People v. Ross CA5

CourtListener 10289696CalctappDec 6, 2024

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Filed 12/6/24 P. v. Ross CA5

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F085822
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF173073B)
v.

TYMERE ANTHONY ROSS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Judith K.
Dulcich, Judge.
Jean M. Marinovich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, and Chung Mi
Choi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2022, a jury convicted appellant Tymere Anthony Ross of second degree
murder for the 2017 death of Hardeep Singh (Pen. Code, § 187;1 count 1). The jury also
convicted Ross of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a);
count 6).
The jury found true that Ross was a principal in the murder, and at least one
principal intentionally and personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d),
(e)(1)). For the murder, the jury found true a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
Ross was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life, which was enhanced by 10 years
for the firearm. In count 6 (active gang participation), the trial court imposed an upper
term, which was stayed. Ross was also sentenced in three other pending felony cases.
In this matter, Ross was tried with his codefendant, Kenton Michael McDaniel.2 It
was the prosecution’s theory that McDaniel was the shooter, and Ross aided and abetted
first degree felony murder. The jury, however, acquitted Ross of first degree murder. In
counts 2 through 5, the jury acquitted Ross in two counts of conspiracy, one count of
attempted robbery, and one count of attempted burglary.
Similar to Ross, the jury convicted McDaniel of second degree murder. However,
the jury rejected the prosecution’s theory that McDaniel was the shooter, finding it not
true that McDaniel personally discharged a firearm. The jury did not identify the shooter.
It appears the jury must have concluded that J.T., a minor, was the shooter. J.T. was
present at the crime scene, but he did not participate in this trial.
Ross contends that his murder conviction must be reversed for insufficient
evidence because nothing demonstrates his own malice for murder. Respondent
disagrees, arguing that the record either shows Ross held his own intent to kill or he acted

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2 In companion appeal number F085937, we resolve issues which McDaniel raises.

2.
with implied malice. After scrutinizing the record, we agree with Ross, and we reject
respondent’s assertions. Insufficient evidence supports the second degree murder
conviction, which must be reversed. Nothing establishes Ross’s own malice, which may
not be imputed to him simply because he was involved in the events leading up to Singh’s
death. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Ross’s gang conviction in count 6 was based on this murder. As such, it must also
be reversed for insufficient evidence. Accordingly, we vacate this criminal judgment.
The trial court shall resentence Ross on his remaining felony cases.
BACKGROUND
Neither Ross nor McDaniel testified at trial. We summarize the material trial
facts. We provide additional details later in this opinion when relevant to the specific
issues raised.
I. Singh’s Murder.
On November 24, 2017, Hardeep Singh was fatally shot with a .45-caliber gun.
The bullet entered his face and exited the back of his head. The shooting occurred at
Singh’s apartment complex in Bakersfield, California. Singh was shot while he was
standing outside.3 This shooting was reported to authorities at around 11:25 p.m. When
officials turned over Singh’s body, they discovered a kitchen knife lying under him.
Just before the shot occurred, one witness heard a possible argument between
Singh and another man. After the shot was fired, two witnesses saw a single black male
running away. That suspect entered a vehicle, which sped off. One witness saw the
suspect get into the front passenger seat.

3 At the time of his death, Singh had morphine, methamphetamine, and alcohol in
his blood system.

3.
Law enforcement eventually identified and arrested four suspects: (1) Hawthorne;
(2) Ross; (3) McDaniel; and (4) J.T., who was a minor when this murder occurred. J.T.
did not participate in this trial.
On the night Singh was killed, Hawthorne was working as a prostitute. Earlier
that evening, Singh contacted her for a date after she had posted an advertisement for her
services. Singh and Hawthorne had not previously met.
Hawthorne drove to Singh’s apartment complex with Ross, McDaniel and J.T. in
her vehicle. She arrived at around 11:00 p.m. It took her about 10 minutes to find Singh.
She parked her vehicle, and she went alone to meet Singh, who was waiting for her
outside.
According to Hawthorne, Singh rejected her services because he did not “want a
black girl.” Hawthorne testified that Singh’s rejection of her was not a big deal, and it
was common in prostitution. She went back to her vehicle. At trial, she denied seeing
Singh with a knife or other weapon.
According to Hawthorne, as she drove away, McDaniel told her to stop, saying he
needed to use a restroom. First McDaniel and then J.T. exited her car. A short time later,
Ross also exited her vehicle. Hawthorne heard a single shot. Hawthorne told the jury
that Ross was not gone very long before the shot was fired, and he was the first to return
to her vehicle. She said it took another 30 or 40 seconds before McDaniel and J.T.
returned to her car. According to Hawthorne, McDaniel was holding a firearm when he
got into the rear passenger seat.
Hawthorne testified that, after everyone got back into her vehicle, Ross and J.T.
were screaming at McDaniel asking, “[W]hy did you do that?” According to Hawthorne,

4.
McDaniel said he had to get out his aggression because his girlfriend had been assaulted,
and he was mad.4 McDaniel said that Singh “swung a knife at me.”
Hawthorne told the jury that McDaniel pointed his gun at her and told her to drive
away. At some point, J.T. commented that, if McDaniel was going to shoot, then
McDaniel should have looked in Singh’s pockets for money.
Law enforcement found a phone charger lying on the ground near Singh’s body.
McDaniel’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was on that charger. The DNA on the charger
was a mixture from multiple sources. McDaniel’s DNA was a minor contributor to that
sample, while an unknown female was the major contributor. It is 120 billion times more
likely that McDaniel contributed his DNA to this sample than a random person in the
African American community.
II. The Motive for Singh’s Murder is Unclear.
It does not appear that property was taken from Singh. He had an iPhone and
$200 in his pocket. He was wearing jewelry. Nothing was disturbed in his apartment,
which was nearby.
On the night in question, Ross, McDaniel and J.T. were active gang members with
the West Side Crips. There was no evidence that Singh was a member of any gang.
Singh’s apartment complex was outside the normal territory of the West Side Crips.
The prosecution attempted to establish robbery or burglary as the motive for this
crime. Earlier in 2017, Ross had accompanied Hawthorne on a prostitution date
involving a different client. Ross had stolen cocaine from that other client, which he
shared with Hawthorne.
It was the prosecution’s theory that Ross accompanied Hawthorne on her date with
Singh in order to rob Singh, or to burglarize his apartment. It was the prosecution’s

4 According to a detective at trial, Hawthorne previously stated that McDaniel had
“said something about his girlfriend had been kicked in the stomach by some East Siders,
and he had to get some frustration out.”

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theory that Ross arranged for McDaniel and J.T. to accompany them for that purpose.
According to the prosecution, Singh was killed during an attempted robbery or burglary.
At trial, Hawthorne testified that she was never aware of any plan that Singh
would be robbed. She claimed that, when she picked up Ross to drive to her date with
Singh, Ross had insisted that McDaniel and J.T. would also accompany them. She had
initially refused, but she eventually relented. Hawthorne testified that, before that night,
she had never met McDaniel.
Hawthorne believed that Ross, McDaniel, and J.T. were going to remain in her
vehicle and smoke while she was with Singh for about one hour. However, she told the
jury that, as she drove to meet Singh, J.T. had asked her if he could “run through” Singh’s
apartment, and she had told him, “[H]ell, no.” Hawthorne told the jury that she had
understood J.T. to mean he wanted to go into Singh’s residence and steal something. The
jury learned that, during an interview with law enforcement, Hawthorne had claimed that
J.T. had asked if all of them could run through Singh’s apartment.
According to Hawthorne, both Ross and McDaniel came to her residence on a
different day after this murder. McDaniel “threatened” her and told her that she “better
not say nothing.” She also told the jury that, after she was in custody for Singh’s murder,
she happened to see Ross on a jail bus. According to Hawthorne, Ross called her a
snitch. He also said she had “better watch out” for her daughters.
The jury rejected the prosecution’s theory regarding felony murder. The jury
found both Ross and McDaniel not guilty of conspiracy, attempted robbery or attempted
burglary. The jury acquitted both Ross and McDaniel of first degree murder. However,
the jury found both of them guilty of second degree murder.5

5 We note that, with CALCRIM No. 522, the jury was instructed that provocation
may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree. The jurors were informed that
they were to decide the weight and significance of any provocation, and whether the
crime was first or second degree murder. This record contains evidence that strongly

6.
III. The Concerns Regarding Hawthorne’s Credibility.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor acknowledged that Hawthorne had
credibility concerns. The prosecutor conceded that Hawthorne had lied. The prosecutor
asked the jurors to scrutinize her testimony.
Hawthorne was initially charged with Singh’s murder, and she faced a life
sentence or possibly the death penalty. She testified against Ross and McDaniel pursuant
to a plea agreement. In exchange for her truthful testimony, she agreed to be convicted as
an accessory after the fact (§ 32) with credit for time served. This plea agreement also
resolved some outstanding misdemeanor charges in a different county.
Hawthorne was placed on witness relocation. She was receiving from the state
about $1,700 a month for relocation expenses.
Hawthorne was about 31 years old when this murder occurred. She had worked as
a prostitute since she was 18 years old. She admitted to the jurors that she had stolen
items from some of her prior clients, such as watches and jewelry.
At the time Singh was killed, Ross was 19 years old.6 Despite their age
difference, Hawthorne claimed to the jury that she had a prior romantic relationship with
Ross. Through Ross, Hawthorne had previously met J.T., whom she believed was Ross’s
cousin.
Hawthorne denied that Ross was her pimp.7 However, she told the jury that Ross
would occasionally go with her on calls with clients. She would give him a percentage of
her earnings in exchange for his protection.

suggests Singh was holding a knife when he was killed. According to Hawthorne,
McDaniel said that Singh “swung a knife at me” after McDaniel was back in her vehicle.
6 When Singh was killed, McDaniel was 18 years old and J.T. was 17 years old.
7 The jury heard evidence that suggested Ross was earning money pimping other
women.

7.
Law enforcement interviewed Hawthorne multiple times. Before she was arrested,
Hawthorne lied to law enforcement, claiming she had no knowledge of Singh’s death.
After she was arrested, she eventually provided details about Singh’s murder, culminating
in her plea agreement. Hawthorne consistently denied any knowledge of a plan to rob
Singh.
Hawthorne initially told law enforcement that only McDaniel exited her vehicle
and confronted Singh. Law enforcement used a ruse and said witnesses had seen
multiple suspects exit her vehicle. Hawthorne then claimed that both Ross and J.T. also
exited her car. At one point during her statements to law enforcement, Hawthorne
admitted that, when the three males exited her vehicle, she believed they were going to
rob Singh.
IV. The Jury Did Not Identify McDaniel as the Shooter.
In November 2017, law enforcement was conducting a wiretap operation of
certain members of the West Side Crips. This operation was initially unrelated to Singh’s
homicide.
Through this wiretap operation, law enforcement discovered that, on the day after
Singh’s murder, J.T. called a gang member asking for .45-caliber bullets. That same day,
law enforcement stopped a vehicle in Bakersfield in which McDaniel and J.T. were both
back passengers. A firearm was recovered from under the seat where J.T. had been
sitting.
J.T.’s DNA was on this firearm. Testing later confirmed that this firearm had been
used to kill Singh. Law enforcement discovered a video on social media that showed J.T.
holding this same firearm several days before Singh’s murder. Ross was with J.T. in that
video.
Hawthorne told law enforcement that, on the night Singh was killed, McDaniel
was holding a black gun. She also told the jury that McDaniel’s gun was black.
However, the gun used to shoot Singh was silver, or at least had a silver-colored slide.

8.
At trial, Hawthorne said she believed McDaniel had been the shooter. According
to Hawthorne, McDaniel was the only one holding a firearm when the three returned to
her vehicle after she heard the shot. However, during her trial testimony, Hawthorne
admitted that she never saw McDaniel shoot. She believed he was the shooter because he
had held a gun, and the others had asked why he did that.
No surveillance cameras captured this shooting. Two eyewitnesses reported that
the suspect who ran away was wearing a white shirt or sweatshirt. Video from social
media showed Ross wearing a black shirt earlier that same day. Video from social media
showed J.T. wearing a black shirt on the night of the homicide. Video from social media
showed McDaniel wearing a white shirt the day before this homicide.
One eyewitness said that the male suspect who ran away got into the front
passenger seat of the vehicle that sped off. Hawthorne testified that it was Ross who was
the front passenger. McDaniel and J.T. were the back passengers.
Some bushes were growing in the area where Singh was shot. At trial, the two
eyewitnesses stated they only saw the single suspect. However, they both agreed it was
possible other suspects may have been present.
One eyewitness said the fleeing suspect was shorter than Singh. In court, the two
eyewitnesses could not identify either Ross or McDaniel as the male they saw running
from Singh.
The prosecutor argued to the jury that McDaniel was the shooter who killed Singh.
According to the prosecutor, the evidence suggested that McDaniel dropped the phone
charger when he drew his firearm. In contrast, McDaniel’s trial counsel argued to the
jury that J.T. must have been the shooter. McDaniel’s counsel asserted that McDaniel
was taller than Singh, but J.T. was shorter than Singh. McDaniel’s counsel told the jury
that J.T.’s height matched the description of the fleeing male.
The jurors found true that both Ross and McDaniel were principals in this murder,
and another principal discharged a firearm. The jurors did not find true that McDaniel

9.
personally discharged a firearm during this murder. The jurors also did not find true that
McDaniel used a firearm when participating in a criminal street gang.
In this appeal, both Ross and respondent assert it was McDaniel who must have
fatally shot Singh.
V. The Cell Phone Evidence.
An expert for the prosecution reviewed cell phone data. The expert explained that
a cell phone will connect to a cell tower within an approximate 20- to 30-mile radius.
Hours before this murder, cell phone records suggest that McDaniel, Ross, J.T.,
and Hawthorne were in south Bakersfield. At the time of this homicide, their cell phones
were all in the vicinity of Singh’s apartment complex.
On the night in question, either Hawthorne or Ross used Ross’s cell phone to
communicate with Singh. This was done just before Hawthorne met Singh.
The first 911 call to report Singh’s murder occurred at 11:25 p.m. Around the time
of this homicide, neither Ross, McDaniel nor J.T. were using their respective cell phones.
The cell phone data shows that, within minutes after Singh’s homicide was
reported to authorities, the phones used by Hawthorne, Ross, McDaniel and J.T. had
already traveled from the area near Singh’s apartment complex back to south Bakersfield.
DISCUSSION
I. Ross’s Murder Conviction Must be Reversed Due to Insufficient Evidence.
Ross argues that his murder conviction must be reversed. According to Ross,
nothing establishes his own malice. In contrast, respondent asserts we should affirm
Ross’s murder conviction. Respondent contends that Ross was an aider and abettor who
acted with an intent to kill, or with implied malice.
A. The standard of review.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and decide
whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could

10.
make the necessary finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must be
reasonable, credible and of solid value. We presume every inference in support of the
judgment that the finder of fact could reasonably have made. We do not reweigh the
evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. We cannot reverse the judgment merely
because the evidence could be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. D’Arcy
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 293.)
B. The elements of murder.
Murder requires malice aforethought, which is either express or implied. Express
malice is an intent to kill, which can be exhibited as “a deliberate intention to unlawfully
take away the life of a fellow creature.” (§§ 187, subd. (a); 188, subd. (a)(1).)
Implied malice occurs when a perpetrator (1) intentionally commits an act (or fails
to act); (2) the natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human
life; (3) at the time he acted, the perpetrator knew his act was dangerous to human life;
and (4) the perpetrator deliberately acted (or failed to act) with conscious disregard for
human life. (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 974; see also CALCRIM No. 520.)
Malice may not be imputed to a person based solely on his participation in a
crime. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
C. The elements to establish murder liability for an aider and abettor.
An aider and abettor cannot be found guilty of murder based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 950.)
However, aiders and abettors may be convicted of murder either under a theory of direct
aiding and abetting, or a theory of implied malice.
Under a theory of direct aiding and abetting, a defendant may be guilty of murder
if (1) a perpetrator committed murder; (2) the defendant knew that the perpetrator
intended to commit murder; (3) before or during the commission of the crime, the
defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing murder; and (4) the
defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the

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crime. (CALCRIM No. 401; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 466.) To be guilty
of murder as a direct aider and abettor, it is required that the defendant know and share
the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator. (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 585.)
Under a theory of implied malice, an aider and abettor may be liable for murder if
he aids in the commission of a life-endangering act. (CALCRIM No. 526; People v.
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 466.) Under this theory, the defendant must know the
perpetrator intended to commit the life-endangering act. (People v. Curiel, supra, at
p. 466.) It must be shown that the defendant intended to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of that act, the defendant knew that act is dangerous to human life, and the
defendant acted in conscious disregard for human life. (Id. at pp. 466–467.) The aider
and abettor must “actually foresee the homicidal or life-endangering consequences of the
perpetrator’s actions.” (Id. at p. 470.)
D. Substantial Evidence does not Establish Ross’s Malice.
Respondent contends that Ross was an aider and abettor who held an intent to kill.
In the alternative, respondent asserts that Ross was an aider and abettor who acted with
implied malice.
This record does not support either of respondent’s assertions.
1. Insufficient evidence demonstrates Ross’s intent to kill.
To establish an intent to kill, respondent argues it is reasonable to infer that Ross
knew J.T. was armed that fatal night.8 Respondent notes that Ross had previously robbed
one of Hawthorne’s dates, and it was Ross who insisted that his fellow gang members
would accompany them on Hawthorne’s date with Singh. Respondent asserts that the
younger gang members, McDaniel and J.T., would have been expected to follow Ross.

8 Several days before Singh’s murder, J.T. was in a video with Ross wherein J.T.
was holding the firearm used in this murder.

12.
Respondent contends that the cell phone data “tended to show [Ross’s] association with
McDaniel, [J.T.], and Hawthorne at the time and location of the crime.”
According to respondent, Ross, McDaniel, and J.T. began whispering amongst
themselves after Singh rejected Hawthorne and she returned to her vehicle. Respondent
contends it is reasonable to infer that Ross and his fellow gang members were “offended”
and “upset” by Singh’s rejection of Hawthorne. Respondent maintains that, as a result,
Ross and the others must have “intended to shoot” Singh. Respondent asserts that, from
all of the circumstantial evidence, we can infer Ross’s intent to kill.
Respondent’s assertions lack merit. As an initial matter, we disagree with
respondent’s interpretation of the record. Contrary to respondent’s view, the evidence
does not reasonably establish that Ross, McDaniel, and J.T. were “whispering amongst
themselves” after Singh rejected Hawthorne and she returned to her vehicle. To the
contrary, the passage which respondent cites only reasonably demonstrates that McDaniel
and J.T. were whispering together in the backseat.
In any event, even if respondent’s interpretation of the record is correct,
respondent’s position is nevertheless wholly unpersuasive. Hawthorne stated that she
“couldn’t really hear what they were saying.” As such, even if Ross took part in the
whispering, we have no way to know what was actually discussed. Thus, we cannot
logically and reasonably draw an inference from this evidence that Ross must have held
an intent to kill. (See Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b) [an inference is a deduction of fact
that may be logically and reasonably drawn from another fact or group of facts otherwise
established].) In short, respondent asks us to speculate, but mere suspicion and
conjecture do not represent substantial evidence. (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353,
360.) This evidence fails to establish Ross’s express malice.

13.
Respondent’s remaining arguments regarding Ross’s intent to kill are also without
merit. Respondent notes that all three gang members exited Hawthorne’s vehicle. 9
Respondent cites the testimony of the prosecution’s gang expert for the proposition that
gang members are expected to assist each other, and younger gang members follow older
gang members. According to respondent, it is reasonable to infer that Ross “coordinated”
the actions of McDaniel and J.T., who are younger than Ross.
We may not impute malice to Ross simply because he was involved in the events
leading up to Singh’s death. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The prosecution’s gang expert had no
personal knowledge regarding who killed Singh or how this murder occurred. As such,
evidence regarding how gang members are expected to act in general does not establish
Ross’s malice on this particular occasion. Likewise, Ross’s prior bad acts cannot be used
to prove he acted in a particular manner on that fatal night. (Evid. Code, § 1101,
subd. (a).) Ross’s prior conduct, such as when he stole cocaine from one of Hawthorne’s
other dates, only reasonably suggests a possible intent to rob Singh. (See id. at subd. (b)
[evidence of prior bad acts are admissible to prove, in part, motive, opportunity, and
intent].)
Respondent fails to address evidence that strongly suggests Ross did not aid and
abet in Singh’s murder. The suspected perpetrator was heard possibly arguing with
Singh. Only a single suspect was seen fleeing after Singh was shot. McDaniel’s DNA
was found on the charger near Singh’s body. Hawthorne consistently stated that Ross and
J.T. expressed surprise that Singh had been shot. According to Hawthorne, McDaniel
said that Singh “swung a knife at me” after McDaniel was back in her vehicle. When
asked why he did it, McDaniel said he had to get out his aggression because his girlfriend

9 During one of her interviews with law enforcement, Hawthorne stated that she lost
sight of Ross when he left her vehicle with the others. However, during that same
interview, she said Ross was “back instantly” when she heard the “bang,” and it was like
Ross “didn’t even make it by them or something.”

14.
had been assaulted, and he was mad. Hawthorne testified that only McDaniel was seen
with a firearm that night. When officials turned over Singh’s body, they discovered a
kitchen knife lying under him. Nothing from the totality of this evidence reasonably
suggests that Ross aided and abetted the perpetrator with an intent to kill, or that Ross
even knew somebody was going to fire at Singh.
Substantial evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross
committed second degree murder as a direct aider and abettor. Nothing reasonably
suggests that Ross knew the perpetrator intended to commit murder. Nothing shows that,
before or during the commission of the crime, Ross intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing murder. Nothing demonstrates that Ross’s words or conduct
did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of this murder. (CALCRIM
No. 401; People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 466.) In short, respondent’s arguments
are wholly unpersuasive that substantial evidence establishes Ross’s liability for second
degree murder under a theory of direct aiding and abetting.
2. Insufficient evidence demonstrates Ross’s implied malice.
To establish implied malice, respondent argues it was McDaniel who must have
shot Singh. According to respondent, a reasonable inference may be drawn from the
record that Ross “and his cohorts planned, at a minimum, a violent confrontation” with
Singh while armed with a firearm. Respondent again points to the “whispering” that
occurred before the males exited Hawthorne’s vehicle. Respondent contends it is
reasonable to infer that Ross “and his fellow gang members sought retaliation” against
Singh “for rejecting Hawthorne and depriving them of a share of Hawthorne’s profits.”
Respondent asserts that the confrontation “created a grave danger” for Singh’s life, Ross
was aware of that danger, and he consciously disregarded it. As such, respondent takes
the position that we should find substantial evidence of Ross’s implied malice for murder.
Respondent’s assertions regarding implied malice are also unpersuasive. We
cannot reasonably conclude from the “whispering” that Ross must have intended for

15.
somebody to shoot at Singh. Again, we have no way to deduce from the evidence the
actual topic of that conversation, or to what extent Ross participated in that discussion.
Respondent asks us to speculate, and speculation does not represent substantial evidence.
(People v. Davis, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 360.)
Under prior law, a defendant who aided and abetted an intended assault could be
liable for murder if the murder was the natural and probable consequence of the intended
assault. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) However, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine may no longer be used to establish an accomplice’s
liability for murder. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we reject respondent’s assertion that planning
“a violent confrontation” establishes Ross’s liability for murder.
This record does not contain substantial evidence establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ross committed second degree murder as an aider and abettor under a theory
of implied malice. Nothing reasonably suggests that Ross knew the perpetrator intended
to shoot at Singh. Nothing shows that Ross intended to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of that life-endangering act. (CALCRIM No. 526; People v. Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at pp. 466–467.) In short, respondent’s arguments are wholly unpersuasive
that substantial evidence establishes Ross’s liability for second degree murder as an aider
and abettor under a theory of implied malice.
3. The prosecutor’s closing arguments confirm our interpretation of
the record.
Our conclusion that substantial evidence fails to establish Ross’s liability for
second degree murder is bolstered by the prosecutor’s arguments to the jury. The
prosecutor made it clear that, if Ross was guilty of murder, he was guilty under a theory
of first degree felony murder. The prosecutor told the jurors he was not going to review
the lesser-included offenses of murder for Ross because second degree murder and
manslaughter “only apply to the alternative, willful, premeditated theory.” The
prosecutor told the jury that second degree murder applied to McDaniel, who was

16.
“differently situated” from Ross. In effect, the prosecutor informed the jurors that, if
Ross was guilty of murder, he was guilty only under a theory of first degree felony
murder, and not murder requiring an intent to kill, such as second degree.
This record suggests that Ross coordinated a plan to rob or burglarize Singh.
However, the jury rejected the prosecutor’s theory that Ross aided and abetted first
degree felony murder. Instead, the jury found Ross guilty of second degree murder, a
theory which the prosecutor did not pursue against Ross. In fact, the prosecutor
essentially admitted to the jury that such a theory did not apply to Ross.
The jury’s second degree murder conviction cannot stand. Nothing reasonably
suggests that Ross knew and shared the murderous intent of the actual killer. Nothing
reasonably demonstrates that Ross aided or encouraged the commission of this murder.
(In re Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 585.) Likewise, nothing reasonably suggests that
Ross knew the perpetrator was going to shoot at Singh, or that Ross intended to aid the
perpetrator, or that Ross actually aided the perpetrator in the commission of that life-
endangering act. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 466–467.) Malice may not
be imputed to Ross simply because of his participation in the events leading up to Singh’s
homicide. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
This record does not contain substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross was guilty of second degree murder as an
aider and abettor. Evidence does not reasonably demonstrate Ross’s malice for murder,
either express or implied. Accordingly, Ross’s murder conviction must be reversed.10
Based on the principle of double jeopardy, retrial is barred. (See Lockhart v. Nelson
(1988) 488 U.S. 33, 39.)

10 Because we reverse the murder conviction in count 1, we do not address Ross’s
alternative claim of instructional error.

17.
II. Ross’s Gang Conviction Must be Reversed Due to Insufficient Evidence.
At trial, the prosecution’s gang expert opined that the West Side Crips are an
active criminal street gang in Bakersfield, California. The expert went over the primary
activities of that gang, which included murder and robbery. The gang’s structure and
hierarchy were explained.
The gang expert opined that, when Singh’s murder occurred, Ross, McDaniel, and
J.T. were all active members of the West Side Crips. The expert opined that Hawthorne
was not a gang member. There was no evidence that Singh was involved in a gang.
Based on a hypothetical matching the evidence surrounding Singh’s murder, the
gang expert opined that this killing was done for the benefit of, in furtherance of, and in
association with the West Side Crips.
In count 1, the jury convicted Ross of murder. The jury found true a gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found true a firearm enhancement
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).
In count 6, the jury convicted Ross of participation in a street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)).
Ross asserts that his gang conviction in count 6 and the gang enhancement in
count 1 must be reversed for insufficient evidence. Because the firearm enhancement in
count 1 is contingent on the gang enhancement, he contends it also must be reversed.
Respondent concedes that both the gang enhancement and the firearm
enhancement in count 1 must be reversed due to insufficient evidence. We agree.
However, those issues are moot because we have already held that the murder conviction
in count 1 must be reversed for insufficient evidence.
The remaining issue before us is the gang conviction in count 6.
It is a felony if a person “actively participates in a criminal street gang with
knowledge that its members engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang
activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in felonious criminal conduct by

18.
members of that gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (a).) Respondent argues that we should affirm
Ross’s gang conviction because Ross committed murder. In the alternative, respondent
contends that Ross was pimping Hawthorne, which was the “felonious criminal conduct”
committed by members of Ross’s gang. As such, respondent asserts that substantial
evidence supports the gang conviction in count 6.
We reject respondent’s arguments. Because we are reversing Ross’s murder
conviction, Singh’s murder no longer establishes that Ross willfully promoted, furthered,
or assisted in felonious criminal conduct by members of his gang. (See § 186.22,
subd. (a).)
Regarding pimping, respondent is correct that some evidence suggests Ross was
engaged in pimping activities. However, a theory of pimping was never presented to
Ross’s jury. This jury was never instructed that pimping could serve as the “felonious
conduct” justifying the gang conviction in count 6. Instead, the jury was informed that
the “felonious criminal conduct” which Ross must have promoted, furthered or assisted
as a gang member was murder, attempted robbery, or attempted burglary.
We “cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to
the jury.” (Chiarella v. United States (1980) 445 U.S. 222, 236.) “Appellate courts are
not permitted to affirm convictions on any theory they please simply because the facts
necessary to support the theory were presented to the jury.” (McCormick v. United States
(1991) 500 U.S. 257, 270–271, fn. 8; accord People v. Pennington (2017) 3 Cal.5th 786,
800.) Accordingly, respondent’s position lacks any merit.
This record does not contain substantial evidence based on a theory presented to
the jury establishing that Ross willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted in felonious

19.
criminal conduct by members of his gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).) Therefore, the gang
conviction in count 6 must be reversed for insufficient evidence, and retrial is barred.11
We will remand this matter for resentencing. Ross’s determinate abstract of
judgment includes convictions in four separate criminal cases, including the judgment in
this matter. Because part of Ross’s aggregate judgment has been stricken on review, a
full resentencing is required so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in
light of the changed circumstances. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) The
trial court shall impose a new aggregate term of imprisonment for his remaining
convictions in the multiple cases. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITION
The murder conviction in count 1 is reversed for insufficient evidence. The gang
conviction in count 6 is reversed for insufficient evidence. Retrial is barred. The
judgment in this matter is vacated. This matter is remanded so the court may resentence
Ross on his remaining felony convictions.

LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, J.

FAIN, J.

11 Because we reverse both of Ross’s convictions, we do not reach his claims that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel, or that he is entitled to additional custody
credits.
 Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

20.

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