CourtListener 10292376•People v. Graham CA1/3
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Filed 12/12/24 P. v. Graham CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170105
v. (Humboldt County
WAYNE RALPH GRAHAM, Super. Ct. No. CR2302747)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted Wayne Ralph Graham of seven counts of being a felon
in possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); undesignated
statutory references are to this code.) It also found true the aggravating
circumstance that he induced others to participate in the commission of the
crime. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a), (b); undesignated rule references
are to these rules.) The trial court sentenced him to seven years, four months
in prison. On appeal, he argues the aggravating circumstance finding is not
supported by substantial evidence and the court incorrectly instructed the
jury on the circumstance. He also challenges his sentence, arguing the court
erroneously relied on his “recent felonies” to impose the aggravated term.
Finally, he challenges certain fines and fees, including a $600 court fine
(§ 1202.5, subd. (a)), arguing the court failed to hold a hearing regarding his
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ability to pay in violation of his constitutional rights. We strike the $600
court fine, but otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
In September 2023, Graham told his friend, Hank Carper, he needed to
retrieve his guns. As a convicted felon, Graham was prohibited from
possessing firearms, and Graham’s sister was storing the guns in a gun safe.
He did not give Carper a reason for needing to get his guns. Carper drove
Graham to his sister’s house. When they arrived, Graham asked his brother-
in-law for the guns. His brother-in-law brought the guns from a garage, and
Graham and Carper put them in the backseat of Carper’s car. Graham’s
sister called the police. Officers arrived and searched the vehicle, finding
seven firearms. A search of the garage revealed different caliber ammunition
in an ammunition box.
The district attorney charged Graham with seven counts of being a
felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and five counts of
being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The
information also alleged he had two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds.
(b)–(i), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)) and that he induced others to participate in
the commission of the crimes (rule 4.421(a)(4)).
A jury found Graham guilty of the firearm possession charges, found
true the prior strike convictions — a 2020 conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and a 2022 conviction for criminal threats
(§ 422) — and found true that he induced Carper to assist in committing the
crimes. The trial court sentenced Graham to seven years, four months in
prison — the upper term of three years on count one, doubled to six years
because of his prior strike; a consecutive term of eight months, doubled to 16
months because of the prior strike for count two; and the upper term of three
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years, doubled to six years for counts three through seven, to run
concurrently. The court also imposed various fines and fees, discussed in
detail below.
DISCUSSION
I.
Graham argues there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
finding on the inducement aggravating circumstance — that he induced
others to participate in the commission of the crime or occupied a position of
leadership or dominance of other participants in the commission. (Rule
4.421(a)(4).) The circumstance is satisfied when the defendant is the
dominant party in planning at least a portion of the crime. (People v. Kellett
(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 949, 961.) After examining “the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact” could have found the aggravating
circumstance allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt, we disagree. (People
v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
The record establishes Graham induced Carper to retrieve the guns.
Graham initiated the plan when he told Carper he needed to get his guns.
(Kellett, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 961.) At Graham’s direction, Carper
drove him to his sister’s house where the guns were stored. (People v. Searle
(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1097 [requiring evidence of directing or prodding
others to participate in the crime].) Indeed, the jury could reasonably infer
Graham solicited Carper’s assistance because he needed someone to drive
him to his sister’s place. (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053
[presuming “in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
could reasonably deduce from the evidence”].) After arriving at the house,
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Carper helped Graham load the guns into the car. (Kellett, at p. 961
[inducement aggravating factor present where defendant and accomplice both
cut chain to property and entered the premises].) To the extent Graham
argues this evidence merely reflects Carper assisted Graham as a friend
rather than being induced, “reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) Substantial
evidence supported the jury’s true finding on the aggravating circumstance.
II.
Graham next contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 3227 — the pattern instruction for the aggravating
circumstance of inducing another to participate in committing the crime —
which defines “induced” as “instructed.” According to Graham, “induced”
does not mean “instructed” and nothing in case law defines the term as such.
The dictionary, he argues, defines “induced” as “persuading or influencing.”
Thus, he concludes, CALCRIM No. 3227 is an incorrect statement of law.
Graham forfeited his right to challenge the instruction on appeal by
failing to object to it below. Parties “may not complain on appeal that an
instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or
incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or
amplifying language.” (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024.) True, the
forfeiture rule does not apply if the instructions are incorrect or an error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights — that is, “resulted in a
miscarriage of justice, making it reasonably probable the defendant would
have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of error.” (People v.
Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249; People v. Mason (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 818, 823; People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886,
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916; § 1259.) But Graham fails to identify any error. (People v. Sullivan
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549 [presuming jury instructions are correct].)
Having independently reviewed CALCRIM No. 3227, we conclude it
“fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law” on the aggravating factor.
(People v. Partlow (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 540, 558; People v. Posey (2004)
32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) The instruction informed jurors that to find the factor
true, the prosecution must prove the defendant “induced others to participate
in the commission of the crimes.” (CALCRIM No. 3227.) It defined induced
as “persuaded, convinced, influenced, or instructed,” a correct statement of
the law. (Ibid.) Specifically, evidence of “inducement” is satisfied if the
defendant “directed or prodded” others into committing the criminal offense.
(People v. Searle, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1097.) The term “instruct” is
synonymous with “direct.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Thesaurus Online
(2024) <https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/instruct> [as of
Dec. 12, 2024].) Because defining “induce” to include “instruct” accurately
states the law regarding inducement, no error appears. (People v.
McCormack (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 253, 256.)
We are unpersuaded by Graham’s unsupported assertion that
CALCRIM No. 3227’s definition of “induce” is incorrect because it was not
used in any previously drafted pattern jury instructions. (People v. Ibarra
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1188 [rejecting defendant’s argument that
CALJIC instructions solely state the correct law].) There was no error, thus
the instruction did not affect Graham’s substantial rights. (People v. Jimenez
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 730.)
III.
Graham contends the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by
imposing the upper term for his firearm possession offenses. (People v.
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Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988 [abuse of discretion standard of
review for sentencing decisions].) Prior to the trial on the aggravating
circumstances, the court apparently noted it would not instruct the jury that
his prior convictions as an adult “are numerous or of increasing seriousness.”
(Rule 4.421(b)(2).) It observed that Graham’s offenses were less serious than
his prior felony convictions. But at sentencing, the court relied, in part, on
his recent felonies — a 2020 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon; and
a 2022 conviction for criminal threats — to impose the higher term. Graham
argues “recent felonies” is not a valid aggravating factor under rule 4.421,
thus requiring reversal and remand. We disagree.
Where there are three possible terms of imprisonment for a particular
offense, the trial court generally must impose a sentence not exceeding the
middle term. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) An upward departure from the middle
term is authorized if there are aggravating circumstances and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact. (Id., subd. (b)(2),
see also subd. (b)(3) [defendant’s prior convictions may be established by a
certified record of conviction].) Rule 4.421 provides a nonexhaustive list of
factors a court may consider when imposing an aggravated sentence. This
includes the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult if they “are numerous
or of increasing seriousness.” (Rule 4.421(b)(2).) Critically, the court may
also consider other factors that “reasonably relate to the defendant or
circumstances” of the underlying crime. (Rule 4.421(c); People v. Yanaga
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 619, 627.)
Though Graham’s recent felonies decreased in seriousness —
decreasing from assault to possession of firearms — and thus could not
qualify as an aggravating factor under rule 4.421 (b)(2), the trial court here
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properly considered them under rule 4.421(c). (People v. Berry (1981)
117 Cal.App.3d 184, 191.) Graham’s recent felonies reasonably relate to him,
specifically to his recidivism. 1 (People v. Yanaga, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
p. 627 [“ ‘scope of information a sentencing court may consider is very
broad,’ ” since it includes “ ‘facts relating to the defendant which are not
directly connected to commission of the crime for which he is being
sentenced’ ”].) There was no error here, and Graham has not demonstrated
otherwise. The court exercised its informed discretion in imposing the upper
term. (People v. Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.)
Given the above, we reject Graham’s argument that the cumulative
prejudicial impact of the trial court’s errors in assessing the aggravating
circumstances requires us to reverse his sentence. (People v. Sorden (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 582, 618.) Graham has not established any error and thus
cannot establish “a ‘cumulative effect of all the errors’ or ‘cumulative
prejudice.’ ” (Ibid.)
IV.
Graham argues the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the
trial court’s sentencing decision. Specifically, the abstract of judgment
contains a checkmark indicating he was sentenced per section 667,
subdivisions (b)–(i) or section 1170.12 — prior strike convictions that double
his sentence. It then accurately states the total time for Graham’s doubled
1 During oral argument, and for the first time in this appeal, Graham’s
counsel argued that, under Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821,
836–839, a jury was required to make this finding. We decline to consider
this new argument. (New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098 [“[n]ew issues cannot generally be
raised for the first time in oral argument”].) Moreover, the jury here did find
Graham had prior felony convictions, the fact on which the trial court’s
sentencing decision was based.
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sentence due to his prior strike conviction is seven years, four months. But
the abstract of judgment contains a section titled “Other orders,” noting the
“[t]ime imposed for Counts 1-7 doubled due to previous strike prior
conviction.” According to Graham, this section is misleading because the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation may interpret the abstract of
judgment as requiring his total sentence to be doubled to 14 years and eight
months. No correction is necessary.
Courts may order the correction of abstracts of judgment that fail to
accurately reflect the sentencing court’s oral judgment. (People v. Clark
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 260.) The oral pronouncement controls when
“there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment” and the
abstract of judgment. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)
There was no discrepancy here. The court orally pronounced its sentencing
decision, imposing the upper term of three years for count one and a
consecutive term of eight months, one-third the middle term, for count two,
both doubled to a total of seven years, four months, with the sentences on the
remaining counts to run concurrently. The abstract reflects the base
sentence — a checkmark next to the box noting Graham’s sentence was
doubled due to a prior strike conviction — and a total sentence of seven years,
four months. The portion of the abstract that Graham challenges simply
describes how his total sentence was calculated. While it may have been
preferable for the court to omit any additional information in the “Other
orders” section of the abstract of judgment to avoid confusion, its inclusion
does not render the abstract of judgment incorrect.
V.
At Graham’s sentencing, the trial court imposed several fines: a $600
court fine (§ 1202.5, subd. (a)); a $40 court operations assessment fee as to
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each charge (§ 1465.8); a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee as to each
charge (Gov. Code, § 70373); a restitution fine of $2,100 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b));
and a restitution fine of $2,100 that the court ultimately stayed (§ 1202.45).
Graham did not object that he was unable to pay at the sentencing hearing.
Citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164 — requiring “the
trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s
present ability to pay before it imposes” these assessments2 — Graham now
argues the court should not have imposed the two assessment fees and
restitution fine without making a similar determination here.
This claim is forfeited. (People v. Evers (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 551,
556.) The trial court sentenced Graham in 2024, more than four years after
Dueñas was decided. Yet Graham failed to request an ability-to-pay hearing.
(Evers, at p. 556 [“Once case law exists holding that a hearing on ability to
pay is constitutionally required when requested, a defendant who does not
object or ask for a hearing forfeits the claim of error”].) None of Graham’s
arguments persuade us to consider this issue for the first time on appeal.
(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6 [appellate court has
the discretion to address errors raised for the first time on appeal].)
We reject Graham’s argument that his counsel’s failure to object to the
fines and fees deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. While
defendants have the right to effective assistance of counsel, reversal on that
basis is only warranted if “(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had
no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel
2 The California Supreme Court granted limited review in People v.
Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844, to
decide whether the trial court must “consider a defendant’s ability to pay
before imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments,” and “[i]f so, which
party bears the burden of proof regarding the defendant’s inability to pay.”
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was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be
no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
The record here is silent regarding defense counsel’s decision to forgo
objecting to the fines and fees. Indeed, it is entirely possible counsel knew
Graham was able to pay. The probation report submitted by the sheriff noted
that, although Graham reported no assets or debts, he received funding from
his retirement, Social Security, and insurance accounts. On this record, we
cannot conclude he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We do agree, however, that the court was not authorized to impose a
$600 court fine under section 1202.5 for Graham’s firearm possession
offenses. While that section authorizes courts to impose a $10 crime
prevention program fine on enumerated offenses, firearm possession is not
one of them. (§ 1202.5, subd. (a).) The crime prevention program fine must
be stricken. (People v. Allen (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 986, 989–990.) The
People’s argument that the court simply intended to impose the $600 fine
under section 672 — authorizing the court to impose a fine not exceeding
$1,000 for misdemeanors and $10,000 for felonies in addition to terms of
imprisonment — does not alter this conclusion. While the “abstract of
judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction, and cannot prevail over the
court’s oral pronouncement of judgment to the extent the two conflict,” the
court did not mention section 672 when imposing the $600 fine at sentencing.
(People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070.) It simply imposed a $600
court fine. Amending the abstract of judgment to impose the fine under
section 672 is not appropriate here.
DISPOSITION
The $600 crime prevention program fine (§ 1202.5) is stricken. The
judgment as modified is affirmed.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
FUJISAKI, J.
A170105; P. v. Graham
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