People v. Valentine CA4/1

CourtListener 10285084CalctappNov 27, 2024

Full text

Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Valentine CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082627

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD295459)

BRADLEY VALENTINE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Steven E. Stone, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanski and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
After the trial court granted the People’s disputed motion to consolidate
two matters, the People filed an amended information and a jury convicted
Bradley Valentine of a misdemeanor count of exhibiting a deadly weapon
other than a firearm (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(1); count 2) but acquitted
him of a felony count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1); count 1).
On appeal, Valentine contends his conviction must be reversed because the
trial court violated Penal Code section 1009 in allowing the People to amend
the information without holding a preliminary hearing on the misdemeanor
count. Alternatively, he claims his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in failing to object to amendment on this ground. The People
concede error but claim it was harmless.
While Valentine forfeited this claim for appellate review by failing to
object to amendment on this specific ground in the trial court, because (1) the
claim depends on undisputed facts and is largely a legal determination and
(2) of Valentine’s alternative claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we
exercise our discretion to reach the merits and agree with the weight of
authority that error of this type requires reversal. We therefore reverse
Valentine’s conviction of count 2 and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Given our determination, we need not correct
the inconsistent oral and written sentences imposed for count 2.
I.
A.
In September 2021, Valentine sought to use the restroom at a store, but
the manager informed him it was closed. Outside the store door, he
brandished what the manager described as a machete. Law enforcement
called to the scene found a knife in Valentine’s car.
In December 2021, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging
Valentine with exhibiting a deadly weapon other than a firearm. In July
2022, Valentine accepted informal pre-plea diversion. The trial court vacated

2
the trial date and instead set a hearing to assess Valentine’s compliance with
the relevant terms.
B.
Also in July 2022, after a verbal argument with a man holding a pair of
scissors, Valentine struck the man with a golf club. The People filed a
complaint charging Valentine with assault with a deadly weapon.
In August 2022, a preliminary hearing was held in the felony case.
Finding probable cause, the trial court bound Valentine over on the felony
charge.
C.
The misdemeanor case was set to trail the felony case. The felony trial
was set for January 11, 2023.
On January 9, the People moved to consolidate the misdemeanor and
felony cases. Trial was postponed. Defense counsel objected to consolidation
under section 954 because the cases were unrelated, of different classes, of
different evidentiary strength, and lacked cross-admissible evidence.
On June 12—the day the postponed trial was to commence—after a
hearing at which defense counsel repeated her objections, the court granted
the People’s motion. The following day, the misdemeanor case was
dismissed; the amended, consolidated information was filed; and trial began.
Defense counsel unsuccessfully renewed her objections to consolidating the
two charges in the amended information.
The jury acquitted Valentine of the felony count but convicted him of
the misdemeanor count. The court sentenced Valentine to 180 days in jail,
time served.

3
II.
The People concede the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
consolidated the misdemeanor count with the felony count and permitted the
filing of an amended information without holding a preliminary hearing on
the misdemeanor. We accept their concession.
Under section 1009, “[a]n indictment or accusation cannot be amended
so as to change the offense charged, nor an information so as to charge an
offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination.”
(Italics added.) The parties agree no preliminary examination was held on
count 2, and no evidence of count 2 was taken at the preliminary examination
on count 1. Accordingly, the trial court erred in allowing the consolidation
and amendment.
The parties, however, disagree as to the error’s implications, although
they agree our review is de novo. (See e.g., People v. Uribe (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 836, 857.)
Valentine acknowledges his trial counsel failed to specifically object to
amending the information under section 1009 or to seek dismissal under
section 995, which provides that an “information shall be set aside” upon the
defendant’s motion if “before the filing thereof the defendant had not been
legally committed by a magistrate” or “the defendant had been committed
without reasonable or probable cause.” (§ 995(a)(2)(A)-(B).) Even so, he
urges us to exercise our discretion to address his claim—which he contends is
primarily, albeit not purely, a question of law—on the merits. Valentine
claims the error is reversible per se. Alternatively, he argues it is reasonably
likely the trial court would have denied consolidation or dismissed the
misdemeanor count, which was a more favorable outcome. Should we decline

4
to address the merits of his claim due to forfeiture, Valentine argues his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance.
The People counter the error at issue is a pure question of law and thus
not forfeited, so Valentine’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. They
argue consolidation and amendment was harmless, as “the People would
have moved to dismiss the felony complaint . . . and then refiled” a complaint
alleging both counts, which would have led to a preliminary hearing and
trial. Accordingly, “there is no reasonable probability” Valentine “would have
obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error.”
We do not accept the People’s concession on forfeiture, as courts have
concluded trying a charge not subjected to a preliminary hearing is a
forfeitable issue. (See e.g., People v. Burnett (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 151, 179.)
Yet we have “the discretionary power to entertain an objection first raised on
appeal.” (People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311.) Doing so is
particularly apt where, as here, resolving an unpreserved issue (1) involves
applying the law to what the parties agree are undisputed facts and
(2) averts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Yarbrough
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 310.)
Exercising our discretion to reach the merits of Valentine’s claim, we
reverse his conviction. The weight of authority suggests where, as here, the
erroneous amendment of the information resulted in the defendant’s
conviction of the erroneously added offense, prejudice is implicit and the
appropriate remedy is reversal, with no harmless error analysis required.
(People v. Dominguez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 858, 867-868.)
Burnett declared: “It is as a matter of law irrelevant whether a
defendant is prejudiced by being prosecuted for an offense not shown by the
evidence at the preliminary hearing.” (Burnett, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.)

5
“In stating that prejudice is irrelevant, the Burnett majority relied upon
People v. Winters (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 997, which, in turn, cited People v.
Bomar (1925) 73 Cal.App.372.” (Dominguez, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 867
[cleaned up].) “In both Winters and Bomar, the information was improperly
amended to add new charges and the defendants were convicted of the
improperly added charges.” (Ibid., citing Bomar, at p. 378; Winters, at
p. 999.) “[P]rosecuting or convicting [a defendant] of an offense different from
and not transactionally related to the one shown by the evidence at the
preliminary hearing” is “clear[ly] illegal[ ]” (Burnett, at p. 178) and
“unquestionably prejudicial” (Dominguez, at p. 868). As a result, the
“[p]rejudice to the defendant resulting from the amendment to the
information is obvious.” (People v. Kellin (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 574, 576.)
We find this reasoning persuasive and follow it here.
At any rate, as Valentine notes, there is more than a reasonable
probability “the trial court would have ruled in the defense’s favor on the late
considered motion to consolidate and/or dismissed the charge had counsel
quickly asserted the section 995 and/or [section] 1009 grounds.” Without the
addition of count 2 to the information, Valentine could not have been
convicted of that count in this case. As Valentine states: “Winning an
opposition to a motion is a favorable outcome. The absence of a charge is a
favorable outcome.”
Although the People claim they would have simply sought to dismiss
the felony complaint and filed a new complaint alleging both counts, this
representation is made in an appellate brief rather than drawn from and
supported by the record or presented by way of sworn declaration. We thus
decline to consider this extra-record assertion.

6
The People further argue “[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest
that the outcome in the preliminary hearing or trial in this scenario would be
any different than the outcome as it actually played out.” We are not
convinced. When defense counsel renewed her objection to consolidation of
the felony and misdemeanor matters, Valentine interjected: “We’re not ready,
your Honor. We’re not ready to fight it, it’s a new trial.” Although Valentine
had actual notice of count 2, that is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry.
(People v. Graff (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 345, 363.) At the time amendment
was sought, Valentine was on pre-plea diversion for count 2 and not
anticipating imminent trial on a charge for which no probable cause had been
found. As Valentine notes, amending the information on the eve of trial to
include count 2 undeniably affected his ability to investigate and defend
against the charge.
Ultimately, we refuse to speculate as to what may have happened had
the erroneous consolidation and amendment never been granted, or after
Valentine successfully blocked amendment of the information under
section 1009 or obtained dismissal of count 2 by way of a section 995
motion—outcomes the People concede were “likely.” Even assuming it is
reasonably probable Valentine could have been convicted of count 2 in a
consolidated trial had the error not occurred or had it been remedied, myriad
other possibilities are also reasonably probable: the People may not have
renewed their motion, and Valentine could have completed diversion on
count 2 or been acquitted of the charge in a separate trial. We thus conclude,
even if harmless error analysis is required, the record evidences the
erroneous amendment prejudiced Valentine. Accordingly, we reverse
Valentine’s conviction of count 2.

7
III.
We reverse Valentine’s conviction of exhibiting a deadly weapon other
than a firearm (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(1); count 2) and remand this
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we
reverse the conviction, we need not remedy the other conceded error in the
sentencing minute order.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

8

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.