People v. Doulphus CA3

CourtListener 10284115CalctappNov 26, 2024

Full text

Filed 11/26/24 P. v. Doulphus CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----

THE PEOPLE, C098549

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. NCR88403)

v.

CHASE ALAN DOULPHUS,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2016, defendant Chase Alan Doulphus pled guilty to three counts of robbery
and one count of voluntary manslaughter and admitted three firearm enhancements
related to the robbery counts. The trial court sentenced him to 42 years four months in
state prison. In 2022, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 The trial court struck his manslaughter conviction and resentenced him to 38

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022,
the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive
change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

1
years four months. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when
it declined to dismiss any of the firearm enhancements or strike any associated
punishment, which accounted for the bulk of his new sentence. We conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion because substantial evidence supports its finding that
dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety.
In his reply brief, defendant also argued the trial court erred in failing to calculate
and award him custody credits after resentencing. We asked the People for supplemental
briefing on that issue and they properly conceded the issue. We will direct the trial court
to recalculate custody credits and amend the abstract of judgment. Finding no other
error, we will otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, codefendant Roger Bounnhaseng worked on a marijuana farm with the
victims, S.R, K.V., and G.P.2 Bounnhaseng also lived on the farm in a fifth-wheel trailer
with S.R. and G.P. One day, Bounnhaseng told G.P. he was leaving the farm and would
return later.
The next morning, Bounnhaseng returned to the farm with defendant and
defendant’s brother, Alan Doulphus.3 Bounnhaseng, Alan, and defendant went to the
trailer where S.R. and G.P. were sleeping, and Bounnhaseng woke them up by throwing
zip-ties on them and telling them to tie themselves up. Because the victims knew
Bounnhaseng, they thought it was a joke until they walked out of the trailer and saw
defendant and Alan, respectively, armed with a shotgun and a rifle. Once outside, S.R.’s
and G.P.’s hands were placed behind their backs, their wrists zip-tied, with duct-tape on

2 To protect their privacy, we refer to the victims and witnesses by their initials.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10).)
3 Given the shared surname with the defendant, we will refer to this witness by his
first name to avoid any confusion. No disrespect is intended.

2
their ankles and mouths, after which they were laid face down on the ground next to each
other near the trailer.
Defendant and Alan went to a nearby tent, grabbed K.V., and brought him to the
area where S.R. and G.P. were tied up. As they attempted to restrain K.V. with zip-ties
and duct-tape, K.V. broke free and tried to run away. Defendant chased after K.V. and
fired his shotgun at him. Alan also shot at K.V. as he attempted to escape. Defendant
and Alan’s shots collectively hit K.V. 11 to 12 times, and K.V. died from the gunshot
wounds.
After chasing and shooting K.V., defendant and his codefendants loaded about 55
pounds of marijuana into their car and left the farm. Defendant then led a California
Highway Patrol officer on a high-speed chase during which he reached speeds exceeding
100 miles per hour before crashing his car and injuring himself. Officers arrested
defendant and seized the stolen marijuana, a pistol from the trunk of the car, and a
magazine found outside the car which looked like it was associated with the pistol.
Plea Agreement
Defendant pled guilty to three counts of robbery (§ 211) and voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the enhancement allegations that he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm as to the commission of each robbery
count (§12022.53, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of
five years as the principal term for robbery, plus 20 years for the attendant firearm
enhancement; consecutive one-year terms for the remaining two robbery counts, plus six
years eight months for each attendant firearm enhancement; and a two-year term for
voluntary manslaughter, for an aggregate term of 42 years four months.
Resentencing Petition
In 2022, defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. Before the hearing, the trial court struck the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
The prosecution acknowledged two enumerated factors in section 1385, subdivision (c)

3
applied: Multiple enhancements were alleged in a single case, and application of the
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), (B) &
(C).)
However, the prosecution opposed any further reduction of the sentence, arguing
that the trial court should not dismiss any enhancements because defendant’s “conduct on
the day of the offense shows that he is very capable and willing to do a variety of things
that would result in physical injury, serious danger, or the killing of others. Not only did
[d]efendant fire the shot that killed the victim, all of his conduct from that day shows a
blatant disregard for human life.” The prosecution also stated that getting into “a high
speed pursuit with law enforcement” further showed that defendant was a risk to public
safety.
Defendant claimed the presence of enumerated mitigating factors in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (H) required the trial court to dismiss the enhancements unless
it found dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Defendant also
argued in mitigation that he participated in rehabilitative programming while in prison
and did not have a significant criminal history. He presented certificates of completion
from 10 rehabilitative courses and several letters of support from family and friends,
including one from a correctional officer, which defense counsel said was “somewhat
rare” and demonstrated defendant’s “significant efforts while . . . in custody.” Defense
counsel asked the trial court to either strike all three enhancements, strike all
enhancements except the one attached to the principal term, or have the enhancements
run concurrently.
The trial court acknowledged that the enhancements did “result in a sentence that’s
over 20 years because one of them alone results in 20 years” and that multiple
enhancements were alleged in this case. The trial court considered several mitigating
factors, including defendant’s youth at the time he committed the crimes, as well as
documents submitted by defendant: reference letters, including one by a correctional

4
officer, evidencing his rehabilitative efforts in prison. However, it found defendant’s
conduct during the commitment offense “unequivocally was the pinnacle of being
dangerous” because someone died and multiple people were tied up and robbed at
gunpoint. On balance, the trial court found, “notwithstanding his continued betterment of
himself . . . while he has been in prison” evidenced by his rehabilitation efforts, letters of
support, and course certificates, “that the dismissal of those enhancements would without
a doubt endanger public safety, and, as such, they will remain notwithstanding the
changes to [section] 1385.”
The trial court resentenced defendant to the middle term of three years for the
principal robbery count plus a 20-year firearm enhancement and consecutive one-year
sentences for the remaining robbery counts plus two six-year eight-month firearm
enhancements for a total aggregate term of 38 years four months. After imposing the
new term, the trial court said, “All the credits and everything else will remain the same,”
and ordered an amended abstract of judgment sent to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and all parties.
DISCUSSION
I
Abuse of Discretion Under Section 1385
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by finding dismissal of any
enhancement would endanger public safety. We reject defendant’s argument that “there
was no basis” for the trial court to find dismissal of the enhancements would endanger
public safety.4

4 Defendant also contends the trial court erred because it “did not even consider the
option of dismissing any particular enhancement, or dismissing an enhancement and
imposing a lesser term for an uncharged enhancement.” To the extent defendant intended
this contention to be an independent ground to argue the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to reduce an enhancement, it is forfeited because he failed to raise the

5
Section 1385, subdivision (c) requires a trial court “[i]n exercising its discretion
. . . [to] consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any of the mitigating circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) “Determining whether resentencing a defendant poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to society is necessarily a forward-looking inquiry.” People
v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063; People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215, 229.) This “provision means that if the court finds that dismissal of
an enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ then the court need not consider the
listed mitigating circumstances.” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287,296, fn.
omitted.) “[S]ection 1385[, subdivision ](c)(2) does not require the trial court to consider
any particular factors in determining whether ‘there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.’ ” (Id.
at p. 299.)
We review the trial court’s determination not to dismiss an enhancement for abuse
of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Mendoza, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 371; In re White (2020)
9 Cal.5th 455, 470.) Substantial evidence exists if, reviewing the “ ‘record in the light
most favorable to the judgment[,]’ ” we conclude “ ‘ “ ‘the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People v. Alvarez (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
761, 774.) In the absence of evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume the trial

substantive issue in the trial court and failed to separately argue or develop the issue in
his brief. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375-376 (Carmony); Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B), 8.360(a) [each point in a brief must be stated under a separate
heading]; see People v. Lombardo (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 553, 565, fn. 6 [declining to
address an argument “because it was not stated under a separate heading or
subheading”]; People v. McElroy (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 874, 884, fn. 3 [same].)

6
court was aware of, and followed, the law. (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336,
361.) A trial court’s discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner, given the particular
facts of the case. (Carmony, supra, at pp. 376-377.)
The trial court considered several factors when deciding whether dismissing the
enhancement would endanger the public, including the two present enumerated section
1385 mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), (B) & (H).) It also considered
defendant’s prison records, which showed significant rehabilitative efforts by defendant,
including his “continued betterment of himself” and his prospects demonstrated by the
completion of several self-help courses and the submission of several letters of support,
including one from a correctional officer.
We conclude the trial court’s finding that “dismissal of [the] enhancements would
without a doubt endanger public safety” was prospective and supported by substantial
evidence. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); People v. Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1063.)
The court considered defendant’s serious criminal misconduct, in which he tied up three
people; robbed them at gunpoint; fired a shotgun multiple times, killing one of the
victims; and then got into a high-speed chase with law enforcement that resulted in a car
crash in which he was injured. This conduct was found to outweigh the mitigating
factors and supports the trial court’s finding that dismissing the enhancements would
endanger public safety. Its decision certainly was not arbitrary or capricious. We
therefore find no abuse of discretion.
II
Custody Credits
Defendant also argues the trial court erred in failing to award presentence custody
credits, which may be raised at any time on appeal. (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th
335, 345-346, fn. 11, 349, fn. 15.) We requested supplemental briefing from the People

7
on whether the trial court is required to recalculate defendant’s custody credits and to
amend the abstract of judgment. The People concede this issue, and we agree.
A defendant is entitled to custody credit for the time between the original
sentencing and resentencing. (§ 2900.1 [when a sentence that a defendant is currently
serving is modified, the time already served shall be credited upon resentencing]; People
v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23 [when a resentencing occurs and results in
modification of a felony sentence during the term of imprisonment, “the trial court must
calculate the actual time the defendant has already served and credit that time against the
‘subsequent sentence,’ ” but not award conduct credit].)
When the trial court sentenced defendant in 2016 it awarded him 1,092 days of
custody credit (950 actual days plus 142 of conduct credit). At the 2023 resentencing, the
trial court awarded defendant the same number of custody credits. The trial court failed
to award defendant any actual custody credits for the time defendant spent in prison
between the original sentencing in 2016 and resentencing in 2023. This was an error.

8
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to recalculate defendant’s presentence custody credits,
prepare an amended abstract of judgment incorporating those credits, and forward the
amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

\s\ ,
Krause, J.

We concur:

\s\ ,
Hull, Acting P. J.

\s\ ,
Feinberg, J.

9

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.