People v. Harris CA2/7

CourtListener 10292744CalctappDec 13, 2024

Full text

Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Harris CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B335872

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA082311)
v.

YONGDA HUANG HARRIS,

Petitioner and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Christopher W. Dybwad, Judge. Affirmed.
Miriam K. Billington, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Petitioner and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________
Yongda Huang Harris petitioned the superior court for a
finding of factual innocence under Penal Code section 851.8,
subdivision (c)1, more than 10 years after the dismissal of a felony
charge against him for possession of a blackjack. No arguable
issues have been identified by Harris’s appointed appellate
counsel following her review of the record or by Harris in his
supplemental letter brief to this court. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. October 5, 2012 Incident at LAX
On October 5, 2012, Harris arrived at Los Angeles
International (LAX) Airport from Japan. A United States
Customs and Border Protection (Customs) officer noticed Harris
was wearing what appeared to be body armor underneath his
trench coat and selected him for secondary screening. Harris was
found to be “wearing a ballistic vest with two steel trauma plates,
flame-retardant leggings, and knee pads.” (Harris v. United
States (C.D.Cal., Aug. 9, 2017, No. 2:16-cv-05606-CAS)
2017 U.S.Dist. Lexis 127302, *2 (Harris).) Harris “voluntarily
disclosed” to Customs officers that his luggage contained
“[v]arious slapjack or sap[2] self defense items.”
Harris’s two pieces of checked luggage were searched.
Customs officers found “a smoke grenade; three leadfilled billy
clubs; a collapsible tactical baton[;] two human-sized bags; a bone

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 “Black’s Law Dictionary defines a ‘sap’ as ‘[a] club, a
blackjack, a hose containing rocks in the middle, or any other
object generally used as a bludgeon.’ ” (People v. Mayberry (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 165, 170.)

2
saw; a folding saw; a hatchet; an ice pick; a gas mask with a set
of extra filters; a full[-]body biohazard suit; two pairs of
protective boot covers; an oven mitt; a set of cooking tongs[;]
three black full-face ski masks; several pairs of protective
eyeware [sic]; black tactical gloves; a box of black latex-free
examination gloves; thin black fabric gloves[;] a blindfold; a white
S&M style mask with zippers over the eyes and mouth; a set of
hearing protection muffs; a large pair of headphones[;] three
camping style hats; an eye patch; a false beard and adhesive;
binoculars; knives[;] several rolls of duct tape; a pair of metal
hand cuffs; a set of steel leg irons; numerous plastic flexi-cuffs in
multiple sizes[;] batteries[;] a small digital video recorder; several
blank video recording cassettes; a pair of wire cutters; three pairs
of scissor; approximately 50 condoms; [and] an electronic device
to repel dogs.” (Harris, supra, 2017 U.S.Dist. Lexis 127302, at
**2-3.)
Additionally, Harris’s laptop computer was found to contain
“Japanese anime and manga graphically depicting the rape,
molestation, and sexual torture of children,” “publications that
dealt with instructing how to kill people,” “guides to defeating
alarms, locks and security systems,” and “information regarding
Rohypnol and other date-rape drugs.” (Harris, supra,
2017 U.S.Dist. Lexis 127302, at **3-4.) In addition, “Harris had
several cover letters seeking employment as an English teacher
at various schools in Japan. There was a Word document which
included the schedule for schools in Japan (Harris worked as an
English teacher at a junior high school in Japan in 2011), which
included notations about when children arrived and left school.
The Word documents also listed about 24 remote, vacant plots of
land in Japan, notations about the proximity of those locations to

3
different junior high and high schools, descriptions of the
remoteness and isolation of each vacant lot, information about an
hourly ‘love hotel’ in the same area as the school, and information
about free graveyard land for Muslims in Japan.” (Id. at p. *4.)
Harris was arrested.3 (Harris, supra, 2017 U.S.Dist. Lexis
127302, at *5.)

B. The Federal Case
In November 2012, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment on one count charging that Harris “knowingly and
willfully made material false, fictitious, and fraudulent
statements on a customs declaration form,” in violation of
18 U.S.C. section 1001. The indictment charged that Harris
falsely identified China as the only country he had visited prior to
arriving in the United States and lied about the value of the
merchandise he had acquired abroad. (Harris, supra,
2017 U.S.Dist. Lexis 127302, at **6-7.)
In December 2012, Harris entered a guilty plea, and the
district court placed him on probation for five years. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed his conviction. (United States v. Harris (9th Cir.
2015) 611 Fed. Appx. 480, 481.) In 2017, Harris successfully
moved under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 to set aside his guilty plea.
(Harris v. United States, supra, 2017 U.S.Dist. Lexis 127302, at
p. *28.) The district court determined that, before pleading
guilty, Harris was never advised that an element of the charge
under 18 U.S.C. section 1001 was that Harris knew his

3 The record is unclear as to which agency arrested Harris.
However, Harris contends he was in the custody of the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD), taken to a station, and
questioned by LAPD detectives.

4
statements on the customs declaration form were false. The
court found Harris’s plea was invalid on this basis and vacated
the judgment and commitment order. (Id. at **18, 27-29.) The
court subsequently granted the government’s application to
dismiss the indictment against Harris. (Harris v. United States
(C.D.Cal. Aug. 14, 2019, No. 2:16-CV-06169-CAS) 2019 U.S.Dist.
Lexis 138439, *3 [referencing earlier proceeding in which
indictment was dismissed].)
In 2019, the district court denied Harris’s motion for
expungement of his criminal records associated with the arrest at
LAX, finding in part that Harris “fail[ed] to demonstrate that his
arrests were unlawful or otherwise invalid.” (Harris v. United
States, supra, 2019 U.S.Dist. Lexis 138439, at *15.)

C. The State Court Case
In November 2012, the People filed a felony complaint for
an arrest warrant alleging that on or about October 5, 2012,
Harris “unlawfully manufacture[d], cause[d] to be manufactured,
import[ed] into the State of California, ke[pt] for sale, offer[ed]
and expose[d] for sale, and g[ave], len[t], and possess[ed] an
instrument and weapon of the kind commonly known as a
blackjack,” in violation of section 22210. On January 28, 2013, a
copy of Harris’s signed plea agreement regarding his federal
conviction was filed with the superior court. In May 2013, the
trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the case in the
furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385.

5
D. Section 851.8 Petition
On April 24, 2023, Harris filed a motion for a finding of
factual innocence under section 851.8. He argued the LAPD
wrongfully arrested him in October 2012 at LAX Airport because
the officers “had no probable cause and no legitimate legal reason
to arrest petitioner.” Harris contended section 22210 did not
apply “to travelers transiting LAX who did not stay in the state of
CA.” He requested appointment of counsel and a telephonic
hearing.4
The superior court appointed counsel. Harris’s counsel
filed a supplemental pleading arguing “[n]o reasonable person
would believe that the defendant would be subject to California
law since the jurisdiction [at LAX Airport] is solely controlled by
the United States/federal government,” and “[t]he incident should
never have been reported to the local police (LAPD), for
prosecution by the state government.” The petition did not cite
any authority for the proposition that incidents that occurred at
LAX Airport were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government.
Similarly, at the hearing on the petition, Harris’s counsel
conceded he had no authority to support a finding of exclusive

4 The record includes a minute order from March 24, 2023,
demonstrating the superior court granted Harris’s petition under
section 851.91 to seal his arrest record and to deem “the arrest
. . . not to have occurred.” (§ 851.91, subd. (a) [“[a] person who
has suffered an arrest that did not result in a conviction may
petition the court to have his or her arrest and related records
sealed” without a finding of factual innocence].) In his April 2023
petition, Harris stated he did not want to seal his arrest record;
instead, “he wanted [a] determination of factual innocence and
expungement.”

6
federal jurisdiction. The superior court denied the petition. The
court concluded the state complaint “appears to [have] be[en]
dismissed because [Harris] pled in federal court to . . . an event
arising from the exact same stop that’s the basis of the state
prosecution.” In reviewing the federal plea agreement, the court
noted Harris “admitt[ed] specifically that his luggage [was]
searched and . . . to currency in the luggage and making false
statements. But that appears to suggest that, at the very least,
the officers had a reasonable basis to bring the charge that was
brought in the particular case.” Harris did not attend the
hearing.
Harris timely appealed. (§ 851.8, subd. (p)(1).) Although
there is no right to appointed counsel for a section 851.8 petition
or appeal (People v. Scott M. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 688, 702-703,
disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Adair (2003)
29 Cal.4th 895, 908, fn. 6 (Adair)), counsel was appointed to
represent Harris in this appeal. After a review of the record,
Harris’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) stating she did not
identify any arguable issues and advised Harris that he could
submit a supplemental brief identifying contentions this court
should consider. On August 26, 2024, Harris filed a
supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 851.8
“In any case where a person has been arrested, and an
accusatory pleading has been filed, but where no conviction has
occurred, the defendant may, at any time after dismissal of the
action, petition . . . for a finding that the defendant is factually
innocent of the charges for which the arrest was made.” (§ 851.8,

7
subd. (c).) “A finding of factual innocence, however, shall not be
made unless the trial court ‘finds that no reasonable cause exists
to believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the
arrest was made.’ ” (People v. O’Day (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 426,
432 (O’Day); see § 851.8, subd. (b).) “The defendant bears the
initial burden of proof to show no such reasonable cause exists.”
(O’Day, at p. 433.) “Reasonable cause” is defined as “that state of
facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to
believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” (Adair, supra,
29 Cal.4th 895, 904 [cleaned up].)
“A petitioner’s burden to establish factual innocence has
been described as ‘ “incredibly high” ’ and as requiring ‘ “no doubt
whatsoever.” ’ ” (People v. Mazumder (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 732,
738.) “[T]he record must exonerate, not merely raise a
substantial question as to guilt.” (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 909; accord, People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449,
1459.) “If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden
of proof shifts to the prosecution to show the existence of
reasonable cause.” (O’Day, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) The
superior court may determine factual innocence based “upon
declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any other evidence
submitted by the parties which is material, relevant, and
reliable.” (§ 851.8, subd. (b).)
A section 851.8 petition “may be filed up to two years from
the date of the arrest or filing of the accusatory pleading,
whichever is later. . . . Any time restrictions on filing for relief
. . . may be waived upon a showing of good cause by the petitioner
and in the absence of prejudice.” (§ 851.8, subd. (l).)

8
“[W]e apply an independent standard of review and
consider the record de novo in deciding whether it supports the
trial court’s ruling.” (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905.)

B. The Superior Court Properly Denied Harris’s Petition
Harris was charged with violating section 22210, which
punishes “any person in this state who . . . imports into the state,
keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives, lends, or
possesses any leaded cane, or any instrument or weapon of the
kind commonly known as a billy, blackjack, sandbag, sandclub,
sap, or slungshot . . . .” The statute turns on possession and does
not require proving malicious intent or wrongful use of the
instrument or weapon. (See People v. Baugh (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 438, 443 [“Section 22210 criminalizes possession
of all dangerous weapons, not just their use or the intent to use
them.”].)
Harris argues his petition for a determination of factual
innocence should have been granted because (1) the search of his
luggage was illegal; (2) he was not in possession of the prohibited
item because the item was in his checked luggage; and (3) section
22210 did not apply to him because he was simply “transiting”
the prohibited item through California on his way to
Massachusetts, rather than “import[ing] it into the state.”5
Harris’s contentions are meritless.
Harris suggests his petition for a factual innocence
determination should be granted because an illegal search led to

5 Harris also complains about the treatment he received from
LAPD officers while detained. However, his alleged
mistreatment is not relevant to whether he is factually innocent
of the charge.

9
the recovery of the blackjack. However, in deciding a section
851.8 petition, the superior court “may consider otherwise
inadmissible evidence—such as police reports and evidence
suppressed pursuant to section 1538.5,” which addresses the
exclusion of evidence based on an illegal search or seizure.
(Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 905.) Thus, even if the blackjack
found in Harris’s checked luggage was the fruit of an illegal
search, we may consider the presence of that blackjack in the
luggage in determining whether Harris’s section 851.8 motion
was properly denied.
Harris also argues that he never had “physical control” of
the items in his suitcase because “they were in secured checked
luggage.” That contention likewise fails to demonstrate his
factual innocence. “ ‘The law recognizes two kinds of possession:
actual possession and constructive possession. A person who
knowingly has direct physical control over a thing is then in
actual possession of it. A person who, although not in actual
possession, knowingly has the right of control over a thing, either
directly or through another person or persons, is then in
constructive possession of it.’ ” (People v. Azevedo (1984)
161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242-43, disapproved of on other grounds by
People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617.) Thus, “[c]onstructive
possession exists where a defendant maintains some control or
right to control contraband that is in the actual possession of
another.” (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 417.)
Harris concedes in his supplemental brief that “various
slapjack or sap self defense items were found” in “his two checked
bags,” after he “voluntarily disclosed he had them” to Customs
officers. Harris’s admissions demonstrate he had constructive
possession of two checked bags, one of which contained the

10
blackjack. (See People v. Hampton (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 515,
523 [“Appellant’s contention that he did not exercise dominion or
control over the footlocker because he did not carry it is without
merit. Possession does not require actual physical contact;
constructive possession is sufficient.”].) “Constructive possession
. . . exists when one checks baggage with an airline.” (United
States v. Peart (11th Cir. 1989) 888 F.2d 101, 105; see United
States v. Ocampo-Guarin (1st Cir. 1992) 968 F.2d 1406, 1409-10
[defendant was in constructive possession of checked suitcase and
the cocaine it contained where defendant was responsible for
bringing the suitcase from abroad into the United States and
there was no dispute she intended to reclaim suitcase].)
Harris also contends his luggage “was being automatically
transferred onto a connecting flight” to Massachusetts, and
section 22210 does not apply to persons just “transiting” a
prohibited item through California to a final out-of-state
destination. Even assuming this fact would help exonerate
Harris, he submitted no evidence in connection with his petition
showing he had a connecting flight and did not intend to reclaim
his luggage at LAX.
In sum, the record before us does not exonerate Harris from
a charge pursuant to section 22210. (See Adair, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 909.)
Harris also raises ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
including counsel’s failure to proffer the arguments raised in
Harris’s supplemental brief, to research the exclusive federal
jurisdiction argument, and to inform the superior court that
Harris’s federal plea had been set aside and his conviction
vacated. Harris also contends that his counsel “prevent[ed] his
client Mr. Harris from appearing by phone to bring up these very

11
cogent and essential legal facts to support his innocence” and
“made his client miss the court hearing.”
Harris did not have a constitutional right to counsel in
connection with his section 851.8 petition, and thus any claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit. (People v. Scott M.,
supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at pp. 702-703 [“The proceedings
contemplated by section 851.8 occur after any state action or
criminal proceeding has terminated favorably toward the
defendant, and the right to have records expunged is a purely
statutory one, invoked against the state at the request of the
subject of the records.”]; cf. People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412,
489 [“claim that habeas corpus counsel is burdened by an
unconstitutional conflict of interest . . . lacks merit . . . because
there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel in state habeas corpus proceedings”].)
In any event, counsel is not ineffective for failing to make
arguments that lack merit. (See, e.g., People v. Solomon (2010)
49 Cal.4th 792, 843, fn. 24; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585,
616.) Notwithstanding his assertion that he was prohibited from
providing “cogent and essential legal facts” at the evidentiary
hearing, Harris has not shown that the facts he would have
provided were “material, relevant and reliable” to the court’s
determination of factual innocence. (Compare People v.
Chagoyan (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 810, 818 [superior court abused
its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing where “ ‘the
testimony appellant sought to present would have constituted
“material, relevant and reliable” evidence [citation] on the issue
of whether there was “reasonable cause to arrest him in the first
place” ’ ”] with People v. Mazumder, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at

12
p. 742 [no evidentiary hearing required under section 851.8
because petitioner was statutorily ineligible for relief].)
Although Harris faults his counsel for failing to alert the
superior court that Harris was allowed to withdraw his plea in
the federal case, he overstates the importance of that fact.
Harris’s plea was set aside because he was not advised that the
government would have to prove he knowingly made false
statements on his customs forms. The district court’s decision did
not suggest Harris was improperly arrested or was improperly
charged with crimes based on the contents of his luggage. To the
contrary, the district court later denied Harris’s motion for
expungement and found Harris “fail[ed] to demonstrate that his
arrests were unlawful or otherwise invalid.” (Harris v. United
States, supra, 2019 U.S.Dist. Lexis 138439, *15.)
Finally, even assuming his counsel was incompetent in
some respect, Harris has also failed to establish that a more
favorable outcome would have resulted but for that
incompetence. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
697 [“a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance
was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies”]; In re Clark
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766 [prejudice requires “a reasonable
probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted”
absent counsel’s alleged incompetence].)6

6 We observe that Harris filed his petition more than 10
years after the accusatory pleading was filed, significantly
beyond the two-year deadline to file a petition set forth in the
statute. (§ 851.8, subd. (l).) Although the time restriction may be
waived upon a showing of good cause and in the absence of
prejudice, Harris did not explain the delay in filing his petition in
the superior court or in this court.

13
No cognizable legal issues have been raised by Harris’s
appellate counsel or by Harris. Further, we have independently
reviewed the record and are satisfied no arguable issue exists.
(See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231-232; see
generally People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Harris’s section 851.8 petition for a
finding of factual innocence is affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

14

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.