In re K.R. CA2/4

CourtListener 10291330CalctappDec 10, 2024

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Filed 12/10/24 In re K.R. CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

In re K.R. et al., Persons B323191
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 21CCJP05315
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.R. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore.
Conditionally reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant D.O.
Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant B.R.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________

INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises out of the juvenile dependency
proceedings relating to K.R. and H.R., born in June 2010 and
September 2017, respectively. B.R. is the mother of both children.
Non-party R.J. is H.R.’s father and D.O. (father) is K.R.’s father.
Before this case was initiated, the children were in mother’s care.
In August 2022, the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction
over the children under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section
300, subdivisions (a) and (b). Unlike H.R., who was placed with
her parents, the court removed K.R. from mother, declined to
place K.R. with father per his request as a non-offending
noncustodial parent under section 361.2, subdivision (a), and
placed K.R. with her maternal grandparents.
On appeal, mother contends the jurisdictional findings are
unsupported by substantial evidence and, therefore, subject to
reversal. For this reason, and because father was non-offending,
she argues the dispositional order pertaining to K.R. must also be
reversed. Father joins mother’s arguments. Alternatively, he
asserts the portion of the dispositional order placing K.R. with
her maternal grandparents must be reversed, as the record lacks
sufficient evidence demonstrating she would suffer detriment if
required to live with him. He also contends K.R.’s dispositional
order must be conditionally reversed because the Department of

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
Children and Family Services (Department) failed to discharge
its duty of initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of the case, so we do not fully restate those details here.
Instead, in the Discussion, post, we discuss the facts as needed to
provide context for and resolve the issues presented on appeal.
With respect to mother’s appeal, we first conclude the
juvenile court erred by finding K.R. fell within the purview of
section 300, subdivision (b) based on mother’s emotional abuse.
We then conclude, however, it correctly declared both children
dependents of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b), as the record contains sufficient evidence showing they were
at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to mother’s
history of violence with R.J. We therefore need not address
mother’s challenges to the other jurisdictional findings and reject
her assertion that K.R.’s dispositional order must be reversed.
With respect to father’s appeal, we reject father’s
contention that the detriment finding under section 361.2,
subdivision (a) must be reversed due to insufficient evidentiary
support. However, we agree with father that K.R.’s dispositional
order must be conditionally reversed due to the Department’s
failure to comply with ICWA’s inquiry requirements.

DISCUSSION

I. Mother’s Appeal

A. Justiciability
We begin by addressing the Department’s assertion that, to
the extent she challenges the jurisdictional findings pertaining to
H.R., mother’s appeal should be dismissed as moot.

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“An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally
renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163.) “However, dismissal of a
dependency appeal for mootness following termination of
jurisdiction ‘is not automatic, but “must be decided on a case-by-
case basis.”’” (Ibid.) “A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ]
it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him [or her] any effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.]
For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First,
the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the
harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the
outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
276 (D.P.).) Thus, to avoid a finding of mootness, the appealing
parent must “demonstrate[ ] a specific legal or practical
consequence that would be avoided upon reversal of the
[challenged] jurisdictional findings . . . .” (Id. at p. 273.)
Mother acknowledges that, while this appeal was pending,
the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over H.R. and awarded
her and R.J. joint physical and legal custody. In arguing the
court’s actions have not rendered the portions of her appeal
relating to H.R. moot, however, she “has not demonstrated a
specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided
upon reversal of the [challenged] jurisdictional findings.” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.) We therefore agree with the
Department that her challenges to the jurisdictional findings
pertaining to H.R. are moot and turn our attention to whether to
exercise discretionary review. (See id. at pp. 273, 277.)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In deciding whether to exercise

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discretionary review, we consider the following factors: (1)
“whether the challenged jurisdictional finding ‘could be
prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the
current or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction”’”; (2)
“whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct”; and (3) “why the appeal
became moot.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.) These “factors . . . are not
exhaustive, and no single factor is necessarily dispositive of
whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot
appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Having considered the D.P. factors, we conclude
discretionary review is appropriate. Specifically, we find the
jurisdictional findings against mother may play a role in future
dependency and/or family law proceedings, such that “ensuring
the validity of [the challenged] findings . . . [is] particularly
important.” (D.P., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 285.) In addition, the
parties do not dispute that jurisdiction over H.R. was terminated
based on mother’s prompt compliance with her court-ordered case
plan; therefore, “discretionary review [is] especially appropriate”
here. (Id. at p. 286.) Accordingly, we will not dismiss mother’s
appeal.

B. Jurisdictional Findings
In exercising jurisdiction over the children, the juvenile
court found they were at substantial risk of serious physical
harm due to mother’s history of domestic violence with R.J.,
mental and emotional problems, and placement of K.R. in a
detrimental situation by driving a vehicle, in which K.R. was a
passenger, while under the influence of marijuana. It additionally

5
found K.R. fell within the purview of section 300, subdivision (b)
because mother emotionally abused her.
With respect to the emotional abuse allegations, the
juvenile court acknowledged the petition filed by the Department
alleged jurisdiction was necessary under section 300, subdivision
(c)(1).2 Based on the evidence presented, the court found mother’s
verbal abuse was “definitely hurtful to [K.R.] and plac[ed] her at
risk,” but did not “rise[ ] to the level of a c-1 count.” Thus, it
sustained the emotional abuse allegations under subdivision (b)
rather than subdivision (c).
Mother disputes the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
each jurisdictional finding. We begin by addressing her challenge
to the emotional abuse finding. On this point, mother contends
jurisdiction was improper under section 300, subdivision (b)
because the record lacks evidence showing her verbal abuse
placed K.R. at risk of physical – rather than emotional – harm.
We agree.
Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), the juvenile court
may exercise jurisdiction over a child if “[t]he child has suffered,
or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) The failure or
inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child . . . .” “‘“A jurisdictional finding under section
300, subdivision (b) requires: ‘“(1) neglectful conduct by the

2 Section 300, subdivision (c) permits the juvenile court to
exercise jurisdiction when “[t]he child is suffering serious
emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious
emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression,
withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or
others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian . . . .”

6
parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious
physical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of
such harm or illness.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The third element
‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious
physical harm in the future . . . .’ [Citation.]”’” (In re Jesus M.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 111.) Consequently, jurisdiction may
not lie under section 300, subdivision (b) “where . . . one parent
has behaved badly, undeniably causing family trauma, but
presents no obvious threat to the child[’s] physical safety.” (Id. at
p. 112.)
“‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’
[Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’”’
[Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous
with any evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence
must be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable
in nature, credible, and of solid value.’” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 591, 602.)
The record demonstrates mother has verbally abused K.R.
K.R. told the Department that mother screams and curses at her,
calls her names, makes fun of her, shames her, and compares her

7
to others. Consistent with K.R.’s statements, A.R. (maternal
grandmother) related K.R. has said mother “‘cuss[es]’ her out,”
calls her names while she is crying, and has “threat[en]ed to ‘beat
the sh[*]t out of her.’” H.R. likewise reported mother gets angry
with K.R., has yelled at K.R. “‘a lot of times,’” and “‘yells bad
words’ at [K.R.]”
As a result of mother’s verbal abuse, K.R. has suffered
emotional harm. Specifically, K.R. reported that in September
2021, she had a panic attack after mother teased her and called
her names. According to K.R.’s therapist, Dr. Corinne Hickson,
mother’s actions have caused K.R. to develop feelings of anger,
pain, hatred, and abandonment. Dr. Hickson also reported K.R.
experiences severe anxiety stemming largely from her high-
conflict relationship with mother and mother’s emotionally
abusive behavior.
Emotional harm, however, does not provide a basis for
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). “As appellate
courts have repeatedly stressed, ‘“[s]ubdivision (b) means what it
says. Before courts and agencies can exercise jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating
that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness.”’” (In re Jesus M., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p.
111, original italics.) And while the record demonstrates K.R. has
sustained emotional harm as a result of mother’s verbal abuse,
we could not locate any evidence showing she has suffered, or was
at risk of suffering, physical harm. The record, for example, does
not reflect K.R. has thought about or engaged in acts of self-harm
due to emotional pain mother has inflicted. Nor does it establish
K.R.’s anxiety affects her physical health, such as by impairing
her daily functioning or driving her to illicit substances to cope.

8
Attempting nonetheless to draw a connection between
mother’s emotionally abusive behavior and a risk of physical
harm to K.R., the Department asserts: “Mother’s treatment of
K.R. caused the 11-year-old child to run away because she was
scared to be in mother’s care, subjecting her to risk of physical
harm.” This argument fails because it misrepresents the record.
Specifically, the record does not demonstrate mother’s conduct
drove K.R. to flee her home indefinitely without explaining her
whereabouts, as the Department suggests. Rather, it shows that
in September 2021, K.R. refused to attend a concert with mother
in Las Vegas, left the family home, and went to her maternal
aunt’s home nearby. We did not find any evidence demonstrating
K.R. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm while en
route to or upon arrival at her aunt’s home. Nor could we locate
any evidence showing K.R. was likely to take more drastic actions
subjecting her to such risk.
Accordingly, on the record before us, we conclude the
juvenile court erred by finding K.R. fell within the purview of
section 300, subdivision (b) based on mother’s emotional abuse.
In light of this conclusion, we consider whether the court’s other
jurisdictional findings rest on adequate evidentiary support.
In addition to exercising jurisdiction over K.R. based on
mother’s emotional abuse of the child, the juvenile court also
declared K.R. and H.R. dependents of the court under section
300, subdivisions (a) and (b), finding they were at risk of harm
due to mother’s history of violence with R.J.3 Arguing the court

3 Section 300, subdivision (a) permits the juvenile court to
exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,

9
erred in so doing, mother acknowledges she and R.J. have
engaged in violent altercations, but asserts they will not do so in
the future because: (1) the most recent incident “occurred one or
two years prior to the jurisdiction hearing” held in August 2022;
(2) mother and R.J. ended their romantic relationship; and (3)
she “voluntarily and successfully completed her domestic violence
services.”
Mother correctly observes the record contains evidence
supportive of a finding contrary to that of the juvenile court’s
regarding the risk of harm posed to the children by her history of
violence with R.J. The existence of evidence conflicting with a
jurisdictional finding does not justify reversal, however. Instead,
as noted above, when reviewing jurisdictional findings on appeal,
we must view the record in the light most favorable to the
finding, draw all reasonable inferences to support it, and uphold
the finding so long as it “is supported by substantial evidence
even if substantial evidence to the contrary also exists.” (DeNike
v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 371, 382.)
Applying this standard, we conclude the record contains
substantial evidence demonstrating that, at the time of the
adjudication hearing, the children remained at risk of harm due
to mother’s history of violence with R.J.
Mother and R.J. were in an on-and-off relationship for five
years, which ended around February 2021. According to maternal

serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by
the child’s parent or guardian.” “Domestic violence is
nonaccidental” and, therefore, dependency cases based on
exposure to domestic violence may be filed under section 300,
subdivision (a) or subdivision (b). (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 594, 599-600.)

10
grandmother, the relationship was not healthy, and it was not
mother’s first abusive relationship. Soon after she and R.J. began
dating, mother told her sister and maternal grandmother that
R.J. had grabbed her roughly. Subsequently, more than once, R.J.
and mother engaged in violence in the children’s presence. On
one occasion, K.R. saw R.J. grab mother by the collar of her shirt
and “‘put his fist up like he was going to hit her.’” K.R. intervened
and “‘stopped him.’” Another incident took place in 2020, while
H.R. was with her parents in a car parked outside maternal
grandmother’s home. H.R. witnessed R.J. hit mother’s head into
the car’s steering wheel, causing her lip to bleed. After bringing
H.R. into maternal grandmother’s home, mother carved the word
“liar” into the hood of R.J.’s car and slashed his tires. H.R. was
“‘screaming bloody murder’” after the incident and talked about it
for weeks. Thereafter, mother did not contact law enforcement or
seek help per maternal grandmother’s suggestion. Instead,
mother went to Las Vegas with friends and later reconciled with
R.J.
Although no longer involved romantically, mother and R.J.
still interact regularly because they are co-parenting H.R.4 Their
relationship continues to be fraught with conflict. R.J. related he
and mother get into arguments because she is easily irritated.
Before the adjudication hearing, while H.R. was in R.J.’s care, the
Department observed the parents “had some difficulty working
together for the best interest of [H.R.]” Consequently, the
Department had to intervene and mediate the parents’ disputes

4 For this reason, mother’s reliance on In re Ma.V. (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 11 is misplaced. There, in contrast with the present
case, the mother not only ended her relationship with her former
abuser, but also ceased all further contact with him. (Id. at p. 22.)

11
over coordinating visitation times, exchanges, and other matters.
Further, mother openly criticized R.J. and disapproved his
parenting style, asserting he was incapable of caring for H.R.
We acknowledge that mother completed a domestic violence
program for victims before the adjudication hearing took place.
While she has expressed concern about H.R.’s safety in R.J.’s
care, fearing R.J. may become violent in his current relationship,
mother has not exhibited any insight or awareness into how her
own aggressive behaviors toward R.J. endangered her children.
Nor has mother acknowledged how her tendency to instigate and
escalate conflicts may have contributed to violence between her
and R.J. Instead, mother has continuously blamed others for the
Department’s involvement with the family.
In sum, the record reflects mother and R.J. have a history
of violence and that, at the time of the adjudication hearing, they
remained in a tense co-parenting relationship in which they
continued to have disagreements requiring Department
intervention. Based on this evidence, as well as mother’s failure
to take responsibility for her role in her altercations with R.J.,
the juvenile court could reasonably find the children were at
substantial risk of serious physical harm due to the probability of
violence recurring between mother and R.J.
Having concluded the juvenile court correctly exercised
jurisdiction over the children pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b) based on the petition’s domestic violence
allegations, we need not address whether the other jurisdictional
findings are supported by substantial evidence. It is well-settled
that “‘[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for
its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s

12
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged
statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’”
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)

C. Dispositional Order Regarding K.R.
Mother asserts the dispositional order relating to K.R.
must be reversed because the juvenile court erred by exercising
jurisdiction over her. As discussed above, however, the court
properly found K.R. fell within the purview of section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b). We therefore reject mother’s contention
that K.R.’s dispositional order must be reversed based on the
court’s improper exercise of jurisdiction.

II. Father’s Appeal

A. Justiciability
Turning our attention to father’s appeal, we begin by
addressing the Department’s assertion that his challenge to the
detriment finding rendered under section 361.2, subdivision (a) is
moot. On this point, the Department argues: “[E]ven if father
prevails on [his challenge], this [c]ourt cannot grant effective
relief because unchallenged, superseding orders demand [K.R.]
remain with her grandparents.” Specifically, it observes that,
while this appeal was pending: (1) at review hearings held in
February and May 2023, the juvenile court ordered K.R. to
remain in out-of-home care, finding she would suffer detriment if
returned to the custody of either parent; and (2) at the section
366.26 hearing held in November 2023, the court granted K.R.’s

13
maternal grandparents legal guardianship of the child. Father,
however, did not appeal any of these orders.
Father does not address or otherwise dispute whether his
challenge to the detriment finding is moot. Assuming, arguendo,
that this is the case, we have considered the D.P. factors and
again conclude discretionary review is proper. Mother and father
have a history of involvement in hostile and contentious family
law proceedings relating to custody of and visitation with K.R.
The juvenile court’s detriment finding under section 361.2,
subdivision (a) may play a role in future proceedings of this
nature. Therefore, “ensuring [the finding’s] validity . . . [is]
particularly important.” (D.P., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 285.)

B. Dispositional Order – K.R.’s Placement
“When a juvenile court orders removal of a child from the
custodial parent, it must determine whether there is a
noncustodial parent who wants to assume custody. If so, the
court must ‘place the child with the [noncustodial] parent unless
it finds that [such] placement . . . would be detrimental to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
child.’ (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)” (In re Solomon B. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 69, 74-75.) “A finding of detriment must be made by
clear and convincing evidence.” (Id. at p. 75.)
In determining whether placement with a noncustodial
parent would be detrimental to the child, the juvenile court must
“weigh all relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net
harm.” (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.)
Relevant factors may vary with each case but generally include
the child’s relationship or lack thereof with the noncustodial
parent, the child’s wishes, the child’s need for services, and the
existence and quality of the child’s bond with other family

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members. (See ibid. [sibling relationships]; In re A.C. (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 38, 43 [absence of relationship between parent and
child, child’s wishes]; In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
1254, 1262-1264 [need for continued therapeutic services].) No
one factor is dispositive, including the child’s preferences. (In re
C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402 (C.M.).)
“We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for
substantial evidence, ‘bearing in mind the heightened burden of
proof’ in the trial court.” (In re Solomon B., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th
at p. 75.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved
by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In
conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012 (O.B.).)
Father contends the detriment finding must be reversed
because it lacks sufficient evidentiary support. In support of his
position, father emphasizes: (1) he would pose no danger to K.R.’s
physical safety, as he has no history of abuse or criminal activity;
(2) he did not abandon K.R.; (3) mother and maternal
grandmother sabotaged his relationship with K.R.; and (4) K.R.’s
reports of anxiety around the idea of her residing with father
were exaggerated and not credible. For the reasons discussed
below, we are not persuaded by his contentions.

15
First, father’s argument misses the mark by fixating on
how K.R.’s negative feelings toward him were largely the product
of mother and maternal grandmother’s influence, rather than any
wrongdoing on his part. This is because, for purposes of section
361.2, subdivision (a), a detriment finding need not be related to
misconduct by the noncustodial parent. (See In re Luke M., supra,
107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.) Rather, as noted above, the juvenile
court must “weigh all relevant factors to determine if the child
will suffer net harm.” (Ibid.)
Second, father’s argument fails because it essentially asks
us to disregard the applicable standard of review. In discussing
the record, father focuses on the evidence supportive of his
position while ignoring or downplaying the evidence against him.
As discussed above, however, we cannot examine the record
through his proffered lens. Instead, we “view the record in the
light most favorable to the” challenged finding, “indulge
reasonable inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn
from the evidence,” “accept the fact finder’s resolution of
conflicting evidence,” and defer to the juvenile court’s credibility
determinations. (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1008.) Applying
these principles, we conclude the detriment finding must be
upheld.
Father was not involved in K.R.’s life until she was two
years old, when a paternity test confirmed she was his child. At
that point, he sought visitation with and custody of K.R. The
family court ultimately granted mother primary physical custody
of K.R. and awarded father overnight visits every other weekend,
as well as three-hour visits every other Wednesday and
alternating holidays. The parents later agreed to drop father’s
Wednesday visits due to his work schedule.

16
Until K.R. was four years old, father’s visits were
monitored and went well. Upon becoming unmonitored, however,
K.R. started having meltdowns, throwing fits, and expressing she
did not want to visit father. K.R.’s negative shift in her view of
father was the result of mother’s manipulation and influence,
which began when K.R. was two years old. In any event, K.R.
visited until she was 11 years old, when father moved to
Nebraska. Maternal grandmother reported K.R. seemed to enjoy
the visits at one point in time. K.R., however, related that she
never liked visiting father, and that he forced her to go with him.
After father moved to Nebraska in January 2021, his
relationship with K.R. worsened. According to K.R., father left
without saying goodbye to her, causing her to feel angry and as
though he had abandoned her. At the time of the adjudication
hearing, K.R. had not visited father for over a year and a half. He
also did not maintain regular phone contact with K.R. Nor did he
ask the family court to modify its visitation order after realizing
his weekend visits with K.R. were no longer feasible, and mother
refused to allow K.R. to stay with him for part of the summer.
Moreover, when father visited California with his family in the
summer of 2021, he did not make any efforts to see K.R. during
the trip. Consequently, K.R. adamantly told the Department that
she wants nothing to do with father, does not want a relationship
with him, and does not want to visit or live with him. In February
2022, she declined to have a conversation with him facilitated by
the Department. K.R. believed father was not a good person;
instead, she viewed him as “the ‘bad guy’” who did not want her
and was “‘not [her] real family.’”
Dr. Hickson, K.R.’s therapist, confirmed the negative
nature of K.R.’s relationship with father. According to Dr.

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Hickson, K.R. feels abandoned by both of her parents and was
experiencing a great deal of emotional pain. Dr. Hickson further
related K.R. has experienced anxiety when thinking about
visiting or living with father. Dr. Hickson also opined K.R. was in
desperate need of stability, but “father has not offered much in
the way of stability in that he has not been consistently involved
with [K.R.] for over a year.”
In sum, the record reflects father was not a part of K.R.’s
life until she was two years old. While she visited him on
weekends for several years, their relationship became rocky as
mother instilled in K.R. negative beliefs about his character. The
relationship then deteriorated after father moved to Nebraska in
January 2021 and largely ceased efforts to maintain contact with
K.R. Ultimately, due to multiple factors – including father’s
inaction following his relocation and mother’s influence on K.R.’s
view of him – K.R. harbored many negative feelings toward
father, did not view him as a part of her family, refused to live
with or visit him, and became anxious when presented with the
idea of doing so.5 And while K.R. was growing more receptive to
having a relationship with father as the adjudication hearing

5 In support of his position, father analogizes this case to
C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th 1394 and asserts K.R.’s “wish to
remain with [her] maternal grandparents” and “lack of an
established relationship with father” are insufficient to support a
detriment finding under section 361.2, subdivision (a). Unlike
C.M., however, the evidence in this case shows that, besides
wanting to live with her grandparents, K.R. has a complicated
relationship with father marred by strong feelings of anger,
hostility, abandonment, and distrust. Therefore, C.M. is
distinguishable and does not apply.

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approached, he was not in a position to provide K.R. with the
stability that her therapist opined she needed and desired.
Thus, based on the evidence discussed above, we conclude
“the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which
[the juvenile court] could have found it highly probable that”
K.R.’s “placement with [father] would be detrimental to . . . [her]
emotional well-being.” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011; § 361.2,
subd. (a).) The court therefore did not err by denying father’s
request for placement under section 361.2, subdivision (a).

C. ICWA
Finally, father contends K.R.’s dispositional order must be
reversed, as the Department failed to discharge its duty of initial
inquiry under ICWA and related California law. Specifically, he
argues that although the Department was in contact with several
of K.R.’s relatives while her dependency case was open, it failed
to ask any of them about whether she had any Indian ancestry as
required under section 224.2. In response, the Department
concedes it did not discharge its duty of inquiry, but maintains
reversal is not required because any ICWA error was harmless.
While this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court
published its opinion in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112,
which resolved a split in authority regarding “whether a child
welfare agency’s failure to make the statutorily required initial
inquiry under California’s heightened ICWA requirements
constitutes reversible error.” (Id. at p. 1125.) In so doing, it held
that “error resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA inquiry
requires conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare
agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of section 224.2,
document its inquiry in compliance with [California Rules of
Court] rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the

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notice provisions of section 224.3.” (Id. at p. 1136). Accordingly,
because we agree with the parties that the Department’s ICWA
inquiry was insufficient, we must conditionally reverse the
dispositional order pertaining to K.R. (Ibid.)

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional finding based on mother’s emotional
abuse is reversed. In all other respects, the jurisdictional order is
affirmed. The dispositional order relating to K.R. is conditionally
reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with
instructions to the court and the Department to comply with the
inquiry, notice, and documentation requirements of ICWA. If the
juvenile court subsequently determines that ICWA does not
apply, then it shall reinstate the dispositional order. If the court
determines that ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in
conformity with ICWA and related California law.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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