People v. Lopez CA1/2

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Filed 12/4/24 P. v. Lopez CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A166940
v.
JUAN PABLO LOPEZ, (San Mateo County Super. Ct.
No. NF433910A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Juan Pablo Lopez, a former San Mateo County deputy
sheriff, moved to quash a search warrant seeking his personal cell phone
records. After the trial court denied his motion, a jury convicted Lopez of
theft by false pretenses, two counts of mortgage fraud, and conspiracy to
commit a computer crime. On appeal, Lopez contends the court erred in
denying his motion to quash the search warrant. He argues that: (1) the
search warrant is defective because it is based upon an affidavit that failed to
present facts showing probable cause, and (2) the United States v. Leon
(1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon) good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable because the police did not act with objective reasonable reliance
on the invalid search warrant. Lopez further asserts that all of the evidence
acquired pursuant to a subsequent search warrant should be excluded as
“fruit of the poisonous tree.” We conclude the original search warrant was

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supported by probable cause. In any event, the Leon good faith exception
applies. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. The April 2014 Search Warrant
Detective Andrew Armando of the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office
authored a 15-page affidavit in support of the challenged search warrant on
April 25, 2014.
On the morning of December 1, 2013, contraband—an unauthorized
cell phone (hereafter jail phone) and narcotics—was found in cell No. 38 in
pod 5 West at the San Mateo County jail. Hours later, the jail phone received
a call made from a San Mateo County phone line located at 1050 Mission
Road in South San Francisco (San Mateo County Superior Court – Northern),
also known as the Northern Court. The jail phone was passcode protected.
Additionally, the jail phone had no identifying information: the “Samsung
identification sticker” had been removed and the SIM card information had
been “scratched off.” Based on these alterations, Detective Armando believed
“it was clear . . . that the owner/possessor of the phone went through great
lengths to conceal the ownership information” relating to the jail phone.
Detective Armando’s application sought judicial authority to search
Lopez’s personal cell phone records, stored voicemail messages, text
messages, stored email content, and all geographical location information
between the dates of August 17, 2013 and April 24, 2014. Detective Armando
represented these records would “either place Juan Lopez within the
proximity of 1050 Mission Road” on December 1, 2013, “or help exclude him
from involvement in this criminal investigation.”
According to the search warrant affidavit, Detective Armando received
a call from Detective Hector Acosta, one of the officers investigating the

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contraband, who stated the jail phone was found in an undamaged ceiling
light fixture in cell No. 38. Detective Armando noted the light fixtures in the
cells are “enclosed with a secure screen and only a screwdriver with a ‘ “star
shaped” ’ bit could open or close” the fixture. The screwdriver was not found
in the cell or in possession of the inmates occupying the cell: Dionicio Lopez1
and David Serrano. Both inmates disclaimed any knowledge about the jail
phone and the narcotics.
Detective Armando reviewed a report from Detective Acosta, who
interviewed Correctional Officer Del Carlo on December 2, 2013, as part of
the contraband investigation. Officer Del Carlo had been assigned to work in
housing unit 5 West on November 8, 2013. Del Carlo admitted that Dionicio,
who had previously told him about the jail phone, gave Del Carlo the jail
phone to hide in mid-November. When Del Carlo had asked Dionicio how he
obtained the phone, Dionicio replied, “ ‘Money talks.’ ” Del Carlo said
Dionicio “told him that he had two people that were helping him get
contraband.” Del Carlo admitted he knew about the jail phone on
November 8 and helped Dionicio conceal it. Del Carlo later “came up” with a
plan with Correctional Officers Bleeker and Verber for them to “discover” the
jail phone on December 1, so that Del Carlo would not appear to be involved.
Del Carlo was “adamant” that he did not initially bring the phone into the
jail.
Detective Armando reviewed a supplemental report from Detective
Acosta, which stated that on January 7, 2014, Dionicio asked Detective
Acosta to join him in the visiting room. Dionicio told Detective Acosta that
once he got out of jail, his attorney would tell him everything about the jail

1 Appellant Lopez and Dionicio Lopez are not related; to avoid

confusion we refer to Dionicio Lopez by his first name.

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phone. As they were talking, Dionicio’s parents arrived. Detective Acosta
recorded the conversation between Dionicio and his parents. Dionicio’s
mother wanted to know if “they” were treating him well; he answered, “some
of them do.” Dionicio told his mother that Detective Acosta wanted “some
valuable information.” Dionicio’s mother asked him if he “pissed them off.”
Dionicio responded, “ ‘The one that’s not there anymore?’ ” Dionicio’s mother
said, “ ‘And the other one.’ ” When Dionicio asked his mother how she knew,
she said, “ ‘It’s apparent.’ ” Dionicio then asked his mother what “ ‘they’re
saying about the guy that’s not there anymore, working on the other side.’ ”
Dionicio’s mother told Dionicio to stop talking.
After reviewing the conversation between Dionicio and his mother,
Detective Armando “came to the conclusion” that “ ‘the one that’s not there
anymore’ ” was referring to Officer Del Carlo who had been placed on
administrative leave after the discovery of the jail phone. Detective Armando
further concluded that the statement about “ ‘ the guy . . . that’s working on
the other side’ ” appeared to be a reference to Deputy Juan Lopez, who had
been assigned to Dionicio’s housing unit until November 11, 2013, when he
was “moved to the jail lobby”; he was then “transferred to court security” on
January 5, 2014, two days before the recorded visit between Dionicio and his
mother. Detective Armando represented that “working on the other side”
was a reference to the court security unit which was “located directly across
the street from the jail.”
On April 8, 2014, Detective Armando received a copy of an outgoing
letter from Dionicio, in which he wrote, “ ‘as far as the cell phone goes or
alleged cell phone lol. . . . [I]f it is true they found it in my room then im
famous in here because its never been done. . . . Unless I tell them how this

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alleged cell got in here whitch [sic] they think it was a cop, then they are
keeping me in the hole.’ ”
Detectives Armando and Acosta spoke about the letter and agreed they
“had never told Dionicio” that they thought “the phone was brought into the
facility by a ‘cop.’ ” Detective Armando added, “Based on these two references
Dionicio appears to be talking about a cop and Juan Lopez who had been
transferred to court security.”
Detective Armando described another investigation regarding Jaime
Rodriguez, a prior inmate who had been housed in cell No. 38 between
June 17, 2013 and November 18, 2013. Records from the jail phone reflected
numerous calls and texts to a number later determined to be associated with
Rodriguez’s girlfriend, Stephanie Torres. After obtaining Torres’s cell phone
records, Detective Armando found two text messages between Torres’s cell
phone and an unknown number on November 28, 2013. The first one was an
incoming message to Torres’s phone that said: “ ‘Juan is in rwc hel pik uvup
on the way bak he said.’ ” The second message was an outgoing message
from Torres’s phone that said: “ ‘Juan said if he could go now? Or should I
tell him to wait.’ ” Detective Armando found no other “Juan” references in
the other 129 pages of Torres’s records.
Detective Armando further stated that on December 1, 2013, at
5:55 p.m., he observed an incoming call to the already-seized jail phone.
Phone records revealed the number belonged to “a trunked phone line”
associated with the Northern Court located at 1050 Mission Road in South
San Francisco.2

2 As part of his investigation, Detective Armando represented he also

called the jail phone twice.

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On April 3, 2013, Detective Armando obtained the card key access
records for the Northern Court from December 1, 2013, and learned there had
been no card key access between 2:00 p.m. and 5:55 p.m.—the time of the
phone call from the trunked line to the jail phone. Based on his training and
experience working court security for the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office,
Detective Armando knew there is a single door on the north side of the
building that only sheriff’s office sworn staff (deputies, sergeants, and
command staff) can enter with a key. Security video cameras cover this entry
point and the interior of the building. On April 22, 2014, Detective Armando
authored a search warrant to obtain all security footage for December 1,
2013, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.3
Detective Armando represented that the search warrant target phone
number belonged to Lopez. He reported an electronic search revealed that
the target number “belongs to the AT&T network,” and the caller ID
information listed “Juan Lopez” as the associated person. Detective Armando
averred that “cell tower information” related to December 1, 2013 would
“either place Deputy Juan Lopez at 1050 Mission Road during the time the
call was placed to the jail cellular telephone or potentially exclude him as a
co-conspirator.” Detective Armando further said he “kn[e]w that a
comparison of Deputy Juan Lopez’s cell phone call detail records will either
show common calls between him and the cellular telephone which was
located in the jail or show no common call history which would also
potentially exclude him.”

3 Although the warrant for the security video was served on the

custodian of records on April 23, 2014, the record does not indicate whether
the surveillance footage was ever obtained.

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Detective Armando concluded: “Based on this investigation, I know
that Dionicio . . . obtained one or more cellular telephones during his stay in
the Maguire Correctional Facility. I know that Dionicio . . . said to
Correctional Officer Del Carlo that ‘money talks’ and that is how he could get
things into the jail. In Dionicio’s letter that was copied by C/O Santiago,
Dionicio . . . references that detectives feel that a ‘cop’ is involved. In
Stephanie Torres’[s] two text messages the name ‘Juan’ is suspicious because
it is clear that both parties know who ‘Juan’ is but are not messaging him
directly. [¶] Further, the conversation between Dionicio Lopez’s mother and
Dionicio, even in code, appears to be discussing both Juan Lopez and Michael
Del Carlo. Further, Del Carlo in his interview with Detective Acosta . . . said
that there were two people involved in bringing narcotics and the cell phone
into the facility. [¶] . . . [¶] I further know that a call was placed to [the jail]
cellular telephone on the day it had been located by law enforcement, from a
county line which could only be accessed through a Sworn Sheriff’s Office
entry point (Northern Court transportation door) with a San Mateo County
Sheriff’s Office Key.”
B. The July 2014 Search Warrant
Inspector Jordan Boyd of the San Mateo County District Attorney’s
Office authored a 21-page affidavit on July 8, 2014.
Inspector Boyd averred that between October 13, 2013, and continuing
through June 3, 2014, Lopez committed: (1) false declaration of candidacy;
(2) fraudulent voting; (3) perjury by declaration; (4) conspiracy; (5) theft by
false pretenses; and (6) commercial burglary. In connection with these
offenses, Inspector Boyd sought judicial authority to obtain the records from
the following entities: (1) San Mateo County Registration & Elections

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Division; (2) Metropolitan Transportation Commission; (3) Yahoo!; (4) Apple,
Inc.; (5) AT&T Wireless; and (6) PayPal.
Through his own investigation, speaking with other investigators, and
reviewing police reports, Inspector Boyd learned that on December 1, 2013,
Detective Armando began investigating a cell phone that was found in the
possession of an inmate at the county jail. Detective Armando and other
detectives “conducted extensive interviews with civilians, inmates, and
correctional staff members and executed five (5) search warrants” to further
the investigation. In his April 14, 2014 affidavit, Detective Armando
requested a search warrant to seize and examine “approximately 8-months of
historical call detail records” for Lopez’s personal cell phone. Inspector Boyd
examined Lopez’s cell phone records, which listed an address in Newark,
California and referenced a Yahoo! email account. From his call detail
analysis, Inspector Boyd concluded “the majority of Lopez’s cell phone
activity, over an 8-month period, indicates Lopez was living in Newark
(Alameda County) and not Redwood City (San Mateo County).”
Inspector Boyd believed Lopez, who was then seeking to be elected
sheriff in San Mateo County, was ineligible to run based on his residency in
Alameda County. He further opined Lopez’s “filing of candidacy papers to
run was illegal,” as was the creation of a PayPal account “to solicit
contributions for his ‘campaign.’ ” Inspector Boyd checked various public
sites and databases4 to confirm Lopez’s address, his eligibility to run for

4 In support of the warrant, Inspector Boyd checked, among others, the

following public sites: (1) Lopez’s campaign website; (2) county tax records
from Alameda and San Mateo; (3) CLEAR public database; (4) Alameda
County Water District; (5) California Department of Motor Vehicles;
(6) California Department of Social Services; (7) San Mateo County Fictious
Business Name database; and (8) San Mateo County voter registration
records.

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public office in San Mateo County, and his campaign finance practices. He
also contacted the California Fair Political Practices Commission and
discovered no campaign finance disclosure forms had been submitted. As
such, there was no way of knowing “how much money Lopez’s campaign has
raised; how the funds were spent; or if the campaign donations and
expenditures are legally permissible.”
C. Motion to Quash or Traverse the April 2014 Search Warrant
On April 16, 2018, Lopez filed a motion to quash or traverse the April
2014 search warrant and to suppress all evidence against him. Specifically,
Lopez argued: (1) there was nothing in Detective Armando’s affidavit “aside
from his conclusory statements and attempts to link [Lopez] to a conspiracy”;
(2) there was no corroboration or indication that the “Juan” is Lopez; (3) there
was no corroboration that Lopez was at 1050 Mission Road at the time the
phone call was made; and (4) Detective Armando “knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,” included false
statements in the warrant affidavit.
Lopez argued that all evidence presented against him—including that
in support of the mortgage fraud and conspiracy counts—was ultimately
derived from the April 2014 search warrant as stated in the July 2014 search
warrant because it was only discovered as a result of the collection and
review of the original April 2014 cell phone records. Accordingly, Lopez
argued that all evidence brought against him must be suppressed as “fruit of
the poisonous tree.”
On May 1, 2018, Lopez filed a supplemental motion, arguing that
Detective Armando “perjuriously alleged that [Lopez] placed a telephone call
to the [jail] phone” and that the “egregious nature” of his “false statements
and mischaracterizations” fell outside the good faith exception. Lopez

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postulated that “the most suspicious call” was actually made by Detective
Armando, and that Detective Armando intentionally included this “false
allegation to mislead” the judge and induce him to sign the warrant.
In opposition, the People argued there was probable cause to support
the issuance of the April 2014 search warrant, or, in the alternative, the Leon
good faith exception applied.
D. Initial Hearing
At the October 3, 2018 hearing on Lopez’s motion, trial counsel
reiterated “there’s no probable cause” and that “nothing in the search
warrant affidavit actually point[ed] to” him. Instead, Detective Armando
improperly used the “search warrant as an investigatory tool against [Lopez]
to see if [Lopez] is participating in a certain crime” rather than telling the
magistrate that he had probable cause to believe the cell phone records would
contain evidence of a crime; this was an improper use of the search warrant.
Moreover, there was no basis for, or corroboration of, Detective Armando’s
conclusion that the “cop . . . working on the other side” was him, despite the
appearance of his first name in suspicious texts and that he recently moved
“to the other side.” Counsel emphasized that “Juan” was a common name,
that the calls to the jail phone must have been made by Detective Armando,
and that the affidavit stated that execution of the warrant might exclude
Lopez as a suspect, which is an improper purpose. Counsel concluded, “It’s
all baseless bare conclusions.” Further, there was no need for Lopez’s
personal cell phone records if the call came from the courthouse “trunked
line.” Finally, no one identified “Lopez as doing anything nefarious in this
case.”
In response, the People explained that Detective Armando had a
“strong suspicion” that execution of the warrant would disclose evidence of a

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crime. He was aware that contraband had been brought into the jail and that
an officer was involved. He knew, based on work assignments and
intercepted statements, that the person involved had worked in the area of
the jail where the phone was found and was now “working on the other
side”—a reference to the Northern Court on “the other side” of the street from
the jail and where Lopez had recently been transferred; and intercepted texts
referred to “Juan,” which is Lopez’s first name.
The People further argued that one call to the jail phone was made
from a location accessible only to deputies with a key to the jail. The warrant
specified that two people were involved in bringing drugs and the phone into
the jail. The call from the facility across the street was made to the jail
phone before anyone knew that the phone had been confiscated, suggesting
that it was the deputy involved making the call. Taken together, these facts
provided the requisite probable cause. In any event, Detective Armando was
forthcoming in taking what he had to a judge, he relied on the judge’s
determination that there was probable cause, and he was entitled to the
good-faith exception.
Lopez’s counsel countered that the good-faith exception was
inapplicable because the affidavit was “bare bones,” and so deficient that
Detective Armando acted in bad faith, as the warrant was “designed . . . to
mislead the magistrate.”
The court stated it had concerns about the factual basis for the warrant
but not that it was so lacking in probable cause that it could not be issued. It
stated that the good faith exception would be important and invited further
briefing on that before reaching a decision.

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E. Supplemental Motion
On October 12, 2018, Lopez filed a second supplemental motion. Lopez
argued that the very overbreadth of the warrant request meant there was no
probable cause for the request and at the very least that the good faith
exception should not apply. Detective Armando for his stated purposes would
have needed no more than a single day—December 1—for geolocation and
would have no need for voicemail and stored email content. Moreover, had
Detective Armando been acting in good faith he would have used the security
camera footage from the county building he stated he was trying to exclude
Lopez from, which he admitted he requested the day before he signed the
warrant affidavit. “Presumably, had the security camera footage showed that
[Lopez] was in the building, that would have been used as probable cause for
the search warrant.”
F. Follow-up Hearing
At the October 17, 2018 follow-up hearing, Lopez’s trial counsel argued
the good faith exception did not apply where “a warrant is so lacking indicia
of probable cause so to render . . . the reliance on it unreasonable and if it’s so
facially deficient that it cannot be reasonably presumed to be valid.” Counsel
also argued the overbreadth of the search warrant and the lack of any
investigative activity whatsoever to corroborate any suspicions against Lopez
showed bad faith. That was especially true because Detective Armando had
the jail phone for five months before he authored this search warrant, and if
he was interested in seeing who had called the phone, he would have pulled
the records on the jail phone without infringing on Lopez’s privacy.
Counsel asserted Detective Armando’s characterization of the call from
the Northern Court as being “suspicious” was misleading because he did not
distinguish the “suspicious call” from one of the test calls Detective Armando,

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himself, had made. The defense position was that Detective Armando was
the source of the “suspicious call.” Counsel added that Detective Armando’s
“suspicious call” allegation was “either perjury or incompetence.” “It’s either
he’s lying because he knows that this is one of his calls or he’s just not doing
his job well . . . .”
The People emphasized that Detective Armando corroborated the
information he received from Officer Del Carlo by following up with a
telephone services manager who confirmed that the suspicious phone call
originated from the facility on the other side. The People highlighted facts
supporting the warrant, including: Officer Del Carlo informed Detective
Armando that others were involved in bringing contraband into the jail;
Dionicio gave the jail phone to Officer Del Carlo; a picture of Dionicio’s
cellmate, Rodriguez, was sent from Torres’s cell phone with references to
“Juan” around the same time that Lopez—whose first name is Juan—worked
in the pod where Rodriguez and Dionicio were housed; and Dionicio’s mother
mentioned a person who was moved “to the other side” around the time Lopez
was moved “to the [facility on] the other side.”
In response to the claim that Detective Armando acted in bad faith, the
People stressed that Detective Armando “certainly was doing what he could
do to advance this investigation,” including examining phones from unrelated
cases, reviewing phone records, and preparing additional search warrants.
The People underscored that case law relied upon by Lopez was inapplicable
because it involved anonymous informants, which requires corroboration;
there was no anonymous informant here.
In denying the motion to quash the search warrant, the court stated it
was “apparent that this warrant was a product of a long investigation”
pertaining to the contraband found in cell No. 38. There was sufficient

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evidence to establish probable cause “given the linkages between Stephanie
Torres, Jaime Rodriguez, and . . . the linkage between Mr. Rodriguez being
housed with Dionicio Lopez in cell 38.” The court further reasoned: “The fact
that the cell phone in [c]ell 38 had a call sent to it from a phone at 1050
Mission Road, which we know as the Northern courthouse where there was
limited access on the day in question which was established by the warrant
and, most importantly, references to Juan in Stephanie Torres’[s] cell phone.”
All of these factors together amounted to probable cause, and even if
reasonable people might disagree, “the Leon good-faith exception would
apply.”
With respect to the Leon factors, the court explained there are four:
“was the magistrate misled by information in the affidavit which the officer
knew or should have known to be false. None of that has been presented at
this time; two, did the magistrate abandon their judicial role. There’s [no]
evidence of that;[5] three, was the affidavit so lacking indicia [of] probable
cause as to render a belief in its existence being entirely unreasonable. I
don’t believe so based on the factors that I have just pointed to. And was the
warrant so facially deficient that an officer could not reasonably presume to
be valid. Same analysis applies to factors three and four under Leon.”
Nevertheless, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence to
trigger a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154
(Franks).

5 A reasonable reading of the transcript suggests the word “no” is

missing in this sentence; there is no evidence or discussion about whether the
magistrate abandoned their role.

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G. Franks Hearing
At the Franks hearing on March 28, 2019, Lopez presented testimony
from Torres and Detective Armando.
Torres testified that Juan Lopez was not the “Juan” referenced in her
texts. Lopez did not drive her anywhere and she never met him. She had
“[n]o communications whatsoever” with him. She did not know Deputy Juan
Lopez’s name but recognized him from her visits to Rodriguez (her child’s
father) in jail.
Detective Armando testified that Lopez’s cell phone number was never
found in the jail phone. Additionally, Lopez’s cell phone number was not
found in Torres’s cell phone. Although he agreed “Juan” was a common first
name, given the close proximity of the texts to the date the jail phone was
found, Detective Armando thought the references were “suspicious.”
Detective Armando did not investigate the unknown number in Torres’s
records, even though he suspected that number was connected to potentially
unlawful activity. He also never asked Torres if she knew Lopez.
Among the 129 pages of cell phone record data reviewed, Detective
Armando reported finding only two “Juan” references. Detective Armando’s
affidavit did not reference the fact that the two suspicious texts occurred on
Thanksgiving Day. The affidavit also failed to mention three additional
“Juan” references, to wit: (1) “ ‘Juan didn’t leave the garage door open’ ”;
(2) “ ‘In talking to Juan he said it’s g-u-d to come out. No staying. Denied’ ”;
and (3) “Anthony is downstairs with Juan. What . . . a way to start off my
New Years.’ ”
Lopez’s counsel presented evidence obtained from the jail phone;
Detective Armando’s two test calls did not appear in the call data. Detective
Armando said when he did the first test call, the jail phone indicated a

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missed call. He was concerned that the jail phone was having connectivity
issues. When he obtained the jail phone records, he did not see his test call,
but he saw a call from a county line that he did not believe was associated
with his desk. Detective Armando did not know if it was possible if the call
he made from his desk line could have been routed through the “trunked”
county line at 1050 Mission Road.
Lopez’s counsel then presented evidence obtained from the “trunked”
county line, which revealed there were no outgoing calls to the jail phone on
December 1, 2013. Detective Armando explained that at the time he wrote
his affidavit, he did not have this information and did not seek to examine
the county line’s records despite his ability to do so.
Detective Armando did not interview Dionicio or his parents. He knew
of no relationship between Lopez and Dionicio and Dionicio’s parents.
The People argued the defense had not established any intentional
misrepresentation or reckless disregard for the truth. In response, defense
counsel argued that reckless disregard for the truth could be shown by a
failure to investigate, which is what occurred here. Specifically, there was no
effort to connect Lopez with Torres; a failure to obtain the phone records of
the county line; and a failure to follow-up on Lopez’s whereabouts.
In denying Lopez’s request, the court explained that “no one has proven
that [Detective Armando] intentionally” failed to do something. The court
also “thought he was very honest and direct about explaining” why he did or
did not do certain things during the investigation. The court concluded:
“none of the testimony . . . rose to the level of intentional misrepresentations
or reckless disregard for the truth. And . . . , if he was somewhat negligent
perhaps in some of the investigatory steps he took that does not qualify to

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quash a warrant.” Accordingly, the court found there was “nothing in this
warrant to excise . . . .”
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings,
express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In
determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent
judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Although our review of factual
determinations is deferential, it is not without limit. Factual determinations
must be supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] To satisfy the
substantial evidence standard, the evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings must be ‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” ’ ” (People v.
Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937.)
B. The Affidavit Established Probable Cause
1. Applicable Law
In determining whether an affidavit is supported by probable cause,
the magistrate must make a “practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , including the
‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 (Gates).)
“On review, the search warrant affidavit is construed in a
commonsense and realistic fashion” (People v. Hernandez (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 919, 923), and its sufficiency must be judged on the totality of
the circumstances contained therein (People v. Andrino (1989) 210

17
Cal.App.3d 1395, 1401). “The affidavit must establish a nexus between the
criminal activities and the place to be searched. [Citation.] ‘The opinions of
an experienced officer may legitimately be considered by the magistrate in
making the probable cause determination.’ [Citation.] However, an affidavit
based on mere suspicion or belief, or stating a conclusion with no supporting
facts, is wholly insufficient.” (People v. Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715,
721.) We consider “whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding a fair probability existed that a search would uncover
wrongdoing.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040 (Kraft).)
2. Analysis
The affidavit established that an unauthorized cell phone and
controlled substances were found in inmate Dionicio’s cell at the county jail
on December 1, 2013. Detective Armando raised five points in seeking to
establish that Lopez’s personal cell phone records were required to “either”
connect Lopez to the jail phone, “or help exclude him from involvement in this
criminal investigation.”
First, Detective Armando noted Officer Del Carlo told Detective Acosta
“there were two people involved in bringing narcotics and the cell phone into
the facility.”
Second, Detective Armando concluded from Detective Acosta’s report
that Dionicio and his mother were discussing Lopez when they referred to
“ ‘the guy that’s not there anymore, working on the other side.’ ” Detective
Armando explained he thought this “appear[ed] to be a reference to Deputy
Juan Lopez” because Lopez had been assigned to Dionicio’s housing unit until
November 11, 2013, “when he was moved to the jail lobby”; Lopez was later
transferred to court security on January 5, 2014, two days before Dionicio’s
visit with his parents.

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Third, in a letter, Dionicio refers to officers believing a “cop” brought
the cell phone into the jail; however, neither Detective Armando nor
Detective Acosta told Dionicio they suspected an officer. Based on this
reference, Detective Armando believed Dionicio “appear[ed] to be talking
about . . . Juan Lopez who had been transferred to court security.”
Fourth, someone texted Torres, the girlfriend of Dionicio’s former
cellmate Rodriguez, and referenced a “Juan” being able to pick her up.
Torres texted the unknown number back, “Juan said if he could go now? Or
should I tell him to wait?”
Fifth, on the date of its discovery, the jail phone received a call at
5:55 p.m. from a trunked phone line identified as the Northern Court.
Detective Armando investigated the key card access to the courthouse and
determined there had been no key card access during the relevant time
frame. Based on his experience, only someone with a San Mateo County
Sheriff’s Office key could have accessed the building and made the call.
Despite these asserted connections, Lopez contends, “[t]hroughout the
whole course of [the] investigation by numerous detectives, no one mentioned
appellant by name. There was no evidence whatsoever that appellant was in
any way involved in bringing the contraband into the jail.” Probable cause,
however, does not require conclusive evidence that a search will uncover
relevant evidence, only that “ ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” (Kraft, supra, 23
Cal.4th at p. 1041; accord, Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238.) “ ‘ “[S]ufficient
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment.” ’ ” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 592;
see also People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 163 [“The showing
required in order to establish probable cause is less than a preponderance of

19
the evidence or even a prima facie case”].) In making this determination a
magistrate may draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to
be found based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense. (See
Gates, at p. 240; People v. Sandlin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1315 [“It is
not essential that there be direct evidence that such evidence will be at a
particular location”].)
From the detailed 15-page affidavit, which includes reliance on reports
from multiple investigating officers, law enforcement personnel were
necessarily involved in the transmission of contraband into the jail. The jail
phone’s concealment in an undamaged light fixture in cell No. 38 permits the
reasonable inference that only a correctional officer could have possessed the
specialized tool needed to remove the light fixture. While the affidavit does
not specifically state that Lopez was the officer who accessed the light fixture
or gave Dionicio the tool, it is clear that, based on his training and his four-
month long investigation, Detective Armando suspected Lopez’s involvement.
(See People v. Garcia, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 724.) First, Lopez was
working in unit 5 West, which included cell No. 38 when phone records show
Rodriguez using the jail phone. Second, given the short time between Lopez’s
January 5, 2014 transfer to court security across the street and Dionicio’s
January 7, 2014 visit with his parents, it was reasonable for Detective
Armando to infer that the otherwise cryptic reference to the “guy that’s not
there anymore, working on the other side” was Lopez, particularly in the
absence of any evidence that other correctional officers were transferred from
unit 5 West to court security during the relevant time frame.
Contrary to Lopez’s contention, nothing in the affidavit suggests
Detective Armando was motivated by an indiscriminate “fishing expedition”
at the expense of his privacy rights. Rather, Detective Armando sought

20
information for a finite period of time consistent with the information
detailed in the affidavit in which to either confirm or dispel Lopez’s
involvement in the criminal activity under investigation.
Based on Detective Armando’s narrated sequence of events, which
includes the names of the inmates involved and the dates they were housed
in cell No. 38 within unit 5 West, the undamaged location of the jail phone’s
concealment, and Lopez’s work assignments with overlapping dates,
locations, and secure access, it was reasonably probable for the magistrate to
conclude Lopez was involved. (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.)
Three inmates had been housed in cell No. 38 during the
November/December time period when, per the affidavit and recovered jail
phone records, the jail phone was in use. Dionicio was housed in cell No. 38
from November 2012 through the December 2013 discovery of the jail phone;
Rodriguez was housed in cell No. 38 between June 2013 and November 18,
2013; Serrano moved into cell No. 38 on November 20, 2013. Notably
overlapping with Dionicio and Rodriguez, Lopez had been assigned to
housing unit 5 West during this same time period6 and until November 11,
2013. Lopez was then reassigned to work in the jail lobby until January 5,
2014, when he was transferred to work in the San Mateo County Sheriff’s
Office Court Security Unit “on the other side” of the street across from the
jail.

6 Although the start of Lopez’s assignment to unit 5 West is not

specified in the affidavit, the reference to it being Lopez’s “regular
assignment” suggests he had worked there for some time prior to his
November 11 transfer to the jail lobby and his January 5 transfer to “the
other side.” The reasonableness of this inference was later supported by
Torres’s testimony that she recognized Lopez from her time visiting
Rodriguez when he was in custody in unit 5 West.

21
This timing overlap also supports the warrant’s expanded duration
from August 17, 2013, through April 24, 2014, as do additional articulated
facts that further connect Lopez to the jail phone: (1) Lopez’s transfer to “the
other side” immediately preceding Dionicio’s mother’s surreptitious reference
to “the one that’s not there anymore”; (2) the December 1, 2013 call to the jail
phone from a trunked line originating at the Northern Court—located across
the street from the jail lobby where Lopez then-worked—could only have
been made by someone with a sheriff’s key; and (3) the first name of Juan—
matching Lopez’s first name—appearing in two November 2013 text
messages from the cell phone belonging to the girlfriend of cell No. 38 inmate
Rodriguez, the same phone that was also used to text the jail phone in
November 2013; and (4) Dionicio’s April 8, 2014 letter reference to “a cop”
being involved.
Considering these articulated connections between Lopez and cell
No. 38 and its inmates and their use of the jail phone—including calls and
messages to and from Torres—it was reasonable for Detective Armando to
further connect the investigative trail to Lopez and his similarly timed
transfer to “the other side” and for the magistrate to conclude Lopez was
involved. While Lopez questions the need to search his personal cell phone,
the affidavit notes deliberate efforts to conceal or obfuscate that require
expanded investigation, such as the destruction of identifying information
contained within the jail phone and its SIM card, the use of a trunked phone
line, the surreptitious references between Dionicio and his parents, and
Torres’s texts about “Juan.” Moreover, recognizing today’s technologically
mobile society, it is reasonable to infer that Lopez carried a personal cell
phone, which would have been reasonably likely to possess evidence of his
involvement with the jail contraband. (See People v. Meza (2023)

22
90 Cal.App.5th 520, 536 [reasonable for magistrate to conclude perpetrators
were carrying cell phones the morning of the murder and used them in
coordinating their movements]; Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 385
[cell phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the
proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature
of human anatomy”; “[c]ell phones have become important tools in facilitating
coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises”];
United States v. James (8th Cir. 2021) 3 F.4th 1102, 1105 [finding probable
cause supported warrant for cell phone records “[e]ven if nobody knew for
sure whether the robber actually possessed a cell phone, the judges were not
required to check their common sense at the door and ignore the fact that
most people ‘compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time’ ”].)
In sum, we conclude the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding there was a reasonable probability that Lopez was involved in
bringing the contraband into the jail or concealing that contraband and that
evidence about the contraband would likely be found on his personal cell
phone. (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) Accordingly, probable cause
supported issuance of the search warrant.
C. The Good Faith Exception
Even if the affidavit had not established probable cause, the evidence
seized from Lopez’s cell phone pursuant to the search warrant need not be
excluded, because the officers relied on the warrant in good faith. (Leon,
supra, 468 U.S. at p. 922.)
A search conducted pursuant to a warrant is presumably conducted in
good faith. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 922.) Nevertheless, the officer’s
reliance on the magistrate’s probable cause determination must be objectively
reasonable—in other words, there can be no finding of good faith if a

23
reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal
despite the magistrate’s authorization. (Id. at pp. 922–923 & fn. 23.) Lopez
asserts that the good faith exception does not apply because the affidavit in
support of the search warrant was so lacking sufficient indicia of probable
cause that Detective Armando could not have reasonably believed it was
valid.
The record, however, supports the conclusion that a reasonably well-
trained officer in Detective Armando’s position would not have known his
affidavit failed to establish probable cause. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 923,
see also People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 596.) The affidavit reflects
that Detective Armando conducted an extended four-month investigation—
that was still ongoing at the time the warrant was sought—before seeking
judicial authority to obtain Lopez’s cell phone records. After retrieval of the
jail phone, Detective Armando conducted a full data extraction, during which
he discovered several calls from the jail phone went to a number later
determined to belong to Torres, the girlfriend of an inmate previously housed
in cell No. 38. Detective Armando obtained a search warrant for Torres’s cell
phone, resulting in the production of 129 pages of records, which in turn
revealed the texts from November 28, 2013, that referenced a “Juan.”
As part of his investigation, Detective Armando also checked the card
key access records to determine who had been in the Northern Court on
December 1, 2013. Based on his review of the security log, Detective
Armando knew two employees had been in the building on December 1, but
left several hours before the time of the call to the jail phone. As the records
showed no further key card access after the employees left, it was objectively
reasonable for Detective Armando to believe that only someone within the
San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office could have accessed the building through

24
their separately keyed side entrance, just as it was reasonable to infer that
only correctional personnel could have accessed the light or provided the tool
to access the light where the jail phone had been hidden. Considering the
additional articulated connections between Lopez and cell No. 38 and its
inmates, it was reasonable to further connect the investigative trail to Lopez
and his similarly timed transfer to “the other side.” That Detective Armando
also obtained a search warrant to recover the security footage from
December 1 further demonstrates his good faith diligence; the fact that the
footage had not been produced in advance of the April 2014 search warrant
application does not make the investigation unreasonable.
On this record, we cannot conclude a well-trained officer should
reasonably have known that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause
such that a search warrant should not have been requested. (See Leon,
supra, 468 U.S. at p. 924; People v. Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 596.)
Because Detective Armando’s belief that the affidavit presented probable
cause to search Lopez’s cell phone records was not objectively unreasonable,
the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and the motion to quash
was properly denied.7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

7 By reason of this holding, there is no need to address Lopez’s

argument that all of the evidence obtained from the subsequent July 2014
search warrant should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree.

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_________________________
DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

_________________________
STEWART, P. J.

_________________________
MILLER, J.

People v. Lopez (A166940)

26

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