People v. Harmon CA2/1

CourtListener 10290392CalctappDec 9, 2024

Full text

Filed 12/9/24 P. v. Harmon CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B335051

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA030176)
v.

DERICK DARNELL HARMON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Ricardo R. Ocampo and Teresa P. Magno, Judges.
Appeal treated as petition for writ of habeas corpus; petition
granted.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
In 1994, Derick Darnell Harmon was convicted of robbery.
His sentence included, among other enhancements, three one-
year prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code1 section
667.5, subdivision (b). The Legislature subsequently deemed all
section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements to be invalid unless
imposed for a sexually violent offense. It also made persons in
the custody of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) serving time on a judgment including the
now-invalid enhancement potentially eligible for resentencing
under former section 1171.1, later renumbered section 1172.75.
In July 2022, after receiving notice from CDCR that
Harmon was potentially eligible for resentencing, the trial court
struck Harmon’s three section 667.5, subdivision (b),
enhancements but did not hold a full resentencing hearing as
required by section 1172.75, nor did it notify Harmon that it was
conducting any type of hearing. The following year, in September
2023, Harmon filed a motion, seeking a resentencing hearing
under section 1172.75. In December 2023, the trial court denied
the motion for lack of jurisdiction and Harmon appealed.
Harmon contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we
agree that the trial court erred in not conducting a resentencing
hearing under the procedures set forth in section 1172.75,
subdivision (d). At Harmon’s request, and with no objection from
the Attorney General, we exercise our discretion to treat
Harmon’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as
Harmon did not timely appeal from the July 2022 order or
amended judgment and there is no indication the December 2023

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
order is appealable. We grant the petition for writ of habeas
corpus and remand the matter for a full resentencing hearing.

BACKGROUND
In 1994, a jury found Harmon guilty of one count of second
degree robbery (§ 211). After finding prior conviction allegations
to be true, the court sentenced Harmon to 50 years to life: 25
years to life for the robbery under the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667,
subd. (e)), plus a consecutive term of 25 years for five prior
serious felony enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
(five years each).2 As reflected in the abstract of judgment, the
court imposed three one-year enhancements under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), and ran the three-year term concurrently with
the rest of Harmon’s sentence.
At the time Harmon was sentenced in 1994, section 667.5,
subdivision (b), required a trial court, when sentencing a
defendant to prison for a felony, to impose a one-year term for
each prior prison term the defendant had served, unless the
defendant had remained free of custody for at least five years.
Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 amended section
667.5, subdivision (b), to limit the enhancement to prior prison
terms served for sexually violent offenses. (Sen. Bill No. 136

2 The December 19, 1994 abstract of judgment indicates the

court sentenced Harmon to a 20-year term for four prior serious
felony enhancements, plus a five-year term for the robbery, in
addition to 25 years to life for the robbery. This appears to be a
clerical error, as it reflects the court imposed two different terms
for the same robbery. We need not resolve the discrepancy at this
juncture because we are remanding the matter to the trial court
for a full resentencing, and Harmon may raise the issue there.

3
(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, the
Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483, which made Senate Bill
No. 136’s changes to the law retroactive and added former section
1171.1, later renumbered section 1172.75, to achieve this purpose
by providing resentencing relief for custodial defendants with
now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. (Sen. Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; § 1172.75.)
In 2022, CDCR identified Harmon as someone who was
potentially eligible for relief under former section 1170.1 (now
section 1172.75) and so notified the trial court. On July 21, 2022,
the trial court (Judge Ricardo R. Ocampo) struck the three
section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior prison term enhancements
and stated it was leaving the remainder of Harmon’s sentence of
50 years to life unchanged. It does not appear from the record
that the People or Harmon were notified about these proceedings.
In its minute order from that day, the court ordered the clerk to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and send it to CDCR.
On September 7, 2023, Harmon, as a self-represented
litigant, filed a “Motion for Resolution to Correct the Sentence.”
He argued in the motion that pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483
and section 1172.75, he was entitled to present for the trial
court’s resentencing consideration evidence of “postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and
record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated,
evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances
have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).) He requested the court appoint counsel to obtain

4
and “prepare such documentation for the court’s review and
consideration.” He also asserted that the abstract of judgment
prepared after the July 21, 2022 hearing referenced above did not
accurately reflect his custody credits, and urged the court to
correct the judgment.
On December 18, 2023, the trial court (Judge Teresa P.
Magno) held a hearing on Harmon’s motion, at which Harmon
was not present nor represented by counsel. A deputy district
attorney who was present informed the court that he had
reviewed the motion and did not believe the court had
jurisdiction because Judge Ocampo had already held a
resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, and the “sentence is
final.” The court agreed with the prosecutor and denied the
motion for lack of jurisdiction. The court commented that “the
proper avenue” for Harmon to challenge the alleged “mistakes
[that] were made by Judge Ocampo” is “to appeal the matter in a
higher court.” The trial court ordered the clerk to give Harmon
notice of the ruling. The court’s December 18, 2023 minute order
indicates such notice was mailed to Harmon.
On January 3, 2024, Harmon, who was self-represented,
filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s December 18, 2023
order.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides that any section
667.5, subdivision (b), prior prison term enhancement imposed
before January 1, 2020 is invalid, unless it was imposed for a
prior conviction for a sexually violent offense. Subdivisions (b)-
(d) of section 1172.75 establish the procedure for defendants in
custody to obtain resentencing relief.

5
First, as set forth in subdivision (b) of section 1172.75, “The
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
and the county correctional administrator of each county shall
identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term
for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a) and shall provide the name of each person, along
with the person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or
docket number, to the sentencing court that imposed the
enhancement.”
Second, as set forth in subdivision (c) of section 1172.75,
“Upon receiving the information described in subdivision (b), the
court shall review the judgment and verify that the current
judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in
subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a),
the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
In resentencing a defendant under section 1172.75, the
court is required to, among other things, appoint counsel for the
defendant and “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council
and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2) & (5).) The court may also consider postconviction
factors such as rehabilitation. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
On July 21, 2022, after receiving the requisite notice from
CDCR and verifying that Harmon’s abstract of judgment includes
the section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements, the trial court
struck the invalid enhancements but did not conduct a
resentencing in accord with section 1172.75, subdivision (d). As
both parties agree, this was error. Harmon was entitled to a full

6
resentencing. (See People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270,
1276 [“ ‘By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
“invalid” enhancements’ ”].)
Harmon did not file a timely notice of appeal from the trial
court’s July 21, 2022 order or amended judgment. We note that
Harmon was not present at the July 21, 2022 hearing or
represented by counsel, and the record does not indicate he
received notice of the order or amended judgment within the
period for filing an appeal.
Harmon took the instant appeal from the trial court’s
December 18, 2023 order denying his motion requesting a
resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d). Section
1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to file a motion for
resentencing (see People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332),
and Harmon does not explain how the order denying his motion
would be appealable.
Rather, he requests that this court either (1) “view the
December 18, 2023 hearing as simply an extension of the July 21,
2022 hearing so that [his] claim that he is entitled to a full
resentencing hearing can be viewed on the merits,” or (2) treat
the appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Attorney
General does not object to or endorse a particular approach but
urges this court to review the matter on the merits, stating: “In
light of the clear errors that occurred at the 2022 recall-and-
resentencing hearing, and in the interests of judicial and
taxpayer economy, appellant’s claims are well-taken and
respondent agrees that the matter should be remanded” for a full
resentencing hearing.

7
In the interest of judicial economy, we may exercise our
discretion to treat a purported appeal as a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and thereby reach the merits of the defendant’s
contentions. (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 928, fn. 4.)
We choose to do so here. As the Attorney General concedes,
Harmon is entitled to a full resentencing in accordance with the
procedures set forth in section 1172.75, subdivision (d), and we
remand the matter for such a hearing.
DISPOSITION
Treating this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
we grant the petition. The matter is remanded for a full
resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

KLATCHKO, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

* Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

8

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.