In re M.M. CA5

CourtListener 10289547CalctappDec 6, 2024

Full text

Filed 12/6/24 In re M.M. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re M.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN F088172
SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. JD145369-00)
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. OPINION
S.M.,

Defendant and Respondent.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Susan M. Gill,
Judge.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Ana M. Ovando, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Peña, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.
At issue in this case is the juvenile court’s order offering family reunification
services to S.M. (Mother). The Kern County Department of Human Services
(Department) appeals, contending the court erred. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
When Mother gave birth to the child at the center of this case, Mother tested
positive for numerous illicit drugs. Mother’s history with using those drugs is
longstanding and well documented.
The Department swiftly detained the newborn child and filed a juvenile
dependency petition, alleging Mother failed to protect the newborn, and Mother
previously and similarly lost custody of another child due to drug abuse in a different
dependency case. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 300, subds. (b)(1) & (j).) No family
reunification services were ordered in that case. Specifically, the juvenile dependency
petition explained “[M]other’s ongoing substance abuse place[d] the [newborn] at risk.”
At the disposition hearing, Mother testified she, in her prior case involving the
other child, was addicted to drugs. She sought treatment then, but “relaps[ed]” because
she could not continue to “afford” treatment. Relative to the newborn, Mother testified
she quit using drugs “on [her] own free will.” She was also enrolled in treatment and
regularly attended “N[arcotics] A[nonymous] meetings ….” She acknowledged “the last
time [she] used any illegal substance” was after the petition was filed in this case, but was
then-currently “111 days clean.”
The juvenile court found Mother had “a long history of substance abuse, but” also
that she “show[ed] the fortitude, … willpower, [and] intelligence” to analyze “her
substance abuse[.]” It stated it was “so impressed with … [M]other” as she could
“articulate why she wasn’t successful [in treatment] before.” It believed, “with a high

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2.
level of confidence,” Mother would “succeed” with her treatment, “finding her to be very
credible” and “very committed to … “sobriety[.]”
Ultimately, the juvenile court held “it would be contrary to the law to not offer
[Mother] reunification services in this case.” It did so, adjudging the newborn “a
dependent of the Court” and ordering “[f]amily reunification services” to Mother
“because she ha[d] made a reasonable effort to remove the problems that … led to the
removal of the” other child.
DISCUSSION
The Department contends the juvenile court erred in finding Mother made
subsequent reasonable efforts to treat the drug addiction that led to removal of her child
in a prior dependency case. It claims Mother “has a significant history of substance
abuse,” spanning more than a decade. Nonetheless, it acknowledges “the court must
examine” a much shorter time period—the time between the prior child’s removal and
the newborn’s disposition hearing.2
Mother, of course, argues the juvenile court’s order was correct. We agree.
“When a child is removed from a parent in a juvenile dependency case, the court is
required to order reunification services for the parent unless one of several statutory
exceptions allowing for ‘bypass’ applies. [Citation.] As pertinent here, a juvenile court
may bypass reunification services when (1) a juvenile court has previously terminated
reunification or parental rights over a sibling or half sibling to the child in the current
case, and (2) the parent has not subsequently made a ‘reasonable effort’ to treat the
problems that led to that previous termination of services or parental rights.” (In re
Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1266, fn. omitted (Jayden M.).)
“[I]n assessing whether a parent made a reasonable effort to address a problem
from a prior dependency case involving the current child's sibling or half sibling and

2 The time period in this case is approximately 15 months.

3.
where reunification services or parental rights were terminated under subdivisions (b)(10)
or (b)(11) of section 361.5, the juvenile court should consider the entire time span
between, at the one end, the earliest time a sibling or half sibling was removed from the
parent’s custody due to that problem and, at the other end, the dispositional hearing in the
current case.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) “A ‘reasonable effort to
treat’ a problem means just that. The question is not whether the parent has
‘ “ ‘cure[d]’ ” ’ or ‘ “abolished” ’ the problem [citations], or whether the parent has
‘attained’ a ‘ “certain level of progress” [citation]. Instead, the focus is on the parent’s
effort. It is not enough to show ‘any’ effort, even a genuine one. [Citation.]
‘[L]ackadaisical or half-hearted efforts’ will also not do. [Citation.] Instead, the effort
must be reasonable, and reasonableness is assessed by looking to (1) the duration of the
parent’s effort, (2) the ‘extent and context’ of the parent’s effort, and (3) other factors
related to the ‘quality and quantity of those efforts.’ [Citation.] The parent’s progress,
or lack thereof, ‘both in the short and long term’—while not dispositive—is nevertheless
relevant ’to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1276, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In
making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light
most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633
(R.T.).)
We uphold the juvenile court’s order. Mother testified she was enrolled in
treatment, attending other meetings, not using drugs, and sober for “111 days.” The court
found Mother credible and, indeed, was “impressed with” her, especially her ability to
pinpoint why prior treatment failed. Mother’s insight lent credence to her belief

4.
treatment would now succeed. We will not—and cannot—second guess the court’s
credibility and factual determinations. (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
The parties also argue whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering
reunification services in this case. The argument is inapposite. When a juvenile court
finds a parent has made reasonable efforts to treat the problem that led to the removal of a
prior child, reunification services are mandatory.3 (§ 361.5, subds. (a), (b), (b)(10) &
(11) [reunification services “need not be provided” when court finds parent “has not
subsequently made a reasonable effort”].) In other words, no reasonable effort is a
condition precedent to bypassing reunification under these provisions.4
DISPOSITION
The May 20, 2024, order is affirmed.

3 The juvenile court correctly noted this in its ruling.

4 Other statutory bypass provisions may still apply.

5.

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.