set aside based solely on an

appeal from a dispositional order challenging jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) But the exit order,

like the dispositional order, was based on the jurisdictional findings; each was

permissible only if the dependency court had jurisdiction.

For this reason, even before our Supreme Court decided In re D.P., various Court

of Appeal opinions reversed exit orders as a consequence of reversing jurisdictional

findings. For example, in In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583, the juvenile

court concluded there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jurisdictional finding that

mother’s neglect placed the child at risk of harm. Though the juvenile court had

terminated dependency jurisdiction with a custody order, the Court of Appeal reversed,

explaining “[b]ecause there was no basis for dependency jurisdiction, we also reverse the

disposition order and the custody order the juvenile court issued.” (Id. at p. 583.) The

Court of Appeal remanded to the family court for a hearing on custody and visitation. (Id.

at pp. 583-584; see also In re G.B. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 475, 483, 489 [reversing the

jurisdictional findings, disposition order, and “[a]ll orders issued after the disposition

hearing,” including an exit order and an order terminating the dependency]; In re Jesus

M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 114 [“In the absence of jurisdiction, the court had no

4
authority to issue a dispositional order or the family law custody order”]; In re R.M.

(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 986, 991 [“In light of our determination that the jurisdictional

order must be reversed, the dispositional order placing the children outside Mother’s

home and all subsequent orders as to Mother must be reversed as well”].) The majority’s

view contradicts these cases, which demonstrate the exit order is vulnerable to reversal.

Before In re D.P., it was possible for the Court of Appeal to conclude the

termination of a dependency rendered moot an earlier appeal, even if a custody ruling

that would continue to affect the parent was at issue. That explains why, in In re Rashad

D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 (Rashad D.), a case the majority relies on, the court

held that “an appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody is

necessary for this court to be able to provide effective relief.” Without another appeal,

Rashad D. held, “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in the

now-closed case.” (Ibid.) In re D.P. did not adopt this view. Though it provided an

extensive explanation of how appeals are not rendered moot by a dependency case’s

termination, In re D.P. nowhere required an appeal from the termination order for the

appellate court to provide effective relief.

For instance, In re D.P. cited favorably In re A.R. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733 for

its holding that a case was not moot. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 276-277.) In In

re A.R., while an appeal from a dispositional hearing was pending, the trial court

terminated jurisdiction over the dependency case. (In re A.R., supra, at p. 740.) With no

indication that the parent filed a notice of appeal from the termination order, the Court of

5
Appeal held the case was not moot because the dependency rulings would affect the

parent in family court. (Ibid.) In re D.P.’s approval of this case shows it does not

support Rashad D.’s conclusion that the failure to appeal from the termination order

precludes effective relief.

Our appeal, however, is not even moot under Rashad D. Here, the termination of

the dependency was ordered at the disposition hearing. According to Rashad D., in that

circumstance an appeal from the disposition order “arguably” would preserve jurisdiction

over the dependency case. (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) In another

opinion from the same division with the same author, the court ruled on a dependency

challenge even though the notice of appeal was filed on the day of a dispositional hearing

while the order terminating jurisdiction was stayed until counsel filed a custody order on

a later day. (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 205 fn. 5.) Here, much the

same thing happened. At the September 19 hearing, the trial court announced two orders

identical in substance, a disposition order and an exit order, but filed the exit order on a

form submitted a few days later. Both orders encompassed the final rulings in the

dependency case, including removing custody from father.

In all, under In re D.P., this case is not moot. If we were to find insufficient

evidence to support the jurisdictional finding, we would order both the dispositional order

and the simultaneously announced exit order vacated, as the juvenile court would have

lacked the power to issue both.

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For the above reasons, I dissent from the mootness holding and would address the

merits of the challenge to dependency jurisdiction. I agree with the portion of the

majority opinion reversing the restraining order.

RAPHAEL
J.

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