People v. Trujillo CA2/3

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Filed 12/5/24 P. v. Trujillo CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B326889

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA263278
v.

TIMOTHY JAMES TRUJILLO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Norman J. Shapiro, Judge. Affirmed.

Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2006, a jury convicted Timothy James Trujillo of the
second degree murder of Mario Alvarado. Trujillo now appeals
from an order denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court concluded Trujillo
had not made a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing
relief. Trujillo contends the trial court—the same court that had
presided over his 2006 trial—erred by making “factual findings
requiring the weighing of conflicting evidence and credibility
determinations.” He also argues ambiguities in the jury
instructions and the prosecutor’s statements during closing
argument allowed the jury to convict him without finding he
personally harbored malice. We find the record of conviction
conclusively establishes Trujillo’s ineligibility for resentencing
as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial
of his petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Mario Alvarado is killed in the Los Angeles
County Jail
We take our statement of the facts from the testimony at
Trujillo’s trial. Trujillo summarizes that testimony in his briefs.
In addition, we previously granted the Attorney General’s
request for judicial notice of the reporter’s transcripts in
Trujillo’s direct appeal from his conviction, People v. Trujillo
(Mar. 27, 2008, B192062) [nonpub. opn.] (Trujillo I).2

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section
1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We refer to the factual background from Trujillo’s trial only
“for background purposes and to provide context for the parties’

2
In December 2003, Jorge Lopez was in the Los Angeles
county jail. There were two other inmates in the cell with Lopez:
Mario Alvarado and Jorge Munoz. After two or three days,
Trujillo was put in the cell with the other three men. Lopez,
Alvarado, and Munoz were considered “paisas.” A paisa is a
person from “the countryside”—usually a “[f]oreign national”
—who is not a gang member. Trujillo was a Sureno, or
“Southsider.”
The first night Trujillo was in the cell with the three
other men, he stayed up all night drinking pruno. Pruno is an
inmate-made alcoholic beverage. The next morning, Trujillo was
still drinking. Trujillo asked Alvarado to drink pruno with him
and to sing. Alvarado drank “a couple of shots” of pruno and
sang one song. Lopez told Alvarado not to drink with Trujillo.
Trujillo wanted Alvarado to keep singing. Trujillo “got
mad” and started pushing Alvarado. Alvarado jumped into his
bunk and Trujillo tried to pull him out. Trujillo eventually pulled
Alvarado off his bed. Trujillo threw a lot of punches at Alvarado;
Alvarado covered himself with his arms. Trujillo hit Alvarado
in the face. Trujillo said, “These paisas don’t want to fight.”
Deputies took Trujillo out of the cell.
Howard Goldberg was an inmate in the county jail in
December 2003. In the early evening of December 9, inmates
were being moved from the Inmate Reception Center (IRC)
to another facility known as Wayside. Goldberg was in a group
of inmates waiting inside a laundry room area. Goldberg saw
Trujillo and another man enter the laundry room, “strike”

arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978,
fn. 2.)

3
another inmate in the face, and then leave. As inmates waited
in the hallway in line, Goldberg saw Trujillo and the same second
man “attack” an inmate behind Goldberg. Goldberg was unsure
if that inmate was the same man he’d seen Trujillo hit in the face
earlier: “[i]t might[’ve] been the same person.” The victim of
the “attack” “fought back.” He socked Trujillo in the eye “and
swelled his eye up.”
One of the deputies saw the altercation, took the victim
out of the line, and had him sit on a bench in the middle of the
hallway. Goldberg was staring at Trujillo and Trujillo said,
“ ‘What you are looking at?’ ” Trujillo “flexe[d] his chest and
yell[ed,] ‘Sureno[s]’ . . . a couple of times.”
As the line of inmates moved, Trujillo went into cell 215
and Goldberg went into cell 217, next door. Goldberg heard
“thumping sounds” as if a scuffle were going on in cell 215,
and sounds of a fist hitting something or the wall. Deputies
then told the group of inmates in cell 217 to “pile into” cell 215.
At some point, Goldberg went to use the toilet in cell 215 and
saw a “man with his head bashed in lying face-down with
bloody clothes on top of his head.” Blood was “spattered
all over the wall.”
Goldberg reached down to see if the man had a pulse but
a group of inmates told him to mind his own business. Goldberg
saw the prone man’s face “[v]ery clearly.” It was “the worst thing
[he’d] ever seen in [his] life.” Goldberg “knew he was dead.”
Goldberg didn’t say anything to the deputies because he was
scared. There’s a code of conduct in jail against “rats.”
Goldberg then got on the bus to Wayside. Trujillo was
on the same bus.

4
On December 9, 2003, Brandon English also was an inmate
in the county jail. He was in cell 215. Trujillo was in that cell
as well. Alvarado was brought into the cell. Trujillo walked
toward Alvarado and told him to “come here.” Alvarado shook
his head “no.” Trujillo approached Alvarado, put his arm around
him, and walked him over to where another man was who had
been talking with Trujillo.
Trujillo then “punch[ed] [Alvarado] in the face.” Alvarado
“went down to the ground” and “immediately, like, curled up.”
Four or five other people came in and they “started jumping
[Alvarado], punching him, kicking him.” Alvarado was dragged
toward the back of the cell. Trujillo and “one other dude” who
was with him “just commenced to jumping and stomping on
[Alvarado], kicking him, beating him.”
Alvarado was making a loud “gargling breathing” noise.
Trujillo grabbed Alvarado and “drug him . . . inside the little wall
part of the stall.” Trujillo was stomping and kicking Alvarado.
Trujillo “had . . . one, like hard, jump, stomp against the back
of [Alvarado’s] . . . head.” Trujillo said “he had to die, that he
must die.”
Another inmate, Timothy Keiffer, testified at trial that
he was in cell 218, across from cell 215. Keiffer saw “several
inmates beating up on one individual.” He was “[b]eing hit
with fists.” The man being beaten “went down to the ground.”
Keiffer saw “about six” men “just start stomping on [the victim]
and kicking him.”
Keiffer testified Trujillo was punching the victim and
also was one of those stomping him after he was on the ground.
Keiffer said Trujillo and another man dragged the victim into

5
a corner by the toilet and sink stall. Trujillo stomped on
the victim “multiple times.”
A detective later showed Keiffer 60 to 80 photos and
Keiffer chose six, including a photo of Trujillo. In Keiffer’s view,
Trujillo was the “main aggressor”—he “was more in control
of the situation than the others.” According to Keiffer, Trujillo
“[p]articipated not only in [the] beating but continually stomped
on [the] individual over by the toilet, even after it was over.”
On cross-examination Keiffer admitted he’d named
two inmates other than Trujillo—Javier Arteaga and Javier
Bocanegra—as the two who dragged Alvarado over to the toilet.3
Shawn Hansborough testified he’d been an inmate in cell
215 that evening. He saw Trujillo there. Trujillo called a man
Hansborough referred to as “a paisa” a “rat.” Trujillo “[s]tarted
socking” the man, then he “and the rest of his, um, buddies”
“circled” the man and “just . . . beat him down.” This was
“[r]ight by the toilet.”

3 At trial, the defense called a sheriff’s department sergeant
who testified jail paperwork showed Keiffer was at the Twin
Towers and then the Men’s Central Jail—not the IRC—from
December 3 until the morning of December 10. In his brief
here, Trujillo asserts the sergeant testified “it was impossible
for Kieffer [sic] to be at IRC without it being listed in the
computerized records.” Trujillo is mistaken. Here was
the exchange:
“Q [by defense counsel]: Now it’s possible that he [Keiffer] could
have been housed in the IRC module without it being reflected in
here [referring to the inmate housing movement records defense
counsel had subpoenaed], is it not?
“A: It’s possible.”

6
The man “fell, and he was helpless, and they just kept
beating him and beating him,” with their hands and feet,
“stomping him, kicking him” until “he was unconscious.”
Hansborough “specifically” saw Trujillo kicking the man.
Trujillo and “the rest of the guys that was around beating
[the man]” pulled him closer into the toilet stall. After Trujillo
and the others lay the man by the toilet, Trujillo stood over him
and spit on him.
Alvarado’s body was discovered in cell 215 around
11:00 p.m. on December 9. The body was lying face down covered
with trash and inmate clothing.
A coroner testified the cause of Alvarado’s death was blunt
trauma to the head and neck, and asphyxia caused by the neck
injuries.
2. The charges, trials, verdicts, and sentence
The People charged Trujillo with Alvarado’s murder.
The People alleged Trujillo had a prior strike for burglary.
Trujillo was tried twice. His first jury was unable to reach
a verdict. (Trujillo I.) At Trujillo’s second trial in May 2006,
the court instructed the jury with (among other instructions)
CALJIC Nos. 3.00 (Principals–Defined), 3.01 (Aiding and
Abetting–Defined), 8.10 (Murder–Defined), 8.11 (“Malice
Aforethought”–Defined), 8.20 (Deliberate and Premeditated
Murder), 8.30 (Unpremeditated Murder of the Second Degree),
8.31 (Second Degree Murder–Killing Resulting from Unlawful
Act Dangerous to Life), 8.50 (Murder and Manslaughter
Distinguished), 8.70 (Duty of Jury as to Degree of Murder), 8.71
(Doubt Whether First or Second Degree Murder), 8.72 (Doubt
Whether Murder or Manslaughter), 8.74 (Unanimous Agreement

7
as to Offense–First or Second Degree Murder or Manslaughter),
and 8.75 (Jury May Return Partial Verdict–Homicide).
In light of the testimony that Trujillo had been drinking
pruno, the court gave the jury CALJIC Nos. 4.21 (Voluntary
Intoxication–When Relevant to Specific Intent), 4.21.2 (Voluntary
Intoxication–Aider and Abettor), 4.22 (Voluntary Intoxication–
Defined), and 8.47 (Involuntary Manslaughter–Killing While
Unconscious Due to Voluntary Intoxication).
The court did not give the jury CALJIC No. 3.02 (Principals
–Liability for Natural and Probable Consequences).
The jury in Trujillo’s second trial acquitted him of
first degree murder and found him guilty of second degree
murder. Trujillo waived jury on his priors and the trial court
found true the allegations that Trujillo had a prior strike
as well as four prison priors. The court sentenced Trujillo to
35 years to life in the state prison, calculated as 15 years to life
for the murder, doubled because of the strike, plus five years
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court imposed three
one-year terms for three of the prison priors, to be served
concurrently; it imposed and stayed the fourth prison prior.
Another panel of this court affirmed Trujillo’s conviction.
(Trujillo I.)
3. Trujillo’s petition for resentencing
In May 2022 Trujillo, representing himself, filed a form
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Trujillo checked
boxes on the form stating (1) he was convicted “[a]t trial” “of 1st
or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine,” (2) he “could not
now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes
made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019,”

8
and (3) he “was convicted of 2nd degree murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or under
the 2nd degree felony murder doctrine and [he] could not now
be convicted of murder because of changes to Penal Code § 188,
effective January 1, 2019.” Trujillo did not check box 1 or box 5
(which applies only to first degree murder), but he checked
the subboxes to box 5 that stated, “I was not the actual killer,”
“I did not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet, counsel, command,
induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree [sic],” and “I was not
a major participant in the felony or I did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the crime or
felony.” Trujillo also checked a box that stated, “I request that
this court appoint counsel for me during this re-sentencing
process.”
The court appointed counsel for Trujillo. The prosecution
filed an opposition to Trujillo’s petition. The prosecution
contended Trujillo “was convicted under the legal theory
of directly aiding and abetting a 2nd Degree murder.” The
prosecution noted the trial court had not instructed the jury
on either the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or felony murder. The prosecution asserted, “The record of
conviction proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
personally acted with malice aforethought.” The prosecution
attached as an exhibit the court of appeal opinion in Trujillo’s
direct appeal.
Trujillo’s counsel filed a reply. Counsel noted Senate Bill
No. 775 prohibited the court from “consider[ing]” the appellate
court’s opinion “for anything except determining a case’s
procedural posture.” Counsel contended “it does not preclude

9
eligibility for consideration now that the jury back then was
‘instructed [about Trujillo] as an aider and abettor.’ . . . [J]ust
as with felony murder and Banks/Clark analysis[4], yesterday’s
standards and tests and factors do not dispose of today’s petitions
or automatically preclude issues’ consideration.” Counsel did
not explain how the law had changed since 2006 as to direct
aiders and abettors.
Counsel also argued Trujillo was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing because “it has not and cannot be determined that
Trujillo was the actual killer.” Citing People v. Garcia (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 956 (Garcia), counsel also argued “the evidence
at trial did not establish that Trujillo’s actions actually caused
death.”5
Counsel appeared before the trial court on November 22,
2022. Trujillo was present on Webex. The court had noted at
an earlier status conference that it was “in receipt of” Trujillo’s
petition, the court of appeal opinion on direct appeal, “a copy of

4 In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, our Supreme Court “provided
substantial guidance on the meaning of” the phrases “ ‘major
participant’ ” and “ ‘reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 703 (Strong).) Those terms apply
in felony-murder cases. In Trujillo’s case, the prosecution did
not proceed on a felony-murder theory, nor did the court instruct
the jury on felony murder.
5 Garcia was a felony-murder case. Garcia was the actual
killer of the 82-year-old victim. The issue in Garcia was whether
he could be considered the “ ‘actual killer’ ” when the victim
died from lethal cardiac arrhythmia an hour after Garcia had
assaulted and robbed him. (Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 959–960.)

10
the original information,” the jury instructions, the verdict forms,
the abstract of judgment, and “a register of actions document
from the clerk.” The court stated it “recall[ed] the matter . . .
because . . . the court as well as the staff and the jury and the
parties went to the county jail to view the scene.” The court
continued, “This matter involved a beating at the L.A. county
jail where the victim of course died by blunt force trauma in
somewhat of a group beating where the defendant certainly
took part.”
Trujillo’s counsel told the court, “I am submitting on the
pleadings and asking the court to hold that my client has met
his prima facie burden at this stage of the proceedings to show
that he is eligible for consideration for resentencing under
1172.6, that the court should issue an O.S.C. to the People
as to why he is not entitled to relief.”
The prosecutor, referring to his “opposition papers,”
responded, “[I]n order to make a prima facie showing the
petitioner has to show that he was convicted under a theory
of either natural and probable consequences or felony murder,
and the appellate court opinion shows those instructions were
not given to the jury. . . . On the contrary, the defendant was
convicted as an aider and abettor in first [sic] degree murder
as a malice murder I should say . . . . As a threshold matter
he’s not met the prima facie showing.”
The court asked Trujillo’s counsel if he wished to respond.
Counsel replied, “I will submit on my written pleadings, Your
Honor.”
The court stated,
“I have considered the written pleadings
from both sides. [¶] The court at this time,

11
Mr. Meister, is going to deny any relief to
Mr. Trujillo. I’ll further add, and I know
I listened to the case, I heard the case,
I received the verdict. This court received
a verdict. Your client was either the actual
killer in this matter in the beating or at the
very least a major participant directly with
reckless indifference to human life, so I don’t
believe he is entitled to any relief.”
DISCUSSION
1. Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 986 (Reyes); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–
843 (Gentile)) and significantly narrowing the felony-murder
exception to the malice requirement for murder (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
pp. 707–708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis)).
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–3.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3)
now prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule.
(Gentile, at pp. 842–843.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of
felony murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate
the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he
could no longer be convicted of murder because of the legislative

12
changes to the definitions of the crime. (See Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Effective January 2022, the
Legislature extended resentencing eligibility to individuals
convicted of murder on “any theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if requested. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962–963;
see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3).) The prosecutor must then
file a response to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply,
and the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled
to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, the court takes the
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled
to relief if his factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971; see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463–464
(Curiel).) The court may consider the record of conviction,
which will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see Curiel, at pp. 463–464; People
v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251 (Williams).) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving

13
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis,
at p. 972; see People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
But if the record of conviction contains facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition, the trial court is justified
in rejecting them. (Eynon, at p. 975; see Lewis, at p. 971.)
The jury instructions are part of the record of conviction,
because the instructions “given at a petitioner’s trial may provide
‘readily ascertainable facts from the record’ that refute the
petitioner’s showing, and reliance on them to make the eligibility
or entitlement determinations may not amount to ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,’ ”
which may not take place until after an order to show cause
issues. (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055, review
granted on other grounds Sept. 23, 2020, S263939 and held
for Lewis, review dismissed Nov. 17, 2021, opinion citable to
the extent not inconsistent with Lewis; see People v. Estrada
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, 946 (Estrada) [jury instructions
showed trial court never instructed jury on natural and probable
consequences doctrine; summary denial of petition affirmed].)
2. Trujillo is ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law
Trujillo notes the trial court, in denying his petition,
stated he “ ‘was either the actual killer in this matter in the
beating or at the very leas[t] a major participant directly with
reckless indifference to human life [sic].’ ” As the terms “major
participant” and “reckless difference” concern defendants tried
under a felony-murder theory, and this was not a felony-murder
case, Trujillo asserts the court erred. Trujillo also contends
the court—having tried the case—erred by “rel[ying] on its
own factual determinations” in recalling the trial.

14
Trujillo is correct that the court erred by referring to him
as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference
to human life. As for the trial court’s recollection of the trial,
the court did not say it relied only on its recollection. The court
stated it had received Trujillo’s petition, the jury instructions,
the verdict forms, the abstract of judgment, and a “register
of actions document.”
In any event, independently reviewing the matter as we
must (People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 866), “we keep
in mind that we review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not the court’s
reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we
affirm.’ ” (People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123–124.
See also People v. Mbaabu (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148,
fn. 4 [“Because we must affirm if the court’s ruling was correct
on any basis, we consider alternative bases for the order.”].)
a. The jury convicted Trujillo as the actual killer
or a direct aider and abettor
The record of conviction demonstrates the jury convicted
Trujillo as—at a minimum—a direct aider and abettor of
Alvarado’s murder. The court did not instruct the jury on
felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Direct aiding and abetting requires the jury to find the defendant
acted with express malice—intent to kill—and is therefore still
a valid theory of liability of aiding and abetting. (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 848 [well settled that Senate Bill No. 1437
“does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder
because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
aforethought”]; Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1252
[same]; People v. Lopez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1248
[“An accomplice who directly aids and abets the perpetrator

15
in committing murder is liable for murder [following Senate Bill
No. 1437] just as he or she was liable” before its enactment.].)
As our Supreme Court has explained, “to establish liability
for murder under the theory of direct aiding and abetting, ‘the
prosecution must show that the defendant aided or encouraged
the commission of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of
committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission.’ ”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 466.) The jury had to find all
of these elements to be true to convict Trujillo of murder under
an aider and abettor theory. Here, the jury was instructed
Trujillo could be found guilty of murder on such a theory if
it concluded he had knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and “[b]y act or advice,” “[w]ith the intent or purpose
of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of
the crime,” he “aid[ed], promote[d], encourage[d] or instigate[d]
the commission of the crime.” (CALJIC No. 3.01.)
Trujillo does not dispute this governing law. Instead,
he contends the record of conviction “does not conclusively negate
the possibility that the jury found [him] guilty of second degree
murder by imputing to him the implied malice of Alvarado’s
the [sic] actual killer.” Trujillo relies heavily on People v. Langi
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi). That reliance is misplaced.
In Langi, the jury rejected a felony-murder theory, but
found the defendant guilty of second degree murder, robbery,
and battery. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 977.) The
Langi court reasoned that, because the instruction for second
degree implied malice murder did not require a finding that
the perpetrator intended to kill, the aiding and abetting jury
instructions left open the possibility that the jury convicted

16
the appellant for intending to aid the perpetrators’ intentional
acts, without necessarily possessing an intent to aid or encourage
the victim’s killing. (Id. at p. 983.)
Here, the only theories on which Trujillo’s jury was
instructed were first and second degree murder (as well as
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as lessers), either as
a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. These theories
remain valid and do not qualify for section 1172.6 relief. (See
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 990.) The ambiguity the Langi
court found there is not present here. CALJIC No. 3.01 required
the aider and abettor to know the perpetrator intended to commit
“the crime.” The only crime charged here was murder, either
first or second degree. In other words, murder was the target
offense. By contrast, in Langi, the defendant also was charged
with and found guilty of the crimes of robbery and battery.
(Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 976–977.) Thus, the
ambiguity in the jury instructions in Langi allowed for the
possibility that the defendant had been convicted of aiding
and abetting murder based on a finding that he intended to
aid and abet a non-murder battery or other crime. But here,
the only crime charged—murder—required one of two different
intents: either intent to kill (express malice) or conscious
disregard for human life (implied malice). We see no reasonable
possibility the jury could have found that Trujillo, as an aider
and abettor, could know the perpetrator intended to commit a
specific crime and help the perpetrator commit that crime—here
defined in CALJIC Nos. 8.11 and 8.31 as requiring intent to kill
or a conscious disregard for human life—and yet not personally
harbor the requisite mens rea. As our Supreme Court has said,
where the only unlawful purpose charged is an unlawful killing,

17
“one cannot knowingly and intentionally help another commit
an unlawful killing without acting with malice.” (People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123.)
b. The prosecutor’s closing argument did not
mislead the jury or permit it to convict Trujillo
on an imputed malice theory
We also reject Trujillo’s contention that the prosecutor’s
closing arguments exacerbated any potential ambiguity. Trujillo
complains that the prosecutor, in discussing “ ‘principals’ ” in
a crime, “did not specify whether ‘the crime’ was the assault or
murder.” He also complains that the prosecutor, in discussing
aiding and abetting, used the analogy of a getaway driver in
a bank robbery, and referred to the “equally guilty” language
in CALJIC No. 3.00. In addition, he argues the prosecutor, in
telling the jury that “assaulting someone who is laying [sic] on
the floor” constitutes implied malice, “urged the jury to convict
appellant of second degree murder if it was not able to find
express or implied malice.”
The prosecutor didn’t “specify” whether “the crime” as used
in CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01 was assault or murder because the
People didn’t charge Trujillo with assault. Nor did the prosecutor
ever utter the words “natural and probable consequences,” nor
did he argue that the jury could convict Trujillo of murder if
it found he intended only to aid and abet an assault. The trial
court instructed the jurors on the definition of “principals” and
on direct aiding and abetting. It did not instruct them with
CALJIC No. 3.02 on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (See Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 946–949
[in light of jury instructions, prosecutor’s statements in closing
argument which defendant “characterize[d] as a ‘natural and

18
probable consequences theory’ ” of murder did not entitle
defendant to evidentiary hearing].)
As for Trujillo’s second argument, the prosecutor never
argued Trujillo could be guilty of murder if some other inmate
kicked and beat Alvarado to death and Trujillo didn’t know that
would happen, intending to assist only in an assault. Instead,
the prosecutor told the jury it could convict Trujillo of murder
as either a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor. The
prosecutor said the judge would instruct the jurors on aiding
and abetting and, again, the judge did that. The prosecutor cited
the trial testimony of Brandon English that, as Trujillo stomped
on Alvarado, he said something like, “ ‘He’s got to die.’ ”
As for the “equally guilty” language, our Supreme Court
has explained CALJIC No. 3.00 “generally state[s] a correct rule
of law. All principals, including aiders and abettors, are ‘equally
guilty’ in the sense that they are all criminally liable.” (People
v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433.)
Nevertheless, the high court has cautioned the instruction’s
use of the phrase “equally guilty” could be “misleading if the
principals in a particular case might be guilty of different
crimes and the jury interprets the instruction to preclude such
a finding.” (Ibid.)6 There was no such risk of the jury being
misled here. And, regarding the “getaway driver” analogy,
the law remains that a direct aider and abettor need not be
present at the scene if the other requirements for direct aiding
and abetting are met. (See CALCRIM No. 401 [“If all of these

6 The former version of CALCRIM No. 400 also contained the
“equally guilty” language. (See Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 947–948.) The current version of CALCRIM No. 400 does
not contain that language. (CALCRIM No. 400.)

19
requirements [elements 1–4] are proved, the defendant does
not need to actually have been present when the crime was
committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor.”].)
Trujillo’s third argument about implied malice lacks
merit as well. The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC
No. 8.11. That instruction told the jurors that malice may be
express or implied, and that malice is implied when the killing
resulted from an intentional act; the natural consequences of
the act are dangerous to human life; and the act was deliberately
performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life.
In closing, the prosecutor argued Trujillo’s statement that
Alvarado “had to die” was “an expression of an intent to kill” and
therefore constituted express malice. The prosecutor went on to
discuss implied malice, telling the jury, “[I]f you stomp someone’s
neck while they are laying [sic] defenseless on the ground, you
don’t have to say anything. You implied your intent to kill. You
have told us everything we need to know.” Referring to English’s
testimony, the prosecutor stated Trujillo made that statement
“just before what can only be termed the coup de grâs, the final
blow, where he jumps on [the] back of [Alvarado’s] head.” The
prosecutor continued, “How many times can you kick somebody
in the face, in the neck, and say you didn’t want to kill him?”
Nothing in these statements invited the jury to convict Trujillo
on a theory of imputed malice.
c. Section 1172.6 does not provide an opportunity for
Trujillo to relitigate claims of errors at his trial
Finally, Trujillo continues to assert he could not have killed
Alvarado because, by the estimated time of Alvarado’s death,
Trujillo had already been transported to Wayside. He refers to

20
other “disputed evidence at [his] trial” and says “the evidence
of [his] guilt was, at least, a close call.” But a defendant may
not use the procedures set forth in section 1172.6 to relitigate
his conviction or the underlying trial. “The mere filing of a
section [1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new
opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings. To the contrary,
‘[n]othing in the language of section [1172.6] suggests it was
intended to provide redress for allegedly erroneous prior
factfinding. . . . The purpose of section [1172.6] is to give
defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189
with respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide
a do-over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’ ”
(People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947; see also
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549 [a section 1172.6
petition “is not a means by which a defendant can relitigate
issues already decided”]; People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
428, 438 [section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner to establish
eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error”].)
In sum, the jury instructions given here required the
jury to find Trujillo personally harbored express or implied
malice either as the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor.
He accordingly is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6
as a matter of law.

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Timothy James
Trujillo’s petition for resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

BERSHON, J.


Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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