People v. Harris CA1/3

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Filed 12/24/24 P. v. Harris CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169862
v.
NOAH MICHAEL HARRIS, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
No. 01001961580)
Defendant and Appellant.

In this court’s prior nonpublished opinion, People v. Harris (Aug. 18,
2023, A164007) we reversed defendant Noah Michael Harris’s conviction for
attempted murder. On remand, the trial court entered a modified judgment
for attempted voluntary manslaughter and resentenced Harris. Harris now
asserts the trial court erred by failing to obtain a supplemental probation
report prior to resentencing. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an information
charging Harris with attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664;
count 1); elder or dependent abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1); count 2); assault with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3); dissuading a witness from
testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); count 4); and making criminal threats (§ 422,

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
subd. (a); count 5). The information alleged Harris inflicted great bodily
injury upon an elderly victim during the commission of counts 1 and 3
(§ 12022.7, subd. (c)), and he used a deadly weapon during the commission of
counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information further asserted
Harris had two prior felony convictions, which impacted his eligibility for
probation (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)). These charges arose from an incident during
which Harris threw a rock at the victim’s car, Harris and the victim engaged
in a “heated verbal altercation,” the victim drove his car toward Harris before
stopping, and Harris “cut the side of the victim’s neck,” resulting in serious
injury. (People v. Harris, supra, A164007.)
A jury convicted Harris on all counts and found true the great bodily
injury enhancement on count 3. The trial court sentenced Harris to an
aggregate term of nine years in state prison.
On appeal, this court reversed Harris’s conviction for attempted
murder due to instructional error. (People v. Harris, supra, A164007.) We
remanded the matter and provided the district attorney with the option of
either retrying appellant or accepting a modification of the judgment to
reflect a conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter. (Ibid.) The
district attorney elected to not refile the attempted murder charge.
Accordingly, the court modified the judgment to reflect a conviction of
attempted voluntary manslaughter.
In advance of the resentencing hearing, Harris submitted a sentencing
memorandum recommending three alternative sentencing options:
(1) probation with drug treatment and mental health services; (2) three years
in state prison; or (3) behavioral health court. The district attorney
requested the court reimpose Harris’s nine-year sentence.

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Following the parties’ arguments at the resentencing hearing, the trial
court denied Harris’s request and instead imposed an aggregate term of eight
years in state prison. Harris timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Harris argues his sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded
because the trial court failed to obtain a supplemental probation report prior
to resentencing. Harris asserts the approximate two-year gap between the
original probation report and his resentencing, combined with the impact of
his mental illness, necessitated a new probation report. We disagree.
“[A] probation report is not necessarily required if a defendant is
statutorily ineligible for probation . . . .” (People v. Dobbins (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 176, 180 (Dobbins).) In such cases, the court has discretion to
decide whether a probation report should be provided. (People v. Bullock
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985, 989.) “This is not to say a probation report may
not be helpful to a court on resentencing.” (Ibid.) “There may be compelling
reasons for ordering a probation report even when the defendant is ineligible
for probation. The defendant’s postconviction behavior and other possible
developments remain relevant to the trial court’s consideration upon
resentencing. Still, in many cases obtaining a new report will be a
meaningless exercise. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate the
need for an updated report, with the input of counsel.” (Id. at p. 990.) “We
review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Knowles
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 764.)
As an initial matter, the Attorney General asserts Harris forfeited this
claim because he did not ask for a probation report or object to proceeding
without one at the resentencing hearing. As relevant here, trial courts are
only required to request a presentence investigation report where the

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defendant is eligible for probation or “if a significant period of time has
passed since the original report was prepared.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.411(a)(1)(B), (a)(2); Pen. Code, § 1203, subds. (b) & (g).) While couched in
mandatory language, the rule requiring a supplemental report due to the
passage of time has been interpreted as only requiring a supplemental
probation report when the defendant is eligible for probation. (People v.
Franco (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 831, 834 fn. 21 [“rule 4.411(c) requires a
supplemental report only if the defendant is eligible for probation.”]; People v.
Johnson (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1432 [decided under former rule
411(c)].) Accordingly, the failure by a probation-ineligible defendant to
request a supplemental probation report or object to proceeding without one
results in a “waiver of a supplemental report in the trial court and forfeiture
of the right to object to the absence of such a report on appeal.” (Franco, at
p. 834.) While the court had discretion to order a supplemental report, the
court’s decision not to order a new probation report was not error.
In response, Harris argues the forfeiture rules do not apply because he
was not “unequivocally ineligible” for probation but only “presumptively
ineligible.” He fails to cite any authority supporting his claim that this
distinction is meaningful. And California Rule of Court, rule 4.413 suggests
otherwise. Subdivision (b) provides that if a defendant is presumptively
ineligible for probation, “the court should apply the criteria in [subdivision]
(c) to evaluate whether the statutory limitation on probation is overcome.”
Only once this hurdle is met should the court “apply the criteria in rule 4.414
to decide whether to grant probation.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.413(b).)
Accordingly, if a court concludes the statutory limitation on probation is not
overcome, then a defendant is not eligible for probation, and the rules

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requiring a probation report for probation-eligible defendants are not
triggered.
Harris does not argue he was found eligible for probation. Nor does
Harris argue the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find that
Harris overcame the presumption against probation eligibility. To the
contrary, the trial court explicitly stated, “probation is in no way . . .
warranted in this case” due to the severity of the injuries Harris inflicted on
the victim. Accordingly, Harris was not eligible for probation and forfeited
any right to a supplemental probation report by failing to object or request
such a report. “A defendant should not be allowed to stand silent when the
court proceeds without a supplemental probation report, gamble that a trial
court will impose a lesser term of imprisonment and then urge reversal for
the failure to obtain the report without being required to make some showing
that he was prejudiced thereby.” (People v. Begnaud (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d
1548, 1556, fn. 7.)
Even if Harris had not forfeited his objection, we would conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Harris without obtaining
a supplemental probation report. On this issue, we find Dobbins, supra, 127
Cal.App.4th 176 instructive. While Dobbins involved a harmless error
analysis because the defendant in that matter was eligible for probation, we
find the reasoning relevant to the question of whether the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to request a supplemental probation report.
In Dobbins, the Third District Court of Appeal concluded the trial
court’s failure to obtain a supplemental probation report prior to sentencing
did not result in reversable error. (Dobbins, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at
p. 183.) The court explained, “The original probation report apprised the trial
court of defendant’s background and other relevant information. And his

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record was such (including as it did numerous parole violations and periods of
incarceration) that there was little justification for a further grant of
probation. . . . The judge who sentenced defendant was the same judge who
presided over the trial and was thus intimately acquainted with the facts
underlying his violation of probation, which involved use of a weapon.
Considering these circumstances, there is no reason to believe that additional
information would have led to reinstatement of probation.”
Similar reasoning applies here. The probation report prepared in
advance of Harris’s original sentencing presented evidence to the court
regarding Harris’s history of mental illness and substance abuse. That
report also set forth Harris’s record of probation violations and prior
convictions, as well as his conduct while in detention pending sentencing.
And the resentencing judge was the same judge that conducted the original
sentencing hearing; as such, she was familiar with the facts and
recommendations contained in the original probation report. Moreover,
Harris submitted a sentencing memorandum prior to resentencing which
further discussed his mental health issues, and nothing in the record
indicates the court did not consider his submission. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing Harris without first
obtaining a supplemental probation report.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
FUJISAKI, ACTING P. J.

_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Harris/A169862

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