In re A.G. CA2/4

CourtListener 10291333CalctappDec 10, 2024

Full text

Filed 12/10/24 In re A.G. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

In re A.G., a Person Coming B328990
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 22CCJP05027

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Ariana G.

Defendant and Appellant;
A.G.,
Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Charles Q. Clay III, Judge. Dismissed.
Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Deborah Dentler for A.G., a Person Formerly Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Memorandum Opinion

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion as the
parties are familiar with the facts, and our opinion does not meet
the criteria for publication. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19
Cal.4th 1232, 1261–1264; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).)
Ariana G. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court exit order
awarding Antonio G. (father) sole legal custody of their two
children, J.G. and A.G. Mother’s challenge on appeal focuses
solely on A.G. A.G., however, reached the age of 18 while
mother’s appeal was pending and therefore is no longer under the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction nor subject to custody by either
parent.
On August 26, 2024, we invited the parties to file
supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the appeal was
moot and should be dismissed because A.G. had reached the age
of majority. Minor’s counsel submitted the matter to this court on
the briefing and the record. In her letter brief, mother contends
her appeal is not moot because she “‘has demonstrated a specific
legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon
reversal.’” Namely, mother contends the outcome of this appeal
“may infect future dependency proceedings involving her two
younger children.”
“‘[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency
appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any
effective relief if it finds reversible error.’” (In re Rashad
D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163; see In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 276.) An “‘appeal may become moot where
subsequent events . . . render it impossible for the reviewing
court to grant effective relief.’” (In re Rashad D., at p. 163.) “A
reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-case basis whether

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subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case
moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a
subsequent proceeding.”’” (In re D.P., at p. 276.)
Here, mother challenges the juvenile court’s exit order
granting father sole custody. But the family court only has
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate custody over “minor”
children, which is statutorily defined as a person under 18 years
of age. (See Fam. Code, §§ 2010, subd. (b), 3022 [jurisdiction
extends to parties’ minor children]; see also Fam. Code §§ 6500,
6501 [defining “minor”].) Thus, even if we were to reverse the exit
order, the family court no longer has jurisdiction to make orders
regarding the custody of A.G., who is no longer a minor.
(Edwards v. Edwards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 136, 143 [an adult
is not in the custody of either parent]; see also In re Marriage of
Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, 594 [Under Family Code
section 7505, subdivision (c), parental authority over a child
ceases by operation of law when the child reaches the age of
majority].) Because we cannot render effective relief, this appeal
is moot.
Mother’s argument that her appeal is not moot because it
could impact future family or dependency proceedings is
misplaced. Whether the challenged finding could impact future
proceedings does not determine whether her appeal is moot.
Instead, as discussed below, this argument goes to whether
discretionary review is appropriate. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 285.) Similarly, mother incorrectly relies on In re Nathan E.
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114 (Nathan E.). The appellate court in
Nathan E. did not, as mother contends, find an appeal was not
moot because purported error could infect future dependency

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proceedings. Rather, the court exercised its discretion to consider
a moot appeal. (Id. at p. 121.)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Discretionary review generally
is appropriate only when a case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy between the
parties may recur, or when a material question remains for the
court’s determination. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court identified
several additional, non-exhaustive factors for evaluating whether
discretionary review of a moot case may be warranted. (Id. at pp.
285–287.) First, the court may consider whether the challenged
finding could impact current or future dependency proceedings,
for example, by influencing the social service agency’s decision to
file a new dependency petition or the juvenile court’s
determination about further reunification services. (Id. at p. 285.)
Second, the court may consider the nature of the findings against
the parent: “The more egregious the findings against the parent,
the greater the parent’s interest in challenging such findings.”
(Id. at p. 286.) Third, the court may consider whether the case
became moot due to prompt compliance by parents with their
case plan: “It would perversely incentivize noncompliance if [the]
mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from
jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant or
for whom the court has issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)
The first factor weighs in favor of discretionary review
because the exit order granting father sole legal custody may
impact future family or dependency proceedings regarding
mother’s other children. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.)
One factor alone, however, does not warrant reaching the merits

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of mother’s challenge. (Id. at p. 286.) As to the second factor, the
challenged finding was based on mother’s substance abuse issues.
While these issues are serious, we do not consider them so
egregious as to merit review in this case. (See id. at p. 286.) As to
the third factor, this appeal became moot because A.G. reached
the age of 18, not because of mother’s prompt compliance with the
case plan. Indeed, mother contributed to delayed resolution by
failing to promptly address her drug use and by consistently
failing to drug test. Denying merits review in this case would,
therefore, not “perversely incentivize noncompliance” with a
juvenile court’s orders. (Ibid.) Consequently, this factor cuts
against discretionary review of her appeal.
No other factor supports reaching the merits. Mother’s
appeal is fact-specific as to the findings against her, and she does
not argue that there may be a recurrence of the issues between
the parties or that a material question remains. Finally, mother
does not assert that this case involves issues of broad public
interest. Under these circumstances, we see no good reason to
exercise our discretion to decide any moot issues.

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DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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