People v. Campos CA4/1

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Filed 11/26/24 P. v. Campos CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083277
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JESUS CAMPOS, (Super. Ct. No. CR125741)
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jesus Campos appeals from an order denying his petition under Penal

Code section 1172.61 for resentencing on a 1992 first degree murder conviction.
We reverse and remand so the trial court can conduct the prima facie review of
Campos’s petition upon an adequate record.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Charges, Conviction, and Sentence
In 1991, Campos was charged with the murder of George Reyes. The
charges included an allegation that Campos used a firearm in the commission
of the offense, namely a pistol. The jury convicted Campos of first degree
murder. The court found that Campos used a firearm in the commission of the
offense within the meaning of section 12022.5. He was sentenced to 27 years to
life in prison.
B. Direct Appeal
We affirmed the judgment of conviction on direct appeal. (People v.
Campos-Covarrubias (Oct. 27, 1993, D017737 [nonpub. opn.].)
C. Section 1172.6 Petition and Ruling
In May 2023, Campos filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6, alleging that he was eligible for relief under amendments to the
law made by Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). He alleged that the
charges allowed for his prosecution “under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime.” The court appointed counsel to represent him.

1 Penal Code section 1172.6 was originally enacted as Penal Code
section 1170.95, but then renumbered as section 1172.6 on June 30,
2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10 (Assem. Bill No. 200).) We refer to the
subject statute by its current number throughout this opinion. All
further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The People’s initial response summarized facts from the direct appeal,
and attached the appellate opinion to the response. The response also included
a copy of the information, relevant minute orders, and the abstract of
judgment. The People argued that pursuant to People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis), the trial court could consider the appellate opinion
in determining the sufficiency of the petition at the prima facie stage. It
referenced Campos’s trial testimony in which he acknowledged that he was the
actual killer and stated that the appellate decision established that there were
no accomplices to the crime.
At the hearing, Campos’s counsel argued that at the prima facie stage,
the court could consider the appellate decision only for procedural purposes,
and that the court should not consider trial testimony. She further noted that
the jury instructions had not been provided. The prosecutor countered that
“the [District Court of Appeal] opinion, even without the facts, lays out that
Mr. Campos was the sole actor and not an accomplice.”
The court asked the prosecution whether, “assuming I don’t rely on the
factual statement in the Court of Appeal decision,” the record for denying the
petition was sufficient based upon the abstract of judgment showing his
conviction for first degree murder and the enhancement showing personal use
of a firearm, as well as the information that charged only Campos for the
murder. The prosecution assured the court that “the procedural portions and
legal findings from the [District Court of Appeal] opinion goes to show that
Mr. Campos acted alone and did, in fact, shoot the victim to death.” The
prosecutor emphasized that “the legal findings” in the appellate decision
showed that Campos acted alone, with premeditation, deliberation and
willfulness, and therefore was not an accomplice. Campos’s counsel countered
that without the jury instructions, the evidence was insufficient to deny the
petition.

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The court agreed that it would not consider the facts as stated in the
appellate decision; and it further agreed that the allegation of the use of the
pistol “does not in and of itself exclude the possibility of a felony murder rule
conviction or his having the role of an accomplice.” Nonetheless, the court
denied Campos’s petition, stating:
“[W]hen taken in combination with the other facts, the
documents that the Court has before it, including the charging
document, the sentencing document, and the procedural
history that’s outlined in the Court of Appeal, I believe their
conclusion is correct, that he was a sole actor. He was not—
there’s no theory of felony murder, no theory—no accomplice
theory upon which he was convicted. And for those reasons,
not relying on the statements of fact in the Court of Appeal
decision. . . . But, for those reasons, and relying exclusively on
the procedural history offered by the Court of Appeal, with
that combination I find there is not a prima facie showing, and
thus I’m not going to send [sic] an OSC.”

Campos filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
Campos argues that the trial court erred by denying the section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. He argues that “nothing in [his] record of
conviction dispositively identifies the actual killer, and any resolution of that
factual issue would require an evidentiary hearing at which both parties have
the opportunity to present new or additional evidence.” He notes that in
responding to the petition, the People did not present the court with the jury
instructions, verdict forms, or transcripts of closing arguments that could have
shown the theories of culpability that were presented to the jury. He further
argues that the information relied upon by the court was insufficient for the
court to conclude that he was ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of
law. As we explain below, we agree.

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A. We Deny Respondent’s Motion for Judicial Notice
Respondent has brought before us a motion that we “take judicial notice
of the record from appellant’s direct appeal, case no. D017737, including the
unpublished opinion resolving that matter” (the motion), arguing that “[t]he
record from the direct appeal is relevant because it is part of the record of
conviction appropriate for consideration in a summary denial of a resentencing
petition under . . . section 1172.6.” He further argues that the jury instructions
would establish that the jury was not instructed on any theory of imputed
liability.
Campos objects to the request. Among other concerns, he notes that the
appellate record was not provided to the trial court, was not the basis for the
trial court’s ruling and is not part of the record on appeal. He states that his
appellate counsel has not had an opportunity to evaluate the records.
As an initial matter, we note that there are no records attached to the
motion, nor does Respondent explain why it was not practicable to do so, in
violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(3). The motion is
overbroad, in that it makes no attempt to distinguish items in the record that
would constitute the record of conviction (and therefore could be considered at
the prima facie stage) from the record in its entirety. Further, to the extent
that the motion requests that we take judicial notice of the unpublished
opinion on direct appeal, as discussed above, that opinion was attached to the
People’s initial response to the petition, and therefore is part of the record
before us, so there is no need for us to take further judicial notice of it.
But even if the motion did not suffer from these technical defects, we
would deny it.
It is true that the court may take judicial notice of the records of a court
of the state. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Cal. Rules of Court,

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rule 8.252(a)(2)(C).) But it is also true that reviewing courts generally consider
only those matters which were considered by the trial court, particularly when
the same information could have been presented to the trial court. (See
Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325 [“[A] reviewing court will
ordinarily look only to the record made in the trial court.”].) “An appellate
court may properly decline to take judicial notice . . . of a matter which should
have been presented to the trial court for its consideration in the first
instance.” (Id. at pp. 325–326.)
Further, as we recently explained in People v. Gallardo (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 296 (Gallardo), without the trial court’s review of the record of
conviction, “the burden is then placed on the appellate courts to review the trial
court’s order for harmless error, which would, in this case, require us to review
volumes of transcripts in the first instance. Section 1172.6 does not
contemplate the appellate courts’ performing such a function, nor are the
reviewing courts equipped to do so.” (Gallardo, at p. 299.) Unlike the situation
in Gallardo, here, the parties provided the court with briefing, and the People’s
brief included some parts of the record of conviction, including the information,
the abstract of judgment and the opinion on direct appeal. However, the
portion of the record on which Respondent now relies to support its arguments
on appeal, namely the jury instructions, were not provided to the trial court,
leaving it without the information it needed to fully consider Campos’s petition
at the prima facie stage. “[W]e will not base our review entirely on evidence
not considered by the trial court.” (Gallardo, at p. 303, fn. 3 [denying request
for judicial notice on appeal from a denial of a petition under section 1172.6].)
Further, it is not clear to us that Campos has had an opportunity to
review the jury instructions (other than those discussed in Respondent’s brief)
and other relevant records to ensure that they are complete and accurate and
to develop legal arguments based on them. If the People had presented the

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records to the trial court, these issues could have been resolved below, and the
trial court would have had an adequate basis to make the requested finding.
We deny Respondent’s motion for judicial notice.
B. Standard of Review
We independently review an order denying section 1172.6 relief at the
prima facie stage. (People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 866.)
C. Governing Law
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 significantly limited the
scope of California’s felony murder rule and eliminated liability for murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine through two key
provisions. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong).) First, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended
section 189 so that “[d]efendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with
the intent to kill can be held liable for [felony] murder only if they were ‘major
participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.’ ” (Strong, at p. 708, quoting § 189, subd. (e)(3).) Second, it
amended section 188 to provide that, when the felony-murder rule does not
apply, a principal in the crime of murder can only be convicted where he or she
acted “with malice aforethought,” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3);
see People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.)
Under section 1172.6, subd. (a), a defendant who could not have been
convicted under current law may petition the sentencing court to vacate their
murder conviction and resentence them on any remaining counts. The process
begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met. (See § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).) If the
defendant’s petition is facially valid, the trial court is permitted to examine the
record of conviction after appointing counsel to assess whether it conclusively

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refutes the petitioner’s claim of eligibility. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–972.)
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), the court may deny the petition at
the prima facie stage if the record of conviction discloses that the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 960,
971.) Otherwise, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d) to determine whether
to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the

petitioner on any remaining counts. (Lewis, at p. 960.)2
One of the requirements for the prima facie showing is that the petitioner
“could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, a court may deny the petition at the prima facie
stage if the record of conviction conclusively establishes that the petitioner was
convicted on a theory not affected by Senate Bill No. 1437. (See, e.g., People
v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1257–1258; People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47–48, 59–60.)
D. The Incomplete Record Before the Trial Court Does Not
Establish that Campos is Ineligible for Relief
In its ruling denying Campos’s petition at the prima facie stage, the court
referred to “the charging document, the sentencing document, and the
procedural history that’s outlined in the Court of Appeal.” Either considered
individually or in combination, these matters are inadequate to find Campos’s
ineligibility as a matter of law.

2 If the case proceeds to an evidentiary hearing, the burden is “on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder” under California law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d).)
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First, it is true that the information charges only Campos for the first
degree murder of Reyes and names no codefendants. However, the fact that a
petitioner is charged alone “does not establish ineligibility as a matter of law.”
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 339 [prosecutors are not
required to try all codefendants together, so a charging document does not
exclude others and does not foreclose the prosecution from presenting imputed
malice as to the named defendant].)
The “sentencing document” (presumably, the abstract of judgment)
establishes the bare fact that Campos was convicted of first degree murder. It
provides no insight into the theory by which the jury reached the verdict.
Further, to the extent that by referencing the “sentencing document,” the court
was considering the enhancement for personal use of a firearm, the courts have
held that the findings supporting such enhancements are not the equivalent of
a finding as to the defendant’s mental state. (See, e.g., People v. Offley (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598 [enhancement based on section 12022.53 does not
establish that defendant acted with malice aforethought].)
Finally, we are puzzled by the court’s reference to “the procedural history
that’s outlined in the Court of Appeal.” The appellate opinion does not include
a section on procedural history, instead focusing on a relatively lengthy
discussion of the facts as elicited during trial and then moving on to appellate
issues of prosecutorial error, judicial misconduct, and sufficiency of the
evidence. In discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, the opinion states that
Campos “was the individual who shot and killed Reyes,” but it cannot be said
that such a statement was part of the procedural history of the case. Instead,
that statement appears to be the appellate court’s characterization of certain
testimony in the case. But the facts set forth in an appellate petition may not

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be considered on a petition for resentencing. (People v. Flores (2022)

76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988).3
Thus, on the incomplete record that was before the trial court, there was
insufficient evidence to conclude that Campos was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law.
Because we deny the request for judicial notice, our inquiry ends here.
As in Gallardo, we believe it is appropriate to remand the matter so the court
can consider Campos’s eligibility at the prima facie stage with the benefit of a
fully developed record and informed briefing by the parties.

3 As stated in Flores, “[T]he factual summary in an appellate
opinion is not evidence that may be considered at an evidentiary hearing
to determine a petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing. (§1170.95, subd.
(d)(3) [‘The court may also consider the procedural history of the case
recited in any prior appellate opinion.’].) If such evidence may not be
considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s ultimate
eligibility for resentencing, we fail to see how such evidence could
establish, as a matter of law, a petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing
at the prima facie stage.” (Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to
conduct proceedings consistent with section 1172.6, subdivision (c).

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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