People v. Meza CA4/1

CourtListener 10286121CalctappNov 27, 2024

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Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Meza CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082022

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV1102812-1)

HECTOR J. MEZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Jon D. Ferguson, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric Multhaup, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael
D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2011, Maria B. died after a group of men beat her, doused her with
gasoline, and set her body on fire. Defendant Hector J. Meza, Maria’s former
boyfriend, was among several individuals found guilty of first degree murder

in her death, as well as other charges. (Pen. Code, §§ 187 and 189.)1 In
connection with convicting Meza of first degree murder, the jury found true
three special circumstances: (1) that the murder was committed by means of
lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)); (2) that the murder was committed while
Meza was engaged in the commission of mayhem (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(J));
and (3) that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
Following changes to California’s murder statutes in 2018 and 2021,
Meza filed a petition for resentencing alleging that he could no longer be
convicted of murder due to these statutory changes and requesting relief

pursuant to section 1172.6.2 (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015 (Sen. Bill No. 1437);
Stats. 2021, ch. 551 (Sen. Bill No. 775).) The trial court denied the petition at
the prima facie stage, finding that each of the three special circumstance
findings made relief unavailable as a matter of law. We agree Meza is not
eligible for relief, and therefore affirm the order.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Meza’s petition requested relief under section 1170.95, the predecessor
statute in effect at that time. Section 1170.95 was renumbered as section
1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. For simplicity’s sake, we consistently refer to
the statute by its current designation.
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DISCUSSION

For our purposes, it is sufficient to address the trial court’s conclusion
that the jury’s true finding on the felony murder special circumstance based
on mayhem establishes that Meza remains liable for murder under current
law. Because this finding indicates his murder conviction is entirely
unaffected by the recent statutory changes, he is ineligible for resentencing
relief as a matter of law.
In People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong), the Supreme Court
addressed whether defendants found to have committed a special
circumstance felony murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) before the decisions in
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th
522 (Clark) could still state a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6.
It concluded that for trials conducted before the decisions in Banks and
Clark, a felony-murder special circumstance finding does not conclusively
preclude a prima facie case under section 1172.6. (Strong, at p. 710.) But the
trial in this case took place after both Banks and Clark were decided. And as
the court in Strong made clear, “findings made after Banks and Clark
ordinarily establish a defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under [section
1172.6] and thus preclude the defendant from making a prima facie case for
relief.” (Strong, at p. 710.)
Here, the jury was instructed that to find true the mayhem-murder
special circumstance, it had to reach one of three conclusions: (A) Meza was
the actual killer, or (B) he aided and abetted the murder with intent to kill,
or (C) he was a major participant in committing mayhem and, in doing so,
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Each of these remains a
viable theory of murder liability after the statutory changes effected by
Senate Bill No. 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775. In other words, if any one of

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these alternatives is true—and the jury had to find at least one was true—
there is no way Meza can show that he “could not presently be convicted of
murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January
1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Once the jury finds (A) or (B) or (C) and
that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the
commission of mayhem, it was and continues to be murder of the first degree
under California law.
Meza does not dispute the logic of this analysis or that a felony-murder
special circumstance finding after Banks and Clark “ordinarily” precludes
relief under section 1172.6. Instead, he argues that the jurors in his case
were not properly instructed regarding Alternative (C) because the trial court
failed to explain they should consider the Banks/Clark factors both with
respect to deciding whether Meza was a “major participant” and whether he
acted with “reckless indifference.” But even if we were to assume Meza was
correct, he would establish at most a garden-variety instructional error based
on law that was applicable at the time of his trial. (See Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 617–623 [discussing factors relevant to a finding of reckless
indifference].) His argument should have been raised on direct appeal. As
we have explained on several occasions in different contexts, a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is not a second appeal allowing a
defendant to challenge errors that should have been addressed on appeal
from the judgment. (See People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865,
867–869; People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1172–1173.) It permits
relief only to the extent the defendant can show he could no longer be
convicted of murder or attempted murder in light of recent statutory changes.
Here, the changes to sections 188 and 189 effected by Senate Bill No. 1437
cast no doubt on the validity of Meza’s first degree murder conviction because

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the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding establishes that he
would be guilty of the same crime under current law.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Meza’s petition is affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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