CourtListener 10287169•People v. Avina CA4/3
Full text
Filed 12/3/24 P. v. Avina CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063096
v. (Super. Ct. No. 17NF1132)
JOSEPH ANTHONY AVINA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Reversed.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski, Felicity A. Senoski and Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2018, defendant Joseph Anthony Avina pled guilty to three
attempted murders. A year and a half later, he filed a petition under Penal
1
Code former section 1170.95 (now codified as § 1172.6) to vacate the three
attempted murder convictions and for resentencing. The trial court
summarily denied the petition. We find the denial was error, reverse the
postjudgment order denying the petition, and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
In January 2018, Avina was charged, by way of an amended
felony complaint, with nine counts, including the attempted murders of A.M.,
F.M., and J.M. In connection with the attempted murder of J.M., it was
alleged Avina acted with premeditation. All three attempted murders were
alleged to have been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. It
was alleged Avina was a principal in the crimes and that “another principal
in the offense intentionally discharged a firearm.”2
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6
without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to
the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the opinion.
2 Avina also was charged with three counts of second degree
robbery (§§ 211 & 212.5, subd. (c)), two counts of street terrorism (§ 186.22),
and one count of carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant
in a criminal street gang (§ 25850, subds. (a) & (c)(3)). These additional
charges are not relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
2
In October 2019, Avina pled guilty to the charges and admitted
the sentencing enhancement allegations. As part of pleading guilty to the
attempted murders of A.M. and F.M., Avina admitted he “unlawfully, and
with the specific intent to kill, attempted to murder [A.M.] and [F.M.], human
beings, in violation of C.P.C. 664/187(a), and vicariously discharged a firearm
[within] the meaning of P.C. 12022.53(c).” In connection with pleading guilty
to the attempted murder of J.M., Avina admitted he “unlawfully, and with
the specific intent to kill, attempted to murder [J.M.], a human being, in
violation of C.P.C. 664/187(a), and personally discharged a firearm per
12022.53(c).” (Italics added.) Avina was sentenced to 13 years, eight months
for the three attempted murder convictions.
In May 2022, Avina petitioned for resentencing. The trial court
denied the petition. Avina timely appealed the court’s order.
DISCUSSION
Avina petitioned to be resentenced under section 1172.6, which
allows “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner
to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Relief
under section 1172.6 is not available if the “defendant was either the actual
killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2.’” (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.)
3
When a petition is filed, “the court must evaluate the petition ‘to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’”
(People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The petitioner has the burden
of making the prima facie case. The “‘prima facie bar was intentionally and
correctly set very low.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.) “At the
prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that he
or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the
allegation is refuted by the record.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
463, italics added.) “When the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty
plea rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts ‘the
defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.’” (People v. Gaillard
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211–1212.)
If the petitioner clears the very low prima facie bar, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c) & (d).) We review de novo whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
Avina admitted an intent to kill in connection with all three
charges of attempted murder. The trial court found this admission made
Avina ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. Two months after the
court made this finding however, the California Supreme Court held that
intent to kill “does not itself conclusively establish that a petitioner is
ineligible for relief” under section 1172.6. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 461.) That is because section 1172.6 is designed “to ensure that murder
culpability is commensurate with a person’s actions . . .” (People v. Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 464, italics added.) Accordingly, the basis for the
4
court’s denial was erroneous. But that is not the end of the inquiry because
we review the ruling de novo.
Although Avina admitted an intent to kill A.M. and F.M., he did
not admit to any action taken to fulfill that intent. Instead, he admitted only
that he “vicariously discharged a firearm”—an apparent reiteration of the
charge in the amended complaint that “another principal in the offense
intentionally discharged a firearm.” Because the record before us does not
establish any action taken by Avina toward the murder of A.M. or F.M., the
Attorney General concedes—and we agree—Avina has made his prima facie
case as to those convictions. The denial of the petition as to the attempted
murders of A.M. and F.M. is reversed and the matter is remanded for the
trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct the required
evidentiary hearing as to those convictions.
The attempted murder of J.M presents a different question
because, although Avina was not charged with personally discharging a
firearm in connection with any of the attempted murders, in his plea Avina
admitted he “personally discharged a firearm” in connection with the
attempted murder of J.M.
The Attorney General argues Avina’s plea “conclusively
establishes that [Avina] was not convicted under the natural and probable
consequences theory.” In support of this argument, the Attorney General
relies on People v. Romero (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 145, but Romero is not
analogous. In Romero, the defendant was charged with first degree murder,
pleaded no contest to the charge, and “admitted the allegation that he acted
intentionally, deliberately, and with premeditation” in committing the
murder. (Id. at p. 148.) The plea was based on the facts drawn from a
5
preliminary examination,3 specifically that Romero: (1) agreed to drive
another person to a third person’s home so the second person could shoot the
third person to death; (2) knew the plan was to shoot the third person to
death; and (3) participated in the plan for the promise of money. (Id. at pp.
148–149.)
Avina’s plea here does not offer any facts regarding the
attempted murders. Further, although Avina’s admission that he “personally
discharged a firearm per 12022.53 (c)” could logically support an inference he
discharged a firearm at J.M., there is nothing other than inference to support
that proposition.
Given the paucity of the record of conviction, the absence of any
facts supporting Avina’s plea, and the intentional setting of a “‘very low’” bar
for a prima facie case (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), we
conclude the trial court erred in denying Avina’s petition as to the attempted
murder of J.M. at the prima facie stage. The denial of the petition as to the
attempted murder of J.M. is also reversed.
3 Defense counsel stipulated that the preliminary examination
transcript provided a factual basis for the plea. (People v. Romero, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at p. 149.)
6
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order denying Avina’s section
1172.6 petition for resentencing is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
the issuance of an order to show cause and an evidentiary hearing on Avina’s
entitlement to resentencing on his convictions for attempted murder.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
7
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.