Hoffman v. Minahen CA1/2

CourtListener 10286451CalctappDec 2, 2024

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Filed 12/2/24 Hoffman v. Minahen CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RAY HOFFMAN, III, as Trustee of
the Ray Hoffman III 2013 Revocable
Trust, A169725
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Marin County
v. Super. Ct. No. CIV2104100)
WILLIAM MINAHEN, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

This case concerns disputes between neighboring landowners over an
access easement burdening property owned by plaintiff Ray Hoffman, III
(plaintiff). Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief
against his neighbors and easement holders, defendants William Minahen
and Kimberly Minahen (when referred to collectively, defendants), alleging
defendants were not entitled to use the easement to access an accessory
dwelling unit (ADU) they were building on their property. Defendants then
filed a cross-complaint asserting various causes of action based on plaintiff’s
construction of improvements allegedly encroaching upon the easement and
failure to adequately maintain the easement. Plaintiff in turn filed a cross-
complaint seeking among other things to quiet title to the areas occupied by
his improvements.

1
Following a bifurcated court trial on the complaint, the trial court
issued a statement of decision and entered a judgment in defendants’ favor.
Plaintiff appeals, contending the trial court misinterpreted the scope of the
easement. Defendants argue this appeal must be dismissed because the
judgment is not final and not appealable and, in any event, plaintiff’s
arguments fail on the merits. We agree with defendants that the judgment is
not final and not appealable, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.1
BACKGROUND
The Facts
Plaintiff and defendants own and reside in neighboring parcels of land
and single-family homes in San Rafael. Access to defendants’ landlocked
property is provided by an easement on plaintiff’s property, which was
granted to defendants’ predecessors in interest through a series of
agreements.
Specifically, in 1957 Harry and Rose Albert, Paul and Mary Fair
Marrin, and F. Somers and Helen Peterson—three couples who owned
neighboring properties on Fairway Drive in San Rafael—entered into the
“Grant of Easements and Agreement” (the Original Grant). Each couple
granted an easement “for roadway and public utility purposes” over the
portion of their property traversed by the right of way described in the

1 We note that both parties requested oral argument in response to a

notice sent by this court’s clerk, as a matter of course, when the appeal was
fully briefed. A party’s right to oral argument exists in any appeal
“ ‘considered on the merits and decided by a written opinion.’ ” (Moles v.
Regents of University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 871; accord, Lewis v.
Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1254–1255.) Because we dismiss this
appeal without reaching the merits, the parties are not entitled to oral
argument, which we find in this instance to be unnecessary to our procedural
dismissal of this appeal.

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agreement—the Alberts granted an easement to the Marrins and Petersons;
the Marrins granted an easement to the Alberts and Petersons; and the
Petersons granted an easement to the Marrins. The easement2 runs from
Fairway Drive over the Albert and Marrin properties, and then the Peterson
property.
At that time, the Peterson property consisted of two parcels of
undeveloped land. Under paragraph 5 of the Original Grant, the Petersons
agreed that their use of the easement “shall at all times be limited to use by
no more than one residential unit on each of the Peterson properties.” (Italics
added.)
In 1965, the Alberts, Marrins, and Petersons entered into the
“Amendment to Grant of Easements and Agreement” (the Amendment).
They agreed to amend paragraph 5 of the Original Grant to state in pertinent
part: “Peterson understands and agrees that the use of the right of way for
roadway and public utility purposes is intended, and shall at all times be
limited, to use by not more than two residential units on the two parcels of
land hereinbefore referred to as the Peterson property.” (Italics added.)
Also in 1965, the Marrins and Petersons created a new parcel between
their properties through a lot line adjustment. Robert and Mary Liles
(defendants’ predecessors in interest) purchased this new parcel.
At some point not apparent in the record, the Alberts constructed a
driveway on the easement and made improvements on the left side of the
driveway.
In 1978, plaintiff acquired the property owned by the Alberts and has
since resided there. Over the years, plaintiff made additional improvements

2 We will refer to the easements, collectively, as the easement.

3
to those previously made by the Alberts. Plaintiff also constructed a
retaining wall on the uphill side of the driveway running across his property,
a portion of which is within the easement.
In the early 1980’s, a single-family home was built on the Peterson
property.
Around this time, a dispute arose between the Lileses and plaintiff
regarding “whether or not the Liles parcel may enjoy the benefits and
burdens of the Original Grant and whether or not the owners of the Liles
parcel may be consistent with the Original Grant construct a single-family
home thereon which makes use of the easement for roadway and public
utility purposes.” A lawsuit ensued, and in 1981 plaintiff, the Lileses, and
other neighbors who succeeded to rights to the easement, entered into the
“Grant of Easement and Settlement Agreement” (the 1981 Settlement
Agreement). One of the “recitals” states, “The parties desire to settle [their]
dispute by means of a grant of easement to the Liles, and their successors
and assigns, . . . and an acknowledgement of their right to construct a single-
family home on the Liles parcel.” In paragraph 1, plaintiff agreed to grant
the Lileses and their successors the right to use the easement. Paragraph 2
then states: “The above-described grant of easement shall be subject to the
various conditions and burdens set forth in the Original Grant, as well as to
the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.”
In 1987, William Minahen’s father purchased the property from the
Lileses. In 1989, a single-family home was constructed on that property. In
2008, defendants became owners of that property and currently reside in the
single-family home.
In around 2019, through a settlement of a lawsuit between plaintiff and
a successor of the Marrin property, plaintiff obtained a lot line adjustment,

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resulting in him acquiring ownership of all the land on which the easement
runs.
On September 14, 2021, plaintiff, through counsel, sent a letter to the
Marin County Community Development Agency. According to that letter,
plaintiff had recently learned that defendants had applied to build an ADU
on their property. The letter stated plaintiff’s objections “to the addition of
another residence on the [defendants’] property on the basis that the parcel is
landlocked, and has, as it [sic] sole means of access, a limited access
easement over [plaintiff’s] property.” The letter went on, “[plaintiff] will not
allow the [defendants] use of the driveway on his property for any more than
one residence . . . .”
On November 5, the Marin County Planning Division approved
defendants’ application to construct the ADU. Defendants were also issued a
building permit. William Minahen testified he started building the ADU
around the time of the County’s approvals.
The Proceedings Below
On December 7, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants asserting
one cause of action for declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleged that “Defendants’
proposed construction of an ADU on [their] Property will necessarily utilize
Plaintiff’s Property for access, for construction and for ultimate use and
enjoyment of the proposed ADU, and that each such use will violate the
Original Easements Agreement, as amended, and the subsequent 1981
Settlement Agreement . . . .” Plaintiff further alleged that the proposed ADU
“violates requirements of the Marin County Code . . . .”
In his prayer for relief, plaintiff sought a declaration that defendants’
use of the Easement to access their ADU “will exceed the scope of and violate
and breach the [easement agreements].” Plaintiff also sought the

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“[i]mmediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, followed by a
preliminary injunction, and ultimately by a permanent injunction
commanding Defendants to cease and desist from the uses of the Easement
for the development, construction and occupancy of an ADU on Defendants’
Property.”
On January 7, 2022, defendants filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff
asserting the following causes of action: “breach of easement agreement; Cal.
Civ. Code § 845”; “wrongful interference with easement/encroachment;
injunctive relief”; “nuisance”; “negligence”; and “declaratory relief.”
Defendants alleged that plaintiff failed to adequately maintain and make
necessary repairs to the easement, and had installed various modifications on
his property that encroached upon the easement. Defendants sought
damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
On February 17, plaintiff filed an ex parte application “for temporary
restraining order (‘TRO’) and order to show cause why a preliminary
injunction should not issue so as to preserve the status quo and prevent
Defendants from overburdening the easement until the case can be heard on
the merits.” (Italics omitted.) Following a hearing the next day, the trial
court denied the application, finding plaintiff did not met his “burden[ ] of
establishing [a] likelihood of prevailing on the merits or of sufficient burden
on the plaintiff and easement.”
On January 23, 2023, plaintiff filed a cross-complaint to defendants’
cross-complaint asking for: (1) a declaration that defendants’ interest in the
portion of the easement occupied by his improvements “has been terminated”;
(2) a declaration that plaintiff “has a prescriptive easement to use the part of
the Easement occupied by the Improvements”; and (3) a judgment quieting
title to the portion of the easement occupied by his improvements.

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The trial court bifurcated trial on the complaint and cross-complaints.
A court trial on the issues in the complaint was held on May 12, 15, and 16.
The trial court heard testimony from plaintiff, William Minahen, and
Kimberly Minahen, among other witnesses. The trial court admitted into
evidence the Original Grant, the Amendment, and the 1981 Settlement
Agreement, along with other documents and correspondence pertaining to
defendants’ application to the County to build an ADU. On July 14, the
parties submitted written closing arguments.
On August 31, the trial court issued a “Tentative Ruling and Proposed
Statement of Decision and Judgment” in favor of defendants. Plaintiff filed
objections, including to the “factual and legal bas[e]s” of the court’s
substantive findings.
In addition, as a procedural matter, plaintiff objected to the “Proposed
Judgment” on the ground that it “is in the form of a final judgment, but it
does not appear to be a final judgment.” He argued: “The decision in the
Tentative Ruling does not appear to be a final judgement [sic] because the
parties’ cross-complaints still have to be tried. ‘A judgment that disposes of
fewer than all the causes of action framed by the pleadings, however, is
necessarily “interlocutory” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)), and not yet
final, as to any parties between whom another cause of action remains
pending.’ Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741.
Also, although the Proposed Judgment effectively denies plaintiff’s prayer for
a permanent injunction, this denial does not appear to be a final judgment
because there are issues still to be tried in the case. See Rutter Group, Civil
Trials and Evidence §2:128: 1 (‘An interlocutory order dismissing a cause of
action for permanent injunctive relief is not immediately appealable’) . . . . [¶]
The court should clarify that the court’s decision on this part of the case is an

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interlocutory order, not a final judgment, so there it is clear [sic] that it is not
appealable.” (Italics omitted.)
On October 31, the trial court issued its “Final Statement of Decision,”
which repeated much of the tentative decision nearly verbatim. The court
overruled plaintiff’s objections. After providing the factual background, the
court set forth its “Findings and Legal Conclusions.” It began by stating,
“This is a bifurcated trial and the only two issues before the Court, which are
interrelated, are: 1) is an ADU a separate dwelling constituting a ‘single
family residence’ or additional ‘residential unit’ in violation of the Easement
Agreement, the Amendment, or the 1981 Agreement and 2) has Plaintiff
proved that Defendants’ installation of their ADU and use thereafter has and
will overburden the easement?” The court then found, “After considering the
testimony and evidence, . . . the answer to both of these questions is no.” The
court went on to discuss the bases of its conclusions.
In the last paragraph of the statement of decision entitled, “Judgment,”
the court wrote, “Based on the foregoing statement of decision, it is hereby
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Judgment is entered in favor of
Defendants against Plaintiff.” (Capitalization omitted.)
On December 23, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the statement
of decision, which motion the trial court denied on March 11, 2024.
DISCUSSION
A threshold and, as it turns out, dispositive issue is whether we have
jurisdiction over this appeal.
The existence of an appealable judgment or order is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to an appeal. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 688, 696.) A trial court’s order or judgment is appealable when it is

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made so by statute. (Ibid.)
“[Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 904.1, subdivision (a)3 governs the
right to appeal in civil actions. It codifies the ‘one final judgment rule,’ which
provides that ‘ “ ‘an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an
entire action.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1138 (Kaiser), quoting In re
Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756 (Baycol).) “ ‘ “The theory
[behind the rule] is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a
single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of
intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.” ’ ”
(Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 756.)
“A judgment is final, and therefore appealable, when it embodies ‘the
final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding’
(§ 577). A judgment constitutes the final determination of the parties’ rights
‘ “ where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance
or noncompliance with [its] terms . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ’ ” (Kaiser,
supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138, citing Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390,
399.) Thus, “an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to
complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties even if
the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried
separately, or may be characterized as ‘separate and independent’ from those
remaining.” (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743
(Morehart).)
“A complaint and cross-complaint are treated as independent actions
for most purposes, except with respect to the requirement of one final

3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

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judgment.” (Westamerica Bank v. MBG Industries, Inc. (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 109, 132 (Westamerica).) “ ‘Where a complaint and cross-
complaint involving the same parties have been filed, there is no final,
appealable judgment until both have been resolved.’ ” (Ibid.) “Thus, a
judgment which resolves a complaint but does not resolve a cross-complaint
pending between the same parties, is not final and not appealable, even if the
complaint has been fully adjudicated.” (Ibid., citing Angell v. Superior Court
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 691, 698 and Southern Pacific Land Co. v. Westlake
Farms, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 807, 825–826; accord, Eisenberg, et al.,
Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶¶
2:69, 2:70 (Eisenberg).)
Here, the judgment was rendered on the issues raised in the complaint,
without adjudicating those raised in the cross-complaints. As plaintiff notes,
the parties “are still awaiting a bifurcated trial on cross-complaints in this
action.” Thus, as defendants argue, and plaintiff appears to concede, the
judgment plaintiff seeks to appeal is not a final determination of the parties’
rights. As such, we agree with defendants that the unresolved cross-
complaints defeat appealability of the judgment. (Westamerica, supra, 158
Cal.App.4th at p. 132; Angell v. Superior Court, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p.
698; Southern Pacific Land Co. v. Westlake Farms, Inc., supra, 188
Cal.App.3d at pp. 825–826.)
Plaintiff’s reliance on section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) (section
904.1(a)(6)) to argue the judgment is appealable is unavailing.4

4 We note that plaintiff made the opposite argument below in his

objections to the tentative statement of decision. As mentioned, he argued
that “although the Proposed Judgment effectively denies plaintiff’s prayer for
a permanent injunction, this denial does not appear to be a final judgment
because there are issues still to be tried in the case.” Plaintiff then asked

10
“[I]n its remaining subdivisions, [section 904.1] lists various specific
additional appealable orders that stand as exceptions to the [one final
judgment] rule.” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 756, fn. 3.) Section
904.1(a)(6) provides that an appeal “may be taken” from “an order granting or
dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction.” This
includes any order that, although not labeled an “injunction,” in effect grants
or refuses to grant injunctive relief. (Eisenberg, supra, ¶ 2:128e, citing PV
Little Italy, LLC. v. MetroWork Condominium Assn. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
132, 142–143.)
Plaintiff argues “[t]his appeal is authorized by section 904.1(a)(6),”
because “[t]he central ruling below was the denial of [his] prayer for an
injunction,” which in turn “was the central subject of the preceding trial.”
Defendants counter that “the Final Statement of Decision and Judgment is
not an order denying injunctive relief, but deals instead with the entirety of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, which alleges only one cause of action for Declaratory
Relief.”
Neither party acknowledges that the complaint upon which the
judgment was entered sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. Thus,
insofar as the trial court entered a judgment in favor of defendants, it
effectively denied plaintiff’s request for both declaratory and injunctive relief.
To the extent plaintiff seeks to appeal the aspect of the judgment
denying him injunctive relief, we do not agree that such denial is appealable
under section 904.1(a)(6).

that the court “clarify that [its] decision on this part of the case is an
interlocutory order, not a final judgment” and “is not appealable.” (Italics
added.) As discussed in the text, this argument (and not the contradictory
argument plaintiff makes now on appeal) is correct.

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Whether an order denying injunctive relief is appealable depends on
whether it involves a pendente lite injunction (such as orders on preliminary
injunctions, temporary restraining orders, or other provisional injunctions) or
a permanent injunction, and whether the injunctive order is interlocutory or
final. As the leading appellate treatise explains, an interlocutory order
denying a request for permanent injunctive relief “is not immediately
appealable, but may be reviewed by a petition for writ of mandate or on
appeal from the final judgment. The right of appeal conferred by [section]
904.1(a)(6) applies exclusively to pendente lite injunction orders (preliminary
injunctions, TROs, or other provisional injunctions).” (Eisenberg, supra, ¶
2:128.1, citing Bishop Creek Lodge v. Scira (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 631, 633
(Bishop Creek) and Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640,
649–651 (Art Movers), italics omitted.)
In Art Movers, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 640, the court addressed the proper
application of former subdivision (f) of section 904.1 and its predecessor,
section 963, subsection 2 (both predecessors to section 904.1(a)(6)). It
interpreted the statute as “provid[ing] a remedy by appeal for the grant or
denial of a pendente lite injunction which is to continue in force during the
pendency of the litigation and until final determination of the action.
[Citations.]” (Art Movers, at p. 646.) The court explained, “An interpretation
of . . . section 904.1[(a)(6)] which limits its applicability to pendente lite
injunctions is consistent with the manifest differences between pendente lite
and permanent injunctions. Immediate appeal is necessary to review orders
granting or denying pendente lite injunctions, because such orders cannot be
reviewed on an appeal from the final judgment. If the orders are not
reviewed pendente lite, the issues become moot upon entry of final judgment
and plaintiff may suffer substantial and irreparable harm, unredressable by

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appellate review. A plaintiff denied permanent injunctive relief, on the other
hand, suffers no immediate harm, and the denial of injunctive relief may be
more easily reviewed in conjunction with the final judgment.” (Art Movers, at
pp. 646–647.)
The Art Movers court went on to discuss “[a] number of cases [that]
have specifically limited the applicability of . . . section 904.1[(a)(6)’s
predecessors] to pendente lite injunctions and have refused to find
interlocutory orders denying permanent injunctions to be appealable, except
from a final judgment.” (Art Movers, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 647.) The
court noted that “[o]ther cases purporting to allow appeals from interlocutory
denials of permanent injunctions have usually done so in connection with
some other basis for appeal.” (Id. at p. 649.) In concluding that an
interlocutory order dismissing a cause of action for permanent injunctive
relief was not appealable under section 904.1(a)(6), the court observed that
its conclusion was “consistent with the ostensible purpose of [the statute],
that is, to provide immediate appellate review of orders granting or denying
pendente lite injunctions. It is also consistent with the general appellate
policy to avoid piecemeal review of litigation.” (Art Movers, at p. 649.)
Citing Art Movers among other authorities, the court in Bishop Creek
held that section 904.1(a)(6) “applies exclusively to an order refusing to grant
a preliminary injunction. An order refusing to grant a permanent injunction
is not appealable unless and until it is embodied in a final judgment.”
(Bishop Creek, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 633.) Accordingly, the court
concluded that an interlocutory order denying a permanent injunction prior
to trial of legal issues and damages was not appealable. (Id. at p. 634.)5

5 To the extent plaintiff argues the interpretation given to section

904.1(a)(6) in Bishop Creek and/or the authorities it cites is incorrect, we

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Applying these principles here, we conclude that even if a portion of the
judgment may be construed as an “order” denying injunctive relief, such
order is not appealable under section 904.1(a)(6). First, as plaintiff
acknowledged below, the judgment “effectively denie[d] plaintiff’s prayer for a
permanent injunction,” not a pendente lite injunction, such as a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction. As noted, in his complaint
plaintiff sought “a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary
injunction, and ultimately . . . a permanent injunction, commanding
Defendants to cease and desist from the uses of the Easement for the
development, construction and occupancy of an ADU on Defendants’
Property.” Prior to trial, plaintiff filed an ex parte application for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, which application
the trial court denied. Plaintiff did not appeal from that denial.
Consequently, what was left to be adjudicated at trial was plaintiff’s request
for a permanent injunction. Therefore, when the trial court entered
judgment in defendants’ favor following trial, it effectively denied plaintiff’s

disagree. Plaintiff argues, in conclusory fashion, that “the plain and settled
meaning of section 904.1(a)(6) moots the asserted rationale” of Bishop Creek.
However, we think it is plaintiff who disregards the “settled” meaning of the
statute. As explained in Art Movers, despite the broad language of section
904.1(a)(6), case law has limited its scope. (See Art Movers, supra, 3
Cal.App.4th at p. 646 [“It has long been held that [the predecessors to section
904.1(a)(6)] provide a remedy by appeal for the grant or denial of a pendente
lite injunction which is to continue in force during the pendency of the
litigation and until final determination of the action”], citing Brydon v. City of
Hermosa Beach (1928) 93 Cal.App. 615, 618–621; Doudell v. Shoo (1911) 159
Cal. 448, 455; United Railroads v. Superior Court (1915) 170 Cal. 755, 758,
overruled on other grounds in Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52
Cal.2d 601, 606; American Trading Co. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 770,
772.) Plaintiff does not make any meaningful effort to explain why we should
depart from the long established rule. And we decline his invitation to do so.

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request for a permanent injunction.
Second, that denial was interlocutory because, as discussed above, the
cross-complaints remain unresolved and await trial. And because an
interlocutory order denying a permanent injunction “is not immediately
appealable” (Eisenberg, supra, ¶ 2:128.1; Bishop Creek, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th
at p. 633; Art Movers, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 649–651, italics omitted), it
follows that the judgment here is not appealable.
We then must decide whether to dismiss the appeal (as defendants
request) or treat the appeal as a petition for an extraordinary writ (as
plaintiff urges). An appeal from a nonappealable order or judgment may be
considered a petition for extraordinary writ if: (1) the briefs and record before
the court contain in substance all the elements required for an original
mandate proceeding; and (2) there are extraordinary circumstances justifying
the exercise of that discretionary power. (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.
745–747; Angell, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 698.) Plaintiff identifies no
extraordinary circumstances justifying treatment of the appeal as a writ
petition, and we see none. Treating the appeal as a writ petition would not
conserve judicial resources or avoid further trial proceedings because
whichever way we were to resolve the matter, the two cross-complaints still
would have to be tried.
In sum, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Defendants shall recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

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RICHMAN, ACTING P.J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

(A169725)

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