CourtListener 10287056•H.People v. J.A. CA2/6
Full text
Filed 12/3/24 H.P. v. J.A. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
H.P., 2d Civ. No. B327784
(Super. Ct. No. D396062)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
J.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
H.P. obtained a permanent domestic violence restraining
order against J.A. (Fam. Code,1 § 6220), and J.A. appeals. J.A.
claims, among other things, that he was denied due process
because 1) he was not served notice of the hearing on H.P.’s
request for that restraining order, and 2) he was denied his right
to a continuance when he appeared at the hearing. On this
incomplete record, he has not shown error. We affirm.
1 All statutory references are to the Family Code.
FACTS
In 2019, H.P. obtained a three-year domestic violence
restraining order against J.A. In 2022, H.P. filed a request to
renew the restraining order. She alleged J.A. had been arrested
twice for “felony stalking.” The trial court set a hearing for
January 18, 2023. J.A. was personally served with the request to
renew the restraining order and the notice of the January 18th
hearing by a sheriff’s “authorized agent” on January 13, 2023.
On January 18, Commissioner Kawai presided. There is no
reporter’s transcript. The clerk’s minutes show J.A.’s counsel
appeared “via Zoom” and requested a continuance. The trial
court granted that request and continued the hearing to
February 8, 2023. The trial court thereafter ordered the hearing
continued to February 10, 2023.
J.A. claimed neither he nor his counsel were served notice
of the February 10th hearing date. But J.A.’s counsel checked
“the docket” and learned the hearing date had been changed to
February 10.
There is no reporter’s transcript of the February 10th
hearing. The clerk’s minutes show that H.P. appeared. J.A.
appeared with counsel. The trial court denied J.A.’s request for a
continuance. H.P. and J.A. testified. The court granted H.P.’s
request to “renew the restraining order” and made it a
”permanent order.”
J.A. appealed and requested a settled statement. His
counsel’s declaration contained a request for findings that the
clerk’s minute order for the January 18th hearing was not
accurate because his counsel did not appear at that hearing and
he did not request a continuance. J.A.’s counsel declared that he
talked with the court clerk by phone on January 18 only to
2.
inform him that “[he] did not believe a proof of service was on
file.” The clerk agreed the case had to be continued for that
reason. Counsel said he did not believe his phone call with the
clerk constituted “an ‘appearance’ by [him].” Counsel claimed
J.A. was entitled to one continuance as a matter of right and he
made that request only at the February 10th hearing. Because
the trial court denied a continuance, he was unprepared for the
hearing. The court prevented him from calling witnesses, it
excluded relevant evidence, and he did not consent to a
commissioner.
After the appeal was filed, the trial court held a hearing
and made an oral settled statement. The court found the clerk’s
minute order confirmed that J.A.’s counsel appeared at the
January 18th hearing and requested a continuance. Counsel’s
request for a continuance at the February 10th hearing was his
second request for a continuance and therefore he was not
entitled to a continuance as a matter of right. (§ 245, subd. (a).)
Commissioner Kawai said he was “relying on the minute
order of January 18th, 2023.” (Italics added.) In response to the
commissioner’s questions at the settled statement hearing, J.A.’s
counsel said that the trial court did not prevent him from calling
witnesses on February 10 and that he did not object to the case
being tried by the commissioner. The commissioner found he
excluded some of J.A.’s evidence at the restraining order hearing
because it was not relevant.
DISCUSSON
The Record on Appeal
“A fundamental principle of appellate practice is that an
appellant ‘ “must affirmatively show error by an adequate
record. . . . Error is never presumed. . . . ‘A judgment or order of
3.
the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
the record is silent . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Null v. City of Los Angeles (1988)
206 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1532.) J.A. did not request findings on the
parties’ testimony at the February 10th hearing in the settled
statement. The record is incomplete. This court is unable to rule
on the legal issues raised at that hearing where there is no
reporter’s transcript. We defer to the trial court’s settled
statement findings. (Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 821, 826;
Null, at p. 1532.)
J.A.’s Counsel’s Actions at the January 18th Hearing
J.A. contends the trial court erred by finding that his
counsel appeared at the January 18th hearing and requested a
continuance of the restraining order hearing. He notes his
counsel’s declaration showed his lawyer did not make such an
appearance and did not request a continuance at that hearing.
We must draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment. (Barickman v. Mercury Casualty Co. (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 508, 516.) We do not weigh the evidence, resolve
evidentiary conflicts, or decide witness credibility. (Ibid.) A trial
court may find a witness’s testimony was not credible even if it
was “uncontradicted.” (Jennifer K. v. Shane K. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 558, 579.)
Here the clerk’s minute order shows J.A.’s counsel
appeared at that hearing, requested a continuance, and the trial
court granted it. J.A. claims the clerk was mistaken. But the
clerk is an official court officer. There is a presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed. (People v. Martinez
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 137.) Where a party disputes what
occurred at a hearing, appellate courts rely on the presumption
4.
that the clerk’s minute order is correct. (Wutchumna Water Co. v.
Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 734, 737; Kraemer v. Kraemer
(1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 291, 311.) The clerk’s minutes
“presumptively contain[] only accurate” information. (Copley
Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 106, 115.) This
presumption constitutes “evidence” that “will support” a trial
court’s “finding.” (Smith v. Smith (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 658,
662.) Where there is no reporter’s transcript, as here, the trial
court may rely on the clerk’s record on what occurred at prior
proceedings. (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 552, fn.
6; Wutchumna Water Co., at p. 737; Smith, at p. 662.)
Moreover, Commissioner Kawai who tried this case also
presided over the January 18th hearing. In the settled statement
he found J.A.’s counsel appeared and made that continuance
request. We presume that finding is correct. (Cross v. Tustin,
supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 826; Gee v. American Realty &
Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416; In re Roberts
(1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 95, 97.)
J.A. relies on his counsel’s declaration. But the trial court
decides the declarant’s credibility (Jennifer K. v. Shane K., supra,
47 Cal.App.5th at p. 579; People v. Hamlin (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1463-1465); and “when the litigant fails to
convince the trial judge that his proposed statement accurately
reflects the proceedings in question [as here], the action of the
judge who heard and tried the case must be regarded as final
since his familiarity with the trial and knowledge of what took
place make him specially qualified to determine what the
evidence and the proceedings were.” (Cross v. Tustin, supra, 37
Cal.2d at p. 826, italics added.)
5.
Due Process
The trial court ordered the hearing continued to February
10. J.A. contends neither he nor his counsel were served notice of
that order. But they knew the hearing date was changed to
February 10. J.A.’s counsel declared, “I did check the docket a
few days after [January 18, 2023] and saw the new date of
[February 10, 2023] . . . .” The lack of service of notice does not
violate due process because J.A. had actual notice of the hearing
date from his lawyer. (In re Desiree M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
329, 335; In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 259; In re
Malcolm D. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 904, 913.)
Moreover, J.A. and his counsel appeared at the February
10th hearing; H.P. and J.A. testified. In the settled statement,
the trial court found that after it denied J.A.’s request for a
continuance, the case proceeded to the merits. H.P. claimed J.A.
was arrested twice for “felony stalking.” The court found H.P.
proved good cause to renew the restraining order. It renewed it
“based off . . . the testimony” from H.P. and J.A. and over J.A.’s
objection to that renewal. “[A] party waives all jurisdictional
objections to a proceeding, including lack of notice, by opposing or
resisting the proceeding on its merits.” (In re Gilberto M. (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200; 366-386 Geary St., L.P. v. Superior Court
(1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1186, 1193; Tate v. Superior Court (1975)
45 Cal.App.3d 925, 930.)
The trial court complied with due process. (Goldberg v.
Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 267 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 299].) J.A. claims
it was error to reach the merits because he was entitled to one
continuance as a matter of right. (§ 245, subd. (a).) But the court
found it was his second request for a continuance. (Cross v.
Tustin, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 826.) He claims denial of a
6.
continuance left him with insufficient time to prepare. But the
court could find he had sufficient time to prepare with counsel for
a short hearing against H.P. who represented herself. His claim
that he did not stipulate to a commissioner is without merit.
Commissioner Kawai asked, “[D]id you . . . object to my hearing
the case?” J.A.’s counsel: “No, Your Honor.”
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded in
favor of the respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
7.
R. Paul Kawai, Commissioner
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Law Offices of Michael D. Kwasigroch and Michael D.
Kwasigroch for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Gary Kurtz, Inc. and Gary Kurtz for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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