People v. Scott CA2/2

CourtListener 10292375CalctappDec 12, 2024

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Filed 12/12/24 P. v. Scott CA2/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B329087

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA029914)
v.

DONYELL DEVONNE SCOTT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Nicole C. Bershon, Judge. Conditionally
affirmed and remanded with directions.

Ahrony Appeals Law Group and Orly Ahrony for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Donyell Devonne Scott (defendant) appeals from his Penal
Code section 1172.75 resentencing.1 The trial court conducted a
full resentencing and imposed a 27-year prison sentence, which
was 17 years less than originally imposed. On appeal, defendant
argues that he is entitled to an even lower sentence. He
challenges nearly every aspect of the resentencing. In a
nonpublished opinion issued on May 2, 2024, we vacated the
judgment and remanded the matter for a full resentencing in
light of the trial court’s failure to strike a five-year sentencing
enhancement pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c).
Defendant filed a petition for review before the California
Supreme Court, which was held pending the resolution of People
v. Walker, S278309. On October 23, 2024, the California
Supreme Court transferred this case back to this court with
directions to vacate our decision and reconsider it in light of
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker). After soliciting
supplemental briefing from the parties, we conditionally affirm
the sentence but remand for the trial court to exercise the
broader range of discretion that Walker accords a trial court
under section 1385, subdivision (c).

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2
FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Underlying Crime
On July 21, 1996, defendant belonged to the Rollin’ 60s
Crips gang. Early that morning, he and his friend Duprees
Green (Green) were having breakfast at a Norms restaurant in
Inglewood. Four people—Adan Rios (Rios), Raymond Banks
(Banks), Marcus Kimble (Kimble), and Andrew Young (Young)—
walked into the restaurant; Rios and Banks belonged to a rival
gang.
Rios and Kimble approached the booth where defendant
and Green sat, and started up a conversation. Kimble slid into
the booth next to Green and put his arm around Green’s
shoulder, which made Green uncomfortable. Soon thereafter,
Rios, who was still standing, punched Green several times,
grabbed defendant’s sandwich, and took a bite.
Defendant pulled out a gun and shot Rios in the face. The
shooting prompted the restaurant’s patrons to run for the doors.
With gun still in hand, defendant chased after Kimble,
Banks, and Young. After appearing to pull back the top of the
gun in a motion similar to reloading, he fired six shots in the
rival gang members’ direction, hollering, “I’m going to kill you
mother fuckers too.”
Rios later died from the shotgun wound to the face.
II. Trial and Original Sentencing
A jury convicted defendant of the voluntary manslaughter
of Rios (§ 192, subd. (a)) and the attempted murder of Banks (§§

2 Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we
have construed the facts in the light most favorable to the ruling
below.

3
664, 187, subd. (a)).3 As to both counts, the jury found true the
allegation that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). The jury did not find that the attempted murder had
been premeditated; however, the jury necessarily rejected the
defense theory of provocation (because provocation would have
precluded the jury’s finding of intent to kill necessary for
attempted murder and dictated a verdict of attempted voluntary
manslaughter). Defendant thereafter admitted his 1991
conviction for robbery (§ 211) was a prior “strike” within the
meaning of our “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12) as well as a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a));
defendant also admitted that he had served two prior prison
terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 44 years in state
prison. The court imposed a sentence of 32 years in prison on the
voluntary manslaughter count (thereby making that count the
principal term). The 32-year sentence was comprised of a 22-year
base term (that is, a high term of 11 years, doubled due to the
prior strike) plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. For the
attempted murder count, the court imposed a consecutive six-
year prison term, comprised of a base term of 56 months (which
was one-third of the midterm sentence of attempted murder [that
is, 28 months], doubled due to the prior strike) plus 16 months for
the firearm enhancement (which was one-third of the midterm
sentence for that enhancement). The court then imposed a
consecutive five-year term for the prior serious felony conviction
and a consecutive one-year term for the prior prison term.

3 This verdict occurred at a retrial after the jury at the first
trial was unable to reach a verdict.

4
This court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence on
direct appeal. (People v. Scott (July 21, 1999, B119168) [nonpub.
opn.].)
III. Resentencing
On January 10, 2022, defendant filed a motion for recall of
sentence pursuant to what is now section 1172.75.4 Although the
trigger for the application of section 1172.75 is the existence of a
one-year enhancement for the prior prison term, that section
obligates trial courts to undertake a full resentencing of eligible
defendants to account for “any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” (§ 1172.75, subd.
(d)(2); People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.) After
entertaining exhaustive briefing, which included three additional
briefs by defendant and two oppositions by the People, the trial
court conducted a full resentencing hearing on December 13,
2022.
The trial court imposed a 27-year prison sentence. The
court imposed a sentence of 18 years on the attempted murder
count (thereby making that count the principal term). The 18-
year sentence was comprised solely of the base term (that is, the
high-end term of nine years, doubled due to the prior strike). For
the voluntary manslaughter count, the court imposed a
consecutive four-year sentence comprised of a base term of four
years (which was one-third of the midterm for voluntary
manslaughter [that is, two years], doubled due to the prior
strike). The court then imposed a consecutive five-year sentence

4 At the time the motion was filed, our Legislature had yet to
renumber the section from section 1171.1 to section 1172.75.
(Compare Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3 with Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12,
eff. June 30, 2022.)

5
for the prior serious felony conviction. The court did not impose
any time for the firearm enhancement or the one-year prior
prison term. Shortly before the conclusion of the resentencing
hearing, defendant for the first time asked the trial court to
dismiss his prior strike conviction under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, but the trial court denied the
request as untimely because defendant had not raised the issue
in any of his four prior filings or earlier in the hours-long
resentencing hearing.
IV. Appeal
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant attacks nearly every aspect of his resentencing.
We generally review criminal sentencing for an abuse of
discretion (People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837), but
review subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence
(People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143), subsidiary
legal questions de novo (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688,
694), and the application of the law to undisputed facts de novo
(Martinez v. Brownco Construction Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014,
1018). In conducting the resentencing, the trial court allowed for
extensive argument and often indicated that it was “thinking out
loud”; our review focuses on the rationales the trial court
ultimately articulated rather than its interim musings.5

5 We accordingly reject defendant’s repeated attempts to
characterize the trial court as being confused or internally
inconsistent.

6
I. Imposition of the High-End Term for Attempted
Murder Count
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing the
high-end term for the attempted murder count because (1) the
court ignored the requirements newly enacted as part of Senate
Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) insofar as (a) the aggravating
circumstances were not found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant, and (b) the aggravating circumstances did not
outweigh the mitigating circumstances; and (2) the court erred in
not imposing the low-end term, as required by newly enacted
Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).6
A. The trial court complied with the requirements
of Senate Bill No. 567
Effective on January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended
section 1170 to limit a court’s discretion to impose the upper term
for a crime having a triad of possible sentences. As amended,
section 1170 prohibits a trial court from imposing a high-end
term unless (1) the circumstances in aggravation “justify the
imposition” of the high-end term; and (2) as a procedural matter,
the facts underlying any aggravating circumstances (a) “have
been stipulated to by the defendant,” or (b) “have been found true

6 Defendant also seems to suggest that the trial court erred
in selecting the attempted murder sentence as the principal term
rather than the voluntary manslaughter. However, which of
multiple sentences is the principal term is a function of which
sentence is the longest rather than a function of some substantive
decision by the court. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a) [“The principal term
shall consist of the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the
court for any of the crimes, including any term imposed for
applicable specific enhancements”].)

7
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(2).)
1. Senate Bill No. 567’s procedural requirements
were met
In selecting the high-end term for the attempted murder
count, the trial court cited two aggravating circumstances—
namely, (1) defendant’s personal use of a firearm, and (2)
defendant’s prior prison term. Each of these qualifies as a
“[c]ircumstance[] in aggravation” under the California Rules of
Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2) [“defendant . . . used
a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime”], (b)(3)
[“defendant has served a prior prison term”].) More to the point,
these circumstances satisfy section 1170’s procedural
requirement because (1) the jury found true the enhancement for
defendant’s personal use of a firearm, and (2) defendant admitted
his prior prison term.
Defendant resists this conclusion. Specifically, he argues
that his use of a weapon cannot constitute an aggravating
circumstance to an attempted murder count because the use of a
weapon is “inherent” in every attempted murder. He is wrong.
(§§ 187, 664, subd. (a); CALCRIM No. 600 [elements of attempted
murder do not include the use of a weapon]; accord, People v.
Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 988 [murder may be committed
without use of a deadly weapon].)
2. Aggravating circumstances justify the high-end
term
In selecting the high term, the court weighed the two
aggravating circumstances cited above against several mitigating
circumstances—specifically, (1) the trauma defendant suffered as
a child, which it found was a factor in the commission of the

8
crime; (2) defendant’s relative youth (he was 24 years old); and
(3) defendant’s “good” conduct while in prison and progress on
rehabilitation. The court nevertheless concluded that the
aggravating circumstances justified the high-end term.
Defendant offers a panoply of criticisms.
First, defendant argues that the court improperly relied on
defendant’s reloading or “reracking” of his gun when chasing
after Kimble, Banks and Young; he cites People v. Rodriguez
(1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 241-242 (Rodriguez). Although the
court cited this circumstance as an “aggravating” circumstance,
the court did not cite it as one of the aggravating circumstances it
was relying upon to justify the high-end term; thus, it is
irrelevant to this specific sentencing decision. What is more,
Rodriguez’s holding that the mere reracking of a gun is not itself
an aggravating circumstance is irrelevant here, where the trial
court here mentioned the reracking in conjunction with
defendant’s aggravating conduct in firing off six shots in a
restaurant filled with people.
Second, and along similar lines, defendant argues at length
that there is insufficient evidence that the attempted murder was
“vicious” or “callous.” Again, this is not a circumstance that the
trial court relied upon to justify the high-end term, so it is
irrelevant. What is more, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that the attempted murder was “vicious” or
“callous” because defendant, while yelling at a restaurant full of
panicked, fleeing patrons that he was “going to kill you mother
fuckers too,” fired six bullets in the direction of the fleeing crowd.
Third, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not
giving greater weight to the fact that he was provoked into his
crimes because he and Kimble had bumped into each other at a

9
strip club earlier that morning. The jury’s verdict of voluntary
manslaughter—rather than murder—indicates the jury’s finding
that the murder was provoked, but its attempted murder verdict
necessarily indicates the jury’s finding that the attempted murder
was not provoked. The trial court during the resentencing
independently found that the attempted murder was not
provoked because Banks and the other restaurant patrons on
whom defendant opened fire had not attacked or otherwise
harassed him. We decline defendant’s invitation to conflate the
separate facts underlying the death of Rios and the attempted
murder of Banks.
Fourth and lastly, defendant argues generally that the
court failed to give due weight to the mitigating circumstances of
his traumatic childhood, youth, and postconviction rehabilitative
efforts. In effect, defendant is asking us to reweigh the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. That is beyond our
purview under abuse of discretion review. (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).)
B. The trial court complied with the requirements
of Assembly Bill No. 124
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 124 amended
section 1170 to limit a court’s discretion to impose a midterm or
high-term sentence for a crime with a sentencing triad. As
amended, and as pertinent here, section 1170 obligates a trial
court to impose the low-term sentence if the defendant has
“experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” or was
under 26 years old at the time of the crime, if either was “a
contributing factor” to the crime, unless “the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the low[-end] term would

10
be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Unlike aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the high
term, aggravating circumstances considered when evaluating
whether or not to impose the low term need not be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant.
(People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 204-205.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that a low-term sentence was not warranted on the attempted
murder count. The court found that defendant’s childhood
trauma and his youth were connected with the attempted
murder, but went on to weigh the three mitigating circumstances
listed above against the following five aggravating
circumstances—namely, that (1) the attempted murder involved
great violence, great bodily harm, or threat of great bodily harm,
or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness; (2) defendant was armed with and used a weapon in
the commission of the crime; (3) defendant engaged in violent
conduct that indicates a serious danger to society; (4) defendant
was on probation when the crime was committed; and (5)
defendant’s prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory.
The court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed
the mitigating circumstances, and thus freed it up to consider a
middle- or, if the requirements of Senate Bill No. 567 were also
met (as we have concluded they were), a high-term sentence.
Aside from defendant’s attacks on the trial court’s mention
of reracking the gun as well as its finding that the attempted
murder was “vicious” and “callous”—which we have already
explained lack merit—defendant offers what boils down to three
further arguments attacking the court’s balancing of aggravating
against mitigating circumstances. First, defendant asserts that

11
the trial court did not consider his relative youth. He is factually
wrong, as the court considered his relative youth as a mitigating
circumstance. Second, defendant contends that the trial court
was not permitted to consider his prior strike conviction because
it was more than five years old, because section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(H), so prohibits. This contention is doubly irrelevant: None
of the five aggravating circumstances cited by the trial court
dealt with his prior conviction; what is more, section 1385,
subdivision (c), deals with whether a trial court should strike an
enhancement rather than dealing with whether to impose the low
term of a triad as the base term for a sentence. Third and lastly,
defendant again effectively argues that the trial got the balancing
wrong; as noted above, that is not a cognizable argument under
abuse of discretion review.
II. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences
Defendant next assails the trial court’s decision to run the
four-year voluntary manslaughter sentence consecutive to the 18-
year attempted murder sentence because the two crimes occurred
on the same occasion. Although this argument is forfeited
because it was not raised below (e.g., People v. Sperling (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100), we exercise our discretion to overlook
that forfeiture.
The trial court did not err in running the two sentences
consecutively. Although defendant is correct that our Three
Strikes law does not require a trial court to run sentences
consecutively when the underlying crimes were committed on the
same occasion or under the same set of operative facts (People v.
Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 48), a court in that situation still
has the discretion to do so (ibid.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425;

12
People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262-1263).7
What is more, when a defendant engages in separate acts of
violence against different victims, that fact alone justifies
running sentences consecutively. (People v. Leon (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 452, 468; People v. Valenzuela (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
358, 365.) That is precisely what we have here: Defendant shot
Rios in the face, and then opened fire on different victims—
namely, Banks, his friends, and the restaurant patrons.
Defendant’s final complaint that the trial court erred in not
articulating its reasons for running the sentences consecutively is
without merit because such an articulation is not required,
particularly in the absence of a request (indeed, that is why
defendant’s failure to object constitutes a forfeiture). It is also
not required because courts are deemed to be applying the law
properly in the absence of a showing otherwise. (People v. Weaver
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1313, disapproved on other grounds
as stated in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 939.)
III. Failure to Dismiss the Five-Year Prior Serious
Felony Enhancement
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) amended section 1385 to guide trial courts in deciding
whether and when to dismiss sentencing enhancements. (Stats.
2021, ch. 721, § 1.) As amended, section 1385 grants trial courts
“the authority” and a simultaneous duty “to strike or dismiss a[

7 A court may not rely on a fact to impose a consecutive
sentence if that fact is also an element of the underlying crime or
if the court has elsewhere used that same fact to impose the
upper term or otherwise enhance the defendant’s sentence. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.425(b).) The trial court’s use of the
“multiple victims” fact does not transgress this “no dual use”
limit.

13
sentencing] enhancement” (or, if they prefer, the “additional
punishment for that enhancement”) if doing so is “in the
furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subds. (b) & (c)(1).) Although
this provision makes clear that whether dismissal of an
enhancement is “in the furtherance of justice” is a
“discretion[ary]” call for the trial court to make (id., subds. (c)(1),
(c)(2) & (c)(3)), the provision also directs that the existence of any
of nine enumerated “mitigating circumstances” “weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(Id., subd. (c)(2).)
In Walker, our Supreme Court rejected the notion that the
presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance erects a
rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement
that can be rebutted only by a showing that dismissal would
endanger public safety. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1028-
1029.) Instead, Walker holds that, even when a court determines
that dismissing an enhancement will not endanger public safety,
the court retains discretion not to dismiss or strike that
enhancement. In exercising that discretion, the court is to
“assign[] significant value” to any mitigating circumstance(s),
which “strongly favor[s]” and “will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement”—except when the “court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’” (Id. at pp. 1029, 1036.)
In this case, the trial court declined to strike the five-year
enhancement for defendant’s prior serious felony even after
specifically finding the presence of three mitigating

14
circumstances—namely, that (1) the crimes in this case were
connected to defendant’s mental illness, (2) they were connected
to childhood trauma, and (3) the enhancement was based on a
conviction from 1991, which is more than five years old. (§ 1385,
subds. (c)(2)(D), (E) [when “[t]he current offense is connected to
mental illness” or “prior victimization or childhood trauma”] &
(c)(2)(H) [when “[t]he enhancement is based on a prior conviction
that is over five years old”].)8 The trial court also specifically
found that dismissing the five-year enhancement would not
endanger public safety.
Although the trial court’s failure to dismiss the five-year
prior serious felony enhancement might be proper under Walker
if the trial “court [had found] substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance[s], such that
dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice,’”
this test was not formulated until Walker was decided, which was

8 We reject defendant’s arguments that additional
enumerated mitigating circumstances are at play. Defendant
asserts that applying the five-year enhancement “would result in
a discriminatory racial impact” under the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020 (§ 745) (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)), but cites only
the fact that he is African American and challenged a peremptory
strike at trial under the Batson/Wheeler doctrine (see Batson v.
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d
258). That is insufficient to show that defendant’s race played
any role in his conviction or sentence. Defendant also asserts
that “[t]he application of an enhancement [w]ould result in a
sentence of over 20 years” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), but this
ignores that his sentence was already 22 years before any
enhancement was applied. Thus, application of an enhancement
would not result in a sentence of over 20 years.

15
years after the resentencing at issue. We accordingly
conditionally affirm the sentence but remand for the trial court to
exercise its discretion whether to strike the five-year prior
serious felony enhancement under the test clarified in Walker.
IV. Denial of Romero Motion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying as
untimely his motion to dismiss his 1991 robbery conviction as a
“strike” under the Three Strikes law under Romero. There was
no error for two reasons. First, a defendant has no right to make
a Romero motion, although he may “invite the court” to exercise
its discretion under Romero. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp.
375-376.) Here, the court declined that invitation on the ground
that the invitation was made at the eleventh hour—after the
petition, after three supplemental briefs, after hours of argument
during the resentencing, and just before the sentencing was to
conclude. The court did so—not because it misunderstood its
power to grant the motion—but because it elected not to do so as
a discretionary matter due to the lateness of the request. This
was within the court’s discretion. Second, there is no indication
that the court would have granted the motion. The court clearly
understood its discretion to impose a sentence less than the 27-
year sentence it was imposing, and elected not to do so; its
steadfast refusal to do so in light of what it viewed as a callous
crime confirms that the court would have rejected defendant’s
invitation on the merits. (Accord, People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16
Cal.4th 930, 944 [defendant not entitled to a remand if the trial
court’s comments “indicate that even if it had authority to strike
a prior felony conviction allegation, it would decline to do so”].)

16
V. Calculation of Custody Credits
Defendant argues for the first time in his reply brief that
the trial court erred in failing to exercise its jurisdiction to
compute and apply custody credits at resentencing. Defendant
has forfeited this contention by failing timely to raise it. (People
v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 642-643.) Any error in the
prior calculation is of no moment given the need to vacate and
remand for a new resentencing. At that resentencing, however,
the trial court is required to calculate actual custody credits up to
the date of the resentencing, and local conduct credits up to the
date of the original sentencing. (People v. Sek (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 657, 673.)
DISPOSITION
The matter is conditionally affirmed and remanded to the
trial court to exercise its discretion under section 1385 to decide
whether to strike the five-year prior serious felony enhancement
previously imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667,
subdivision (a) under Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024; if it does,
defendant is entitled to a complete resentencing. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

 Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

17
We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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