CourtListener 10296508•People v. Johnson CA2/7
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Filed 12/18/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B331525
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A772024)
v.
MICHAEL LAMONT JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Marc A. Kohm and Melanie Dorian,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
In 1988, a jury convicted Michael Johnson of first degree
murder and two counts of attempted murder. In 1990, Johnson
pled guilty to another, unrelated first degree murder. Three
decades later, Johnson filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95),1 listing only
his 1990 conviction by plea. However, thereafter, both Johnson
and the People filed briefs exclusively addressing his 1988 jury
convictions and failed to ever mention his 1990 conviction. The
superior court denied the petition at the prima facie stage,
finding him ineligible for relief as matter of law as to his 1988
jury conviction.
On appeal, Johnson contends (1) the superior court erred
by failing to consider his petition as to his 1990 conviction; and
(2) if a petition for his 1988 convictions “was properly before the
court,” the superior court erred in denying it at the prima facie
stage because he could have been convicted under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. We agree with the People
that Johnson forfeited his claim regarding his 1990 conviction.
However, we construe his petition as challenging his 1988
convictions and agree with Johnson that the superior court erred
in denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings where Johnson
will have the opportunity to file a new petition or amend the
existing petition to include his 1990 conviction.
1 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. In 1988, a Jury Convicted Johnson of First Degree Murder
and Attempted Murder
On July 13, 1985, Christopher Wells was standing on the
sidewalk in front of his house with a group of people.2 Yolanda
Johnson (Yolanda)3 and Consuelo Fisher were standing nearby.
Two men, armed with revolvers, and Johnson, armed with a
shotgun, approached Wells. All three men fired in Wells’s
direction, killing Wells and wounding Yolanda and Fisher.
Wells had five bullet wounds in the back of his body from
two different revolvers. Fisher was wounded on her hip and left
foot; each wound was caused by a different gun. Yolanda was
shot in her left eye. A hat that Wells was wearing had two large
holes near the hair level line that were consistent with the
discharge of a bullet from a shotgun.
Wells’s cousin, Rickie Phillips, was near Wells at the time
of the shooting. “Phillips heard six or seven shots ‘all at one
time,’ and ducked down behind a brick wall. After the shooting,
Phillips saw the three men, carrying black objects in their hands,
run back through Wells’s yard to an alley; he identified one of the
shooters as [Johnson], whom he knew as ‘Smokey’ and a member
of the gang known as the 8-Tray Hoover Crips. Phillips testified
2 The underlying facts are taken from Johnson’s unpublished
opinion on direct appeal. (People v. Johnson (Dec. 13, 1989,
B035977) [nonpub. opn.].) We summarize the facts to provide
context and background and do not rely on them in deciding the
merits of this appeal.
3 Because Yolanda shares the same last name as appellant
Michael Johnson we refer to her by her first name.
3
that about [10] minutes before the shooting, he had seen two of
the men who had done the shooting ride bicycles past his group of
friends, stop on the sidewalk about two houses away, and look at
his friends for about two minutes before riding off.”
After Johnson’s arrest, Johnson spoke to police about the
shooting. “[H]e stated that several days before the shooting
‘Gump’ told him that Wells had poured beer over Gump’s head
and was pushing him around; on the day of the shooting, he, ‘Fat
Rat’ and ‘Lil Rat’ were in the area of 82nd between Figueroa and
Hoover; ‘Fat Rat’ told him that he had just seen Wells standing
out front on 84th Street; he told ‘Fat Rat’ and ‘Lil Rat’ that they
were going to scare Wells ‘to keep him from messing with the
home boys’; he had a .410 shotgun, ‘Fat Rat’ and ‘Lil Rat’ both
had .38 revolvers; he carried the shotgun down his pants leg and
the three of them walked down the alley behind 84th Street and
walked through the houses to 84th Street; he was the first to
reach the sidewalk; he took out the shotgun, walked towards
Wells, and fired one round towards Wells, but he was not trying
to hit him; he turned and ran back to the alley and then toward
Vermont; as he was running he heard about 10 shots; he left the
shotgun at Mary’s house and went home to change his clothes; he
stayed the night at ‘June Bug’s’ house and did not see ‘Fat Rat’ or
‘Lil Rat’ the next day.”
In April 1988, the People charged Johnson in an amended
information with the murder of Wells (§ 187, subd. (a)) and the
attempted murders of Yolanda and Fisher (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664).
The People also alleged several firearm allegations.
A jury trial was held. In May 1988, the jury found Johnson
guilty of first degree murder of Wells and attempted murder of
Yolanda and Fisher. The jury also found true as to all counts
4
that Johnson personally used a firearm (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1),
12022.5) and that a principal in the crime was armed with a
shotgun (§ 12022, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Johnson
to 41 years to life. Johnson appealed, and this court affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Johnson, supra, B035977.)
B. In 1990, Johnson Pled Guilty to First Degree Murder
On July 30, 1985, Richard Lewis,4 drove to a hamburger
stand and parked in the parking lot.5 While he was sitting in the
parking lot with his friends, another car approached his car on
the driver’s side. There were two men in the car, and one said,
“ ‘What’s up Hoover Lite.’ ” The passenger then pulled out an
automatic pistol and began shooting, killing Lewis. Someone
identified Johnson as the shooter.
Johnson told a probation officer that on the day of the
shooting, he and three of his friends saw Lewis’s car parked at a
hamburger stand. Johnson and his friends then picked up a
nine-millimeter handgun. “They relocated [Lewis’s car] and shot
into it.” Johnson said he wished Lewis “had not died and if he
could do it over again, he would not have done it.”
In June 1988, under the same case number as Johnson’s
1988 jury convictions,6 the People charged Johnson with the
murder of Lewis. The People also alleged that Johnson
4 Lewis is referred to as both “Lewis” and “Louis Jr.” in the
record of conviction. We will refer to him as Lewis because that
is how his name is spelled in the information.
5 The underlying facts are taken from the probation report.
We summarize the facts to provide context and background and
do not rely on them in deciding the merits of this appeal.
6 The case number for both was A772024.
5
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5), a principal was armed with
a shotgun (§ 12022, subd. (a)), and Johnson was previously
convicted of first degree murder in May 1988 (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(2)). Johnson pled guilty to first degree murder of Lewis and
admitted the allegations. On March 2, 1990, the trial court
sentenced Johnson to life without the possibility of parole for the
special circumstance murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and two years
for the section 12022.5 firearm allegation. The court dismissed
the remaining allegations in furtherance of justice.
C. The Superior Court Denied Johnson’s Section 1172.6
Petition at the Prima Facie Stage
In 2021, Johnson filed a section 1172.6 form petition. The
petition listed the case number as A772024 and the year of
conviction as “March 2, 1990.” The superior court appointed
counsel for Johnson and ordered the People to file a response.
The People filed a response to Johnson’s petition, arguing
Johnson failed to state a prima facie case for relief. The People’s
response referred only to Johnson’s 1988 convictions and included
exhibits related only to those convictions, not his 1990 conviction.
Defense counsel filed a reply that also solely addressed Johnson’s
1988 convictions.
At the prima facie hearing, both the People and the defense
submitted on their pleadings.7 The superior court denied the
petition. The court noted one of the jury instructions included
reference to “natural and probable consequences,” but the
instruction “did not define the target crime.” As to the other jury
7 Before submitting on his pleadings, defense counsel
answered one question from the court regarding the jury
instructions from the trial held in 1988.
6
instructions, the court stated they required the jury to find
Johnson acted with express malice. Thus, the court found
Johnson was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Johnson Forfeited His Claim That the Superior Court
Failed To Consider His 1990 Conviction
Johnson argues the superior court denied his “due process
right to a fair hearing” by failing to consider his 1990 conviction.
In support of his argument, he points to his section 1172.6 form
petition, which lists the date of conviction as “March 2, 1990.” He
contends the court was required to address his 1990 conviction at
the prima facie hearing because he “checked all of the boxes on
the petition necessary to state a prima facie case.” The People
argue that Johnson forfeited his claim on appeal. We agree with
the People.
“ ‘Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not challenge
an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has
forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal.’ ” (People v.
McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 (McCullough).)
Specifically, a defendant is obligated to both object when the
error occurs in the superior court and to press the superior court
for a ruling. (See People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 450
[although defendant objected to issue, he failed to preserve issue
on appeal because “despite the court’s invitation to resolve the
issue at a later hearing, he did not request such a hearing or
otherwise press for a ruling”]; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d
152, 195, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [although defendant moved to exclude
7
testimony pretrial, “[d]efendant was obligated to press for such a
ruling and to object to [witness’s] testimony until he obtained
one”]; People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 949, fn. 5
[although section 1172.6 petition included a request that the
court strike a firearm enhancement, petitioner abandoned claim
on appeal because petitioner did not ensure superior court ruled
on the request].) The reason for this rule is that “ ‘[i]t is both
unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if
timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been
easily corrected or avoided.’ ” (McCullough, at p. 593.)
Johnson is correct that he listed his 1990 conviction on his
section 1172.6 form petition. The People’s written response,
however, exclusively addressed Johnson’s 1988 convictions. At
that point, it was incumbent upon Johnson to bring the omission
to the superior court’s attention and request a ruling on the 1990
conviction. Johnson failed to do either. His written reply
exclusively discussed his 1988 convictions. In addition, at the
hearing, Johnson made no mention of his 1990 conviction. Had
Johnson brought the issue to the attention of the superior court,
it “ ‘could have been easily corrected or avoided.’ ” (McCullough,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 593.) Thus, Johnson forfeited his claim on
appeal. However, as we will discuss, we construe Johnson’s
petition as a petition for relief on his 1988 convictions and
reverse the superior court’s denial. On remand, Johnson is
entitled to file a new petition or amend his existing petition to
include his 1990 conviction.8
8 The People concede Johnson is entitled to amend his
section 1172.6 petition or file a new one to include the 1990
conviction.
8
B. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Johnson’s Petition
Regarding His 1988 Convictions
Johnson contends that if his section 1172.6 petition for his
1988 convictions “was properly before the court,” the court erred
in denying the petition at the prima facie stage. He asserts the
court erred because the jury instructions for aiding and abetting
“leave open the possibility that the jury convicted [him] for the
murder and attempted murder as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” The People do not
dispute that Johnson’s petition was properly before the court.
Instead, the People contend the jury instruction on first degree
murder required the jury to find Johnson harbored an intent to
kill. Further, the People contend “the jury was not actually
instructed on natural and probable consequences.”
Preliminarily, although Johnson listed his 1990 conviction
and not his 1988 convictions on his section 1172.6 form petition,
we construe Johnson’s petition as one for relief on his 1988
convictions because both parties treated it as such in the superior
court, and neither party on appeal objects to this issue. (Cf. A.N.
v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1064
[“[t]he substance of the ‘motion to quash’ is what mattered, not
its label”].) As to the merits, we agree with Johnson and conclude
the court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage.
1. Relevant Legal Principles
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and narrowed the
9
felony-murder rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel); People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis)). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on one’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). The latter provision now requires the People to
prove that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd.
(e)(1)); an aider and abettor to murder who had the intent to kill
(§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or a major participant in an underlying
felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with
reckless indifference to human life as described in subdivision (d)
of section 190.2. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448; People
v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Strong, at p. 708;
Gentile, at pp. 842-843.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) subsequently clarified the amendments to sections 188 and
189 also applied to attempted murder convictions. (People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544.)
Under section 1172.6 “[a] person convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter,” may petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if the
petitioner could not now be convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter because of the changes to sections 188
and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
10
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(b)(3); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.) The
prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes that showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The court may
consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see
Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Eynon
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
11
“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘ “[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’ ” ’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “We review de novo whether the trial court
conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).”
(People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
2. Relevant Jury Instructions
The trial court instructed the jury with the following
relevant instructions: (1) first degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.20);
(2) attempted murder with express malice aforethought (CALJIC
No. 8.66); (3) aiding and abetting (CALJIC Nos. 3.00-3.01); and
(4) conspiracy (CALJIC Nos. 6.10.5-6.16, 6.18, 6.20).
As to first degree murder, the court instructed the jury
with the 1987 version of CALJIC No. 8.20 (1987 rev.) (4th ed.
1979). It stated in relevant part: “All murder which is
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first
degree.”
As to aiding and abetting, the court instructed the jury
with the 1987 version of CALJIC No. 3.00 (1987 rev.) (4th ed.
1987) and the 1984 version of CALJIC No. 3.01 (1984 rev.) (4th
ed. 1987). CALJIC No. 3.00 stated that principals involved in
committing a crime are “equally guilty” and include (1) those who
“directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the act
constituting the crime” or (2) those who “aid and abet the
12
commission or attempted commission of the crime.” It also
included a bracketed portion that stated, “One who aids and
abets is not only guilty of the particular crimes that to his
knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he
is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any act
that he knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged. It is
for you, the jury, to determine whether the defendant is guilty of
the crime allegedly contemplated, and, if so, whether the crime
charged was a natural and probable consequence of the criminal
act knowingly and intentionally encouraged.”
CALJIC No. 3.01 stated, “A person aids and abets the
[commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime when he or
she, [¶] (1) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, by act
or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission
of the crime.”
3. Analysis
We agree with Johnson that the record does not
conclusively establish he was convicted of first degree murder
and attempted murder under still-valid theories. Neither the
jury instructions nor the verdict forms preclude Johnson from
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
Starting with the jury instructions, the trial court
instructed the jury with three theories of liability for first degree
murder and attempted murder: (1) express malice aforethought
(with deliberation and premeditation for first degree murder);
(2) conspiracy; and (3) aiding and abetting. Of importance here,
the aiding and abetting instructions included the 1987 version of
CALJIC No. 3.00, which stated principals are “equally guilty.” It
13
also provided in part: “One who aids and abets is not only guilty
of the particular crimes that to his knowledge his confederates
are contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the
natural and probable consequences of any act that he knowingly
and intentionally aided or encouraged.” This was an instruction
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v.
Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 263-264 (Prettyman) [the
natural and probable consequences doctrine was incorporated in
CALJIC No. 3.00 from 1976 to 1988].) Given these instructions,
the jury could have convicted Johnson of both first degree murder
and attempted murder based on any of these three theories,
including the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 838 [until the Supreme Court
decided People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, it was possible to be
convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine]; People v. Montes (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1006, 1007-1008 [until Senate Bill 775, it
was possible to be convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine].)
Turning to the verdict forms, the forms did not require the
jurors to identify the theory under which they convicted Johnson.
Nor did the forms require the jurors to identify whether Johnson
was guilty as a perpetrator, aider and abettor, or co-conspirator.
(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467 [jury found defendant
guilty of first degree murder, “but it was not required to identify
which theory it found persuasive”].) Therefore, it was possible
that the jury could have found Johnson guilty, both of first degree
murder and attempted murder as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See Curiel, at
p. 468 [“The jury could have relied on the natural and probable
14
consequences doctrine to convict Curiel of murder, and the
findings required under that theory—even when combined with
the finding of intent to kill required by the gang-murder special
circumstance—do not encompass all of the elements of any theory
of murder under current law”]; People v. Montes, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007 [“Because appellant’s jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine for
attempted murder, appellant may establish a prima facie
showing of eligibility”]; cf. People v. Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at p. 546 [defendant “was ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law” because “the jury did not receive instructions that it could
convict [him] based on . . . the natural and probable consequences
doctrine at trial”].)
The People assert the jury could not have relied on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine in convicting
Johnson of first degree murder because “[p]remeditated murder
was the only theory of first degree murder offered [], and the jury
convicted appellant of that crime.” The record does not support
this assertion. The jury was not instructed that it had to find
Johnson acted with premeditated and deliberate malice
aforethought to convict him of first degree murder. As noted, the
jury was instructed on several theories of murder, all of which
would have permitted the jury to convict Johnson of first degree
murder. (See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 838.) Because there
is a possibility the jury relied on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, we cannot say as a matter of law Johnson
is ineligible for relief. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467
[“we must be confident the jury necessarily found” the defendant
was convicted under a still-valid theory].)
15
The People also assert “the jury was not actually instructed
on natural and probable consequences” because the instruction
did not identify any target crime. In making their argument, the
People rely on People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941
(Estrada). Estrada is distinguishable.
In Estrada, the trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 400, the instruction on the general principles of
aiding and abetting. (Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 946.)
The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 400 provided in relevant part:
“ ‘If the prosecution is also relying on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the court should also instruct with the
last bracketed paragraph.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court in Estrada
instructed the jury with the last bracketed paragraph, which
read: “ ‘Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence
establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also
be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the
commission of the first crime.’ ” (Ibid.) The Bench Notes “further
instruct[ed] that after CALCRIM No. 400 is given, ‘[d]epending
on which theories are relied on by the prosecution, the court
should then instruct’ the jury on either (1) ‘CALCRIM No. 401,
Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes’ for ‘Target Crimes,’ or
(2) CALCRIM Nos. 402 or 403 for ‘Natural & Probable
Consequences Doctrine (Non-Target Crimes),’ and that the latter
is appropriate when ‘the prosecution’s theory is that any of the
crimes charged were committed as a natural and probable
consequence of the target crime . . . .’ ” (Estrada, at p. 947.) Only
CALCRIM No. 401—regarding direct aiding and abetting—was
given to the jury. (Ibid.)
The Estrada court held the mere inclusion of the bracketed
language was not sufficient to conclude that the jury was
16
instructed on a natural and probable consequences theory.
(Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) While the inclusion of
the bracketed language “was erroneous,” the court reasoned there
was no reasonable likelihood the jurors could have imputed
malice because (1) the prosecutor did not request CALCRIM Nos.
402 and 403 as required under the Bench Notes when proceeding
on a natural and probable consequences theory; (2) the
instruction did not include other erroneous language associated
with the natural and probable consequences theory, such as
“ ‘equally guilty’ ” language; and (3) the prosecutor did not refer
to the natural and probable consequences theory during closing
argument. (Id. at pp. 947-949.)
None of the court’s reasoning in Estrada is applicable here.
Unlike the CALCRIM No. 400 instruction in Estrada, which
included merely a general, introductory statement of the natural
and probable consequences doctrine (see Estrada, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 947), the instruction on aiding and abetting
in Johnson’s trial, CALJIC No. 3.00 (1987 rev.), included the
entirety of the natural and probable consequences theory. At the
time of Johnson’s trial in 1988, there were no further instructions
on the natural and probable consequences theory, such as an
instruction on the target offense. (Use Note and Comment to
CALJIC No. 3.00 (1987 rev.).) That’s because there was no
requirement that the natural and probable consequences
instruction identify a target crime. It was not until 1996 in
Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248 that the Supreme Court held
that, when the prosecution relies on the natural and probable
consequences theory of accomplice liability and the evidence
supports an instruction on that theory, the trial court must give
“an instruction describing or defining the elements of the target
17
crime.” (Id. at p. 266; see People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
566, 572, fn. 6 [because the defendant’s trial predated Prettyman,
the “natural and probable consequences jury instruction did not
specify the target crime he was charged with aiding and
abetting”].) By not identifying a target crime, the instruction in
Johnson’s trial, if anything, broadened the scope of the natural
and probable consequences doctrine to allow the jury to convict
Johnson of murder based on a mere finding Johnson intended to
aid and abet “unspecified ‘nefarious’ conduct” of which murder
was a natural and probable consequence. (Prettyman, at p. 268.)
Moreover, unlike the instruction in Estrada, the instruction
given at Johnson’s trial included the language “equally guilty,”
which the Judicial Council removed from CALJIC No. 3.00 in
2010 for being potentially “misleading.” (People v. Johnson
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 640 & fn. 5.) Lastly, we cannot
conclusively say, as the court did in Estrada, that the prosecutor
in Johnson’s trial did not rely on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine because the People did not provide us with
the trial transcripts. (Cf. Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 948-949.) Therefore, Estrada does not alter our conclusion.
Because the record leaves open the possibility that Johnson could
have been convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, he has
made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law.9
9 The People do not contend the jury’s true finding that
Johnson personally used a firearm forecloses his eligibility for
relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Williams (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 375, 388 [enhancement under § 12022.53
18
DISPOSITION
The order denying Johnson’s petition under section 1172.6
as to his 1988 convictions is reversed. The superior court is
directed to issue an order to show cause, give Johnson an
opportunity to file a new petition or amend his existing petition
to include his 1990 conviction, and conduct further proceedings
under section 1172.6.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
PULOS, J.*
subd. (d) for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm
and proximately causing great bodily injury “does not necessarily
establish the defendant acted with malice aforethought”]; People
v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598 [same].)
Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
19
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