People v. Norton CA1/1

CourtListener 10286119CalctappNov 27, 2024

Full text

Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Norton CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170410
v.
(San Mateo County
CLINTON LEWIS NORTON,
Super. Ct. No. 22NF006365A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Clinton Lewis Norton pled no contest to one felony count
and admitted a prior strike allegation in exchange for dismissal of other
counts, a referral to Veteran’s Court,1 and a sentence of “32-month top” in
prison. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to 32 months in state
prison. He contends on appeal that a remand for resentencing is required
because the record affirmatively demonstrates that the court believed it had
no discretion to dismiss his prior strike conviction pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We agree that
remand for resentencing is warranted on the record before us.

1 Under Penal Code section 1170.9, trial courts have discretion to order

alternative commitment for eligible military veterans convicted of felonies.
Among other requirements, the defendant must be eligible for probation.
(Pen. Code, § 1170.9, subd. (b)(1).)
I. BACKGROUND
In June 2022, a felony information was filed charging Norton with
driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a))
and receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code,2 § 496d, subd. (a)). The
information alleged as to both counts a prior auto theft conviction (§ 666.5)
and a prior serious or violent felony conviction from 2004 (§§ 667, 1170.12,
subds. (b), (c)(1)).
In September 2023, the parties notified the trial court that they had
reached a plea agreement. They executed a “Declaration Concerning a Plea”
recording the terms of the agreement. The declaration stated Norton’s desire
to plead no contest to the receiving a stolen motor vehicle count (§ 496d,
subd. (a)) and admit the prior strike offense (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) in
exchange for “32 mo top refer to Veteran’s Court [and] dismiss all other cases
w/H/W.”
At the plea hearing, the trial court asked whether “[t]his [was] going to
be a 32-month top,” to which defense counsel responded, “Yes, and referral to
veterans court.” After the court recited the usual consequences of the plea, it
asked Norton if he was promised “anything other than this is going to be
referred with a 32-month top. That’s the low term of 16 months doubled?
You will go to veterans court to see if you’re eligible for veterans court. [¶]
The other cases will be dismissed. There will be a Harvey[3] waiver for
sentencing and restitution. Were any other promises made to you?” Norton
responded in the negative. He pled no contest to the receiving a stolen motor
vehicle count and admitted the prior strike offense.

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

2
In March 2024, the trial court denied Norton probation and sentenced
him to 32 months in prison.
The following month, the trial court held a hearing to determine
Norton’s custody credits. Defense counsel asked the court to consider a
Romero motion. The court declined, stating, “The offer was very clear from
the Court. It was 32-month, top/bottom waived, or 32-month top and refer for
vet treatment court which he’s excluded from, so the sentence, as remains, is
32 months.”
II. DISCUSSION
Norton’s primary contention on appeal is that the trial court incorrectly
interpreted his plea agreement as providing for a specified prison sentence of
32 months instead of a maximum sentence of 32 months, the latter of which
would leave to the court its normal sentencing discretion to determine an
appropriate sentence within the maximum. (See People v. Buttram (2003)
30 Cal.4th 773, 785 (Buttram).) As a result, he argues, the court
misunderstood the scope of its sentencing authority when it imposed on him a
sentence of 32 months in prison, and thus remand for resentencing is
required for the court to exercise its informed discretion. We begin by
reviewing the plea agreement de novo to determine the scope of the trial
court’s sentencing authority under the agreement. (See People v. Woods
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 623, 631 [standard of review for interpretation of plea
bargain].)
A. The Plea Agreement Provides for a Maximum Sentence
At issue here is the meaning of the term “32-month top” in the plea
agreement. Norton argues, and the People appear to agree, that this term
established a maximum sentence, allowing the trial court to exercise its
ordinary discretion to determine whether to impose a lesser sentence. He

3
contends that because 32 months was the low term of 16 months for the
receiving a stolen motor vehicle count, doubled by the prior strike, the court
had discretion under the plea agreement to dismiss the prior strike allegation
and impose a sentence of 16 months. (See Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 785; §§ 496d, subd. (a), 1170.12, subds. (c)(1), (d)(2), 1385.) We agree.
“A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted
according to general contract principles.” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th
759, 767.) “ ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) If
contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.’ (Civ. Code, § 1638.)”
(Ibid.) If, on the other hand, the agreement is ambiguous, “it must be
interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of
making it, that the promisee understood it.” (Civ. Code, § 1649.)
The terms of the plea agreement here are clear and explicit as to
whether the agreement provides for a maximum sentence instead of a
specified sentence. The bargain, according to the plea declaration, was that
Norton pleaded no contest to one count of receiving a stolen motor vehicle and
admitted a prior strike allegation in exchange for dismissal of other counts, a
“32-month top,” and a referral to Veteran’s Court. The plain meaning of the
term “top” shows that the parties intended for 32 months to be the maximum
amount of actual time Norton would serve. (See People v. Tang (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 669, 673, 675 [concluding that a plea agreement for a “ ‘two-
year top’ ” provided for a maximum two-year sentence].) The declaration did
not contain a minimum prison term, nor did it bar Norton from making a
Romero motion. (See People v. Smith (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 46, 51–52 [where
plea agreement does not specify a sentence and is silent concerning the
defendant’s right to file a Romero motion, a trial court has discretion to

4
dismiss a strike in the interests of justice].) And again, at the plea hearing,
the trial court asked Norton if he was promised anything other than “this is
going to be referred with a 32-month top” and the “other cases will be
dismissed,” to which Norton responded in the negative.
“When the parties negotiate a maximum sentence, they obviously mean
something different than if they had bargained for a specific or recommended
sentence. By agreeing only to a maximum sentence, the parties leave
unresolved between themselves the appropriate sentence within the
maximum. That issue is left to the normal sentencing discretion of the trial
court, to be exercised in a separate proceeding.” (Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th
at p. 785.)
Thus, because Norton and the prosecution did not bargain for a
specified sentence, the plea agreement left the trial court with its normal
sentencing discretion to determine a sentence within the 32-month
maximum. (Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 785.) To hold otherwise would
require us to insert into the agreement a specified term of imprisonment,
which we cannot do. (See Alameda County Flood Control & Water
Conservation Dist. v. Department of Water Resources (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
1163, 1190 [“It is well settled that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to add a
provision to the contract that was omitted by the parties.”].)
Therefore, the trial court had discretion under the plea bargain to
dismiss Norton’s prior strike allegation on its own motion or upon invitation
from one of the parties. (See §§ 1170.12, subd. (d)(2), 1385, subd. (a); People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.)
B. Remand for Resentencing Is Warranted
Having concluded that the trial court retained its discretion under the
plea agreement to dismiss the prior strike conviction, we next consider

5
whether the record indicates that the court misunderstood the scope of its
sentencing discretion when it sentenced Norton, and, if so, whether remand
for resentencing would be appropriate.
1. Additional Facts
After Norton entered his plea of no contest, the trial court ordered him
to return “for veterans court” in October 2023. Prior to the hearing, the
Veteran’s Court team submitted its assessment of Norton’s eligibility for the
Veteran’s Court program, in which it recommended his acceptance to the
program given the relationship between his military service and his
substance use disorder.
At the October hearing, the trial court released Norton to “Our
Common Ground” pending an intake hearing for Veteran’s Court. In doing
so, the court advised Norton that he was “facing 32 months in prison,” and if
he “take[s] it seriously, . . . we have room to work with.”
In November 2023, the court remanded Norton to the sheriff’s custody
because he “did not complete Our Common Ground” and was on “Kemp O.R.”4

4 The parties agree that “Kemp O.R.” refers to or is the equivalent of a

Cruz waiver. In People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, our Supreme Court
held that a defendant does not forfeit the protections of section 1192.5
governing plea agreements by failing to appear for sentencing under a plea
bargain, and thus a defendant must be allowed to withdraw his or her guilty
plea should the trial court refuse to adhere to the agreed sentencing terms.
(Cruz, at p. 1250.) Under a “Cruz waiver,” a defendant may waive his or her
right to withdraw a plea, and may agree to a specified sentence as a sanction
for engaging in certain behavior as long as the waiver is part of the plea
bargain itself. (Id. at p. 1254, fn. 5; People v. Masloski (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1212, 1221–1222.) The plea bargain in this case did not include a Cruz
waiver, nor do the parties argue that the court was allowed to impose a
specified sentence as a sanction for Norton’s failure to appear at hearings or
comply with the terms of his release. Additionally, the record reveals that
the “Kemp OR” was for a sentence “up to” 48 months in prison, and not a
specified sentence of 32 months.

6
The court told Norton, “So instead of sentencing you straight to the 32
months, which was the deal, I’m going to re-conference it on December 5th
with your attorney and see if—where we go from there.”
At the December 5 hearing, the trial court decided to “give [Norton]
another chance” and released him to the custody of the Salvation Army but
warned him he was “on Kemp OR” facing “up to 48 months in prison.”
Norton failed to appear at a hearing the following month, and the court
issued a bench warrant. The court later set a sentencing hearing for
March 5. Neither party filed a sentencing memorandum.
At the March hearing, defense counsel argued that Norton left the
Salvation Army “with their permission” but acknowledged that he had
relapsed, resulting in a new misdemeanor charge. Counsel requested a
continuance, but after Norton repeatedly interrupted the court, the court
decided to proceed with sentencing, noting that Norton was “facing up to four
years” because he “failed out of” Our Common Ground and “walked away
from” the Salvation Army. Without further discussion, the court denied
Norton probation and sentenced him to 32 months in prison.
At a subsequent hearing to determine Norton’s custody credits, defense
counsel noted that “there was a contemplation of Romero when [Norton] was
referred to veterans court, and that didn’t happen,” but he “would still like to
ask the Court to consider allowing [him] to file a Romero motion.” (Italics
added.) Apparently construing counsel’s request as a motion, the court
denied the motion, stating, “The offer was very clear from the Court. It was
32-month, top/bottom waived, or 32-month top and refer for vet treatment
court which he’s excluded from, so the sentence, as remains, is 32 months.”

7
2. Analysis
Relying on the principle that a defendant is entitled to a sentencing
decision “ ‘ “made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing
court” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424), Norton contends that
remand for resentencing is required because the court, in sentencing him,
erroneously believed the plea agreement provided for a specified sentence of
32 months, and thus it failed to exercise its informed sentencing discretion to
determine whether to dismiss the prior strike offense.
We agree the record suggests the trial court may have misunderstood
the scope of its sentencing discretion under the plea agreement. Although we
usually presume on a silent record that the court was aware of and followed
the applicable law (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 867), the record
in this case is not silent with respect to the court’s understanding of its
discretion to dismiss the prior strike allegation. In addition to the court’s
comment at the custody credits hearing that the “offer” was “32-month,
top/bottom waived” if Norton was excluded from Veteran’s Court, the same
trial judge commented prior to sentencing, and after Norton failed to
“complete” Our Common Ground, that the “deal” was to sentence him
“straight to the 32 months.” This is exactly what happened at the sentencing
hearing. Together, these circumstances are an “affirmative indication” that
the court mistakenly believed the plea agreement provided for a specified
sentence of 32 months in the event the court determined that Norton should
be excluded from Veteran’s Court. (See People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th
930, 944–945.)
The People argue the trial court did not misinterpret the plea
agreement, and they appear to suggest that the record instead reflects an
understanding between the parties and the court that the court would

8
consider granting a Romero motion if Norton “t[ook] rehabilitating seriously.”
While that may have been the case, the record is at least ambiguous as to
whether the court believed it was required to sentence Norton to 32 months
in prison if he was excluded from Veteran’s Court, especially considering the
court’s stated reason for denying defense counsel’s belated Romero motion.
(See People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1021 [remanding where
record was ambiguous: “We do not agree with defendant’s argument that the
record conclusively establishes that the trial court misunderstood the scope of
its discretion to strike one or more of the enhancements, but we do find that
some of the trial court’s comments during sentencing raise serious doubts in
that regard.”].)
The People further argue that remand for resentencing is unwarranted
because Norton forfeited his claim by not raising the issue at sentencing.
Norton concedes his counsel did not object at sentencing or request an
opportunity to file a Romero motion until the custody credits hearing, but he
asserts that his claim is not forfeited because the forfeiture rule does not
apply where the court failed to exercise its informed discretion. He further
contends that if his claim is forfeited, his counsel was ineffective by failing to
challenge the court’s interpretation of the plea agreement or timely request
dismissal of the prior strike conviction.
Regarding forfeiture, neither party cites authority on point. The cases
relied on by the People hold that “complaints about the manner in which the
trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting
reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 356, limited on another ground by People v. Stowell (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1107, 1112–1113.) But Norton is not challenging the manner in
which the court exercised its discretion or its failure to properly articulate the

9
reasons for its discretionary sentencing choices. He is arguing instead that
the court was in fact uninformed about (and therefore unaware of) the scope
of its discretion under the plea agreement. When the trial court
misunderstands the law and fails to exercise its discretion, that failure is
generally reviewable in the absence of a timely objection, “when [the court’s]
misapprehension is affirmatively demonstrated by the record.” (People v.
Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1026; see also People v. Downey (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912.)5
The authority cited by Norton concern the trial court’s
misapprehension about its sentencing obligations. (See People v. Panozo
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840 [no forfeiture where court misunderstood its
obligation to consider certain statutory factors in sentencing the defendant];
In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1181–1182 [defendant did not
forfeit claim that court “completely failed to exercise its discretion” to set a
maximum term of confinement].) In contrast, under sections 1170.12 and
1385, the trial court could dismiss the prior strike offense on its own motion,

5 The People also contend that Norton forfeited any claim the court

exceeded the terms of the plea agreement because the plea declaration he
signed advised him of his right under section 1192.5 to withdraw his plea if
the trial court withdrew its consent to “any sentence limitation agreement,”
and he failed to request a change of plea. (See People v. Walker (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Wilson (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1570; § 1192.5 [requiring trial
court, upon approving plea, to inform defendant that its approval is not
binding and that defendant may withdraw the plea if the court withdraws its
approval before sentencing].) However, Norton’s claim is not that the court
withdrew its consent to the plea agreement and imposed a punishment that
exceeded the terms of the plea bargain but that the court misinterpreted the
agreement as providing for a specified term of imprisonment. Thus,
section 1192.5 is not implicated here.

10
but it had no sua sponte duty to do so. (See §§ 1170.12, subd. (d)(2), 1385,
subd. (a); People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.)
Nonetheless, we are inclined to find Norton did not forfeit his claim
because “a sentencing court believing it had no discretion to strike prior
serious or violent felony conviction allegations would not do so on its own
motion.” (People v. Sotomayor (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 382, 391.) It cannot be
said that a court was acting with “ ‘ “informed discretion” ’ ” when it failed to
recognize its discretion in the first instance. (See People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; Sotomayor, at p. 391 [“in cases where the record
actually reflects the sentencing judge misunderstood the scope of her or his
discretion” under section 1385, “a motion to strike the prior serious felony
conviction allegations in the trial court is not a prerequisite to obtaining
reconsideration . . . of a sentence imposed pursuant to section 667”].)
In any event, we have discretion to overlook the forfeiture and decide
the matter on the merits. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–
162, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a
question that has not been preserved for review by a party.”].) We would
exercise that discretion here to forestall the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. (See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400.) We
therefore consider whether remand for resentencing is warranted.
Where a trial court misunderstands the scope of its discretionary
powers, “we have held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for
resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would
have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391; see People v.
Smith, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 50 [in case involving plea-based sentence,
“ ‘remand is not required where the trial court’s comments indicate that even

11
if it had authority to strike a prior felony conviction, it would decline to do
so’ ”].) Nothing in the court’s imposition of the 32-month sentence
demonstrates what it would do if it understood it had discretion to dismiss
the prior strike conviction. Although the court sentenced Norton to prison
instead of allowing him to proceed with Veteran’s Court, it also clearly
believed that it could impose a greater prison sentence of four years because
Norton was “on Kemp OR,” yet it chose not to. Moreover, because the court
implicitly denied defense counsel’s request for a continuance and summarily
sentenced Norton without any input from the parties, the record is not
adequate to determine how the court may have weighed the various factors
under the guidance set forth in section 1385 if it had been invited to do so.
Accordingly, we will remand the matter for resentencing. At the
resentencing hearing, the parties will have the opportunity to provide the
court with information and arguments relevant to the court’s determination
of whether to exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior strike conviction.6
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for a new
sentencing hearing at which the trial court shall exercise its discretion in
determining whether to dismiss the prior strike allegation or reimpose the
32-month prison sentence.

6 Given this disposition, we need not address Norton’s arguments that

the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request at sentencing for a
continuance, failing to consider certain mitigating factors, and denying his
belated request to file a Romero motion. Additionally, Norton has withdrawn
his claim that the court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits
and the corresponding request for judicial notice.

12
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A170410
People v. Norton

13

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.