CourtListener 10304596•People v. Gudiel
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Filed 12/26/24
See concurring opinion
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B330830
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA059207
v.
FREDY CORDERO GUDIEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Appellant Fredy Cordero Gudiel, convicted of second degree
murder, filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code 1
section 1172.6. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the petition. We affirm.
FACTS
Gudiel, William Torres, and Pedro Pena were members of
the West Side Locos gang. On October 6, 2004, Edgar Babayan
and William Torres were hanging out in Pelanconi Park in
Glendale. Gudiel called and asked to be picked up at his
girlfriend’s house; he was having a bit of trouble with some guys.
Gudiel’s girlfriend lived in the area belonging to the Toonerville
gang. The West Side Locos and Toonerville gangs do not get
along.
After receiving Gudiel’s call, Babayan, Torres and Pena,
who had joined them, set off in Torres’s car. Torres was driving,
Pena was in the front passenger seat and Babayan was sitting
behind Pena. Gudiel was in the back seat with Babayan.
Babayan testified he saw a wooden Dodger mini-bat and a duffle
bag on the back seat of the car. He also saw an aluminum bat
outside the car during the altercation, which was then brought
into the car after the altercation.
Babayan was a bit concerned that they were headed into
Toonerville territory. About three or four minutes after they
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On January 31, 2024, we granted Gudiel’s request for
judicial notice of the record on appeal, which includes the trial
transcripts and jury instructions.
2
picked up Gudiel they saw the murder victim, William
Maldonado, riding a bicycle in the opposite direction.
Torres made a U-turn and pulled up to Maldonado. From
the front seat, either he or Pena shouted: “Where are you from?”
This means “What gang do you claim.” Maldonado replied
“Toonerville,” stopped his bike, and reached towards his
backpack.
Torres and Pena got out of the car, followed by Gudiel.
Pena hit Maldonado on the head and shoulder with a bat,
knocking him off the bike. Torres hit him with the Dodger mini-
bat, causing that bat to shatter. As Maldonado tried to get up,
Gudiel hit him in the face, twice on the chest, and then kicked
him in the stomach. As Maldonado lay on the ground trying to
protect his head, Gudiel picked up Maldonado’s bike and threw it
at him. One of the bike’s tires hit Maldonado’s leg and the rest of
it landed on top of his body. Gudiel threw the bike only once
because it was “too heavy.” Maldonado was screaming in pain
and bleeding. According to Babayan, who testified at trial, “[H]e
had blood all over him.”
Later that day, Maldonado was taken to a hospital.
Maldonado sustained three injuries to his head. He died four
days later of blunt head trauma. The fatal injury was behind the
left ear, which was caused by the impact of “some blunt object
against the scalp.”
When interviewed by the police, Gudiel explained
Maldonado was attacked because “he claimed Toonerville” and
was therefore an “enemy.” Appellant acknowledged that when he
joined the gang, he knew he would have to kill a rival gang
member. He conceded it was “stupid” to do that but “[t]hat’s how
it is in . . . a gang.”
3
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 24, 2007, a jury convicted Gudiel of second degree
murder and found the offense was committed for the benefit of a
criminal street gang. Gudiel was sentenced to a term of 15 years
to life in prison. We affirmed his conviction in full. (People v.
Gudiel et al. (July 10, 2009, B201995) [nonpub. opn.].)
On January 10, 2022, Gudiel filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1170.95. (§ 1170.95 is now codified as
§ 1172.6.) The trial court appointed counsel and ordered the
People to file a response to the petition. The People’s response
was filed on June 17, 2022.
There is no transcript in our record that establishes when
or if the court found Gudiel had made out a prima facie case and
issued an order to show cause, which are prerequisites to an
evidentiary hearing. At a hearing on October 13, 2022, the trial
court set November 17, 2022 as the “date for a possible prima
facie hearing.” The trial court noted that “there has to be
something special to show that somehow malice was imputed to
the defendant, despite the fact no jury instructions were given.
Otherwise I’m prepared to summarily deny the petition.”
We have no transcript from November 17, 2022. During a
hearing on February 6, 2023, the court asked counsel about the
status of the petition and stated: “I’m kind of heading, that this is
an implied malice murder case.” It then observed that defense
counsel “thinks we’ve already done the prima facie and we’ve
moved to an OSC. Is that not correct? I don’t have an
independent memory.” The court’s judicial assistant then
advised the court that the hearing today was “for an OSC
setting.” The trial court responded: “Then apparently I did rule
4
that it passed the prima facie phase.” The trial court proceeded
as if it had made such a finding. No party objected.
On May 5, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing. The court considered the record of conviction, which
included jury instructions and a transcript of the initial trial. No
new evidence was offered by either party. The People argued
that there were three weapons involved: a souvenir Dodger
baseball bat, another baseball bat, and a bicycle. The victim died
from one of three, or all three combined, wounds to his head. The
People cited Gudiel’s statement that while the others were
beating the victim with the bats, the victim was on the ground
trying to get up. “And then, you know, I went over there and I hit
him, hit him in the face, hit him twice toward his chest then in
the stomach.” “Whenever I got out of the car, I didn’t have shit
on me. I didn’t have fucking no weapons or nothing. So I
started—I started kicking him, and I socked him about three
times. And then, fucking that’s when I was like, man, fuck this.
I lifted up the bike and threw it and it hit him like his body
somewhere.” Gudiel confirmed that he threw the bike on the
victim when the victim was on the ground. The People argued
Gudiel’s role was to keep the victim on the ground while the
others used deadly weapons on him. Gudiel had also told
detectives that as a member of the gang, “If we see each other,
we’re going to want to kill each other.”
Relying on the testimony of the gang expert, Gudiel argued
that the assault was a “hit up,” that is, an encounter between
rival gang members that typically does not end up in any type of
altercation other than a fistfight. The trial court denied the
petition, finding that Gudiel aided and abetted an implied malice
murder because a perpetrator committed the life-endangering act
5
of hitting Maldonado on the head with a baseball bat; Gudiel
knew the perpetrator intended to commit that act; and Gudiel
specifically intended to aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission
of the act. 2
After argument, the trial court stated: “This is the court’s
decision: The first thing I’m going to indicate is that although I
was taken through a series of cases involving felony murder, I do
not think the felony murder cases involving [People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522]
apply to this case, and so I’m not going to apply them, because
there is no indication that they should be applied.
“The situation is that, while I also, I guess, factually
disagree with counsel, that we actually know what caused the
blunt—we don’t know what caused the blunt head trauma. It’s
very possible that the head injury, the blow to the head—because
the coroner, he said things were possible—could have actually
been caused by the bike being thrown on his body, and it could
have been the bike that hit him in the head, so I don’t really
know exactly where you’re coming from, that it’s absolutely clear
that the baseball bat . . . I will indicate that I believe one of the
co-defendants indicated he hit him in the head with the bat.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“Also, in describing this blow to the head, they said it was
similar to a skull fracture that you would see in a high speed
traffic collision. So if it was the bats that caused it, and he saw
2 The trial court made other findings which we need not
consider in light of our conclusion that substantial evidence
supports the finding that Gudiel aided and abetted an implied
malice murder.
6
this person on the ground with this injury from the bat hitting
him in the head so hard that it was like being in a high speed
traffic accident, he had to know that it was dangerous to do
anything further to this guy.
“He also had to know that his co-defendants—you did
articulate that he didn’t know his co-defendants were going to do
this dangerous thing. Well, they exited the car with bats, and
they hit this guy with incredible force, threw him off the bike, hit
him with bats, and he was a witness to this, because he comes in
at the end of the situation. So I disagree again with the
argument that he didn’t know that his co-defendants were violent
and they were going to do this thing, because he actually saw
them do it.
“Gudiel admits throwing the bike on Maldonado, that it hit
Maldonado’s body, and he only threw it once because it was so
heavy, so that suggests that that is a pretty dangerous act, to
throw a huge heavy bike on somebody while they’re on the
ground bleeding and having been hit in the head.
“He also said he hit him in his face while he was on his
back. And as pointed out by the D.A., and I have in my notes, he
was screaming in pain and he was bleeding. I also note that
someone said, and I guess it was Gudiel, that the bike landed on
the top of his body.
“So I believe that Gudiel did act with conscious disregard
for life; he joined the defendants who were beating Maldonado,
and his actual acts of punching the victim, throwing the bike,
were, in fact, dangerous. He disregarded the danger.
“I disagree again with the defense, that I’m not to consider
that he said, that as part of his loyalty or allegiance or his gang
culture, that he had prepared himself for the possibility he would
7
have to kill a rival gang member. He wanted to be a, quote, rider,
and not a punk. It’s my obvious conclusion that ‘rider’ means
someone who stands up for the gang and engages in this beating
kind of activity.
“And then he said:
“I knew there was just a matter of time before I would end
up in jail or dead.
“All of these statements, at least to the court, convey that
he was willing to take those steps necessary to take out a rival
gang member. So I wrote: ‘These statements, coupled with the
acts of Gudiel and the other defendants, convince the court
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gudiel entered into the
beat-down, either with the intent to kill or acted in conscious
disregard for the life of the victim.’
“Now, I agree with you, there is no express malice, because
nothing was said by him, and you can’t just derive from the
situation that they intended to kill him, but I disagree with you
that the theory of implied murder malice has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
“So I have concluded that the petitioner knew his
companions intended to commit a life endangering act. They had
bats. They immediately jumped on the victim. Petitioner
intended to aid them in the commission of that act, and did so by
punching the victim and throwing a heavy bike on him.
“He knew the act was dangerous to life because the victim
was screaming in pain and bleeding. And petitioner disregarded
the risk he entered in.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Gudiel] saw and heard this individual, Maldonado, being
hit with baseball bats by two of his friends, and he saw this
8
person fall to the floor. He saw him full of blood. He saw him
screaming in pain, and with all that, he joined in the melee, and,
therefore, he disregarded the risk to the life of Maldonado.”
The court concluded: “I want to further indicate that the
most significant argument that you made was that the defendant
was 18. I am required by law to consider that factor. I’m
supposed to decide whether his youth was such that he couldn’t
sort of engage in the findings, a conscious disregard for life and so
forth, and understand what he was doing. I’m unable to make—
I’m unable to find that the youth shows that he could not
entertain the requirements of implied malice. There’s too many
facts here that show he should have or he did know what was
going on, the screaming in pain, the fact of all the things he saw
the other people do to this individual; I believe he had to know
that his actions were in conscious disregard for life, that he had
to know that he was joining in the actions of his partners who
were engaging in endangering acts. And so although I considered
the youthful factors and the fact that someone doesn’t have the
same maturity, the same judgment and so forth . . . .
“The youth aspect is not enough to convince this court that
the defendant did not understand what he was doing and that I
should somehow change the result because of his youth.
“I believe he specifically intended to aid and abet his
perpetrators in committing the life endangering act. He knew
the commission of a life endangering act was dangerous to
human life, and I make all of those findings.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[I] believe the defendant thought he was carrying out his
mission in life; he was standing up for his gang, and if it involved
killing someone from a rival gang, he would do it. It’s possible
9
that they didn’t intend to kill him, but their actions, again, meet
the requirements of implied malice.
“I believe the People have produced a valid theory, and I’m
denying the petition for that reason.”
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill No. 1437
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) amended “the felony murder rule
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates
to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It accomplished this by amending
sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3; People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
Senate Bill 1437 also created former section 1170.95 (now
codified as section 1172.6), which set out a procedure by which
defendants convicted of murder under prior law may petition for
resentencing if they believe they could not be convicted of that
crime after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Petitions under section 1172.6 address
convictions where a defendant was not the killer but was held
vicariously liable on one of several theories of liability identified
in the statute. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 967.)
Once a petition is filed, after appointment of counsel and
briefing, the trial court assesses whether petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief. The prima facie inquiry is limited: the
10
court, accepting the petitioner’s factual allegations as true,
makes a “ ‘ “preliminary assessment” ’ ” whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if those allegations were proven.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In assessing whether a
defendant has made a prima facie case, the trial court is entitled
to review the record of conviction, which includes the jury
summations, jury instructions, verdict forms, and prior appellate
opinions. (Id. at pp. 971–972; People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (Lopez).) Although appellate opinions are
generally considered part of the record of conviction, the prima
facie bar was intentionally set very low and the probative value of
an appellate opinion is case specific; a trial court may not engage
in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise
of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.)
If the record establishes ineligibility for resentencing as a
matter of law, the petition is properly denied at the prima facie
stage. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.) However, the
petition and record must establish conclusively that the
defendant is ineligible for relief. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 14.) 3
At an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), the trial court sits as an independent
factfinder and determines whether the People have established
3 The People contend the trial court improperly found that a
prima facie case had been made. The People have provided no
record on this issue and never raised this objection at the trial
court. Given our conclusion that substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that Gudiel aided and abetted an implied
malice second degree murder, we find it unnecessary to reach the
issue.
11
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the
trial court’s factual findings at a section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Mitchell (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591.) In conducting this review, we must
consider the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) And
“we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence, whether
direct or circumstantial.” (Mitchell, at p. 591; accord, Brooks, at
pp. 57–58.)
B. Implied Malice Second Degree Murder
California law recognizes three theories of second degree
murder. These theories are: (1) unpremeditated murder with
express malice; (2) implied malice second degree murder; and
(3) second degree felony murder. (People v. Swain (1996)
12 Cal.4th 593, 601 (Swain).) The case before us is one of implied
malice second degree murder.
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).) Under an
implied malice theory of second degree murder, “the requisite
mental state for murder—malice aforethought—is by definition
‘implied,’ as a matter of law, from the specific intent to do some
act dangerous to human life together with the circumstance that a
killing has resulted from the doing of such act.” (Swain, supra,
12 Cal.4th at p. 603; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850
(Gentile) [a person without an express intent to aid a killing “can
12
still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows
that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts
with conscious disregard for life”].) Second degree implied malice
murder remains valid notwithstanding the recent changes
effected by Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775). (Gentile, at p. 850.)
Aiding and abetting an implied malice murder also remains
valid notwithstanding the changes effected by Senate Bill 1437
and Senate Bill 775. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850.) The
court in People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 explained the
elements as follows: “[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the
combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and
abettor’s own mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of implied
malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the
commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and
abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding
the commission of the life endangering act. Thus, to be liable for
an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by
words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act,
not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be
personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge
that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the
perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act
is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life.” (Powell, at pp. 712–713, fn. omitted.)
C. Analysis
Gudiel argues the evidence “does not support the court’s
conclusion that the throwing of the bike onto Maldonado’s body
was a proximate cause of his death.” He argues that his act of
throwing the bike must be proven as a “ ‘ “substantial factor
13
contributing to” ’ ” death and not “ ‘ “merely theoretical” ’ ” or
insignificant. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) Gudiel
strongly disputes that it was the bike that caused the blunt force
trauma that was the cause of death. The short answer to this is
that throwing the bike in and of itself need not be the actual
cause of Maldonado’s death. It suffices that Gudiel knew he was
aiding in a life-endangering attack by the bat-wielding
perpetrators that caused the victim to bleed profusely, knew
dangerous weapons, baseball bats, were being used against
Maldonado, and intended to stop Maldonado from escaping or
defending himself by incapacitating him further by punching and
kicking him and throwing the heavy bike on him as he lay prone
on the ground. Ensuring Maldonado was unable to escape or
defend himself helped the perpetrators complete their assault.
(People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443 [one of at least
eight gang members who participated in a vicious assault upon
the victim but who did not necessarily strike the fatal blow guilty
of second degree implied malice murder].) The evidence before
the trial court supports its finding that Gudiel knew his
codefendants, when they exited the car with baseball bats,
intended to commit life-threatening violence on the victim, saw
them beating the victim with those bats, and, with conscious
disregard for Maldonado’s life, intended to aid the violence by
punching and kicking the victim and then throwing the heavy
bicycle on him as he lay prone on the ground, bleeding profusely
and screaming in pain.
Appellant contends the trial court should have applied
People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, because “reckless
indifference to human life” under section 190.2, subdivision (d), is
14
“similar” to the conscious disregard for human life that is the
critical element of second degree murder. We do not agree.
These concepts have been separately and distinctly
analyzed and applied in our jurisprudence for decades. “Reckless
indifference” is a finding necessary for death penalty eligibility in
felony murder cases. “Conscious disregard” is an element of the
crime of aiding and abetting an implied malice second degree
murder. Each has its own function and purpose.
As the People point out, the reckless indifference standard
for felony murder special circumstances is qualitatively different
than the conscious disregard standard for implied malice second
degree murder. The reckless indifference standard actually
requires a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than
the conscious disregard for human life standard. (People v.
Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 126, fn. 2; People v.
Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 317; People v. Johnson
(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1285.) That is reason enough not to
combine them into one analytical framework. The trial court did
not err in refusing the invitation to apply Clark. We decline the
invitation as well.
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
STRATTON, P. J.
I concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
16
WILEY, J., Concurring.
I join in the majority result and opinion, except for the final
discussion of “reckless indifference to human life” and “conscious
disregard for human life.” This final discussion suggests these
phrases have different meanings.
In my view, these phrases have the same meaning:
conscious disregard for human life is equivalent to reckless
indifference to human life.
When explaining the latter phrase, our Supreme Court
used the words of the former phrase: “conscious disregard.”
(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 617 (Clark).) When the
same words define two phrases, this suggests the two phrases
have the same meaning.
Both phrases expound the same core concept: recklessness.
Many acts satisfy both phrases. (Cf. People v. Knoller (2007)
41 Cal.4th 139, 158 [owner consciously decided to bring a vicious
unmuzzled 150-pound dog into contact with other people,
knowing that the dog was aggressive and highly dangerous and
that the owner could not control the dog]; Commonwealth v.
Malone (Pa. 1946) 47 A.2d 445, 447-449 [affirming reckless
murder conviction for a Russian roulette killing where the
shooter pointed the gun at a consenting friend].)
I have yet to learn of an example, however, where someone
identifies conduct that would satisfy one phrase but not the
other. I doubt there is such an example. Absent a concrete
example, it is hard to see any practical difference between
conscious disregard for human life and reckless indifference to
human life.
1
The Clark decision built the Model Penal Code’s definition
of recklessness into California state law. (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 617 & fn.73.)
The trial court’s analysis in this case satisfied Clark.
Gudiel acted with reckless indifference to human life. In other
words, he acted with conscious disregard for human life. Under
Clark, the trial court was right to deny Gudiel’s petition. (See
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-623.)
Gudiel displayed a high level of participation. (See Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 [the greater the participation, the
more likely that defendant acted with reckless indifference to
human life].)
Gudiel saw two fellow gang members knocking Maldonado to
the ground and beating him with bats. The blows were full force:
one bat shattered when it hit Maldonado’s head. Maldonado was
screaming with pain. Gudiel joined the violent assault and began
kicking and punching Maldonado to keep him on the ground.
Gudiel sought to maximize the risk of violence to Maldonado.
Rather than restrain the attack or aid the victim, Gudiel
searched for a weapon. He chose Maldonado’s bicycle, which
Gudiel said was so heavy that he could lift it and throw it onto
Maldonado only once.
The beating continued until Maldonado “had blood all over
him” and the injuries were so severe as to cause his death. The
15-to-20 second duration of the attack did not reduce its
recklessness. Gudiel saw they were using clubs to the head. He
joined in with unbridled force and did his best to improvise a
weapon from materials at hand.
Gudiel knew his fellow gang members’ propensity for
violence against rival gang members. His attitude was that,
2
when he joined the gang, he knew he would have to kill a rival
gang member. He said “[t]hat’s how it is” in a gang.
In one lone sentence, the trial court said it saw no need to
apply the Clark case.
That one sentence might have been error, but any assumed
error was harmless. The trial court effectively did apply the
Clark decision.
I disagree with the last three substantive paragraphs of the
majority opinion, but we reach the same ultimate destination by
different roads: we must affirm the order.
WILEY, J.
3
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