People v. Littlejohn CA4/1

CourtListener 10289576CalctappDec 6, 2024

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Filed 12/6/24 P. v. Littlejohn CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082357

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE413231)

MAURICE DWIGHT LITTLEJOHN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Steven E. Stone, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
After Maurice Dwight Littlejohn stabbed M.J., a jury convicted
Littlejohn of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1)
and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1); count 2), and it also found
true related allegations. The court sentenced Littlejohn to an aggregate
prison term of 23 years. He appeals on two issues.
First, Littlejohn contends his conviction must be reversed because the
evidence was inadequate to show he (1) was the person who stabbed M.J. (for
both counts) and (2) harbored a specific intent to kill (for count 1). We
disagree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,
as we must, substantial evidence—including statements from Littlejohn’s
mother and evidence identifying his vehicle as the one that fled the crime
scene—established Littlejohn was the stabber. Moreover, substantial
evidence—including the placement and severity of M.J.’s wounds and
statements from Littlejohn and his mother establishing motive—supported
finding Littlejohn intended to kill M.J.
Second, Littlejohn argues the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the video of his arrest under Evidence Code section 352. We
conclude the trial court made a reasoned and sound determination that any
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence,
which was relevant under section 1101(b) to establish Littlejohn’s
consciousness of guilt and thus his identity as the stabber. We further
conclude it is not reasonably probable Littlejohn would have obtained a more
favorable outcome had the video not been admitted.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I.
A.
One afternoon in 2022, M.J. and his then-girlfriend Cookie—the
mother of Littlejohn’s children—went to Littlejohn’s mother’s apartment.
Littlejohn lived with his mother. He and his then-girlfriend, now his wife,
were in his bedroom. Another male was present, too.

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Littlejohn and M.J. “ha[d] some words.” Abruptly, someone stabbed
M.J.’s left chest. M.J. picked up an object to defend himself and hit someone.
While trying to block another stab “to [his] heart,” M.J.’s arm was stabbed.
He ran outside. In the parking lot, he smashed a black SUV’s window with
the object—“[p]ossibly to slow somebody down,” M.J. later said.
M.J. fell to the ground and told Cookie he thought he was dying.
B.
Littlejohn’s mother called 9-1-1. While on the line, she said, “Oh my
God. Oh my God. You done did it. You done did,” followed by, “Look what
you done did, [Littlejohn]!” She later said, “I’m telling you, [Littlejohn] . . . .
They going to come.”
A neighbor also called 9-1-1. She told the dispatcher, “They’re saying
they’re gonna kill someone.” She also saw a Black man in a white tank top
holding a metal object smash a car window.
C.
Law enforcement officers responding to a call for someone “bleeding
out” found M.J. wearing a bloody white tank top and lying in a pool of blood.
Tracing a blood trail, officers found part of a gold candlestick. They
found another part in the parking lot surrounded by broken glass consistent
with a car window. The trail led to Littlejohn’s mother’s apartment.
Inside, officers found an intact candlestick matching the pieces as well
as what appeared to be the base of the broken candlestick. There was blood
on the floor, the walls, and the couch.
D.
Officers spoke with Littlejohn’s mother that day. She affirmed the only
person M.J. was fighting with when he was stabbed was Littlejohn, and so
“the only way he could have been stabbed was from” Littlejohn. She

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admitted seeing Littlejohn holding a knife. She said she was “hollering
please, . . . don’t do it.”
Officers also spoke with the neighbor. She told them she “picked up the
phone” to dial 9-1-1 because “a large [B]lack female just kept screaming. He’s
gonna kill us.” She saw a Black man wearing a white tank top exit the
apartment holding a “metal bar” he used to smash a car window.
Officers obtained surveillance video from a nearby store showing a
black SUV exiting the apartment parking lot around the time of the stabbing.
E.
Roughly a week later, law enforcement responded to a disturbance at
Littlejohn’s wife’s apartment complex. The jury was shown body-worn
camera footage of Littlejohn’s arrest for both the stabbing and a newly
alleged offense. This court obtained the video from the superior court.
In the video, Littlejohn is standing in the parking lot holding a cane.
Officers tell him to drop it, and he eventually complies but backs away. He
then pulls a knife, takes a fighting stance, and tells officers to “[s]hoot [him].”
An officer tases Littlejohn, he drops the knife, and officers arrest him.
At the scene was a black SUV, with a broken rear passenger window.
Documents containing Littlejohn’s identifying information were found inside,
as was a knife and glass consistent with that found the day of the stabbing.
According to Littlejohn’s wife, the window was intact when they arrived at
the apartment the day of the stabbing. Swabs of bloodstains from the
interior driver’s side door indicated “very strong support” the blood was
Littlejohn’s, and the swab from the interior rear passenger’s side door
indicated “very strong support” the blood was M.J.’s.

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F.
While discussing the day of the stabbing in a recorded jail call,
Littlejohn’s mother described the relationship between Littlejohn, M.J., and
Cookie as “a triangle.” She said M.J. commented on how Cookie “won’t get
out of [Littlejohn’s] room, . . . and she keeps going to bed with” him.
Littlejohn expressed frustration at having to “stay[ ] in the room at my own
home” and said he was “not going [to] be disrespected at . . . all.”
After the arrest, M.J. told law enforcement he was stabbed by “DBrazy”
who was Cookie’s “baby daddy.” When given a lineup of photographs
including Littlejohn, M.J. did not identify him as the perpetrator, whom he
described as having a different appearance from Littlejohn’s.
G.
At trial, M.J. claimed not to see his attacker present. He agreed he
would “like to avoid . . . hav[ing his] name on paperwork,” which a detective
explained meant arrest reports and police contact reports. The detective
stated it was “bad” to have your name on paperwork because it shows “you’re
snitching.”
Littlejohn’s mother testified she did not remember what happened.
Although she had a stroke shortly before the trial and had consumed
intoxicants the day of the stabbing, the court found she was being
“deliberately evasive.”
The neighbor testified she saw Littlejohn go back into the apartment
after everyone came outside. When recalled and impeached with her
statement to police, she acknowledged she did not tell officers that the day of
the incident but reaffirmed seeing it.
According to M.J.’s treating surgeon, one of M.J.’s three stab wounds
was a “penetrating wound to his left chest” that caused dangerous pressure

5
“that could have caused death pretty rapidly” if untreated. M.J. also had to
be intubated due to hypoxic respiratory failure. The surgeon testified the
stabbing instrument penetrated M.J.’s diaphragm, punctured his colon, and
broke a rib. These injuries were “life-threatening” and “close to the heart.”
II.
A.
First, Littlejohn contends insufficient evidence supported the jury’s
determinations that he (1) was the stabber, for purposes of both counts; and
(2) had the requisite intent to kill, for count 1. We disagree.
We review claims of insufficient evidence for substantial evidence.
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) In a criminal case, we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment for substantial
evidence that would allow any reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327,
357.) To be “substantial,” the “evidence must be of ponderable legal
significance,” “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (Estate of
Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644; Zamudio, at p. 357.) Such evidence can
include not only circumstantial evidence but also all reasonable inferences
drawable from such evidence. (People v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278,
286.) Reversal is only appropriate if “upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support” the conviction. (People v.
Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) We do not reweigh the evidence, assess
witness credibility, or choose between competing inferences, as these are jury
tasks. (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.) We also “assume
that the jury accepted that evidence which supports [its] verdict and rejected
that evidence which would support a contrary verdict.” (People v. Ewing
(1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 364, 366.)

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For both alleged insufficiencies, we agree with the People that
Littlejohn relies on the evidence most favorable to him and the inferences
that can be drawn from that evidence instead of the evidence and inferences
supporting the guilty verdict. Yet with the evidence viewed through the
appropriate lens, there is substantial evidence to support findings beyond a
reasonable doubt that Littlejohn (1) stabbed M.J. and (2) did so with the
specific intent to kill.
As the People contend, there is substantial evidence Littlejohn was the
stabber. In her 9-1-1 call, Littlejohn’s mother exclaimed, “Look what you
done did, [Littlejohn]!” A jury could reasonably infer this was a reference to
the stabbing. In her statement the day of the stabbing, Littlejohn’s mother
told officers she saw Littlejohn holding a knife and agreed “the only way
[M.J.] could have been stabbed was from [Littlejohn].” Additionally,
Littlejohn’s vehicle’s appearance and condition matched the one that left the
scene and had his and M.J.’s blood inside it. Although Littlejohn claims other
inferences “could have just as reasonably been” made from the evidence—for
example, that Littlejohn’s mother’s exclamations during the 9-1-1 call could
have “been her reference to the blood being tracked in her apartment”—that
is irrelevant given our deferential review. The above is substantial evidence
sufficiently credible to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
Littlejohn stabbed M.J. (See People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 963
[single witness’ testimony can support conviction].)
We also agree with the People that there is substantial evidence
Littlejohn intended to kill M.J. “Attempted murder requires the specific
intent to kill.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) “A specific intent to
kill requires express malice.” (People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
451, 456.) Express malice “may in many cases be inferred from the

7
defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.” (People v. Smith (2005)
37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) The purposeful “use of a lethal weapon with lethal
force” allows “an intent to kill [to] be inferred.” (People v. Arias (1996)
13 Cal.4th 92, 162.) Further, “evidence of motive is often probative of intent
to kill.” (Smith, at p. 741.)
Here, M.J.’s stab wounds were, according to responding law
enforcement and the treating surgeon, “life-threatening.” The multiple
wounds were on M.J.’s left side, “fairly close to the heart,” and could have
killed him if left untreated. Littlejohn claims “[t]he stabbing was not directed
to either” M.J.’s “heart or neck,” which is where someone “intend[ing] to
cause death” would have stabbed. But the stab wounds were aimed at the
area of the chest where the heart sits, and “the fact that the victim may have
escaped death because of the [perpetrator]’s poor” aim does not “necessarily
establish a less culpable state of mind.” (People v. Lashley (1991)
1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945.) While M.J. later picked up a candlestick to defend
himself, Littlejohn concedes the first stab to M.J.’s chest was while he was
unarmed. “In plunging the knife so deeply into such a vital area of the body
of an apparently unsuspecting and defenseless victim, defendant could have
had no other intent than to kill.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515,
561.) This evidence of intent is bolstered by the motive revealed during the
call between Littlejohn and his mother: he (1) was in an alleged love triangle
with Cookie and M.J. and (2) felt “disrespected” by M.J.’s presence, which
made him feel like he had to stay in his own room in his own home.
Regardless of who may have been the aggressor, this evidence—which is not,
as Littlejohn claims, “only speculation and conjecture”—could lead a
reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Littlejohn
specifically intended to kill M.J.

8
In sum, substantial evidence supported Littlejohn’s convictions.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the alleged lack of substantial
evidence violates Littlejohn’s constitutional right to due process.
B.
Second, Littlejohn argues the trial court abused its discretion under
Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the video of his arrest under
section 1101(b) as relevant to prove identity and consciousness of guilt. He
claims the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by

its potential for undue prejudice.1 Again, we disagree.
1.
Evidence of a person’s character is generally inadmissible to prove the
person’s propensity to commit a crime, but such evidence is admissible “when
relevant to prove some [other] fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, [or] absence of mistake or accident).”
(§ 1101(b).) Even so, a court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (§ 352.) Prejudice “is
not synonymous with ‘damaging,’ but refers instead to evidence that uniquely
tends to evoke an emotional bias against [a] defendant without regard to its
relevance on material issues.” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121,
[cleaned up].)

1 To the extent Littlejohn suggests in passing the evidence was
erroneously admitted without reference to section 352, he fails to develop the
argument or support it with citations to the record and appropriate legal
authority; we accordingly deem this point forfeited. (People v. Verdugo (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 320, 333, fn. 11.) We thus do not decide if the evidence was
properly found admissible under section 1101(b).
9
We deferentially review a trial court’s section 352 ruling for abuse of
discretion. (Kipp, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) It is the defendant’s burden to show
“the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390, [cleaned up].)
2.
Before trial, Littlejohn moved to exclude body-worn camera footage of
his arrest. That day, law enforcement was called to the scene for a different
potential crime Littlejohn committed, but he was arrested for both offenses.
Relevant here, the People argued the video was admissible under
section 1101(b) to prove both (1) Littlejohn’s identity as the stabber, given his
location at his girlfriend’s home rather than the home he usually shared with
his mother, his carrying of a pocketknife, and his possession of a car with a
broken window and inculpatory evidence matching the vehicle seen fleeing
the scene of the stabbing; and (2) his consciousness of guilt, as shown by
Littlejohn’s action of backing away from officers, assuming a fighting stance,
brandishing a knife, and telling officers to shoot him. The People were “not
really seeking” to admit into evidence the portion of the video after Littlejohn
drops the knife—in which he flees on foot and an officer-involved shooting
ensues—conceding it “might be too prejudicial.”
Littlejohn’s counsel argued the evidence was “substantially more
prejudicial than probative.” Counsel claimed the People could get
“everything” they “want[ed] to get into evidence . . . without playing the body-
worn camera footage and without getting into” Littlejohn’s arrest.
Meanwhile, the jury was likely to improperly infer propensity, because “if
he’s willing to pull a knife on these officers . . . , he must have been the one to
pull the knife on” M.J.

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The court admitted the evidence, finding (1) it “directly related to
identity for the reasons the People state” and (2) “[i]dentity seems to be what
this case is about.” The court also found the evidence “admissible to some
extent for consciousness of guilt . . . subject to further objection.” As to
section 352, the court excluded the part of the video “after that tasing,” but it
found the rest of the video “would not create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice in this case.”
3.
We agree with the People that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the probative value of the arrest video not substantially
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.
The trial court’s section 352 analysis was not, as Littlejohn contends,
“flawed.” The list of factors Littlejohn claims the trial court should have
applied in its section 352 analysis are drawn from section 1108 cases
involving propensity to commit sexual offenses; they are thus of limited
relevance here. (Citing People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1116-
1117.) “The weighing process under section 352 depends upon the trial
court’s consideration of the unique facts and issues of each case, rather than
upon the mechanical application of automatic rules.” (People v. Jennings
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314.)
Here, the trial court was aware of and properly exercised its duty to
weigh the relative probative value of the proffered evidence against the
likelihood of undue prejudice. It concluded the footage of Littlejohn’s flight
and engagement in an officer-involved shooting was unduly prejudicial, but it
determined the remainder was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. On this
record, we cannot say this determination went beyond all reason.

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We find support in People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, a prior
decision of this court on which the People rely. In Garcia, the trial court
admitted evidence, including officer testimony and an audio recording of the
defendant’s telephone conversation with a police negotiator, of the
defendant’s arrest following a SWAT standoff about six weeks after the at-
issue shooting incident. (Id. at p. 283.) The jury was unaware the defendant
was wanted for two other shootings. (Id. at pp. 272, 284.) According to the
defendant, (1) given the multiple incidents, the inference of consciousness of
guilt for the charged offenses was “likely false” and “‘exaggerated’”; and
(2) the jury likely used the evidence to improperly infer propensity. (Id. at
p. 284.) We found no abuse of discretion because “[e]vidence of a defendant’s
resistance to arrest, like evidence of flight, is admissible as evidence of the
defendant’s consciousness of guilt,” and “a defendant who has committed
multiple offenses should not enjoy the benefit of the exclusion of relevant
incriminating evidence that would be admissible against a ‘neophyte’ who has
committed only one.” (Id. at pp. 283, 286.)
Littlejohn concedes Garcia “is on point” for his claim “the court knew—
but the jury did not—that his reaction to the police encounter could be the
result of another incident and not any consciousness of guilt as to the [M.J.]
incident.” Although Littlejohn claims Garcia is “not dispositive” of his
remaining section 352 arguments, on this record, we conclude the probative
value of the arrest video was not substantially outweighed by undue
prejudice.
Here, identity was a highly contested issue, and the evidence of
Littlejohn’s resisting arrest “was probative of [his] consciousness of guilt,
which in turn was probative of his identity as the perpetrator of the charged
offenses.” (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 230.) Our high court

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does not require the other act to share distinctive features with the charged
offense when the evidence supports identity in this circumstantial manner.
(See id. at pp. 228-230.) Thus, whether there were “parallels” here beyond
the fact “a knife was involved” is not determinative of the evidence’s
relevance. We further agree with the People that the video was no more
inflammatory—and certainly not significantly and unduly more so—than the
attempted murder with which Littlejohn was charged. Balancing the
evidence’s probative value against the low likelihood of undue prejudice,
section 352 was not violated here. We deem forfeited Littlejohn’s
undeveloped claim that the arrest video “was likely to confuse or distract the
jurors from the specific evidence of the charged incident.” (Verdugo,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 333, fn. 11.)
Given the above, we perceive no abuse of discretion in admitting the
video.
4.
Even assuming error, it was harmless. We disagree with Littlejohn’s
claim that any error in admitting the evidence violated his right to due
process and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the
relevant inquiry is whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) It was not.
“[J]urors are presumed to understand and follow the court’s
instructions.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662.) Here, the jury was
instructed with CALCRIM No. 375, which states the jury may, but need not,
consider other acts evidence—if proven by a preponderance of the evidence—
“for the limited purpose of deciding whether . . . [t]he defendant was the
person who committed the offenses alleged in this case. Do not consider this

13
evidence for any other purpose.” The jury was further cautioned that the
evidence was “not sufficient by itself to prove” Littlejohn’s guilt and that
“[t]he People must still prove each charge and allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Given these instructions, there is no reasonable probability the jury
convicted Littlejohn based on the arrest footage on its own.
Nor did the evidence “unfairly bolster[ ] the prosecution’s case.” The
People’s case was strong, and the evidence of Littlejohn’s guilt, detailed
above, overwhelmingly supported the jury’s verdict even without the arrest
video. Over the course of the People’s 35-minute closing argument, the
People twice referenced the video or what it depicts. The first time, the
prosecutor spent seven sentences describing the video to “note this isn’t the
only pocketknife [Littlejohn] had that day.” The second time was a passing
reference during a longer summary of “the evidence in the totality.” The
contested evidence was not the focus of the trial or the People’s argument.
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude there was no reasonable
probability Littlejohn would have received a more favorable outcome absent
the arrest video’s admission. (See Garcia, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 286
[alternatively concluding that “any error in the admission of the [SWAT
standoff] evidence was harmless”].)
III.
We affirm.
CASTILLO, J.

I CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

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J. Kelety, Concurring.
Although I concur in the result, I write separately because I conclude
that the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecution to admit into
evidence audio and video footage from Officer Fitzgerald’s body-worn camera
showing Littlejohn’s encounter with the police six days after the stabbing (the
video). Nothing about the video was relevant. It did not show that Littlejohn
acted with consciousness of guilt as to the stabbing, nor did it confirm his
identity as the stabber. On the other hand, the video was prejudicial. It
showed Littlejohn as unstable and defiant as he pulled a knife from his
pocket, and Officer Fitzgerald clearly referenced an unrelated, uncharged
assault. The alleged probative value of the video derived almost exclusively
from inadmissible propensity evidence, and its negligible probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudice.
Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court discretion to exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. An
uncharged offense (such as the alleged assault) is only admissible if the
probative value is substantial. (People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698,
715.) Such evidence may lead the jury to believe that Littlejohn was guilty of
the stabbing merely because “he is a likely person to do such acts” or because
his character is offensive and therefore the jury may disbelieve evidence
favorable to him. (Ibid.)
The video is one minute and six seconds long. It begins with Littlejohn
walking towards the officer as the officer gets out of his patrol car in the
parking lot of an apartment building during daylight hours. Littlejohn is
holding a long walking stick. The officer points his taser at Littlejohn and
states repeatedly, “Drop the cane.” Littlejohn stops walking towards the
officer when a woman approaches Littlejohn and stands next to him. The
officer advises her to stand back, and she explains that Littlejohn is her
husband. The officer responds that “[h]e’s about to get tased if he doesn’t
drop the cane.” While facing the officer, Littlejohn asks why he is going to
“get tased.” The officer tells him, “[w]e gotta call. You’re hitting somebody
with that. I, that’s the call we got. So drop it and tell us your side of the
story. Or you’re gonna be under arrest.”
Again, the officer tells Littlejohn to drop the cane. Still standing facing
the officer, Littlejohn drops the cane at his side. The officer then tells
Littlejohn to turn around. Littlejohn says, “I ain’t turning around.” The
officer tells him “[y]ou’re being detained. You understand that?” Littlejohn
twice states, “I’m not being detained.” When the officer says, “Yes you are,”
only then does Littlejohn back away from the officer. The officer follows
Littlejohn and states, “Now you’re under arrest.” At that point, Littlejohn
turns toward the officer, pulls off his ball cap, and bends his knees into a
fighting stance. He quickly stands up and pulls from his sweatpants a

knife.1 He stands facing the officer, with the knife in his hand at his side,
and tells the officer, “shoot me.” The officer shoots Littlejohn with the taser,
causing Littlejohn to scream and fall on the ground. The video ends there.
The People contend that the trial court did not err in admitting the
video “because the body worn camera footage was relevant to show
appellant’s consciousness of guilt and was relevant circumstantial evidence of
appellant’s identity.”
As to consciousness of guilt, the People argue that evidence of a
defendant’s resistance to arrest constituted evidence of consciousness of guilt.

1 The prosecution did not contend that this knife was the knife used in
the charged stabbing. A different knife was found in the vehicle.
2
Yet nothing in the encounter with Officer Fitzgerald suggests that Littlejohn
was conscious of guilt for any crime, and certainly not for the stabbing six
days earlier. Littlejohn objected to being detained and did not follow officer
commands, but lack of cooperation with the police is not the same thing as
consciousness of guilt.
California Supreme Court Associate Justice Evans has noted that the
fact that a person attempted to avoid police interaction generally should have
limited evidentiary significance. “As numerous judges before us have
recognized, many individuals — including, particularly, people of color —
commonly hold a perception that engaging in any manner with police,
including in seemingly casual or innocuous ways, entails a degree of risk to
one’s safety.” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1053 (conc. opn. of
Evans, J.).) The video showed nothing more than Littlejohn—a man of
color—demonstrating his displeasure, and perhaps mistrust, of being
detained by a police officer. The mere fact that he walked backwards away
from the officer when told he was being detained cannot be considered
evidence of consciousness of guilt.
As the majority points out, the prosecutor did not argue that the video
showed consciousness of guilt, and instead pointed out that Littlejohn had a
knife, and that another was subsequently discovered. The jury was
instructed that the video was to be used “for the limited purpose of deciding
whether . . . [t]he defendant was the person who committed the offenses
alleged in this case,” but considering the prosecutor’s comments, that
instruction suggested the video was relevant to show Littlejohn’s identity
only insofar as it demonstrates his propensity to carry knives.
The People argue that “the circumstances of appellant’s arrest and how
the police located the vehicle that fled the stabbing six days prior (with the

3
victim’s blood in it) was relevant.” True. However, the vehicle is not
mentioned or seen in the video, and Officer Fitzgerald did not offer any
testimony that might have given such context. Instead, the police contact in
the video appeared to be entirely related to a report that Littlejohn had
recently assaulted someone with the stick he was carrying. Notably, in
arguing that any error was harmless, the People concede there was other
“explicit” evidence of Littlejohn’s identity and that the video “did not give the
jury any independently sufficient reason to find appellant guilty.”
My colleagues in the majority contend that the video was admissible to
prove Littlejohn’s identity, because he was present at his girlfriend’s house
instead of his mother’s home, where the stabbing had taken place; because he
was carrying a pocketknife; and because he possessed the vehicle that was
involved in the events of the stabbing. I respectfully disagree. Nothing in
the video gave the jury any information as to Littlejohn’s location and, as
noted, the vehicle is not shown or discussed. That leaves us with Littlejohn’s
possession of a common pocketknife, not used in the charged offense. The
mere possession of a pocketknife is common to so many people that it is
virtually useless to establish his identity for a stabbing in a different location
six days prior. In truth, the video did nothing to contribute to the evidence as
to Littlejohn’s identity as the person who stabbed M.J. Other police officers
testified to the circumstances of locating Littlejohn and his vehicle and
establishing his identity, without the need to reference the video.
In sum, there was no real probative value to the video. The People
concede as much in arguing harmless error.
On the other hand, the video was significantly prejudicial. The video
showed Littlejohn acting angrily and defiantly, and pulling out a knife, in an
interaction with police in connection with accusations as to an unrelated

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assault. In the absence of any probative value, it could only have been
intended to let the jury see that Littlejohn must be a bad person, prone to
carrying knives, which is an improper purpose for its admission.
Although in my view, the court erred in admitting the video, I agree
with the majority’s assessment that any error was harmless. Although the
key witnesses declined to identify Littlejohn as the stabber, strong
circumstantial evidence makes clear that the jury would have convicted
Littlejohn of stabbing the victim, even if it had not viewed the video.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.

KELETY, J.

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