People v. Valenzuela CA6

CourtListener 10305030CalctappDec 27, 2024

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Filed 12/27/24 P. v. Valenzuela CA6

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H050501
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 18CR004827)

v.

MARK ANTHONY VALENZUELA,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2019, defendant Mark Anthony Valenzuela pleaded no contest to one count of non-
premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a))1 and admitted that the attempted
murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court
sentenced Valenzuela to a stipulated total term of 17 years in state prison. Valenzuela now appeals the
denial of his petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4).2
For the reasons discussed below, we will reverse the order and remand for resentencing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges, plea, and sentencing
On August 8, 2019, the Monterey County District Attorney filed a first amended information
charging Valenzuela and a codefendant, Miguel Jimenez, with two counts of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2); two counts of assault with a

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Section 1170.95 has been amended and renumbered as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, §
10, eff. June 30, 2022; see also Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) We will henceforth refer
only to section 1172.6.
semi-automatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 3 and 4); street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count
5); and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6). The information further alleged
gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) in connection with counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.
That same day, Valenzuela pleaded no contest to count 1, the attempted murder of John Doe
(without premeditation), (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and admitted the special allegation that he committed
that offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). In the plea waiver
form, Valenzuela agreed that the preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for the
conviction.
In accord with the plea agreement, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 17 years in
state prison, consisting of the middle term of seven years on count 1 plus a consecutive term of 10
years on the gang enhancement. The court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the remaining
counts and special allegations.
B. Petition for resentencing
On March 23, 2022, Valenzuela petitioned for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6,
declaring that he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder. The trial court concluded that
Valenzuela’s petition stated a prima facie case of relief and set an evidentiary hearing which was held
on October 5, 2022.
C. Evidentiary hearing
We recount the testimony and evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing, at which the
court also considered non-hearsay portions of testimony presented at the preliminary hearing.
1. The shooting and surveillance video evidence
On April 7, 2018, siblings John and Jane Doe were standing outside their mother’s house in
Salinas when two young men walked toward them. When the two men were between 7 to 20 feet

2
away,3 the men pulled out guns and began firing at the Does. The Does ran to the back of the house
and escaped unharmed.4
Surveillance video recorded the shooting as well as the arrival and departure of the vehicle
carrying the assailants. A witness testified that she saw a white car, without a license plate, park on the
street by her house just before the shooting. There were three people in the car and the witness saw
one5 young man get out of the vehicle and walk away. A few seconds later, the witness heard gunshots,
then saw the same young man run back and get in the car which then drove away.6
The prosecution also presented testimony and surveillance video showing how, prior to the
shooting, Valenzuela circled the neighborhood for several minutes before parking near the scene. After
the shooters ran back to the car, the video shows Valenzuela driving away and running a stop sign.
2. Encounter with police shortly after the shooting
City of Salinas Police Officer Robert Hernandez was responding to the report of gunshots when
he “learned that the suspect vehicle was a white sedan occupied by three or four Hispanic males.”
Hernandez observed a white Nissan Altima “occupied by three Hispanic males” drive past him in the
opposite direction. Hernandez saw that the vehicle “had black dealer plates, [but] no [license] plates”
and made a U-turn to pull the car over. As he did so, Hernandez saw the Nissan driving on the wrong
side of the road, and he accelerated to try and catch up to it. As he passed a cul-de-sac at a high rate of
speed, Hernandez saw that the vehicle was parked at the end of that cul-de-sac. Hernandez made
another U-turn and the Nissan exited the cul-de-sac and sped away, reaching approximately 70 miles

3
John Doe testified the men were approximately 20 feet away when they started shooting, but
Jane Doe testified the distance was seven to eight feet. In all, the men fired a total of 14 shots at the
Does.
4
Police found bullet holes in John Doe’s car as well as in a small “shack” behind his mother’s
house.
5
The witness testified only one man got out of the car, though there is no dispute that there were
two shooters both of whom are shown on the video approaching the victims, firing multiple times, then
running off together.
6
No witness, including the victims, testified that the shooters called out any gang slogans or
otherwise indicated that they were Norteño gang members at any time.
3
per hour in an effort to evade him. Eventually, Hernandez was able to pull the vehicle over.
Valenzuela was driving the car, with Jimenez and another passenger7 inside. Although the Nissan had
paper dealer plates, Hernandez saw that its license plate was in the glove compartment. The car was
registered to Valenzuela.
In a records check, Hernandez learned that Valenzuela was on probation out of Merced County,
but neither Jimenez nor the other passenger8 were on probation or had outstanding warrants.
Hernandez asked if he could search the vehicle, but Valenzuela refused. During the course of the stop,
Hernandez was informed that a witness at the scene of the shooting had described the suspect vehicle
as a white Honda. Hernandez did not believe he had probable cause to search the car, so he cited
Valenzuela for various traffic infractions and let him go.
3. Gang expert testimony
The parties stipulated that Detective Robert Miller would testify as an expert in criminal street
gangs and further stipulated that Norteños “are an ongoing street gang that engages in a pattern of
criminal activity” under applicable California law at the time of the preliminary hearing. Miller
testified that, in his opinion, Valenzuela and Jimenez were active Norteño gang members and that
“taking out a rival gang member [] makes the Norteño gang stronger.” The district attorney presented
Miller with the following hypothetical: “Three Norteños, Norteño l, Norteño 2, Norteño 3, they drive to
a residence where two Sureño associates are standing outside. Norteño 3 and Norteño 2 get out of the
car while Norteño l, the driver, waits. [¶] Norteño[s] 2 and 3 approach the Sureño associates and both
open fire on the Sureño associates. They then return to Norteño 1’s vehicle, and Norteño l drives them
away.” Based on that hypothetical, Miller stated that it was his opinion that the shooting “was
committed for the benefit of the [Norteño] gang.” Miller further testified that a gang member who
enters rival gang territory and commits a shooting “instills fear in the public and intimidates the public
and the other gang members.”

7
That passenger provided a false name to Hernandez, but Hernandez did not learn the
passenger’s true identity until some months later.
8
The passenger who had provided the false name was in fact on juvenile probation at the time of
the stop, with both search-and-seizure waivers and gang conditions.
4
Miller testified that he was familiar with John Doe and believed he was a Sureño gang member,
“based on the totality of everything” including John Doe’s “own admission.”9 According to Miller, the
neighborhood where the shooting took place was a “Sureño gang area,” though he could not say it was
under Sureño control.
4. Valenzuela’s arrest
A few weeks after the shooting, police arrested Valenzuela in the course of a traffic stop.
Valenzuela was driving the same white Nissan that was depicted in the surveillance videos gathered in
investigating the shooting.
D. Trial court’s ruling
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the district attorney had met its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Valenzuela “shared the intent of the perpetrators to
commit either an attempted murder or a murder.”
Valenzuela timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Valenzuela argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence presented at his
resentencing hearing was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he could be found guilty of
attempted murder. We agree.
A. There is insufficient evidence to support trial court’s finding that Valenzuela could be
guilty of attempted murder
1. Legal Principles
a. Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments to the law of murder
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l,
subd. (f).)” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842.) First, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437,

9
Miller did not know if Jane Doe had any “active Sureño gang affiliation.”
5
section 188, subdivision (a)(3) was added to require that “in order to be convicted of murder, a
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Second, Senate Bill No.
1437 added section 189, subdivision (e), limiting liability for felony murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §
3.) Third, Senate Bill No. 1437 “created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the
former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708 (Strong).)
b. Senate Bill No. 775 permits resentencing on attempted murder convictions
In October 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), effective
January 1, 2022, which amended section 1172.6 to clarify that persons who were convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences theory “ ‘are permitted the same relief
as those persons convicted of murder under the same theor[y].’ ” (People v. Patton (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 649, 656 (Patton).)
“Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but
ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623
(Lee); see also People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1213.) An intent to kill is shown if the assailant
either desires the death of the victim or knows to a substantial certainty that death will occur as the
result of the assailant’s action. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) “[I]ntent to kill or
express malice, the mental state required to convict a defendant of attempted murder, may in many
cases be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.” (Id. at p. 741.)
Although the lack of a motive for an attempted murder is not dispositive, “where motive is shown, such
evidence will usually be probative of proof of intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 742.)
Section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).) When a
defendant is “found guilty of attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences theory of
liability, the ‘intent to kill’ [is] imputed onto [the defendant] from the actual killer or perpetrator.”
(People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1007.) “Because section 188, subdivision (a)(3),
prohibits imputing malice based solely on participation in a crime, the natural and probable

6
consequences doctrine cannot prove an accomplice committed attempted murder. Accordingly, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine theory . . . is now invalid.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 191, 196.)
Although a defendant can no longer be held liable for attempted murder based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, under current law, a “sole and actual perpetrator of the attempted
murder . . . is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.” (Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 657.)
Additionally, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder after the
enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.” (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) “To be guilty of a crime
as an aider and abettor, a person must ‘aid[] the [direct] perpetrator by acts or encourage[] him [or her]
by words or gestures.’ [Citations.] In addition, . . . the person must give such aid or encouragement
‘with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the [direct] perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either
of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of,’ the crime in question. [Citations.]
When the crime at issue requires a specific intent, in order to be guilty as an aider and abettor the
person ‘must share the specific intent of the [direct] perpetrator,’ that is to say, the person must ‘know[]
the full extent of the [direct] perpetrator’s criminal purpose and [must] give[] aid or encouragement
with the intent or purpose of facilitating the [direct] perpetrator’s commission of the crime.’ [Citation.]
Thus, to be guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person must give aid or
encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of
facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the
person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.” (Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th
at pp. 623–624; see also People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 (McCoy).)
“Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the intent to kill must be inferred from
the statements and actions of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (People v.
Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) “ ‘Among the factors which may be considered in making the
determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and
conduct before and after the offense.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 (Nguyen).)
The test is “whether the accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or

7
encouraged him by words or gestures.” (People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 134.) “Evidence
of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as
sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208;
People v. Smith (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1469 [intent is generally proved by the act and
surrounding circumstances].)
c. Resentencing procedure under section 1172.6
When the trial court receives a petition under section 1172.6 requesting vacatur of a murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentencing, and “containing the necessary
declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.
[Citations.] If, instead, the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, ‘the
court shall issue an order to show cause.’ [Citation.]” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, citing
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 970–972, § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
On appeal from an order denying a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, we
review the trial court’s fact finding for substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 298 (Clements); People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.) We “ ‘examine
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would
support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People
v. San Nicholas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657–658.) “Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s
job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder's findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Clements,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it

8
appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ ” the
trier of fact’s determination. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
We must presume on appeal “the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial.” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522,
610.) But “ ‘[a] reasonable inference may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination,
speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guesswork; a finding of fact must be an inference
drawn from evidence rather than a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” (People v.
Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330.)
2. Analysis
In this case, there is no direct evidence of Valenzuela’s intent prior to or during the shooting
itself. The Attorney General contends that, nonetheless, there was substantial circumstantial evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that Valenzuela was guilty of attempted murder as an aider and
abettor. Specifically, the Attorney General points to Miller’s expert gang testimony as demonstrating
Valenzuela’s motive to kill rival gang members, as well as his conduct before, during, and after the
shooting. As discussed below, we disagree that this evidence is sufficient to support a determination
that Valenzuela shared an intent to kill.
a. No substantial evidence to prove Valenzuela shared intent to kill
The main evidence presented at the hearing to prove attempted murder consisted of the
following: Valenzuela drove Jiminez and another young man into a “Sureño gang area”10 where they
circled the neighborhood at least once before Valenzuela pulled over. At some unknown point in time
beforehand, Valenzuela replaced his license plate with a dealer plate. According to the gang expert
Miller, Valenzuela and Jiminez were Norteño gang members and Norteño gang members will try to kill
Sureño gang members or commit shootings in Sureño gang territory to intimidate rival gang members
and the public. Valenzuela remained in the car while Jiminez and the other passenger exited the

10
When asked if the neighborhood was “controlled by the Sureños,” Miller replied that he
“wouldn’t say it’s controlled by [Sureños].” Miller was not asked to explain the difference, if any,
between a neighborhood that is considered a gang “area” versus a neighborhood that is considered to
be under the “control” of a gang.
9
vehicle and approached the victims on foot before pulling out their guns and shooting at them multiple
times. The victims, neither of whom were hit, were standing in front of a car in the carport. However,
several of the bullets struck the hood and windshield of that car, supporting a conclusion that the
shooters intended to kill the victims. The shooters then ran back to Valenzuela’s car and all three men
drove away, with Valenzuela driving.
It is undisputed that Valenzuela was not a direct perpetrator and thus could only be convicted of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor. “ ‘A “person aids and abets the commission of a crime when
he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice
aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]o be guilty
of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person must give aid or encouragement with knowledge
of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s
accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an
aider and abettor must intend to kill.’ [Citation.]” (Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)
In this case, there is no direct evidence to show that Valenzuela knew that Jiminez and the other
man intended to try and kill the victims (or anyone else) that day and that he shared in that intent.
(McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118 [“the aider and abettor must know and share the murderous intent
of the actual perpetrator.”].) For example, there is no evidence (direct or circumstantial) that
Valenzuela knew that either of his passengers had a firearm that day.11 The witness evidence
established the shooters pulled out their weapons after they left the car and just before they opened fire

11
Miller’s testimony regarding gangs and firearms consisted of the following: “Firearms are
kind of a tool of the trade for gang members. They’re used offensively and defensively. Offensively if
they happen to see a rival gang member, they have an opportunity to shoot that gang member if they
have a gun. And defensively to protect themselves against rival gang members. They also use the
guns for committing robberies and other type of crimes.” (Italics added.) Again, while Miller’s
testimony supports a conclusion that gang members will shoot a rival gang member “they happen to
see,” such a shooting will only take place if the gang member has a firearm. Miller did not testify that
gang members are always armed with firearms or that firearms are used exclusively to shoot rival gang
members.

10
on the Does. However, there was no evidence Valenzuela had seen either of his passengers in
possession of a firearm at any time prior to the shooting. While there is some circumstantial evidence
that Valenzuela knew his passengers intended to engage the Does in some capacity, that evidence is not
sufficient to demonstrate that Valenzuela shared their intent to kill the Does and was thereby guilty of
aiding and abetting attempted murder.
b. Motive evidence
Notwithstanding the lack of direct evidence of an intent to kill, the Attorney General appears to
argue that Valenzuela and his passengers’ status as Norteño gang members provided a motive and was
circumstantial evidence of his intent to kill. Specifically, the Attorney General notes that gang expert
Miller testified that Norteño gang members sought to kill rival gang members, especially Sureño gang
members, because doing so bolstered the reputation of the Norteño gang. In addition, the Norteño
gang’s reputation is further enhanced when the killing takes place in the rival gang’s territory.
While a gang expert may not offer an opinion on the defendant’s state of mind or whether he
committed the crime (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1047–1048), “[t]he People are generally
entitled to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense. [Citation.] ‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the
gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and
the like—can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or
fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.’ ” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1,
31.) Expert opinion is ordinarily admissible for such purposes if “guided by hypothetical questions . . .
‘ “rooted in facts shown by the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 967.)
However, “ ‘[g]ang evidence should not be admitted at trial where its sole relevance is to show a
defendant’s criminal disposition or bad character as a means of creating an inference the defendant
committed the charged offense.’ [Citation.] With exceptions not applicable here, ‘evidence of a
person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to
prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.’ (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) ‘Evidence of gang

11
membership may not be introduced . . . to prove intent or culpability. [Citations.]’ (Kennedy v.
Lockyer (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 1041, 1055.)” (People v. Memory (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 835, 859.)
Although the Attorney General argues that Miller’s gang testimony demonstrates Valenzuela’s
motive and intent to commit murder, the testimony still presupposes that Valenzuela knew, on this
specific occasion, that his passengers were armed with firearms and intended to shoot at any Sureño
gang members they encountered as they drove. Miller’s testimony did not and could not establish that
Valenzuela, just because he is a Norteño, had an unvarying criminal disposition to attack Sureños with
deadly force on every occasion in which his fellow gang members acted with an intent to kill.
The dissent relies on Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1015 to bolster its conclusion that “substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s ruling in the case before us.” (Dissent, p. 4) We think Nguyen is
distinguishable. In Nguyen, the gang expert testified that “at the time of the shooting, the Nip Family
and the Cheap Boys were in a state of war, and members of both gangs were expected to be able to
engage in gunfights with their rivals ‘at a moment's notice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1054.) Here, gang expert
Miller testified in general terms about the ongoing rivalry between Norteño and Sureño gangs, saying
that they “feud often” which “usually result[s] in shootings.” (Italics added.) Unlike the gang expert in
Nguyen, Miller did not testify that the Norteño and Sureño gangs in Salinas were currently at war, nor
did he testify that Valenzuela’s subset, Santa Rita Bahamas, was at war with or actively feuding with
any particular Sureño subset, let alone the Sureño subset to which John Doe belonged. In addition, the
defendant in Nguyen was observed “star[ing] back at the occupants of [the victim]’s car as one car
passed the other” (id. at p. 1055) which would support the inference that Nguyen recognized the people
in that car as rival gang members and pointed them out to the shooter. In the present case, there is no
evidence that Valenzuela saw Doe 1 and Doe 2 or that he was the person who made the decision to pull
over so his passengers could get out of the vehicle and shoot at them.
Finally, we also note the dissent’s reliance on, among the other evidence cited, the gang expert’s
testimony that “if they [i.e., Norteño gang members] happen to see a rival gang member, they have an
opportunity to shoot that gang member if they have a gun.” (Italics added.) The language we have
italicized is crucial to the analysis here because the prosecution presented no evidence to support an

12
inference that Valenzuela had a gun himself or knew that either of his passengers were armed that
day. The prosecution also presented no evidence that Valenzuela or either of his passengers had a
history of engaging in violent acts or shootings, whether against rival Sureño gang members or anyone
else. The lack of such evidence is, in our view, fatal to the prosecution’s case.
c. Valenzuela’s conduct before the shooting
The Attorney General also contends that Valenzuela’s conduct prior to the shooting
demonstrates that he shared his passengers’ intent to kill the two victims. He argues that Valenzuela
“served as the Norteño driver for two armed Norteño passengers … as the trio stalked Sureño territory
on Towt Street in search of Sureño targets to extinguish.” According to the Attorney General, the fact
that Valenzuela “circled the neighborhood for at least 11 minutes” before pulling over “supports the
fact that [Valenzuela] was seeking a Sureño target.” The Attorney General also notes Valenzuela’s
efforts to avoid identification by placing his license plate in the glove compartment and instead using
black paper plates on the front and back of his vehicle.
Again, the Attorney General presupposes Valenzuela’s knowledge that his passengers were
armed prior to the shooting and intended to shoot at the Does or other Sureños. It is true that
Valenzuela’s actions of driving his car through a Sureño “gang area” and pulling over near where John
and Jane Doe were standing supports a conclusion that Valenzuela intended to aid and abet some form
of unlawful engagement with the Does (which could have included but not been limited to assault,
robbery, or even murder) by the passengers. Valenzuela’s efforts to make his vehicle less identifiable
are also consistent with an intent to engage in such unlawful activity. However, without evidence of
Valenzuela’s specific intent to kill on this specific occasion that is reasonable, credible, or of solid
value, it would only be speculative to infer that he shared his passengers’ intent to kill when they
attacked the Does.
d. Valenzuela’s conduct after the shooting
The Attorney General also points to Valenzuela’s conduct after the shooting as further evidence
of his intent to kill. After his passengers returned to the vehicle, Valenzuela rolled through a stop sign

13
and, when a police car started following him, he began driving evasively, driving on the wrong side of
the road and attempting to hide in a cul-de-sac.
“It is well settled that the presence at the scene of the crime and failure to prevent it,
companionship and conduct before and after the offense, including flight, are relevant to determining
whether a defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. [Citations.]” (People v.
Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599, italics added.) However, “[m]ere presence at the scene of a
crime is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting.” (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th
518, 529–530.)
We agree that this evidence demonstrates that Valenzuela intended to evade the police after the
shooting, and that his flight could support a conclusion that he was conscious of his guilt. Again
though, there is no evidence that Valenzuela knew his passengers were armed with firearms at any
point prior to the shootings and shared their intent to kill the Does prior to or at the time of the
shooting. Consequently, such flight only lends to speculation and conjecture as to whether Valenzuela
harbored an intent to kill the Does.
Again, we appreciate that our role as the reviewing court is limited after the trial court has
conducted an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, we must presume on appeal “the existence of every
fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial.”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 610.) But an inference “ ‘ “may not be based on suspicion alone, or on
imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work.” ’ ” (People v. Davis (2013)
57 Cal.4th 353, 360.) After careful review of the record, we conclude there is no substantial
evidence—that is, no evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—to support the trial
court’s conclusion that, though not one of the shooters, Valenzuela shared the shooters’ “intent … to
commit either an attempted murder or a murder.”
B. Resentencing options on remand
Following oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing on the trial court’s resentencing
options, assuming we were to reverse and remand the matter. Having determined that the trial court’s
order denying Valenzuela’s section 1172.6 petition must be reversed, we next discuss those options.

14
1. Applicable legal principles
Pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof [at the evidentiary hearing], the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached
to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.”
Section 1172.6, subdivision (e) provides: “The petitioner’s conviction shall be redesignated as the
target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the petitioner is entitled to relief
pursuant to this section, murder or attempted murder was charged generically, and the target
offense was not charged.” In People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 463–464, 469–470 (Arellano),
the California Supreme Court analyzed these subdivisions in the context of deciding whether the
resentencing court may add an offense-specific sentencing enhancement or allegation to the
redesignated conviction. The Supreme Court explained the language of subdivision (d)(3) directing the
court to resentence the petitioner “on the ‘remaining charges,’ ” referred “only to the charges that
remain—not charges that could have been established by the evidence.” (Arellano, at p. 470.)
The court next examined the language in subdivision (e) of section 1172.6, which applies when
murder or attempted murder was charged generically and there has not been a finding on the target
offense or underlying felony.12 “[T]he ‘target offense or underlying felony’ under section 1172.6,
subdivision (e) is the offense or felony that was the predicate for relief in the first place—i.e., the
offense or felony that supported the prosecution’s theory of felony murder, murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory in which malice is imputed based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime.” (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 474–475.)
The Supreme Court concluded that, under subdivision (e), “the underlying felony or target
offense ‘was not charged’ ” if “the defendant was neither convicted of the underlying felony or target

12
The court noted that the terms “target offense” and “underlying felony” are not defined in
section 1172.6 but recognized that the meanings of both are clear. (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
470.) “An ‘underlying felony’ refers to the felony underlying a felony-murder theory (§ 1172.6, subd.
(e); see People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 193 [14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281, 91 P.3d 222]), and the
‘target offense’ refers to the offense the natural and probable consequence of which was murder (§
1172.6, subd. (e); see People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920 [95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 209 P.3d
105]).” (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 470.)
15
offense nor was either crime actually litigated.” (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 474, fn. 5.) Thus,
under section 1172.6, subdivision (e), where the murder or attempted murder offense was charged
generically and the underlying felony or target offense was not charged nor litigated, the trial court
redesignates the murder or attempted murder conviction to “ ‘the target offense or underlying felony
for resentencing purposes.’ ” (Arellano, at p. 470.)
Pursuant to Arellano, when resentencing under section 1172.6, a court lacks “the separate
authority to search out and impose sentence allegations and enhancements that were not charged and
proven at trial” because an enhancement is not part of an underlying felony or target offense.
(Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 474.) However, the Supreme Court left open “whether a court has
discretion under section 1172.6, subdivision (e) to redesignate a murder conviction as multiple
underlying felonies or target offenses or whether a court must redesignate an underlying offense in any
particular degree” because those questions were not before it. (Id. at p. 474.)
2. Analysis
In this case, Valenzuela’s attempted murder was charged generically and he was not convicted
of the target offense nor was the target offense litigated below. The parties agree, and we concur, that
the trial court is therefore governed by section 1172.6, subdivision (e) in redesignating Valenzuela’s
attempted murder conviction on remand.
Section 1172.6, subdivision (e) does not specify how a court determines what the target offense
is when it redesignates a murder or attempted murder conviction. Nevertheless, the parties agree, as do
we, that the trial court has some degree of flexibility in this process. (See People v. Watson (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 474, 488 [“reading section 1170.95, subdivisions (d)(3) and (e) together reflects a
legislative intent to grant trial courts flexibility in designating the underlying offense for resentencing
purposes.”].) The trial court is free to fashion whatever sentence legally complies with the
Legislature’s declared goal in enacting Senate Bill No. 1437: to uphold “a bedrock principle of the law
and of equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level
of individual culpability.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (d).)

16
The parties further agree that, under Arellano, the trial court may not impose unproven or
uncharged sentence enhancements or allegations when resentencing Valenzuela because an
enhancement is not part of an underlying felony or target offense. (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
474.) Again, we concur but express no opinion on whether, as the Attorney General argues, the trial
court may or should reimpose punishment based on the gang enhancement that Valenzuela admitted in
connection with his plea agreement. On remand, the parties will be allowed to argue this issue in the
first instance.
Finally, the Attorney General concedes that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1) prohibits the trial
court from imposing a sentence greater than Valenzuela’s original sentence of 17 years. We agree.
The defendant may be resentenced, “provided that the new sentence … is not greater than the initial
sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).
In his supplemental briefing, Valenzuela acknowledges that it is not clear what limits apply to
the trial court in resentencing him under section 1172.6, subdivision (e), such as: 1) whether the court
may redesignate his sole conviction for attempted murder as more than one target offense or lesser
offenses, or 2) whether Valenzuela is entitled to the benefit of any ameliorative changes to the law of
sentencing on remand. Again, the parties will be allowed to make such arguments in the trial court in
the first instance and we do not intend to suggest how the trial court should rule on such questions.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Valenzuela’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate Valenzuela’s attempted murder conviction and to
resentence him in accordance with Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (e).

17
____________________________
WILSON, J.

I CONCUR:

____________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.

The People v. Valenzuela
H050501
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J., Dissenting.
A trial court’s denial of a Penal Code section 1172.61 petition following an
evidentiary hearing is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).) “Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ has been characterized as a ‘deferential’
standard. [Citation.]” (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Given this court’s limited
role on appeal, defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming there was insufficient
evidence . . . . If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give
due deference to the trier of fact and not retry the case ourselves.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 129–130.) As the majority notes, we must
presume in support of the judgment “the existence of every fact the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial.” (People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 610.) However, “ ‘[a] reasonable inference may not be based on
suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or
guesswork; a finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than a
mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” (People v. Grant (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330.)
Applying this deferential standard of review, the trial court could reasonably
conclude based on the evidence presented that Valenzuela shared the intent to kill of the

1
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
actual shooters in this matter. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
Valenzuela’s petition.
The majority concludes that “without evidence of Valenzuela’s specific intent to
kill on this specific occasion that is reasonable, credible, or of solid value, it would only
be speculative to infer that he shared his passengers’ intent to kill when they attacked the
Does.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)
Based on the following evidence introduced at the evidentiary hearing, I conclude
that the trial court’s finding that Valenzuela intended to kill is not based on speculation,
but rather is a reasonable inference drawn from circumstantial evidence:
(1) A gang expert opined at the preliminary hearing that Valenzuela and one of the
shooters—Jimenez—were active Norteño gang members, that Norteño-Sureño feuds
often result in shootings, and that “taking out a rival gang member obviously makes the
Norteño gang stronger.” The gang expert also testified that “[f]irearms are kind of a tool
of the trade for gang members,” and that “if they happen to see a rival gang member, they
have an opportunity to shoot that gang member if they have a gun.”
(2) Valenzuela drove Jiminez and the other shooter into a “Sureño gang area”
where he passed by the victims’ residence, ran a stop sign, and then circled the
neighborhood before pulling over close to the victims’ residence to let the shooters out of
the car, as shown by video footage.
(3) Valenzuela remained in the car while the shooters got out of the car and
approached the victims on foot before pulling out their guns and shooting at them
multiple times.
(4) A witness saw Valenzuela park his car, saw one or two people leave the car,
and heard gunshots “a few seconds” later, before the person or people returned to the car
and the car left.
(5) After leaving the scene with the shooters in the car, Valenzuela drove
recklessly, evading officers until he was stopped with the shooters still in the car. His

2
car’s license plate had been removed and placed in the glove compartment, replaced with
paper “black dealer plates.”
Based on this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Valenzuela
directly aided and abetted the attempted murder, a theory of murder unaffected by recent
legislative changes to murder law. “ ‘Whether a person has aided and abetted in the
commission of a crime ordinarily is a question of fact. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Among the factors
which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are:
presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the
offense.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 (Nguyen).) All
three of these factors support a finding that Valenzuela directly aided and abetted the
attempted murders. The evidence shows that Valenzuela drove the shooters to a location
near the scene of the shootings, as the witness reported that she heard shots “within a few
seconds” of the shooters exiting Valenzuela’s car. Valenzuela shared gang membership
with at least one of the shooters (Jimenez), he ran a stop sign and circled the victim’s
residence in a Sureño gang neighborhood, he dropped the shooters off near the residence,
he remained in the car during the shootings, and then he evasively drove the shooters
away from the scene of the crime. In addition, the evidence demonstrates that the license
plates had been removed from Valenzuela’s car. Valenzuela’s presence at the scene of
the crime, his companionship with the shooters, and his conduct before and after the
offense all support a conclusion that he directly aided and abetted the attempted murder.
The majority acknowledges that Valenzuela’s actions support a conclusion that he
intended to aid and abet some form of unlawful activity, but states that it would be
speculative to infer that he acted with intent to kill. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) No such
speculation is required; rather, the trial court’s conclusion was a reasonable inference
drawn from the evidence. The relevant question is not whether this court believes that
the evidence ruled out all possibilities short of an intent to kill; the relevant question is
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a reasonable

3
trier of fact could find that Valenzuela directly aided and abetted the shooters.
“Appellate inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence ‘does not require a court to
“ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]
In other words, ‘it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the
defendant’s guilt . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1055–1056.)
Here, the trial court sitting as the trier of fact was presented with circumstantial evidence
of Valenzuela’s intent. It concluded that this evidence demonstrated Valenzuela’s intent
to kill. This ruling must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
Nguyen reinforces the conclusion that substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s ruling in the case before us. Nguyen was a passenger in the back seat of a car
driven by a young woman, with a man sitting in the front passenger seat. (Nguyen, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) The car started following another car, which carried several
members of the rival “Cheap Boys” gang. (Ibid.) The car Nguyen was riding in passed
the other car, and Nguyen and the other passengers “stared back at the car.” (Ibid.)
Later, the car in which Nguyen was riding followed the other car for several blocks until
they stopped next to each other at a light. (Ibid.) When the traffic signal turned green,
the man in the front passenger seat of the car in which Nguyen was riding shot the driver
of the other car before the car in which Nguyen was riding drove away. (Id. at pp. 1053–
1054.) A few days later, Nguyen went to the apartment of another Cheap Boys member
who had been in the other car and asked, “ ‘What’s up with the cops?’ ” (Id. at p. 1054.)
A gang expert testified that Asian gang members tended to “ ‘go from place to place
around the community hunting for their rivals.’ ” (Ibid.) The gang expert testified that a
gang member sitting in the back seat would be expected to serve as a lookout and back

4
the others up if something happened. (Ibid.) The gang expert also testified that the gang
with which Nguyen was affiliated (the “Nip Family”) and the Cheap Boys “were in a
state of war, and members of both gangs were expected to be able to engage in gunfights
with their rivals ‘at a moment’s notice.’ ” (Ibid.)
Based on these facts, the California Supreme Court concluded that substantial
evidence supported Nguyen’s conviction of aiding and abetting attempted murder, which
required proof that Nguyen acted with intent to kill. (Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 1056.) The court in Nguyen reasoned: “Considering this evidence in the context of the
ongoing gang war between the Nip Family and Cheap Boys, as well as the Asian gang
practices described by [the gang expert], the jury could have inferred that defendant knew
of [the shooter’s] intent to kill, shared that intent, and aided [the shooter] by spotting
potential targets.” (Id. at p. 1055.) The California Supreme Court stated that while gang
evidence standing alone cannot prove a defendant is an aider and abettor to a crime, the
prosecution gang expert’s testimony “strengthened inferences arising from other evidence
specific to defendant’s role in the crime at issue.” (Ibid.) Our state Supreme Court
further stated: “Although the issue is close, the record here contains substantial evidence
from which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew of
and shared [the shooter’s] intent to kill [the victim] and acted to further the shooting.
This evidence was also sufficient to support defendant’s related conviction for active
participation in a gang.” (Id. at p. 1056.)
Here, Valenzuela was the driver of the car, not a mere passenger as in Nguyen.
The court in Nguyen upheld the conviction based on Nguyen’s role as a spotter, and
Valenzuela’s actions of circling the area immediately before the shootings evince a
similar or even greater role that he played compared to that of Nguyen. As in Nguyen,
the shooting was carried out against a suspected rival gang member, and gang expert
testimony tied Valenzuela’s role in the shootings to his intent to kill. The expert testified
at the preliminary hearing that he believed Valenzuela was aware on the date of the

5
shootings of the Norteño gang’s pattern of criminal activity, that the shooting was carried
out to benefit the Norteño gang to which Valenzuela belonged, and that firearms were
commonly carried and used in situations such as the instant one. The majority here
concludes that no direct evidence showed that Valenzuela was aware of the shooters’
plan or was aware of their possession of firearms when they exited the car, but the court
in Nguyen did not discuss any direct evidence that Nguyen was aware of the shooter’s
possession of a firearm and nonetheless found that substantial evidence existed that
Nguyen aided and abetted the shooting with intent to kill. As in Nguyen, considering the
evidence in the case before us “in the context of the ongoing gang war,” the trier of fact
“could have inferred that defendant knew of [the shooters’] intent to kill, shared that
intent, and aided [the shooters] by spotting potential targets.” (Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 1055.)
That there is no direct evidence of Valenzuela’s intent prior to or during the
shooting itself does not alter the conclusion that Valenzuela shared the intent to kill of the
actual shooters. “Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably
circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a
conviction. [Citations.]” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208.) The
prosecution’s gang expert demonstrated that Valenzuela had a motive to attempt to kill
the victims, and “evidence of motive is often probative of intent to kill.” (People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) The testimony by the prosecution’s gang expert,
Valenzuela’s presence at the scene of the crime, Valenzuela’s companionship with the
shooters, and Valenzuela’s conduct before and after the offense all support a conclusion
that he directly aided and abetted the attempted murder with the intent to kill.
Recent changes to California murder law, including section 1172.6, were enacted
to ensure that each person is “punished for his or her actions according to his or her own
level of individual culpability.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (d).) Valenzuela was
no mere “getaway driver” who acted without knowledge of the shooters’ plan. Rather,

6
his actions in concealing the car’s identity, driving the shooters into a Sureño gang area,
spotting the victims while running a stop sign and circling the area, dropping off the
shooters a short distance from the site of the shootings, remaining at the scene during the
shootings, and recklessly driving them away support the trial court’s conclusion that he
was a direct aider and abettor of the attempted murder.
Because substantial circumstantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that Valenzuela aided and abetted the attempted murder with intent to kill, I respectfully
dissent. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)

7
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

People v. Valenzuela
H050501

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