CourtListener 10290342•Hanby v. Elite Show Services CA4/1
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Filed 12/9/24 Hanby v. Elite Show Services CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SANDY B. HANBY, D081448
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-
00007372-CU-OE-CTL)
ELITE SHOW SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
James A. Mangione, Judge. Affirmed.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani; Matthew G. Kleiner, Christopher B.
Cato and Andrea K. Williams for Defendant and Appellant.
Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw; Norman B. Blumenthal
and Kyle R. Nordrehaugh for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Elite Show Services, Inc. (Elite) appeals an order denying its
motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff Sandy B. Hanby’s individual claim
under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code,1 § 2698
1 All statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise
specified.
et seq.) and to dismiss or, alternatively, stay her non-individual PAGA claim.
On appeal, citing Viking River Cruises, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 639 (Viking
River), Elite contends that the predispute arbitration agreement between
them should be interpreted as excluding Hanby’s non-individual PAGA
claims from arbitration and therefore only her individual PAGA claim was
subject to arbitration. As explained below, we disagree and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2008, Hanby became employed by Elite and signed a two-page
arbitration agreement, titled “Mutual Arbitration Agreement and Class
Action Waiver” (Arbitration Agreement). In particular, the Arbitration
Agreement included a subdivision (d) (Subdivision (d)), which generally
required arbitration of all claims that may be brought by Hanby.
Subdivision (d) provided in relevant part:
“(d) Except as otherwise prohibited by law . . . , all parties
hereby agree to submit any and all claims, of any type
whatsoever, to binding arbitration, including but not
limited to claims arising from the employment relationship
between [Elite] [and Hanby], . . . all claims based
on . . . violations of public policy, . . . employment claims of
any type, [and] wage claims . . . .”
Subdivision (e) of the Arbitration Agreement provided:
“(e) All parties agree that this provision is a waiver of all
rights that any party has to a civil court action and trial.
All parties further agree and understand that the exclusive
means of resolving any [and] all claims and disputes shall
be decided by arbitration and not by a judge or jury. All
parties acknowledge and mutually agree that the arbitrator
has the authority to award any type of relief available
under the law that could otherwise be awarded by a judge
or jury.”
2
Subdivision (f) of the Arbitration Agreement provided that any arbitration
proceedings were to be conducted by the American Arbitration Association in
accordance with its existing rules.
Importantly, subdivision (h) of the Arbitration Agreement (Subdivision
(h)) provided specific exceptions to Subdivision (d)’s arbitration requirement,
stating in relevant part:
“(h) The parties further agree that the arbitrator shall not
have any right or power to consolidate arbitration claims
brought or held by [Hanby] into, or with, arbitration or
court proceedings involving claims of any other
co-employees employed by Elite, nor shall the arbitrator
have the right or power to hear arbitration brought as a
class action and/or multiple party suit, of any type
whatsoever. . . .”
Finally, subdivision (i) of the Arbitration Agreement set forth a severance
provision, stating:
“(i) The parties expressly agree that in the event any of the
subparagraphs of this Paragraph are found to be unlawful,
unenforceable or against public policy, the offending
subparagraph shall be deemed stricken and severed from
the remaining subparagraphs of this Paragraph, which
other provisions shall remain in full force and effect
between the parties.”
In 2014, Hanby left Elite’s employment. In 2015, she filed the instant
first amended complaint, alleging the following causes of action: (1) unfair
competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.); (2) failure to provide
accurate itemized statements (§ 226); (3) failure to reimburse employees for
required expenses (§ 2802); (4) failure to provide wages when due (§§ 201,
202, 203); and (5) violation of PAGA (§ 2698 et seq.).
In August 2015, the parties entered into a stipulation (Stipulation),
agreeing to submit to binding arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement
3
Hanby’s first, second, third, and fourth causes of action. The Stipulation
excluded her fifth cause of action under PAGA from that arbitration, stating:
“3. [Hanby] and [Elite] agree to stay the present action and
all proceedings relating to the action, pending the
completion of binding arbitration. In light of Iskanian v.
CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th
348, [(Iskanian)] the parties further agree that [Hanby’s]
Fifth Cause of Action asserted under [PAGA] will not be
submitted to arbitration, but will be stayed with this case,
pending the outcome of arbitration.”
Based on the Stipulation, the trial court stayed the action pending completion
of binding arbitration.
In 2019, Hanby accepted Elite’s offer to settle the claims that were
subject to the arbitration proceedings, and the arbitrator accepted the
parties’ joint stipulation as his final award. Hanby subsequently moved to
confirm the arbitration award and lift the stay on her PAGA claim.2
On September 8, 2022, Elite filed the instant motion to compel
arbitration of Hanby’s individual PAGA claim and dismiss, or alternatively
stay litigation of, her non-individual PAGA claim. Elite argued that Hanby
was required to arbitrate her individual PAGA claim pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement and, pursuant to Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. 639,
her non-individual PAGA claim must be dismissed or, alternatively, stayed
pending arbitration of her individual PAGA claim. Elite also argued that it
had not waived its right to require arbitration of Hanby’s individual PAGA
claim because the United States Supreme Court in Viking River had only
2 The record on appeal does not include an order confirming the
arbitrator’s final award on the parties’ joint stipulation regarding Hanby’s
non-PAGA claims. For purposes of our disposition of this appeal, we will
presume the trial court issued an order confirming that arbitration award.
4
recently overruled the holding in Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 prohibiting
the division of individual PAGA claims and non-individual PAGA claims to
allow arbitration of only individual PAGA claims. Elite argued Viking River
therefore allowed it to now divide Hanby’s PAGA claims and require
arbitration of only her individual PAGA claim pursuant to the Arbitration
Agreement.
Hanby opposed Elite’s motion to compel arbitration of only her
individual PAGA claim and to dismiss her non-individual PAGA claim. In
particular, she argued that Viking River did not apply to her PAGA claims
because, unlike the arbitration agreement in Viking River, the Arbitration
Agreement did not include a provision waiving her right to bring PAGA or
other representative claims. She also argued that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) did not apply to her PAGA claims and, even if
it did, the Arbitration Agreement required arbitration of her entire PAGA
claim (i.e., both her individual PAGA claim and non-individual PAGA claim).
Finally, she argued that even if only her individual PAGA claim were
compelled to arbitration, her non-individual PAGA claim should, at most, be
stayed and not dismissed as Elite requested.
In its reply, Elite argued, among other things, that the facts in Viking
River were apposite to those in this case and therefore Viking River’s holding
applied to require arbitration of only Hanby’s individual PAGA claim and
dismissal of her non-individual PAGA claim. In particular, Elite argued that,
contrary to Hanby’s assertion, Subdivision (h) of the Arbitration Agreement
should be interpreted as excluding Hanby’s non-individual PAGA claim from
Subdivision (d)’s arbitration requirement.
In a supplemental brief requested by the trial court, Elite argued that
Hanby’s individual PAGA claim was not included in the arbitration of her
5
four non-PAGA claims pursuant to the Stipulation. It argued that Hanby’s
entire PAGA claim was stayed pursuant to the Stipulation pending
arbitration of her four non-PAGA claims. It further argued that arbitration
of Hanby’s non-PAGA claims did not preclude her from thereafter litigating
her individual PAGA claim.
In her supplemental brief, Hanby argued that her individual PAGA
claim was included in the arbitration pursuant to the Stipulation and
therefore only her non-individual PAGA claim remained to be decided. She
also argued that she retained her standing to bring her non-individual PAGA
claim despite the resolution of her individual PAGA claim in arbitration.
On December 2, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Elite’s motion to
compel. Prior to the hearing, the court issued a tentative ruling finding that
Hanby’s individual PAGA and non-individual PAGA claims fell within the
scope of the Arbitration Agreement and were not excluded from its
arbitration requirement. At the beginning of the hearing, the court
confirmed that it interpreted the Arbitration Agreement as requiring
arbitration of both Hanby’s individual PAGA and non-individual PAGA
claims.
Elite’s counsel argued that the Arbitration Agreement should be
interpreted differently, citing Subdivision (h)’s exclusions from the
arbitration requirement. In particular, he cited Subdivision (h)’s language
stating that the arbitrator would not have the power to consolidate
arbitration claims brought by Hanby with arbitration or court proceedings
involving claims of other employees or to hear arbitration brought by Hanby
as a class action or multi-party suit.
Hanby’s counsel argued that the trial court was correct in its
interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement. He argued that Viking River
6
did not apply here because, unlike in that case, there was no clear intent
shown in the Arbitration Agreement to divide Hanby’s PAGA claim into two
parts. He argued that the Arbitration Agreement required arbitration of any
and all claims, including Hanby’s individual PAGA claim and non-individual
PAGA claim. He further argued that the Arbitration Agreement did not
express any waiver of a representative claim and did not even use the term
“representative” in its provisions. He also argued that Subdivision (h)’s
provision prohibiting consolidation of claims was inapplicable to Hanby’s
PAGA claim. Finally, he alternatively argued that the Stipulation expressly
excluded Hanby’s PAGA claim from the arbitration of her four non-PAGA
claims. He argued that her PAGA claim had been pending for years and
needed to be adjudicated whether in arbitration or court proceedings.
The trial court confirmed its tentative ruling and denied Elite’s motion
to compel. In its minute order denying Elite’s motion, the court stated it
found that Hanby’s individual PAGA and representative (or non-individual)
PAGA claims fell within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. The court
further found that those PAGA claims were not included within the
Arbitration Agreement’s provision waiving arbitration for class actions and
multiple party suits (i.e., Subdivision (h)). The court concluded: “Therefore,
the Court cannot compel arbitration of [Hanby’s] individual PAGA claims but
deny arbitration of [her] representative [i.e., non-individual] PAGA claims.”
Elite timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the court’s order.
7
DISCUSSION
I
Arbitration Agreements Generally
The fundamental policy of both the California Arbitration Act (CAA)
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) and the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) is to ensure
that arbitration agreements will be enforced in accordance with their terms.
(Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59
(Avery).) The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce.
(9 U.S.C. § 1; Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
63, 76.) If a contract does not involve interstate commerce, it nevertheless
remains subject to the CAA. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281 [“A written agreement
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter
arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
for the revocation of any contract.”]; Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97–98 [CAA compels
enforcement of valid arbitration agreements].)
Section 2 of the FAA provides in relevant part: “A written provision
in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) “Arbitration . . . is a matter of
consent . . . .” (Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 479.)
“Although the FAA preempts any state law that stands as an obstacle
to its objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their
terms, . . . we apply general California contract law to determine whether the
parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate their dispute.” (Avery, supra,
8
218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 59–60.) “General contract law principles include that
‘[t]he basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’
mutual intent at the time of contracting. [Citations.] . . . “The words of a
contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.” ’
[Citation.] Furthermore, ‘ “[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together,
so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause
helping to interpret the other.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Franco v. Greystone
Ridge Condominium (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 221, 227 (Franco).)
The terms of a specific arbitration provision in a contract must
reasonably include the dispute for which arbitration is requested. (Ahern v.
Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 675, 688.) A
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he or she
has not agreed to so submit. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle
Market Dev. (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle Museum).)
Finally, under the FAA, where parties enter into an agreement to arbitrate
certain future disputes, any “ambiguities about the scope of [that] arbitration
agreement must be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Lamps Plus, Inc. v.
Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176, 189.) The party seeking arbitration of a dispute
bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement
requiring arbitration of that dispute. (Pinnacle Museum, at p. 236.)
On appeal, where the evidence is not in conflict, we review a trial
court’s order denying arbitration of a dispute under an arbitration agreement
de novo as a matter of law. (Pinnacle Museum, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236.)
II
Agreements to Arbitrate PAGA Claims Generally
PAGA. PAGA authorizes any “aggrieved employee” to initiate a civil
action against a former employer “on behalf of himself or herself and other
9
current or former employees” to recover civil penalties for violations of the
Labor Code “assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency [(LWDA)].” (§ 2699, subd. (a).)
A
“An employee suing under PAGA ‘does so as the proxy or agent of the
state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’ [Citation.] . . . Moreover, the civil
penalties a PAGA plaintiff may recover on the state’s behalf are distinct from
the statutory damages or penalties that may be available to employees suing
for individual violations. [Citation.] Relief under PAGA is designed
primarily to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action.
[Citation.] ‘A PAGA representative action is therefore a type of qui tam
action,’ conforming to all ‘traditional criteria, except that a portion of the
penalty goes not only to the citizen bringing the suit but to all employees
affected by the Labor Code violation.’ [Citation.] The ‘government entity on
whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is always the real party in interest.’ ”
(Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81 (Kim),
italics omitted.)
B
Iskanian. In 2014, the California Supreme Court held in Iskanian that
predispute arbitration agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they
include waivers of an employee’s right to make PAGA claims on behalf of the
employee and/or other employees. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
pp. 383–384, 387.) The court stated: “[A]n arbitration agreement requiring
an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring
representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public policy.” (Id.
at p. 360.) In particular, the court explained that PAGA claims are actually
claims of the state (i.e., LWDA) and that an aggrieved employee is given the
10
statutory right to pursue PAGA claims for civil penalties as the state’s agent
or proxy against his or her employer. (Id. at pp. 380, 386–387.) Although the
arbitration agreement in Iskanian could be interpreted “as requiring
arbitration of individual claims but not of representative PAGA claims,” the
court noted that neither party contemplated bifurcation of those claims. (Id.
at p. 391.) Accordingly, the court held that the employee was required to
arbitrate his individual damages claims and the employer was required to
“answer the representative PAGA claims in some forum.” (Ibid., italics
added.) Iskanian then concluded: “The arbitration agreement gives us no
basis to assume that the parties would prefer to resolve a representative
PAGA claim through arbitration.” (Ibid.) The court stated that on remand
the parties could agree on a single forum to resolve both the PAGA claim and
other claims or, if not, address the question of whether it would be
appropriate to bifurcate the claims with individual claims going to arbitration
and the representative PAGA claims to litigation. (Id. at pp. 391–
392.) Subsequently, courts have concluded that Iskanian included a
secondary holding that an employer cannot split PAGA claims between
individual PAGA claims and non-individual PAGA claims and require
arbitration of only the individual PAGA claims. (See, e.g., Kim, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 88; Perez v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 408,
420–421; Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642, 649.)
Viking River. In 2022, in Viking River, the United States Supreme
Court upheld Iskanian’s primary holding that predispute arbitration
agreements cannot waive an employee’s right to bring PAGA claims, whether
individual PAGA claims or non-individual PAGA claims. (Viking River,
supra, 596 U.S. at pp. 656, 663.) However, Viking River overruled Iskanian’s
11
secondary holding that precluded division of PAGA claims into individual and
non-individual PAGA claims in arbitration agreements. (Id. at p. 622.)
In Viking River, the court stated: “PAGA actions are ‘representative’ in
that they are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as
agents or proxies—of the State.” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 648.) In
that sense, “every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity.”
(Ibid.) Yet, in another sense, some PAGA claims are “representative” in that
they are brought by one employee to recover civil penalties for Labor Code
violations committed against other employees. (Ibid.) Under the arbitration
agreement in Viking River, the employee waived the right to bring a class,
collective, or representative PAGA claim. (Id. at p. 647.) The agreement also
contained a severability clause, providing that if its PAGA waiver was found
to be invalid, any class, collective, or representative PAGA claim would be
litigated in court and the remainder of its provisions would remain valid and
be enforced in arbitration. (Ibid.) Therefore, Viking River held that the
employee’s individual PAGA claim was subject to arbitration and, under its
understanding of California law, the employee thereafter lacked standing to
assert a non-individual PAGA claim and that claim must be dismissed. (Id.
at pp. 662–663.)
Adolph. In Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104
(Adolph), the California Supreme Court recognized Viking River’s holding
that Iskanian remained valid under the FAA to the extent it held that
waivers of PAGA claims in arbitration agreements were contrary to public
policy and therefore unenforceable under state law. (Id. at p. 1118.) Adolph
also recognized Viking River’s additional holding that the FAA preempted a
state law rule that PAGA claims cannot be divided into individual and non-
individual PAGA claims. (Id. at pp. 1118–1119.) However, contrary to
12
Viking River’s conclusion, Adolph held that California law provides that an
employee retains his or her standing to assert non-individual PAGA claims
even if his or her individual PAGA claims were required to be arbitrated if
that employee is an “aggrieved employee” under PAGA. (Id. at pp. 1114,
1123, 1128.) The arbitration agreement in Adolph was similar to the
arbitration agreement in Viking River in that it prohibited the employee from
bringing a PAGA representative action, but included a severability clause
providing for arbitration of all enforceable provisions (including arbitration of
individual claims) and litigation in court of any PAGA representative
claims. (Id. at p. 1115.) In reversing the judgment below and remanding,
Adolph did not express any opinion regarding how the arbitration agreement
in its case should be interpreted. (Id. at pp. 1128–1129.)
III
Trial Court’s Interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement
Elite contends that the trial court erred by interpreting the Arbitration
Agreement as requiring arbitration of both Hanby’s individual PAGA and
non-individual PAGA claims and, based thereon, denying its motion to
compel arbitration of only her individual PAGA claim. We disagree.
A
At the outset, we must first determine which standard of review applies
on appeal in determining whether the trial court correctly interpreted the
Arbitration Agreement. Here, the parties have not cited, and we are
unaware of, any extrinsic evidence that was submitted by the parties below
regarding the meaning of the Arbitration Agreement. Rather, the parties
below simply disagreed on how the plain language of the Arbitration
Agreement should be interpreted. Elite therefore argues that we should
apply the de novo standard in reviewing the trial court’s interpretation of the
13
Arbitration Agreement. We agree with Elite and apply the de novo, or
independent, standard in reviewing the court’s interpretation of the
Arbitration Agreement and are therefore not bound by its interpretation.3
(Mitri v. Arnel Management Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1169–1170;
Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 677, 684.)
B
In determining whether the Arbitration Agreement requires arbitration
of both Hanby’s individual PAGA claim and non-individual PAGA claim, we
look first to Subdivision (d), which set forth the parties’ agreement that “any
and all claims” are subject to arbitration. As discussed above, Subdivision (d)
provided in relevant part:
“(d) Except as otherwise prohibited by law . . . , all parties
hereby agree to submit any and all claims, of any type
whatsoever, to binding arbitration, including but not
limited to claims arising from the employment relationship
between [Elite] [and Hanby], . . . all claims based on . . .
violations of public policy, . . . employment claims of any
type, [and] wage claims . . . .” (Italics added.)
The language “any and all claims, of any type whatsoever,” must be
interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense. (Franco, supra,
3 Elite also argues that the FAA applies to require enforcement of the
Arbitration Agreement because Hanby’s employment involved interstate
commerce. Hanby, in turn argued below and argues on appeal, that the FAA
does not apply, but, in any event, argues on appeal that the trial court
correctly denied Elite’s motion to compel. In determining how to properly
interpret the Arbitration Agreement, we need not, and do not, decide whether
the FAA applies here. Both the FAA and CAA support the enforcement of
parties’ agreements to arbitrate their disputes. (Avery, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) Therefore, to dispose of this appeal, we simply need to
determine how the Arbitration Agreement should be interpreted in regard to
Hanby’s individual and non-individual PAGA claims.
14
39 Cal.App.5th at p. 227.) In so interpreting that language, we conclude that
Subdivision (d) is a plain and unambiguous expression setting forth the
parties’ mutual intent that all claims, regardless of type, are subject to
arbitration (unless prohibited by law). We further conclude, and Elite does
not dispute, that Hanby’s PAGA claims, both individual and non-individual,
are a type of claim that Hanby could bring as an employee or former
employee against it. Specifically, as a former employee of Elite, Hanby could
allege, as she did in the fifth cause of action of her amended complaint, that
she is an aggrieved employee, and bring a PAGA claim, as the proxy or agent
of LWDA, against Elite for violations of the Labor Code committed against
her as well as against other employees. The plain language “any and all
claims, of any type whatsoever,” is sufficient, in and of itself, to support our
interpretation that Subdivision (d) includes Hanby’s individual and
non-individual PAGA claims against Elite.
In addition, we note that there is other language in Subdivision (d) that
provides further support for our interpretation. Specifically, Subdivision (d)
specifies that, among other claims, the parties agree to arbitrate “claims
arising from the employment relationship” between Elite and Hanby, which
presumably would include a PAGA claim for violations of the Labor Code
committed against Hanby and/or other employees, “all claims based
on . . . violations of public policy,” which clearly includes PAGA claims, and
“employment claims of any type, [and] wage claims,” which also clearly
includes PAGA claims. Therefore, the language of Subdivision (d), when
considered as a whole, must be interpreted as requiring arbitration of
Hanby’s individual and non-individual PAGA claims, unless otherwise
prohibited by law.
15
We further conclude that subdivision (e) of the Arbitration Agreement
provides additional support for our interpretation of Subdivision (d), stating
in relevant part:
“(e) . . . All parties further agree and understand that the
exclusive means of resolving any [and] all claims and
disputes shall be decided by arbitration and not by a judge
or jury. All parties acknowledge and mutually agree that
the arbitrator has the authority to award any type of relief
available under the law that could otherwise be awarded by
a judge or jury.” (Italics added.)
The import of the above italicized language is that it not only reinforced
Subdivision (d)’s language requiring any and all claims to be decided by
arbitration, but also expressed the parties’ mutual intent that the arbitrator
would have the authority to award any type of relief available under the law,
which presumably would include civil penalties that could be awarded under
PAGA for any violations committed by Elite against Hanby and/or other
employees.
C
In arguing that only Hanby’s individual PAGA claim, and not her non-
individual PAGA claim, is subject to arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration
Agreement, Elite relies solely on the language of Subdivision (h), which set
forth certain exceptions to the arbitrator’s power. Subdivision (h) provided in
relevant part:
“(h) The parties further agree that the arbitrator shall not
have any right or power to consolidate arbitration claims
brought or held by [Hanby] into, or with, arbitration or
court proceedings involving claims of any other co-
employees employed by Elite, nor shall the arbitrator have
the right or power to hear arbitration brought as a class
action and/or multiple party suit, of any type
whatsoever. . . .” (Italics added.)
16
In arguing that the Arbitration Agreement excluded Hanby’s non-individual
PAGA claim from its arbitration requirement, Elite primarily relies on
Subdivision (h)’s language stating that the arbitrator “shall not have any
right or power to consolidate arbitration claims brought or held by [Hanby]
into, or with, arbitration or court proceedings involving claims of any other
co-employees employed by Elite.” Elite argues, in a conclusory manner, that
this “consolidation” language in Subdivision (h) covered Hanby’s non-
individual PAGA claim because such a claim is brought on behalf of other
employees. However, in so arguing, Elite ignores the plain and ordinary
meaning of Subdivision (h)’s language. (Franco, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at
p. 227.) First, Subdivision (h)’s consolidation provision began with a
description of claims that may brought by Hanby, i.e., “claims brought or held
by [Hanby].” Second, Subdivision (h) stated that an arbitrator had no right
or power to consolidate Hanby’s claims “into, or with, arbitration or court
proceedings involving claims of any other co-employees.” In arguing that
Subdivision (h) excludes Hanby’s non-individual PAGA claim from
arbitration, Elite implicitly, if not expressly, argues that Hanby’s non-
individual PAGA claim falls within the second part of the consolidation
provision and not within its first part (which references Hanby’s claims). We
disagree.
Under Subdivision (h)’s consolidation provision, we conclude that
Hanby’s non-individual PAGA claim falls within its description of “claims
brought or held by [Hanby].” Hanby’s fifth cause of action for PAGA
violations alleged that Elite had committed certain Labor Code violations
against her and other employees and that she brought her PAGA claim for
civil penalties against Elite as the state’s proxy or agent on behalf of herself
and those other employees. In so alleging, Hanby properly described her
17
statutory authority to act as the proxy or agent of the state (i.e., LWDA),
which is the real party in interest with the prime authority to bring PAGA
actions against employers for violations of the Labor Code. (§ 2699, subd. (a);
Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81 [employee suing under PAGA does so as proxy
or agent of LWDA].) As discussed above, the civil penalties a PAGA plaintiff
may recover on the state’s behalf are primarily designed to benefit the
general public and are therefore distinct from the statutory damages or
penalties that may be available to employees suing for individual violations.
(Ibid.) Given the capacity in which Hanby brought her PAGA claim and the
civil penalties she sought against Elite that would primarily benefit the
general public, we conclude that Hanby’s individual PAGA claim and non-
individual PAGA claim were, in effect, merely two parts of her whole PAGA
claim against Elite. The first part of that claim was for civil penalties
relating to Elite’s alleged Labor Code violations against Hanby herself, while
the second part was for civil penalties relating to its alleged Labor Code
violations against other employees. Together, her PAGA claim sought civil
penalties for Elite’s alleged Labor Code violations committed against Hanby
and other employees. Therefore, Hanby’s fifth cause of action constituted one
comprehensive PAGA claim, as proxy or agent of LWDA, against Elite for
alleged violations of the Labor Code. As such, it necessarily fell within the
plain and ordinary language of the first part of Subdivision (h)’s consolidation
provision (i.e., “claims brought or held by [Hanby]”).
Furthermore, given the capacity in which Hanby brought her PAGA
claim and the civil penalties she sought against Elite to primarily benefit the
general public, we also conclude, contrary to Elite’s argument, that her non-
individual PAGA claims for Elite’s alleged Labor Code violations against
other employees did not constitute “claims of any other co-employees” within
18
the meaning of Subdivision (h). Because Hanby brought her PAGA claim as
the proxy or agent of LWDA for Elite’s alleged violations of the Labor Code
committed against both her and other employees, those other employees
cannot under PAGA be considered to have themselves made claims within
the meaning of Subdivision (h). Specifically, only Hanby (as LWDA’s proxy or
agent) has made a PAGA claim for civil penalties for Elite’s alleged violations
of the Labor Code committed against those other employees and, in so doing,
those other employees cannot be considered under PAGA or Subdivision (h) to
have made claims against Elite themselves. Accordingly, the only reasonable
interpretation of Subdivision (h)’s consolidation provision is that it does not
apply to exclude Hanby’s non-individual PAGA claim from Subdivision (d)’s
arbitration requirement.
Elite also argues, in a conclusory manner, that Subdivision (h)’s
language, which provided that the arbitrator shall have no right or power to
hear arbitration brought as a “class action and/or multiple party suit, of any
type whatsoever,” necessarily excluded Hanby’s non-individual PAGA claim
from arbitration. In so arguing, Elite fails to explain how Hanby’s
non-individual PAGA claim could be considered a class action or multiple
party suit. To the contrary, as Viking River discussed, a class action is
distinguishable from a non-individual PAGA claim. (Viking River, supra, 596
U.S. at pp. 654–655.) For example, in a class action the lead plaintiff acts as
the representative of a class of members, each of whom has an individual
claim for damages against the defendant. (Id. at p. 655.) Unlike the lead
plaintiff in a class action, a plaintiff who alleges a non-individual PAGA
claim for civil penalties acts, as discussed above, as the proxy or agent of
LWDA for violations of the Labor Code committed by an employer against
other employees. (Ibid.)
19
Likewise, contrary to Elite’s assertion, a non-individual PAGA claim
does not involve a “multiple party suit” within the meaning of Subdivision
(h). Rather, as discussed above, Hanby acts as the proxy or agent of LWDA
in making a non-individual PAGA claim for civil penalties against Elite for
alleged violations it committed against other employees. Therefore, a non-
individual PAGA claim has, in effect, only two parties—Hanby, who as the
plaintiff acts as LWDA’s proxy or agent, and Elite, which is the defendant.
Accordingly, Hanby’s non-individual PAGA claim is not a “multiple party
suit” within the meaning of Subdivision (h), but is, in effect, a bilateral
action, albeit one that involves allegations of Labor Code violations
committed by Elite against employees other than Hanby.
Based on our reasoning above, we conclude that the trial court correctly
found that both Hanby’s individual PAGA and non-individual PAGA claims
were not excluded from arbitration under Subdivision (h) of the Arbitration
Agreement and therefore were required to be arbitrated pursuant to
Subdivision (d) of the Arbitration Agreement.4
D
In light of our interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement as requiring
arbitration of both Hanby’s individual PAGA and non-individual PAGA
claims, Elite’s argument that Viking River applies to require arbitration of
only Hanby’s individual PAGA claim fails because it is based on the faulty
4 Because we dispose of this appeal based on our interpretation of the
clear and plain meaning of the Arbitration Agreement, we need not, and do
not, address Hanby’s alternative arguments in support of the trial court’s
order denying Elite’s motion to compel, such as her argument that the order
should be affirmed because the Stipulation excluded both Hanby’s individual
PAGA and non-individual PAGA claim from the arbitration of her four non-
PAGA causes of action.
20
premise that Subdivision (h) of the Arbitration Agreement excluded Hanby’s
non-individual PAGA claim from Subdivision (d)’s arbitration requirement.
Unlike the Arbitration Agreement in this case, the arbitration agreement in
Viking River expressly included a waiver by the employee of the right to
bring a representative PAGA claim. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at
p. 647.) That agreement also contained a severability clause, providing that
if its PAGA waiver was found to be invalid, any representative PAGA claim
would be litigated in court and the remainder of its provisions would remain
valid and be enforced in arbitration. (Ibid.) Therefore, Viking River held
that under the language of its arbitration agreement and in light of its
overruling of Iskanian’s secondary holding (as discussed above), only the
employee’s individual PAGA claim was subject to arbitration and, in so
holding, implicitly concluded that the employee’s non-individual PAGA claim
was not arbitrable and must be dismissed because, under its understanding
of California law, the employee thereafter lacked standing to assert a non-
individual PAGA claim. (Id. at pp. 662–663.)
E
Finally, although neither party addresses the issue, we briefly discuss
Subdivision (d)’s exclusion from arbitration of those claims for which
arbitration is prohibited by law (i.e., “[e]xcept as otherwise prohibited by
law”). The parties do not cite, and we are unaware of, any statute or case law
that prohibits the arbitration of non-individual PAGA claims. Rather, if the
parties to an arbitration agreement provide for the arbitration of
non-individual PAGA claims, the general policy of favoring arbitration and
enforcing the clear terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement support a
conclusion that those non-individual PAGA claims are not contrary to, or
prohibited by, law and should therefore be arbitrated. (Avery, supra,
21
218 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) Furthermore, it would be logically inconsistent to
allow Hanby, as LWDA’s proxy or agent, to arbitrate her individual PAGA
claim pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement, but then deny Hanby, as
LWDA’s proxy or agent, the right to arbitrate her non-individual PAGA claim
pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement. Alternatively stated, because
employees are permitted to agree to arbitrate their individual PAGA claims
as LWDA’s proxy or agent (see, e.g., Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at
pp. 662–663), they should also be permitted to agree to arbitrate their
non-individual PAGA claims as LWDA’s proxy or agent. We are not aware of
any public policy that would require different treatment of agreements to
arbitrate non-individual PAGA claims.
Although we are unaware of any case that directly addresses this issue,
we note that Iskanian appeared to support arbitration of non-individual
PAGA claims. In Iskanian, the court held that the employer would be
required to “answer the representative PAGA claims in some forum.”
(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 391, italics added.) By using the phrase “in
some forum,” we infer that the court understood that the plaintiff’s non-
individual PAGA claim could resolved either in arbitration or court
proceedings and thereby recognized the arbitrability of non-individual PAGA
claims. (Ibid.) Iskanian also implicitly recognized the arbitrability of non-
individual PAGA claims when it stated that on remand the parties could
agree on a “single forum” to resolve both the PAGA claims and other claims,
which “single forum” presumably could be either arbitration or court
proceedings. (Id. at pp. 391–392.)
Furthermore, we note that a post-Iskanian federal case includes
language that appears to support arbitration of non-individual PAGA claims.
In Sakkab v. Luxotica Retail North America, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 803 F.3d 425
22
(Sakkab), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “Iskanian expresses no
preference regarding whether individual PAGA claims are litigated or
arbitrated. It provides only that representative PAGA claims may not be
waived outright. [Citation.] The Iskanian rule does not prohibit the
arbitration of any type of claim.” (Sakkab, at p. 434, italics
added.) Importantly, the court stated (albeit in possible dictum): “Nothing
prevents parties from agreeing to use informal procedures to arbitrate
representative PAGA claims.” (Id. at p. 436.) In that context, Sakkab
presumably was referring to non-individual PAGA claims because in the
preceding paragraph the court referred to “representative” PAGA claims as
those “claims for penalties arising out of violations against other
employees.” (Ibid.) Therefore, Sakkab supports a conclusion that private
parties may agree to arbitrate both individual PAGA claims and non-
individual PAGA claims.
Based on our reasoning above, we conclude that Subdivision (d)’s
language excluding from its provisions arbitration of any claims “prohibited
by law” does not apply to Hanby’s non-individual PAGA claim (or individual
PAGA claim). Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that Subdivision
(d) required arbitration of both Hanby’s individual PAGA and non-individual
PAGA claims. Because Elite’s motion to compel sought arbitration of only
Hanby’s individual PAGA claim and sought to dismiss (or alternatively stay),
and not arbitrate, her non-individual PAGA claim, we conclude that the trial
court correctly denied its motion.
23
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
RUBIN, J.
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