People v. Thomas CA2/5

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Filed 12/6/24 P. v. Thomas CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B333894

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. SA043366)

CARLOS THOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Affirmed.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2001, when he was 17 years old, Carlos Thomas shot and
killed a rival gang member outside of a liquor store. The jury
found Thomas guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and found true
personal gun use (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(4)) allegations. The trial court sentenced Thomas to 15 years
to life for the murder, plus 25 years to life for the personal gun
use enhancement, for a total of 40 years to life in prison. Another
panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in 2006.
In August 2023, Thomas petitioned for recall and
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 former section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
608 (Heard). The trial court denied the petition because it found
that Thomas’s sentence of 40 years to life was not the functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
On appeal, Thomas contends that his sentence of 40 years
to life was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that the trial
court’s order should be reversed pursuant to Heard.
We affirm the trial court’s order.2

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We deny Thomas’s request for judicial notice, filed on
March 20, 2024, of documents that the trial court did not
consider.

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DISCUSSION

A. Law

Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) provides, that, with
certain exceptions described in that subdivision, “[w]hen a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to
the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” “The
petition shall include the defendant’s statement that the
defendant [meets these criteria], and the defendant’s statement
that one of the following is true: [¶] (A) The defendant was
convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting
murder provisions of law. [¶] (B) The defendant does not have
juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes
with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to
the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall.
[¶] (C) The defendant committed the offense with at least one
adult codefendant. [¶] (D) The defendant has performed acts that
tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for
rehabilitation . . . or showing evidence of remorse.” (§1170, subd.
(d)(2).) “If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
one or more of the statements specified in subparagraphs (A) to
(D), inclusive, of paragraph (2) is true, the court shall recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and hold a hearing
to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the
defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the

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new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.”
(§ 1170, subd. (d)(5).)
In Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, the defendant argued
that he was eligible for resentencing under former section 1170,
subdivision (d) because his aggregate sentence of 23 years plus 80
years to life in prison was the functional equivalent of LWOP.3
The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, held that the
statute by its plain language applies only to juvenile offenders
sentenced to a term of LWOP and not to juvenile offenders
sentenced to an aggregate term that is the functional equivalent
of LWOP. However, the court also held that equal protection
principles require that juvenile offenders sentenced to de facto
LWOP be permitted to petition for recall and resentencing
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d).
The Heard court rejected the People’s argument that
section 3051, subdivision (b)(3), which entitles a defendant who
“was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when
the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the
sentence is a life term of 25 years to life” to a youth offender
parole hearing in their 25th year of incarceration, had

3 Section 1170 has been amended several times since the
defendant in Heard petitioned for resentencing. Notably,
“[e]ffective January 1, 2022, subdivision (d)(2) of section 1170 was
redesignated as subdivision (d)(1) of section 1170. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3.)” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 619.) The
substance of the relevant portions of the statute has remained
unchanged over that time period, however. (Ibid.; Stats. 2022,
ch. 744 (A.B. 960), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023; Stats. 2023, ch. 131
(A.B. 1754), § 155, eff. Jan. 1, 2024; Stats. 2023, ch. 218
(S.B. 852), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2024; Stats. 2023, ch. 560 (A.B. 1104),
§ 2.5, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)

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“ ‘ “reformed” ’ ” the defendant’s sentence such that it was no
longer a de facto sentence to LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) The court acknowledged that in People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), our Supreme Court
held that, due to retroactive operation of section 3051, Franklin,
who was serving a sentence of 50 years to life, was no longer
serving a term of LWOP or de facto LWOP. (Id. at p. 629.) The
Heard court explained that Franklin was distinguishable
“[b]ecause section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), refers to the
‘offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment
for life without the possibility of parole’ (italics added)”—thus, in
the context of eligibility for resentencing under section 1170, the
Heard court disregarded section 3051’s provision for a parole
hearing within the defendant’s expected life span when
determining whether his sentence was the functional equivalent
of LWOP. (Ibid.) The Heard court held the defendant, whose
aggregate sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP when
it was imposed, was similarly situated to the juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP and that there was no rational basis for
distinguishing between the two groups; equal protection
principles required that defendants sentenced to the functional
equivalent of LWOP be given the opportunity to petition for
resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).4 (Id. at
pp. 628–634.)

4 The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three,
joined Heard in People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435. In
Sorto, the defendant was sentenced to 10 years plus 130 years to
life in prison. (Id. at p. 440.) The Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, Division One reaffirmed its position in Heard in People

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B. Analysis

Although in the respondent’s brief the People contend that
Heard was wrongly decided, they have subsequently withdrawn
the argument. As a consequence, on appeal the sole question
before this court is whether Thomas’s aggregate sentence of 40
years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP, such that he is
eligible to petition for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)
pursuant to Heard. We conclude the 40 years to life sentence
imposed is not a de facto life sentence for Thomas under section
1170, subdivision (d), and that, even assuming Heard is correctly
decided, Thomas is ineligible for relief.
Thomas asserts that he will not become eligible for parole
until he has served 40 years in prison and is 57 years old. He
argues that this sentence is equivalent to LWOP under our
Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th
349, 368 (Contreras)—which held that that a sentence of 50 years
to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP—because a 40 years
to life sentence does not “contemplate a sufficient period to
achieve reintegration as a productive and respected member of
the citizenry” as Contreras requires. Thomas argues that the
United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) has concluded
that a sentence exceeding 39 years is the functional equivalent of
LWOP (U.S. Sentencing Commission Final Quarterly Data
Report (Fiscal Year 2012), at Table 25, Appen. A, pp. 1, 7), and
that other states have recognized that sentences similar to his

v. Bagsby (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2024, No. D083358) 2024 WL
4847683. In Bagsby, the juvenile offender was sentenced to 107
years to life. (Id. at *1.)

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constitute de facto LWOP (People v. Buffer (2019) 137 N.E.3d
763, 774 [over 40 years]; Bear Cloud v. State of Wyoming (Wyo.
2014) 334 P.3d 132, 142 [45 years]). Thomas contends that, in
light of studies regarding the average life expectancy in prison,
he is unlikely to live past his 40-year sentence.
The People respond that, although our Supreme Court has
not had occasion to expressly define de facto LWOP, it has offered
guidance. In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, the Supreme Court
held that 25 years to life is not de facto LWOP, and in Contreras,
supra, 4 Cal.5th 349, it held that 50 years to life is de facto
LWOP. In People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, the Court
of Appeal held that a defendant sentenced to 30 years to life, who
would be parole eligible at age 47, was “by no stretch of the
imagination” sentenced to de facto LWOP. (Id. at p. 58.) The
People argue that under section 3051’s youthful offender parole
scheme, Thomas will be eligible for parole in May 2025, when he
will be 41 years old and significantly younger than the defendant
in Perez. The People urge that, even if we do not consider
Thomas’s eligibility for parole pursuant to section 3051, under his
original sentence Thomas will be eligible for parole after serving
40 years when he is 57 years old, which is well within his
expected lifetime. The People further argue that in Colorado, the
Legislature has passed ameliorative legislation providing
juveniles sentenced to LWOP parole eligibility after 40 years
(Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1.3-401, subd. (4)(c)(I)(B)), and in
Nebraska and Texas the legislatures have designated the
maximum parole eligibility date for juveniles as 40 years (Neb.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-105.02; Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12.31). The
People assert that the stance these states have adopted suggests
that, for a juvenile offender, a sentence of 40 years to life provides

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a meaningful opportunity to reintegrate into society within the
defendant’s lifetime and is not de facto LWOP.
We decline to consider the People’s argument that
Thomas’s sentence is not de facto LWOP because, under section
3051, Thomas will be eligible for parole next year at age 41. The
People withdrew their argument that Heard—which holds that
for purposes of determining whether a sentence is de facto LWOP
in the context of section 1170 the court considers the sentence
imposed without regard to later reductions of the defendant’s
parole eligibility date—was wrongly decided, and do not offer any
reason why section 1170 should be interpreted to support their
proposed definition of de facto LWOP in contravention of Heard.5
We agree, however, that Thomas’s 40 years to life is not a
de facto life sentence, even giving Thomas the benefit of the
metric Heard employs. Thomas cites to the USSC’s published
reports, which designate a sentence of 470 months—just over 39
years—and above as a de facto life sentence. (U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Final Quarterly Data Report (Fiscal Year 2012)
Table 25, Appen. A, pp. 1, 7.) The USSC’s definition does not
support Thomas’s argument, however. The USSC indicates that
470 months is “a length consistent with the average life
expectancy of federal criminal offenders given the average age of
federal offenders.” (U.S. Sentencing Commission, Final Quarterly
Data Report (Fiscal Year 2012) Appen. A, p. 7, italics added.)
The average age of federal offenders as reported by the USSC in
July 2022 is 37 years old. (U.S. Sentencing Commission, Life

5 Moreover, we express no opinion as to whether Heard
correctly interprets section 1170 with respect to the definition of
LWOP, as it is not necessary to our resolution of this matter
regardless of the People’s concession.

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Sentences in the Federal System (2022) p. 20.) By this metric, a
life sentence is a sentence that will provide for release on or after
the offender’s average life expectancy of 76 years old. None of the
other authorities cited by the parties indicate that a sentence of
40 years to life is de facto LWOP. To the contrary, the legislation
the parties have cited supports the conclusion that Thomas’s 40
years to life sentence is not de facto LWOP. The South Dakota
Supreme Court has also ruled that a sentence requiring the
defendant to serve 40 years in state prison prior to parole
eligibility at age 55 is not a de facto life sentence. (State v. Diaz
(S.D. 2016) 887 N.W.2nd 751.) As there is no authority that
supports Thomas’s position, we decline to hold that his sentence
of 40 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP. Even if
we disregard that Thomas will be eligible for parole at age 41 as
Heard proscribes and exclude any conduct credits that Thomas
may earn during his incarceration, he will be only 57 years old
when he has served 40 years in prison. This is a sufficiently
young age to permit Thomas to reintegrate into society as a
productive and respected citizen.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Thomas’s petition
for recall of his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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