CourtListener 10296509•People v. Johnson CA1/4
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Filed 12/18/24 P. v. Johnson CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A169510
v. (Alameda County
SHIHEIM JOHNSON, Super. Ct. No. 612650)
Defendant and
Appellant.
A jury convicted Shiheim Johnson of first degree felony
murder with a firearm use enhancement, second degree robbery
with a firearm use enhancement, and two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm. The trial court found true a prior strike
allegation. At sentencing, the trial court struck the prior strike
and firearm enhancements and sentenced Johnson to 25 years to
life for the murder count, a consecutive five years for the robbery
count, and concurrent sentences on the firearm possession
counts. In a prior appeal, we reversed the sentence on the
robbery count because a legislative amendment to Penal Code1
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
Citations to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
1
section 1170, subdivision (b) (section 1170(b)) operated
retroactively and created a presumption of a middle term for all
sentences and a low term presumption when an offender’s
childhood trauma is a contributing factor to an offense. (People v.
Johnson (Sept. 30, 2022, A158418) [nonpub. opn.]; § 1170(b)(2) &
(6)(A).) On remand, the trial court imposed a middle term
sentence of three years on the robbery count. Johnson again
appeals, arguing the trial court failed to properly apply the low
term presumption in section 1170(b)(6) and failed to recalculate
his custody credits. We agree and therefore vacate Johnson’s
sentence and remand for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
“The day before the murder at issue, Joe G. celebrated his
birthday with his cousin, Torian H., and his friend Tyron I.
Several other people were at his party, some of whom were
friends of Joe and some of whom were friends of Tyron. Joe met
defendant, a friend of Tyron, at the party.
“The morning after the party, Torian and Joe discussed
purchasing a gun. Knowing that Tyron had a gun, Joe contacted
him so Torian could arrange to buy the gun. Tyron was to come
alone to Joe’s house.
“Tyron arrived with defendant, and the four met inside
Joe’s house. Joe then told everyone to move outside because his
parents would be returning home. Once outside, Torian pulled
out money to buy the gun, and defendant and Tyron pulled out
guns. Tyron pointed his gun at Torian, and defendant pointed
his gun at Joe’s head. Tyron told Torian and Joe to give them
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‘everything you got.’ Torian responded, ‘I’m not letting this shit
happen to me.’ He struck Tyron with his fists. As they struggled,
Joe yelled, ‘Put the gun down.’ On direct examination, Joe
testified that, several times, defendant yelled, ‘Shoot that [N-
word].’ On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached Joe
with his preliminary hearing testimony wherein Joe described
defendant’s statements as ‘kind of like whispering.’ Joe
acknowledged the statements were not made as part of a
conversation between defendant and Tyron, and Tyron did not
respond. Tyron fired a shot that killed Torian, and Tyron and
defendant ran. Defendant took money and a cell phone from Joe.
“The District Attorney filed an information charging
defendant with murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1); second degree
robbery (§ 211, count 2); and two counts of possession of a firearm
by a prohibited person (§ 29820, subd. (b), counts 3 & 4). The
information also alleged enhancements for personal use of a
firearm for counts 1 and 2 (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subds. (b), (g)), and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1),
1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
“On count 1, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree
felony murder, it found true the allegations that defendant was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference and who
personally used a firearm, but it found not true that defendant
aided and abetted or assisted in the murder with the intent to
kill. On count 2, the jury found defendant guilty and found true
that he personally used a firearm. On counts 3 and 4, the jury
found defendant guilty. At a bench trial, the court found the
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prior strike allegation to be true.” (People v. Johnson, supra,
A158418.)
In preparation for the sentencing, Johnson presented a
report and expert testimony by Dr. Teo Ernst, who conducted a
forensic psychological evaluation of Johnson. Johnson had been
19 at the time of the offense. Dr. Ernst concluded that Johnson’s
functional maturity at the time of the crime was affected by,
among other things, brain injury and childhood psychological
trauma.
In September 2019, the trial court sentenced Johnson to 25
years to life for the murder count and an upper term of 5 years on
the second degree robbery count. Exercising its discretion under
section 1385, subdivision (a), the trial court struck Johnson’s
prior strike and the firearm use enhancement to the murder and
robbery counts for the purposes of sentencing. For the unlawful
possession of a firearm counts, the trial court imposed concurrent
eight-month terms, which was one-third the middle term for each
offense. Johnson’s total prison term was therefore an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life followed by a determinate
term of five years.
The trial court explained that it struck the prior strike and
enhancements based on Dr. Ernst’s report, specifically noting its
conclusions about Johnson’s age, impaired intellectual
functioning, and childhood history of trauma, among other
things. The trial court concluded that imposing a sentence under
the Three Strikes Law would be unjust and that a sentence of 30
years in prison was commensurate with the crime. As to
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circumstances in aggravation, the trial court found Johnson’s
crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, and the threat
of great bodily harm (rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victims were
particularly vulnerable as unarmed juveniles (rule 4.421(a)(3));
Johnson was convicted of other crimes, for which consecutive
sentences could have been imposed but were not (rule
4.421(a)(7)); the manner in which Johnson’s crime was carried
out indicated planning (rule 4.421(a)(8)); and Johnson’s violent
conduct indicated he was a danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)).
For mitigating circumstances under rule 4.423, the trial court
found Johnson had significantly impaired intellectual
functioning, Johnson’s juvenile co-defendant set up the ruse for
the robbery and fired the gun that killed the victim, and Johnson
had no prior adult convictions. The trial court stated that
Johnson had 1,330 days of actual credit.
Johnson appealed. (People v. Johnson, supra, A158418.)
We found no error in his trial. (Ibid.) But while Johnson’s appeal
was pending, the Legislature amended section 1170 to create a
presumption that trial courts should impose the middle term of a
statutory sentencing triad, unless facts supporting any
aggravating circumstances were established by stipulation,
proven to the jury (or court, in a bench trial) beyond a reasonable
doubt, or based on prior convictions proven by a certified record of
conviction. (Ibid.; Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3, subd. (c), adding
§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3), by amendment.) The amendment also
created a presumption that a trial court should impose the low
term of a sentencing triad if an offender’s youth (defined as being
5
under 26 years on the date of the offense) or psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense, “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3,
3, subd. (c), adding § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A)–(B), by amendment.)
We remanded Johnson’s case to the trial court for resentencing
on the robbery count in light of both aspects of the amendment
because the trial court had imposed the upper term on that
count. (People v. Johnson, supra, A158418.) We also instructed
the trial court to correct its sentencing minute order, which had
incorrectly stated that Johnson’s 1,330 actual days of presentence
credit consisted of 665 days of actual custody credit and 665 days
of conduct credits. (Ibid.)
On remand, Johnson filed a resentencing motion in which
he asked the court to impose the low term based on the
presumption in section 1170(b)(6). Johnson highlighted the fact
that the presumption applied because of the evidence in Dr.
Ernst’s report from the original sentencing. Johnson also argued
that the mitigating factors exceeded the aggravating factors.
At the subsequent resentencing hearing, the trial court
began by stating that resentencing was necessary because of the
amendment that created a presumption in favor of the middle
term in all cases involving a sentencing triad. The trial court
said that it was changing the sentence on the robbery count from
the upper term of five years to the middle term of three years
6
while continuing to have it run consecutively to the
indeterminate term of 25 years to life. The trial court also stated
that Johnson had 1,330 days of actual custody credits as of the
original sentencing date.
Johnson’s counsel maintained that the court was required
to impose the low term under section 1170(b)(6)(A) and said that
whatever the sentence on the robbery count, the court should run
it concurrently. Johnson’s counsel asserted that it was ironic
that the actual shooter in the crime was already free because he
was a minor at the time of the crime, while Johnson, who was not
the shooter, faced a sentence of life in prison. He said the court
should impose a sentence of 25 years to life with no consecutive
determinate sentence.
Johnson’s counsel also asked the court to update the
abstract of judgment to reflect total custody credits of 1,633 days.
He argued that Johnson was entitled to more credits as of the
date of his original sentencing than the trial court had awarded,
as well as additional days of credit for time in the jail on the
remittitur.
In response, the court first noted that it had exercised its
discretion to strike Johnson’s prior strike at the original
sentencing. It then said, “And I thought based on all of those
factors that were set forth in the law in looking at your motion
and also looking at Mr. Johnson’s background and all of the other
aspects of the case, I addressed that pretty extensively in my
sentencing script. I went back and looked over the comments
that I made, and I recall the time that I spent on sentencing in
7
this case. So I did take into account Mr. Johnson’s childhood
trauma, his age, a number of different factors. I don’t have all of
those papers in front of me, but it was an extensive sentencing
hearing taking into account all of those things.”
In response to Johnson’s argument about the disparity
between his sentence and the juvenile shooter’s, the trial court
noted that the victim had been killed by people he thought were
his friends and while he was attempting to buy a weapon to avoid
being the victim of robbery. The court said it took into account
all of those factors when looking at Johnson’s case and the
modification that the court made was the modification it stood by.
Regarding credits, the trial court said it wanted Johnson to
get all the credits to which he was entitled and urged the
Department of Corrections to take note of Johnson’s argument.
The trial court’s minute order said Johnson had a total of 330
actual days in custody at the time of sentencing. The abstract of
judgment later showed 1,707 days of actual custody, and the date
of sentencing on the form was the date the trial court had
originally pronounced sentence, not the date of the resentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. Presumption in favor of the low term
Section 1170(b)(1) states, “When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” As relevant here,
paragraph (2) allows a court to impose a sentence exceeding the
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middle term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation
of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170(b)(2).) Section 1170(b)(6)
further provides, “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless the
court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would
be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth or was a youth as
defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the
commission of the offense.”
Johnson contends the trial court’s findings at the initial
sentencing that his youth and childhood trauma contributed to
the offense triggered the section 1170(b)(6) presumption in favor
of the low term at his resentencing. He contends the trial court
was therefore obligated to impose the low term unless it made a
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances. According to Johnson’s interpretation
of the trial court’s comments, the trial court believed it had
satisfied its duty to consider Johnson’s childhood trauma by
relying on that trauma to justify striking his prior strike at the
9
first sentencing hearing. Johnson argues this reason for
imposing the middle term constitutes an abuse of discretion and
the trial court failed to conduct the balancing that section
1170(b)(6) requires.
“Discretionary sentencing decisions, such as whether ‘the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice’ (§ 1170(b)(6)) are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
428, fn. 8.) “ ‘ “A court which is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed
discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have been based on
misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 424.) However, “[i]n the absence of evidence
to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the
correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 361; accord, rule 4.409 [relevant sentencing
factors in the Rules of Court “will be deemed to have been
considered unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise”].)
The People do not dispute that Dr. Ernst’s report and the
trial court’s previous findings about Johnson’s youth and trauma
triggered the presumption in section 1170(b)(6). (See People v.
Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 992 [there must be “some
initial showing” that a defendant’s youth was a contributing
factor before the record must show compliance with section
1170(b)(6)(B)].) The only question is whether the trial court
understood the scope of its discretion and made the necessary
10
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances.
We agree with Johnson that the record indicates the trial
court was not aware of the constrained nature of its sentencing
discretion under section 1170(b)(6). (See People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730, 774 [“ ‘ “[a] court which is unaware of the scope of
its discretionary powers [cannot] exercise that ‘informed
discretion’ ” ’ ”].) At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court
said that the resentencing was necessary because of the
amendment to section 1170(b) that mandated a term no higher
than the middle term unless the facts supporting aggravating
circumstances are established by defendant’s stipulation, jury
findings, or a certified record of a prior conviction. Notably
absent from the trial court’s statement is any mention of section
1170(b)(6)’s presumption favoring the low term when a
defendant’s youth or childhood trauma is a contributing factor to
the offense. (§ 1170(b)(6)(A)–(B).) Our prior opinion cited both
presumptions. (People v. Johnson, supra, A158418.) The People
are correct that we will presume a trial court knows and applies
the correct law, but this presumption only applies “[i]n the
absence of evidence to the contrary.” (People v. Thomas, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 361.) The trial court’s statement that
resentencing was necessary because of section 1170(b)(2)’s cap on
the middle term (in the absence of stipulation, jury findings, or a
prior conviction), while not mentioning the low-term presumption
under section 1170(b)(6), indicates that the trial court was
unaware of the latter provision and rebuts the presumption that
11
the trial court was applying the correct law. The court’s failure to
mention section 1170(b)(6) is particularly suggestive because at
the original sentencing, the court referenced Johnson’s childhood
trauma when it relied on section 1385, subdivision (a) to strike a
prior strike and a firearm enhancement. Given the record of the
2019 sentencing, which the trial court said it reviewed, there is
no evident reason why the trial court would not have mentioned
section 1170(b)(6) as well as section 1170(b)(2) at the
resentencing hearing.
The People point out that Johnson’s resentencing motion
cited section 1170(b)(6)(A) in arguing that the trial court was
obligated to impose the low term because of the presumption and
because the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating
factors. The trial court indicated that it read Johnson’s motion,
referring to “all of those factors that were set forth in the law in
looking at your motion.” In the abstract, the fact that Johnson
cited the correct law and the trial court read it would support an
inference that the trial court understood the new nature of its
discretion. But notwithstanding Johnson’s resentencing motion,
the trial court began the hearing by discussing only section
1170(b)(2)’s ceiling on the middle term in the absence of
defendant’s stipulation, jury findings, or a certified record of a
prior conviction, and did not mention that Johnson’s youth and
trauma supported a low-term presumption under section
1170(b)(6). Accordingly, Johnson’s written motion does not
convince us that we should presume the trial court understood
12
the import of section 1170(b)(6) and its changes to the required
sentencing analysis.
Moreover, after Johnson’s counsel argued in favor of the
low term pursuant to section 1170(b)(6)(A) during the
resentencing hearing, the trial court’s statements suggest it
believed it did not need to consider Johnson’s youth and trauma
under section 1170(b)(6) because it had already “take[n] into
account Mr. Johnson’s childhood trauma [and] his age” and “all of
those factors that were set forth” in Johnson’s motion when, in
2019, it struck the prior strike and declined to sentence Johnson
to the 50 years to life sentence “he could have had.” Contrary to
respondent’s contention, these comments indicate that the trial
court misunderstood its more limited sentencing discretion under
amended section 1170(b), and in particular the weight that must
be given to a defendant’s youth and childhood trauma under
section 1170(b)(6). (See People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th
1415, 1421 [although we assume trial court knew and applied the
governing law, remand is appropriate when the record indicates
the court misunderstood the scope of its discretionary powers]; In
re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470 [abuse of discretion occurs
when trial court “fails to consider a relevant factor that deserves
significant weight”].) We construe the court’s comments to mean
that the court believed it had sufficiently addressed Johnson’s
traumatic childhood when it struck his prior conviction and
thereby reduced his indeterminate sentence. But section
1170(b)(6) governs determinate sentences. It does not state that
the presumption favoring the low term is inapplicable if a trial
13
court gives a defendant a lower indeterminate sentence due to
childhood trauma.
Nor can we construe the trial court’s reference to its prior
sentencing comments as meaning it was increasing Johnson’s
punishment from the presumptive low term to the middle term
based on the same balancing of aggravating and mitigating
factors that it had previously used to impose the upper term at
the original sentencing. If the trial court had meant that it was
adhering to the same balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances as at the original sentencing, it seems more likely
that it would have mentioned the aggravating factors in some
fashion as overcoming the presumption, rather than using
oblique, catchall references to “all of the other aspects of the case”
or “a number of different factors.”
In any event, the trial court could not have intended to re-
adopt its prior balancing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to satisfy section 1170(b)(6) because the trial court
did not identify Johnson’s age or childhood trauma as mitigating
factors at the original sentencing. At the time of the original
sentencing in September 2019, rule 4.423 did not expressly
identify youth or childhood trauma as mitigating factors.
(Former rule 4.423(b).) It was not until March 2022 that rule
4.423 was amended to include as mitigating factors the
defendant’s youth at the time of the crime (rule 4.423(b)(6)) and
the defendant’s experience of childhood trauma that was a factor
in the commission of the crime (rule 4.423(b)(3)). Not
surprisingly, then, when the trial court specified the rule 4.423
14
mitigating factors it considered in September 2019, it noted only
Johnson’s impaired intellectual functioning, his lack of prior
adult convictions, and the fact that it was the juvenile
participant, not Johnson, who set up the robbery and fired the
gun. The trial court must have known at the resentencing that it
had not previously listed Johnson’s youth or trauma as
mitigating factors because it said that it “went back and looked
over the comments” it had made at the original sentencing.
Because the trial court did not previously identify Johnson’s
youth or childhood trauma as mitigating factors, much less
identify them as the “ ‘super mitigants’ ” (Baggett et al.,
California Criminal Law Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar
2024) §§ 37.5, 37.10) they are now under section 1170(b)(6), it
could not have incorporated by reference its prior balancing of
those factors against the aggravating circumstances to satisfy the
statute and impose the middle term here.
Finally, the People contend the trial court identified
various aggravating factors at the resentencing, specifically the
facts that the crime was tragic in that a young man lost his life,
the victim trusted Johnson and his co-participant, and Johnson
and his co-participant did the same thing to the victim that the
victim was trying to buy a gun to avoid. The People also cite the
trial court’s comment towards the end of its remarks, “So I took
into account all of those factors when looking at Mr. Johnson’s
case,” and its conclusion, “the modification that I made are the
modifications that I stand by.” These remarks do not change the
analysis. It does not appear from the transcript that the trial
15
court was relying on the circumstances it highlighted to justify
the middle term in the face of the section 1170(b)(6) presumption.
Rather, the trial court described the crime and made its
concluding statements in response to Johnson’s counsel’s
argument that the robbery term should not run consecutively to
the indeterminate term because Johnson’s co-participant, who
was the actual shooter, was a juvenile and therefore already free
while Johnson received a much lengthier sentence.
In a related vein, the People argue that any error was
harmless because the record shows the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion regardless of whether it was aware
of the low term presumption. The People cite the standard from
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391, which states
that when a trial court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing
discretion because the discretion was changed by a later
retroactive change in the law, “the appropriate remedy is to
remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’
that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even
if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ”
We agree that the Gutierrez standard of prejudice applies
here. Our Supreme Court recently stated in People v. Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at page 773, that “the Gutierrez standard
applies to sentences imposed before [section 1170(b)’s] 2022
amendment or when the record otherwise indicates that the court
has not exercised its ‘ “ ‘informed discretion.’ ” ’ ” (Italics added.)
Following Lynch, we must apply the Gutierrez standard here
because, although the new law was in effect at the time of the
16
resentencing, the record indicates that the trial court was not
exercising its informed discretion. We also note that Lynch
reaffirmed that “ ‘it is almost always speculative for a reviewing
court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had
known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of
sentencing.’ ” (Id. at p. 774.) The Supreme Court thus appears to
have intended Gutierrez’s “clearly indicates” standard to be
difficult to meet, to avoid speculation.
The record here does not clearly indicate that the trial
court would have imposed a middle term even if it had been
aware of the presumption favoring the low term. The trial court
did emphasize that it had taken account of Johnson’s youth and
trauma when it originally sentenced him. But as discussed ante,
the trial court did not apply those factors specifically to the
robbery conviction, nor did it ever indicate that the aggravating
circumstances were so strong as to make the imposition of the
presumptive low term “contrary to the interests of justice.”
(§ 1170(b)(6).) The trial court’s previous balancing of factors
without the low-term presumption says little about whether it
would reach the same result if it had recognized that the low
term was presumptively appropriate. A remand for resentencing
is therefore required.
The fact that we are remanding this case again for
resentencing should not be construed as an indication of our
views on the proper determinate sentence for Johnson. We
express no opinion on that question. We hold only that Johnson
is entitled to a sentence from the trial court that reflects its
17
exercise of informed discretion under the low-term presumption
imposed by section 1170(b)(6). The record does not show that this
has yet occurred.
II. Custody credits
Johnson separately argues the trial court erred by not
updating the calculation of his custody credits at the
resentencing hearing. He argues he is entitled to 2,873 days of
actual custody time prior to his resentencing.
“[W]hen a prison term already in progress is modified as
the result of an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court
must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all
actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or
prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed
and delivered to prison custody.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001)
26 Cal.4th 20, 29, italics omitted; see People v. Dean (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 391, 396–397 [at resentencing, trial court should
update calculation of actual custody credits but not conduct
credits].) We therefore agree with Johnson that the trial court
should have recalculated his actual custody credits at the
resentencing, rather than urging the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation to take note of Johnson’s contentions about
his credits. Because we are remanding to the trial court for
resentencing, we will instruct the trial court to recalculate the
amount of Johnson’s actual custody credits as of the date of the
new resentencing and prepare an amended minute order and
abstract of judgment.
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DISPOSITION
Johnson’s determinate sentence is vacated. The matter is
remanded to the trial court to resentence Johnson on the
determinate portion of his sentence under section 1170 and
recalculate his actual custody credits as of the date of
resentencing. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
determinate abstract of judgment reflecting the new sentence
and custody credits and to send certified copies of the new
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
SIMONDS, J.
People v. Johnson (A169510)
Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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