CourtListener 10295527•In re A.J. CA3
Full text
Filed 12/17/24 In re A.J. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
In re A.J., a Person Coming Under C099657
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY (Super. Ct. No.
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, STKJDDP20200000248)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.J. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
J.J. (father) and J.R. (mother) (collectively, parents) appeal from juvenile court
orders under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating their parental
rights to their daughter, A.J. (daughter). Mother contends the court prejudicially erred by
applying an improper factor in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to
adoption (the parental relationship exception) inapplicable. And father contends the court
prejudicially erred by appointing a guardian ad litem for him without due process.
1
Because parents fail to show prejudicial error, we affirm. Statutory references are
to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2020, the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (the agency) filed a
petition in juvenile court to assert dependency jurisdiction over daughter (age 8) after
father and his girlfriend refused to pick up daughter from a hospital following a mental
health hold. Daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, had attempted suicide three times, had daily
violent tantrums, and had been physically violent toward her sister (also parents’ child;
sister). Father and girlfriend indicated they were unable and unwilling to resume care for
daughter.
The court ordered daughter detained in protective custody, later adjudged her a
dependent of the court, and ordered reunification services. Daughter was placed with
caregivers in July 2020, where she remained throughout the case.
I
Father’s Relationship with Daughter During Reunification Services
Father and daughter had one-hour remote visits twice per week, but father
sometimes ended the visits within the first 15 to 30 minutes. Father also had to be
reminded that he could not have girlfriend involved in the visits because her involvement
made daughter anxious and upset.
In October 2020, daughter alleged multiple incidents of emotional and physical
abuse by girlfriend and made it clear she did not want to return to father’s home if
girlfriend would be there. In March 2021, daughter no longer wanted visits with father
because of girlfriend’s continued involvement with him. By April 2021, father opted to
sever his relationship with girlfriend to mend his relationship with his children; when
informed of that decision, daughter expressed an interest in phone visits. By August
2021, one impromptu, in-person contact with father had occurred and went well, so
2
supervised visits were being set up. But between then and January 2022, although father
completed his case plan objectives, daughter was reluctant to visit father outside of larger
family gatherings.
II
Mother’s Relationship with Daughter During Reunification Services
At the time the petition was filed, mother had lost custody of daughter and sister to
father and mother’s whereabouts were unknown. According to the agency, it appeared
that mother did not have a steady presence in daughter’s life in the last few years.
In August 2020, mother made her first appearance in this case and received
authorization for supervised visits. At first, daughter did not want visits but started them
remotely in October 2020. Before the visits began, daughter told the social worker she
wanted to go back to mother but stay with her caregivers for now. The social worker
described mother’s “lack of parent-to-child bonding [or] involvement” as a problem
requiring intervention.
In a separate proceeding in November 2020, sister was detained from father’s
custody and placed with a relative. Supervised in-person visits for daughter with mother
and sister began in February 2021 and progressed to overnight visits. But the overnight
visits soon brought up hostile sibling rivalry issues, and by September 2021, daughter no
longer felt safe with sister. According to one of daughter’s caregivers, daughter also felt
that mother could not protect her from sister.
Although mother completed her case plan objectives, the attempt to resume joint
sibling overnight visits at her home failed, presenting a problem after sister was placed in
family maintenance with mother. Mother had difficulty managing the siblings together
and understanding daughter’s mental health needs. By January 2022, daughter did not
want to visit mother outside of visits that included extended family or other caregivers.
3
III
Family Counseling Unsuccessful
Family counseling was put in place for daughter, father, mother, and sister to
address daughter’s reluctance to visit, but daughter either remained silent during the
sessions or provided “I don’t know or I don’t remember” responses to questions. The
sessions also resulted in stress that caused daughter’s behavior to decline.
At a February 2022 hearing, the social worker indicated that daughter’s behavioral
health team did not think the counseling sessions were a good idea. The social worker
recommended ending them because they were not in daughter’s best interest. The court
agreed not to force her to participate in them. Daughter ended up attending only a few
sessions and later refused to participate in them altogether.
At the same February 2022 hearing, father and mother asked for discretion for the
agency to increase visits, but daughter’s counsel responded that daughter did not want an
increase and wanted “things to maintain the way that they are right now.” The court
granted the agency discretion if daughter changed her mind.1
IV
Termination of Reunification Services
At the 18-month review hearing2 held in April 2022, the agency recommended
termination of reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. According to
1 Neither parent questioned the propriety of the court’s visitation orders or their
enforcement. (See In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046 [when child refuses
visitation, it is the parent’s burden to request a specific type of enforcement].
2 Administration of dependency cases requires recurrent reviews of the status of the
parents and the children. (In re Candace P. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.) These
reviews are referred to as “6-month,” “12-month,” and “18-month” reviews. (Ibid.) The
18-month review hearing represents a critical juncture in a dependency proceeding. (In
re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 563; see § 366.22, subd. (a).) The minor must either be
4
the social worker, daughter was doing well with her caregivers, had not had any
psychiatric placements, was fearful of father’s home, did not feel safe in mother’s home
because of issues with sister, and felt safest with her caregivers. The agency argued that
returning daughter home would cause her to lose the progress she had made.
In a report for the hearing, the social worker provided additional insight on
daughter’s thinking. On one occasion in December 2021, daughter told the social worker
she wanted to stay with her caregivers “until she [was] ready to go home” with mother,
but daughter was also clear that she would not be “ready” for some time. When pressed
for more specifics, daughter responded, “I don’t know, I can’t remember,” a response the
social worker attributed to daughter’s mental health trauma. Daughter otherwise
consistently stated she wanted to stay with her caregivers.
Father objected to a section 366.26 hearing and argued that insufficient
reunification services were provided. Mother admitted that daughter and sister “just
don’t really get along” and that family counseling was ineffective. But mother
maintained that the record showed daughter still wanted a relationship with mother and
sister.
The court found it was not substantially probable that daughter would be returned
to parents within 18 months of the original detention, ordered reunification services
terminated, and set a section 366.26 hearing. The court allowed visitation with parents to
continue if it did not disturb daughter’s mental health.
returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or the court must terminate
reunification services and set a hearing for the selection and implementation of a
permanent plan (a section 366.26 hearing). (In re J.E., at pp. 563-564.)
5
V
Section 366.26 Hearing and Appointment of Guardian ad Litem
The section 366.26 hearing was originally scheduled for August 2022 but was
stayed for several months by father’s writ petition to this court.3
In August 2022, the agency reported that daughter had not visited father since a
family gathering in December 2021, had not visited mother since January 1, 20224 but
was open to receiving letters. Daughter reported feeling anxious during and after visits
with parents and displayed anxiety simply when parents were discussed. Meanwhile, she
felt stable, safe, and secure with her caregivers and continued to work on her emotional
wellbeing through individual therapy and rehabilitation services. Daughter also
consistently stated her desire to be adopted. After concluding that loss of the parental
relationship did not outweigh the stability of a permanent adoptive home, the agency
recommended adoption.
In January 2023, the agency reported that daughter started accepting visitation
with mother and father in November 2022 for daughter’s birthday but was not ready for
consistent visits. According to daughter’s caregiver, daughter was scared, daughter didn’t
know mother, sister was always mean to daughter, and father didn’t listen to daughter
when she told him she was being hurt.
After the stay was lifted, the section 366.26 hearing was set for April 2023, but
father’s counsel requested a continuance and appointment of a guardian ad litem to
provide “additional help to understand the legal processes.” Not wanting to “leave an
appealable issue,” the agency asked the court to go and ahead and appoint the guardian ad
3 Father’s writ concerned the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1912) and is not
relevant to this appeal.
4 It does appear that daughter spent time with parents, sister, and extended family at
father’s February 2022 wedding and in March 2022.
6
litem, after which the court requested an assessment for father. Two months later (June
2023), the agency informed the court that no date was set for the assessment due to a
backlog and asked the court to proceed with the appointment. Father’s counsel agreed,
and the court proceeded with the appointment “for judicial economy.”
The following month, the agency filed a supplemental report for the section
366.26 hearing. Daughter was now seeing mother once a month on average, but there
was no set visitation schedule. As to father, daughter’s lack of interest in visits with him
was further cemented after she participated in a forensic interview in February 2023 that
caused her to relive certain trauma. Meanwhile, daughter had shown much progress
since the agency’s last report. Her grades had improved, and she had met nearly all her
therapeutic goals. She also made it clear that although she enjoyed family visits, she
would like to complete the adoption process. The agency continued to recommend
adoption.
The section 366.26 hearing occurred in September 2023. A social worker testified
that mother had spoken to daughter a few days before the hearing, had not visited
daughter for the two months before that, and saw daughter about once per month in the
last year. Visits with mother depended on when mother reached out to request them.
Daughter, now almost 12 years old, testified that she considered the other kids in
her caretakers’ home siblings and wanted to be adopted by her caretakers. When father’s
counsel asked if she would prefer guardianship if that meant she could see her family
when she wanted, daughter responded, “I don’t know.” And when father’s counsel asked
how she would feel if she never got to see or talk with mother, she responded, “Sad.” But
when counsel asked if she wanted an ability to have a relationship with mother, she
answered, “Well, I don’t really know.”
Both parents asked the court to allow guardianship. They argued that daughter did
not understand the difference between guardianship and adoption and was unsure of what
she wanted. Mother added that daughter had spent most of her life in the care of her
7
family, maintained a good relationship with parents, and would be sad if her ability to
communicate with her family was severed. And father, among various other arguments,
claimed that daughter clearly wanted to maintain a relationship with her family while
living with her caregivers and that severance from her family would cause trauma to her
detriment.
VI
Section 366.26 Ruling
The court found the evidence clear and convincing that daughter was adoptable.
Moving to the parental relationship exception, it found that parents did not demonstrate
they had the requisite connection, noting that daughter “did not wish to visit” father
because of emotional issues and visits with mother had “stopped for a significant period
of time” and only recently resumed on a monthly basis. The court stated parents’ duty to
show “that the strength and quality of the relationship outweighs the security and sense of
belonging” in the adoptive family. The court noted that daughter’s current home gave
daughter a stable environment and a sense of belonging and reasoned that daughter’s
report that she would be sad if she could not see her family was a “typical response” that
did not outweigh the benefits and stability of the permanent home.
The court concluded by noting that while parents love daughter and want the best
for her, they had “to show that they’ve been in a parental role, and that has not happened.
They’ve not made the parental decisions in their child’s life when they’re rarely visiting.
The parental roles shifted to the caregiver, and I think that’s what transpired.” The court
found it was in daughter’s best interest to have parental rights terminated.
Father and mother timely appealed.
8
DISCUSSION
I
Parental Relationship Exception
Mother contends the juvenile court prejudicially erred by relying on an improper
factor in finding the parental relationship exception inapplicable. We disagree. Even
assuming error, we find no prejudice.
If the court determines that the child is adoptable, it must “terminate parental
rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless an exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) One such exception is the parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) In 2021, our Supreme Court clarified the elements needed to prove that
exception in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). A parent must establish
three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) the parent maintained ‘regular
visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation
permitted’; (2) ‘the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent’;
and (3) ‘terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home [the third
element].’ ” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 815, quoting Caden C., at
p. 636.)
Here, mother focuses on the juvenile court’s final comment that parents were
required to show they had been in a “parental role.” According to mother, this comment
indicates that the court relied on an improper factor under Caden C. that requires
reconsideration by the juvenile court. We conclude that any error in this regard was
harmless. (In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 531.)
Although Caden C. never explicitly questioned use of the phrase “parental role,”
some courts interpreting Caden C. have suggested that the phrase is ambiguous and can
“create more problems than it solves.” (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 211; In
re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 319.) Nevertheless, a parent must still show
9
that the child has “a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) This is where mother fails to show prejudice in the
court’s “parental role” comment.
Mother emphasizes the fact that daughter had been in mother’s care for most of
daughter’s life (until age 8) and reminds us that daughter previously indicated a desire to
return to mother’s care. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [relationship may be
shaped by portion of child’s life spent in the parent’s custody]; id. [courts often consider
how children feel about their parents].) But the record shows that mother had not been a
steady presence in daughter’s life during a few years preceding the petition. And the
record overwhelmingly shows that daughter’s attachment to mother over the course of the
proceedings was detached and ambivalent at best. Such detachment and ambivalence do
not evidence the required connection. (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230 [no
emotional attachment when interactions between parent and child are ambivalent,
detached, or indifferent].)
Early in the case, mother obtained permission for overnight visits but most of
those visits did not occur because of daughter’s refusal to attend and mother’s inability to
understand daughter’s mental health needs and manage her conflicts with sister. In
response, family counseling was instituted but was short-lived because daughter
struggled with the sessions and ultimately disengaged. Then daughter stopped seeing
mother (outside of father’s wedding) for an extended period because daughter was not
interested. After that, daughter resumed irregular monthly visits with mother but only
when mother expressed interest. And at the section 366.26 hearing, daughter stated she
wasn’t sure she wanted to continue a relationship with mother. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [courts may “consider how children feel about, interact with, look to,
or talk about their parents”].) Given this record, it is not reasonably probable that the
juvenile court would have found daughter had a substantial, positive, emotional
relationship with mother had it not considered mother’s parental role in daughter’s life.
10
(In re J.R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 533 [Caden C. error harmless in the absence of
evidence of a substantial, positive, emotional attachment]; In re Celine R. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60 [judgment in dependency case should not be set aside for error
unless it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to appealing
party but for the error].)
Mother’s effort to argue otherwise is unpersuasive. The fact that daughter
“enjoyed” visits with various family members after reunification services were
terminated and that her recent visits with mother “went well for the most part” does not
establish the requisite connection. In her reply brief, mother suggests that daughter
unequivocally expressed her love for mother. But mother takes daughter’s statement out
of context. At the 18-month hearing, a social worker described conversations she had
with daughter about returning home to parents. According to the social worker, daughter
“in essence” communicated that while she loved parents, she was fearful of father’s
home, did not feel safe in mother’s home, and felt safest in her caretakers’ home. This
testimony does not establish the requisite connection with mother; rather, it reinforces
daughter’s complicated and sometimes negative relationship with parents.
Anticipating this conclusion, mother contends the records forming the basis of the
juvenile court’s decision were inadequate because the social worker did not observe the
visits between mother and daughter or try to objectively ascertain daughter’s feelings
toward mother. In support, mother relies on three cases that reversed juvenile court
rulings entered before Caden C. was decided. (In re Dy.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153,
161, 170; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 849, 854; In re D.M. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 261, 267, 271.) But here, Caden C. had been decided months before the
agency filed its 12-month report, so mother had the benefit of Caden C. and could have
challenged the reports in the juvenile court. By failing to do so, she forfeited any
argument about their adequacy. (See In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-
412.)
11
Also, mother fails to show error as to the third element of the parental relationship
exception, namely, terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even
when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (See In re
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 322, fn. 10 [a failure of proof on any of the
elements is fatal].) For this element, the court must consider the harm to the child of
severing the relationship and whether that harm outweighs the benefits of the adoptive
home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) And we review the juvenile court’s
determination “under a hybrid standard, reviewing [the juvenile court’s] factual
determinations concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence but its ultimate
weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of
discretion.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068.)
Here, the only harm mother described at the hearing was daughter’s sadness if she
could not communicate with her family anymore, and mother essentially restates this
claim on appeal. But there is no evidence that daughter experienced emotional instability
or depression when a visit with mother ended or when daughter opted against visits with
her for an extended period. Nor does mother address the evidence of daughter’s
indifference toward mother and mother’s struggle with understanding daughter’s mental
health needs. Furthermore, against daughter’s anticipated sadness weighed the offsetting
benefits of the adoptive home where daughter had lived for over three years and
developed a strong sense of belonging and security. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633 [stable home may alleviate emotional instability of loss of parent].) The balance
the court reached was not an abuse of discretion, and it is not reasonably likely the court
would have found that the scale tipped in favor of continuing mother’s relationship with
daughter and therefore declined to find daughter suitable for adoption had it not
considered mother’s parental role. Any error in the court’s parental role comment was
harmless.
12
II
Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem
Father contends the trial court committed prejudicial error when it appointed him a
guardian ad litem. The agency contends father consented to the appointment and, even if
he did not, any error in the appointment was harmless. We disagree that father consented
but agree that the error was harmless.
A. The Error
In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear through a
guardian ad litem. (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 904 (James F.); Code Civ.
Proc., § 372.) The test for competence “is whether the parent has the capacity to
understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in
preparing the case.” (James F., at p. 910.) Such an appointment “radically changes the
parent’s role, transferring direction and control of the litigation from the parent to
the [guardian ad litem].” (In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67, 70 (Samuel A.).)
“Consequently, the appointment must be approached with care and appreciation of its
very significant legal effect.” (Id. at p. 79.)
Before making the appointment, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing
at which the purpose and powers of a guardian ad litem and the reasons for believing the
parent incompetent are explained to the parent. (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 904.)
If the parent consents to the appointment, the parent’s due process rights are satisfied.
(Id. at p. 910.) If the court appoints a guardian ad litem without the parent’s consent, the
record must contain substantial evidence of the parent’s incompetence. (Id. at p. 911.)
Here, although the agency appears to concede error in the appointment, it cursorily
asserts that father’s silence when the guardian ad litem was appointed should be
construed as consent to the appointment. We disagree. There is no evidence the court
explained the concept of a guardian ad litem to father, nor is there evidence that the court
asked for father’s consent. (In re Joann E. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 355-356.)
13
Because there was no consent, the record must contain substantial evidence of father’s
incompetence. Agency cites no such evidence, so we conclude the appointment was error
and turn to whether that error was harmless. (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 918-
919.)
B. The Error was Harmless
In this harmless error review, we ask whether the appointment of the guardian ad
litem affected the “outcome of a proceeding.” (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 918.)
Father contends we should limit our review to the outcome of the proceeding that resulted
in the guardian ad litem appointment. In his view, because there was no consent or
finding of incompetence, the error was prejudicial. In support, he cites Samuel A. for the
principle that “error in appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent without a supportable
finding of incompetence is [prejudicial] under any standard.” (Samuel A., supra,
69 Cal.App.5th at p. 82, fn. 10.) We disagree because Samuel A. is distinguishable.
In Samuel A., the juvenile court had appointed a guardian ad litem during the
reunification period, and the parent directly appealed from the appointment order.
(Samuel A., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 77-78.) Due to that procedural posture, the
court was considering the prejudicial effect on the appointment order, not any subsequent
orders. A better analogy to our facts is found in In re Esmeralda S. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 84. There the reviewing court considered an appeal from an order
terminating parental rights, and the parent asserted a due process challenge to an order
appointing a guardian ad litem earlier in the proceedings. (Id. at pp. 87, 92-93.) After
agreeing with the due process violation, the reviewing court turned to the harmless error
analysis. (Id. at p. 92.) The court acknowledged that the phrase “outcome of a
proceeding” in James F. was unclear. (Id. at p. 93.) But, after considering the policy
analysis in James F. stressing the importance of avoiding needless reversals of
dependency judgments, the court concluded that the appointment error “may be deemed
14
harmless if the outcome of the review hearings [was] not affected by the violation.”
(Ibid.) We agree that this is the “more efficient and sensible test.” (Id. at p. 94.)
Applying this test, father contends the error was nevertheless prejudicial because
“it is not clear the outcome of the section 366.26 hearing would have been the same if the
[guardian] had not been appointed.” According to father, “there is a real possibility that
the court may have ordered a permanent plan . . . if father had been allowed to testify or
directly participate in the decisions regarding the trial strategy.” Father’s contentions are
not persuasive.
“[A] finding that the juvenile court’s error was prejudicial must be based on a
claim of prejudice rather than speculation of possible prejudice – because it is simply
inefficient to reverse a dependency judgment based upon speculation that an offending
parent may have handled the case differently than his or her [guardian ad litem].” (In re
Esmeralda S., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 96 (emphasis added).) Father’s contentions
are speculation of prejudice. The appointment occurred after reunification services had
been terminated and shortly before the section 366.26 hearing. At this stage, the issues
are limited to whether the child is adoptable and whether there is a statutory exception to
adoption. (In re Matthew Z. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 545, 552-553.) Father does not
contend that appointment of the guardian ad litem prevented him from providing
additional evidence regarding those issues. Indeed, the guardian ad litem never spoke at
the hearing and, unlike Samuel A. where the court prohibited the parent with a guardian
ad litem from communicating directly with counsel (Samuel A., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 77, 81), nothing in the record here suggests similar communication impediments were
imposed on father. (See also James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 917 [nothing in the record
suggested the parent was unable to express his wishes to the court].)
Also, father does not claim he could have offered additional facts via his testimony
or other evidence. (See In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 673 [parent’s
additional witnesses were not called after guardian ad litem was appointed for parent].)
15
In that regard, it is noteworthy that father does not challenge the court’s finding regarding
the parental relationship exception. Instead, he speculates that the “result of the
termination hearing [had the guardian ad litem] not been appointed is [unknown].” Such
speculation is insufficient particularly because the record shows daughter was open only
to receiving letters from father as of August 2022 and had no in-person visits with father
throughout this case outside of larger family gatherings and community visits. These
facts predate the guardian ad litem’s appointment in 2023. Father does not attempt to
articulate how he could have shown that daughter had a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to him or that termination of his relationship with daughter would be
detrimental to her. For these reasons, we conclude that the outcome of the termination
proceeding would have been the same and the error in appointing a guardian ad litem for
father was harmless.5
5 We need not determine whether the harm should be analyzed under the standard for
state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, the more exacting
standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24,
or some intermediate standard of prejudice. (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 911, fn. 1.)
The error here was not prejudicial under even the more exacting standard.
16
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.
/s/
RENNER, J.
17
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.