George v. Hartman CA6

CourtListener 10304577CalctappDec 26, 2024

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Filed 12/26/24 George v. Hartman CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KOSHY PUTHUKKERIL GEORGE, H050941
(Santa Clara County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21CH010234)

v.

ERIC FLOYD HARTMAN,

Appellant.

THE COURT1
Eric Floyd Hartman appeals from the trial court’s grant of Koshy Puthukkeril
George’s request to modify the existing civil harassment restraining order protecting
George from Hartman. Hartman argues that the trial court had neither personal nor
subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the request. He makes this argument based on his
contention that George moved from his residence.
Hartman fails to make reasoned argument or cite relevant authority to support his
theory. Further, we note that the trial court already had jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter of the action and, moreover, the record reflects that George moved
back to his home. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order modifying the civil
harassment restraining order.

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Before Greenwood, P. J., Grover, J., and Danner, J.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
The trial court originally issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) in August
2021 on George’s ex parte request for a civil harassment restraining order and temporary
restraining order against Hartman. The court ultimately granted a restraining order, with
an expiration date of December 16, 2023.
A different panel of this court previously adjudicated two appeals arising from the
civil harassment case. (George v. Hartman (Nov. 9, 2023, H049735, H049886) [nonpub.
opn.].) Both of those appeals were filed by Hartman, and we considered them together.3
The prior appeals challenged (1) the trial court’s order granting George’s petition for a
civil harassment restraining order after a hearing that took place more than 25 days after
the court’s ex parte issuance of a TRO; and (2) the order granting George’s motion for
attorney fees. Hartman disputed the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue the orders. We
concluded the procedural defects raised by Hartman did not divest the court of
jurisdiction, and we affirmed the orders.
In February 2023, the trial court heard George’s motion to amend the civil
harassment restraining order. In the motion, George did not request an extension as to
the duration of the order, but he did request that the court order Hartman to “[c]omply
with all terms and conditions of the December 13, 2021 entered [o]rder.” He also
requested that the court order Hartman to further refrain from a number of specified
actions, such as honking the horn of his car as he passed by George’s home, putting tarps

2
We omit the underlying factual allegations, which are not material to Hartman’s
appeal. We deny George’s motion to augment the record on appeal with several
declarations filed in support of the motion to renew the civil harassment restraining order.
The declarations were filed in September 2023 and therefore were not before the trial
court at the time the court granted the request to modify the civil harassment restraining
order in February 2023. (Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622,
632 [“As a general rule, documents not before the trial court cannot be included as part of
the record on appeal and thus must be disregarded as beyond the scope of appellate
review.”].)
3
We derive a portion of the procedural history from the opinion in those appeals.

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over George’s mailbox, leaving debris on George’s driveway, harassing potential
purchasers of George’s property as well as realtors, agents, and potential occupants of the
house, posting harassing signs, blocking an easement and service of garbage and recycle
bins, and “[d]irectly talking to and harassing protected persons.” George further
requested that Hartman be ordered to refrain from “encouraging, directing, or assisting
others in doing those actions that he is precluded from doing.” Hartman did not appear at
the hearing.
The court granted the motion, stating in the minute order that the evidence
submitted “is not only clear and convincing evidence of continuing harassment and the
need for modification, but that it is overwhelming and not disputed.” The trial court
stated that Hartman had provided no “justification or explanation for his perplexing and
disturbing behavior,” and that there were “several proceedings involving Mr. Hartman
including multiple criminal prosecutions for violation of the restraining order in this
action.” The court continued: “The Court expected that the order was sufficient to tell an
adult to play nicely and not be a jerk, but that . . . appears not to be the case with Mr.
Hartman, that Mr. Hartman has taken multiple opportunities seeking to get around the
express provisions of the restraining order. Mr. Hartman has continued to act as a bully.”
The court also stated that “there is clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hartman’s
response in his CH-620 filing shows disturbing thinking, and especially so considering
that Mr. Hartman is an attorney.” In addition to granting the request to modify the civil
harassment restraining order, the trial court granted George’s request for attorney fees up
to a maximum of $15,000, with the specific amount to be set following receipt of a
declaration from George’s counsel.
Hartman timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Hartman argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its order
modifying the civil harassment restraining order is “void ab initio” because George had

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previously sold and moved out of his residence and moved to a different home at an
undisclosed address. Hartman appears to contend that the order to modify is void
because it only pertains to George’s former residence as the civil harassment restraining
order is “in personam” and not “in rem” so the trial court lost jurisdiction after George
moved.4 For reasons we discuss, these arguments are without merit.
A. Jurisdiction
The principles of appellate review are long-established. “[I]t is a fundamental
principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be
correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, based on the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609, citing Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
To demonstrate error, “[a]n appellant must provide an argument and legal
authority to support his contentions. This burden requires more than a mere assertion that
the judgment is wrong.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836,
852.) “It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment
and defeat the presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat
the point as waived.” (Ibid.)
Hartman provides no coherent argument or citation to authority for the proposition
that the trial court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction when it ruled on
the request to modify the restraining order. He includes in his opening brief general legal
principles and definitions for personal and subject matter jurisdiction, but fails to make
any logical argument as to why such jurisdiction is missing in this case, other than
asserting that George moved to a different residence. As a result, he has forfeited his

4
Although it is somewhat unclear from his briefs, Hartman does not appear to be
challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction on this ground as to the original restraining order.

4
argument challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. (County of Sacramento v. Singh
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 870.)
Even if we consider the merits of the argument, the issue here is straightforward.
Jurisdiction in this matter was established when the trial court granted the original civil
harassment restraining order and “[j]urisdiction of the court over the parties and the
subject matter of an action continues throughout subsequent proceedings in the action.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50; see also Maloney v. Maloney (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 278, 280
[“Numerous decisions are reported in support of the proposition that where jurisdiction of
the person or of the res has once attached it is not defeated by the removal of the person
or of the res beyond the jurisdiction of the court.”]; see also Goldman v. Simpson (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 255, 264 [once court has acquired “fundamental” jurisdiction over the
parties, this jurisdiction continues to final judgment and in subsequent proceedings
incidental thereto].)
Finally, even if we were to accept Hartman’s premise that the trial court somehow
lost jurisdiction after George changed his residence, the trial court made the factual
finding that, although George and his family moved out from their home in January 2022,
they later moved back into it. Hartman does not contest this. Indeed, the record does not
support Hartman’s assertion that George sold the home. Rather, the trial court made
factual findings that George was unable to either rent or sell the property because
Hartman harassed potential tenants, George’s broker, agents working for the broker, and
potential purchasers.
Hartman’s appeal lacks any support in the record or the law, and we thus affirm
the trial court’s order.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to George.

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