CourtListener 10297220•Haluska v. CoStar Realty Information CA4/1
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Filed 12/19/24 Haluska v. CoStar Realty Information CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GREGORY HALUSKA, D083499
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00020303-CU-OE-CTL)
COSTAR REALTY INFORMATION,
INC. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Katherine A. Bacal, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with instructions.
Proskauer Rose, Gregory W. Knopp, Philippe A. Lebel, and Jennifer J.
McDermott for Defendants and Appellants.
Blanchard, Krasner & French, David C. Hawkes; Law Offices of
David A. Huch, David A. Huch; Matcha Law and Stephen Matcha for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
CoStar Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Costar Realty Information, Inc.
(together, CoStar) appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to compel
arbitration of Gregory Haluska’s class claims.
The Terms and Conditions of Employment and Agreement to Arbitrate
Controversies (the Agreement)1 Haluska signed when he began working for
CoStar contains terms requiring arbitration of controversies. This language
includes a “Class, Collective, and Representative Action Waiver” (the Waiver)
wherein the parties agreed that “covered claims must be brought on an
individual basis only, and arbitration on an individual basis is the exclusive
remedy.” Haluska nonetheless filed a lawsuit, alleging three claims on behalf
of himself, a putative class, and a putative subclass, as well as one claim
pursuant to the Private Attorney General’s Act of 2004 (a PAGA claim).
In ruling on CoStar’s subsequent motion to compel arbitration, the
court acknowledged authority holding that a party may not waive
representative PAGA claims. This rendered the Waiver unenforceable as to
the representative, or non-individual, portion of the PAGA claim. However,
the court went on to interpret the last portion of the Waiver as containing a
“poison pill” provision that rendered the entire arbitration agreement
unenforceable. CoStar contends the court erred in so interpreting the Waiver
language.
We agree. Therefore, we affirm the order to the extent the court denied
CoStar’s motion to compel arbitration of Haluska’s PAGA claim but otherwise
reverse the order. But, because the court did not reach Haluska’s additional
arguments that the Agreement was unconscionable, we do not order the court
to immediately grant CoStar’s motion as to the remaining three claims.
1 We have defined “Agreement” as it is defined in the Agreement itself.
2
Instead, we remand with directions to address these unconscionability
arguments, if Haluska still wishes to assert them.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
The Agreement and Lawsuit
Haluska began working at Homes.com in 2019 as an inside sales
representative. In 2021, CoStar acquired the parent company of Homes.com.
Immediately thereafter, Haluska executed the Agreement. Haluska does not
dispute that he signed the Agreement.
Section 5.10 of the Agreement contains subsections governing the
“Arbitration of Controversies.” Subsection (a) provides that, “[i]n the event of
any dispute, claim or controversy cognizable in a court of law between
[CoStar] and [Haluska] concerning any aspect of the employment
relationship, including disputes upon termination, the parties agree to
submit such dispute to final and binding arbitration before a single arbitrator
pursuant to the provisions of the American Arbitration Association’s
Employment Dispute Resolution Procedures.” The subsection further states
that “[t]he parties acknowledge that this mutual requirement to arbitrate
disputes applies to claims . . . [under] federal, state, or local law, ordinance,
or regulation, or based on any public policy, contract, tort, or common law or
any claim for costs, fees, or other expenses including attorney’s fees.”
Subsection (b) of section 5.10 lists excluded claims, including “claims
which are not subject to arbitration or pre-dispute arbitration agreements
pursuant to federal law, but only to the extent federal law prohibits
enforcement of the Agreement with respect to such claims.” It goes on to
explain: “To the extent federal law prohibits enforcement of the
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representative action waiver (discussed in section 5.10(c) below) with respect
to representative claims under California’s Private Attorneys General Act
of 2004, California Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq. . . . such claims also are not
covered by this Agreement.”
Subsection (c) contains the Waiver, which states in full:
“The parties agree that covered claims must be brought on an
individual basis only, and arbitration on an individual basis is
the exclusive remedy. No arbitrator has authority to
consolidate claims or proceed with arbitration on multi-
plaintiff, class, collective, or representative basis. Should such
a claim be initiated in the arbitral forum, the arbitrator shall
summarily reject it as beyond the scope of this Agreement.
Any disputes concerning the applicability or validity of this
waiver shall be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction,
not by the arbitrator. In the event a court determines that
this waiver is unenforceable with respect to any claim, this
waiver shall not apply to that claim, and that claim may only
proceed in court as the exclusive forum.”
Section 5.3 of the Agreement comprises a severability clause expressing
the parties’ intent to enforce the provisions of the Agreement “to the fullest
extent permissible under applicable laws and public policies.” It provides
that:
“ . . . if any term or provision of this Agreement or any portion
thereof is declared illegal or unenforceable by any court of
competent jurisdiction, such provision or portion thereof shall
be deemed modified so as to render it enforceable, and to the
extent such provision or portion thereof cannot be rendered
enforceable, this Agreement shall be considered divisible as to
such provision which shall become null and void, leaving the
remainder of this Agreement in full force and effect.”
In May 2022, Haluska filed a complaint in San Diego Superior Court
alleging individual and class claims for failure to pay overtime wages in
violation of Labor Code sections 510 and 1194, failure to provide accurate
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itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code sections 226 and 226.3,
and unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200, et seq. The fourth cause of action was for
violation of Labor Code section 2698, et seq.—the PAGA claim.
II.
CoStar’s Motion to Compel
CoStar moved to compel arbitration of Haluska’s claims on an
individual basis pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C.
§§ 2−4 (1947)) and to dismiss the putative class and representative PAGA
claims. In his original opposition to CoStar’s motion to compel, Haluska
argued only that the arbitration provisions of the Agreement were
unconscionable.
The court continued the hearing on the motion to permit additional,
simultaneous briefing regarding the impact of Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 (Adolph). In his supplemental
brief, Haluska submitted that Adolph reinforced the California Supreme
Court’s prior holding in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 regarding PAGA claims that “an arbitration agreement
purporting to waive an employee’s non-individual claims is unenforceable as
a matter of state law.” (Adolph, at p. 1118.) Because the Waiver
encompassed Haluska’s representative PAGA claims, Haluska argued it was
invalid. Further, Haluska asserted that the Waiver was non-severable and,
thus, the entire agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable.
In response, CoStar argued the Agreement required Haluska to
arbitrate his first three causes of action on an individual basis in addition to
his individual PAGA claim. It requested the court stay the representative
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PAGA claim pending a finding by the arbitrator that Haluska was, indeed, an
“aggrieved employee,” as required by Adolph.
III.
The Court’s Ruling
Following oral argument, the court denied CoStar’s motion to compel.
The court found that CoStar had presented sufficient evidence that the FAA
governed the parties’ Agreement and that Haluska apparently had conceded
as much. It then agreed with Haluska’s argument that the language from
the last line of section 5.10, subsection (c) stating that, “In the event a court
determines that this waiver is unenforceable with respect to any claim, this
waiver shall not apply to that claim, and that claim may only proceed in court
as the exclusive forum” was a “poison pill” provision that rendered the
Agreement unenforceable. The court explained:
“A ‘poison pill’ effectively prevents the Court from sending a
plaintiff’s ‘ “individual” claims under PAGA (representing the
State of California but pursuing “individual” remedies based
on the plaintiff’s status as a former employee) to arbitration,
while allowing litigation in court of her [or his]
“representative” claims under PAGA, which involve the rights
of other “aggrieved employees.” ’ Westmoreland v. Kindercare
Education LLC (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 967, 982
[(Westmoreland)] (holding that such a provision rendered an
arbitration agreement invalid and so defendant must litigate
all of the plaintiff’s claims in court).
“Had defendants only included a waiver of class and
representative claims in its arbitration agreement, and not
included this poison pill at the end, the result could have been
substantially similar to Viking River and many decisions that
follow it. But in light of the drafting decisions made to the
arbitration agreement and its waiver provision, the agreement
is unenforceable and so defendants must litigate all of
Haluska’s claims in court.”
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In light of this conclusion, the court did not reach the parties’ additional
arguments regarding Haluska’s contentions that the Agreement was
unconscionable.
DISCUSSION
I.
Poison Pill Provision
The “FAA’s primary purpose [is] ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” (Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (1989) 489
U.S. 468, 479.) Generally, arbitration agreements are interpreted using state
contract law principles. (Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
233, 244; Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
1056, 1070–1071.) Where, as here, the arbitration agreement dictates that
the laws of the State of California shall govern disputes, we apply California
rules of contract interpretation. (See Sandquist, at p. 244.)
The court’s interpretation of the final sentence of the Waiver as
constituting a “poison pill” justifying denial of CoStar’s motion to compel
arbitration was a decision of law. Accordingly, we review the ruling de novo.
(Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 686; see also
Harshad & Nasir Corp. v. Global Sign Systems, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
523, 543–544 [“Where, as here, the language of the arbitration agreement is
not in dispute and the arbitrability determination was not based on the
credibility of extrinsic evidence, the applicable standard is de novo”]; Truck
Ins. Exchange v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 67, 91
[interpretation of a contract is a question of law subject to independent
review].)
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CoStar contends that, after finding the Waiver unenforceable only in
part (as to the representative PAGA claim), the court was required to
determine the effect of this finding under the Agreement’s express language.
The Waiver subsection provides: “In the event a court determines that this
waiver is unenforceable with respect to any claim, this waiver shall not apply
to that claim, and that claim may only proceed in court as the exclusive
forum.” CoStar reads this provision as meaning the Waiver is only
unenforceable as to “that claim” (again, the representative PAGA claim), and
as requiring only that the representative PAGA claim proceed in court.
In evaluating this assertion, we look to how the terms in this provision
are used in the Agreement as a whole and attempt to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract was formed. (TRB
Investments, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 19, 27.) Under
California law, “[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give
effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret
the other.” (Civ. Code, § 1641.) “The language of a contract is to govern its
interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an
absurdity.” (Id., § 1638.) Here, section 5.10, subsection (a) of the Agreement
begins by requiring that “In the event of any dispute, claim or controversy
cognizable in a court of law between [CoStar] and [Haluska] concerning any
aspect of the employment relationship, including disputes upon termination,
the parties agree to submit such dispute to final and binding arbitration . . . .”
(Italics added.) It then clarifies that “this mutual requirement to arbitrate
disputes applies to claims for misappropriation of trade secrets” (italics
added) and those based on “any other federal, state, or local law . . . .” The
parties further agreed that this duty to arbitrate extends to “disputes”
between Haluska and the company’s officers, directors, employees, and
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agents that arise out of his employment. Subsection (b) lists “[e]xcluded
claims.” Finally, subsection (c) sets forth the parties’ agreement that
“covered claims” (italics added) must be arbitrated on an individual basis.
Our interpretation of the plain language of the Agreement is that it
refers to the overall issue Haluska has with CoStar as a “dispute,” which led
to a lawsuit. The causes of action set forth in the lawsuit, or raised as part of
the “dispute,” are referred to as “claims.” The parties then must look to
section 5.10, subsections (a) and (b) to determine which claims are covered
and which are excluded. Those that are “covered claims” must be submitted
to arbitration on an individual basis. Thus, it follows that the last sentence
of subsection (c) should be construed as equating “claims” with Haluska’s
causes of action. In other words, it requires that, if a court determines the
waiver is unenforceable as to any one cause of action, the waiver does not
apply to that cause of action only, and only that cause of action may proceed
in court.
This interpretation is in keeping with the language and intent of the
severability clause of the Agreement. That clause expresses “the desire and
intent of the parties that the provisions of this Agreement shall be enforced to
the fullest extent permissible under applicable laws and public policies.” In
furtherance of this intent, the severability clause states that, “if any term or
provision of this Agreement or any portion thereof is declared illegal or
unenforceable by any court of competent jurisdiction, such provision or
portion thereof shall be deemed modified so as to render it enforceable, and to
the extent such provision or portion thereof cannot be rendered enforceable,
this Agreement shall be considered divisible as to such provision which shall
become null and void, leaving the remainder of this Agreement in full force
and effect.” (Italics added.) Once again, this clause supports a construction
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of the overall contract as intending to sever only a provision or portion
deemed unenforceable while enforcing the remainder of the Agreement.
This contrasts with the language of the arbitration agreement
addressed in Westmoreland, which the order suggests the court found
analogous to this case. There, the employee signed a similar arbitration
agreement governed by the FAA. (Westmoreland, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 971.) The agreement defined what types of claims were covered and
excluded and contained comparable provisions governing severance and
waiver of class and collective claims. (Id. at pp. 971–972.) However, the so-
called “poison pill” in Westmoreland is distinguishable in that it provided
“that if the Waiver of Class and Collective Claims is found to be
unenforceable, then this agreement is invalid and any claim brought on a
class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and such court shall be the exclusive forum for such
claims.” (Id. at p. 972, italics added.)
As in the instant case, Westmoreland had filed a complaint asserting
individual and class claims, as well as individual and representative PAGA
claims. (Westmoreland, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 979–980.) The court
commented that, “[i]n the absence of the poison pill provision, Kindercare
could have compelled arbitration of Westmoreland’s non-PAGA claims on
behalf of herself alone . . . [and] could also have compelled Westmoreland to
waive class claims against it.” (Id. at p. 980.) However, the court viewed the
poison pill provision as “an unambiguous expression of the parties’ intent to
avoid parallel litigation before an arbitrator and before a court.” (Id. at
p. 979.) Thus, because the waiver clause conflicted with applicable law on
PAGA claims and expressly provided that, in that scenario, the “agreement is
10
invalid,” the court concluded Kindercare must litigate all of Westmoreland’s
claims in court. (Id. at pp. 980, 982.)
Unlike the poison pill in Westmoreland, the final sentence of
section 5.10, subsection (c) in the instant Agreement contains no language
invalidating the Agreement as a whole, nor does it suggest an intent to avoid
parallel litigation. Instead, in keeping with the severability clause, it
provides only that if the waiver is deemed unenforceable as to any particular
claim, the “waiver shall not apply to that claim, and that claim” (italics
added) must proceed in court. To the extent the intent of the parties can be
gleaned from subsection (c), it suggests the goal was to prevent any class or
representative actions from proceeding before an arbitrator. Thus, we
conclude the variance between the language in the arbitration agreement
here and that in Westmoreland dictates different outcomes.
We are not persuaded by Haluska’s arguments that portions of the
Agreement are ambiguous or rendered so by CoStar’s interpretation. Most
notably, he contends that section 5.10, subsection (b)’s citation to federal law
creates uncertainty as to the meaning of the last sentence of subsection (c).
Subsection (b) explains that “[t]o the extent federal law prohibits enforcement
of the representative action waiver (discussed in section 5.10(c) below) with
respect to representative claims under California’s Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004, California Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq. . . . such claims also are
not covered by this Agreement.” Haluska believes this provision, which only
contemplates a situation in which federal law bars enforcement of the
Waiver, conflicts with CoStar’s reading of the last sentence of the Waiver.
We disagree. The cited provision regarding federal law simply sets forth a
category of “excluded claims.” At the time the parties entered the agreement,
it apparently was foreseeable under the then current state of the law that
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federal law might invalidate the Waiver as to a PAGA claim. However, that
does not make the agreement ambiguous as to other legal impediments to
enforcement of the waiver that were not foreseeable at that time. The
language from subsection (b) of section 5.10 does not in any way render less
clear the severance clause or the instruction that “[i]n the event a court
determines that this waiver is unenforceable with respect to any claim, this
waiver shall not apply to that claim, and that claim may only proceed in court
as the exclusive forum.” If anything, although we recognize the court here
apparently found enforcement of the representative PAGA claim prohibited
by California, not federal law, this provision demonstrates the parties’
mutual intent that when the Waiver is deemed unenforceable as to
representative PAGA claims, only “such claims” should be considered not
covered by the Agreement. Other claims, such as the putative class claims,
thus presumably are still to be considered “covered by this Agreement.”
On a final note, we observe that, following Adolph, CoStar may have
persuasively argued that it was entitled to compel Haluska’s individual
PAGA claim to arbitration even though the representative claim must be
pursued in court. (See Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1123 [holding that
“where a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-
individual claims, an order compelling arbitration of individual claims does
not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims in Court”].)
However, it does not appear CoStar has requested on appeal to bifurcate the
PAGA claim. It asks us only to reverse the court’s order as to Haluska’s class
claims (specifying in its conclusion that it refers to “Haluska’s non-PAGA
claims (i.e., the first, second, and third causes of action)” while acknowledging
that “Haluska may pursue his entire PAGA claim in Court.” Therefore, we
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reverse the order denying the motion to compel arbitration as to Haluska’s
first, second, and third causes of action only.
II.
Unconscionability
Haluska also argued below that the Agreement was procedurally and
substantively unconscionable for a variety of reasons and, thus, void. On this
basis, he asked the court to deny CoStar’s motion to compel arbitration.
The court did not reach Haluska’s unconscionability arguments. On
appeal, Haluska requests that, should we reverse the court’s decision, we
address these arguments and find the Agreement unconscionable and void.
“Unconscionability is . . . a question of law for the court, although factual
issues may bear on that determination.” (Baker v. Osborne Development
Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884, 892 citing Civ. Code, § 1670.5 [“When it is
claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the
court in making the determination” before the court determines whether to
enforce the clause or contract].) Because the determination may thus turn on
the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn
from the evidence, and we have no record to review on appeal, we remand the
matter to the trial court to decide these issues in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed to the extent the court denied CoStar’s motion to
compel arbitration of Haluska’s PAGA claim and reversed as to Haluska’s
first three causes of action. However, because the court did not reach
Haluska’s additional arguments that the Agreement was unconscionable, we
do not order the court to immediately enter an order granting CoStar’s
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motion as to the three putative class claims. Instead, we remand with
instructions to address these unconscionability arguments, if Haluska still
wishes to assert them.
CoStar is entitled to its costs on appeal.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
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