People v. Duenas CA2/1

CourtListener 10283255CalctappNov 25, 2024

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Filed 11/25/24 P. v. Duenas CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B334536

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA088870)
v.

CUTHBERT EMANUEL DUENAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Reversed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
In 2009, “[o]ver the course of more than 18 hours,
defendant Cuthbert E. Duenas raped Veronica twice, beat her
numerous times, and kidnapped her with the intent to rape her.”
(People v. Duenas (June 18, 2019, B288392) [nonpub. opn.].)
Duenas’s conviction included one Penal Code1 section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement. The Legislature
subsequently deemed invalid enhancements “imposed” pursuant
to section 667.5, subdivision (b) unless imposed for a sexually
violent offense. Section 1172.75 creates a procedure for
resentencing persons sentenced to the now invalid
enhancements.
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identified Duenas as potentially eligible for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a) which
provides in relevant part: “(a) Any sentence enhancement that
was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b)
of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
The trial court found Duenas was ineligible for
resentencing. On appeal, the parties agree we must remand for
resentencing albeit for different reasons. We agree with
respondent that the original sentencing court did not have
discretion to stay the prior prison enhancement, and thus the
original sentence was unauthorized. We thus do not decide
whether Duenas was entitled to relief under section 1172.75, as
Duenas posits. We reverse the trial court’s order finding Duenas
ineligible for resentencing and remand for resentencing.

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2
BACKGROUND
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to
California Standards of Judicial Administration, Standard 8.1.
Accordingly, we provide limited factual and procedural
background. The trial transcript of Duenas’s jury trial is not
included in the appellate record and is not relevant to any issue
on appeal.
In 2013, a jury convicted Duenas of two counts of forcible
rape, kidnapping to commit rape, and assault by means likely to
commit bodily injury. With respect to the assault and
kidnapping, the jury found that Duenas inflicted great bodily
injury. The jury found Duenas not guilty of sexual penetration
by a foreign object. Duenas admitted serving a section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior prison term. (People v. Duenas, supra,
B288392.)
The trial court sentenced Duenas to an indeterminate term
of seven years to life and a determinate term of 18 years. The
abstract of judgment indicates that the trial court stayed the
punishment on the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement.
This court affirmed the judgment and remanded for recalculation
of defendant’s custody credits. (People v. Duenas, supra,
B288392.)
The California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identified Duenas as potentially eligible for
resentencing relief under Senate Bill No. 483. Effective
January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 136) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), by
limiting the enhancement to prior prison terms for sexually
violent offenses. (§ 667.5, subd. (b); People v. Jennings (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681.) In 2021, the Legislature enacted

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Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which made Senate
Bill No. 136’s changes to the law retroactive (Stats. 2021, ch. 728,
§ 1), and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to the
Penal Code (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12).
The trial court denied resentencing because the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement had been stayed.
Defendant timely appealed from the order denying resentencing.

DISCUSSION
Duenas argues section 1172.75 requires him to be
resentenced. Respondent argues the original sentencing court
erred in staying the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison
enhancement. As respondent argues, our Supreme Court has
held, “Once the prior prison term is found true within the
meaning of section 667.5(b), the trial court may not stay the one-
year enhancement, which is mandatory unless stricken.” (People
v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241.) Under Langston, the
original sentencing court was required either to strike or impose
the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. Because the
original sentencing court stayed the enhancement, the resulting
sentence was unauthorized. (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1020.)
An unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time
(In re Renfrow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256), and thus we
remand for resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857,
893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for
resentencing “ ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate,
so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances’ ”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [defendants are entitled to sentencing
decisions based on court’s informed discretion].) Here, citing

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Buycks, respondent acknowledges that a “remand for
resentencing” is warranted.
Because we remand for resentencing, we need not address
Duenas’s argument that the trial court erred in finding him
ineligible on the theory the section 667.5 subdivision (b)
enhancement was stayed rather than executed.2 We also need
not address whether Duenas’s convictions for forcible rape and
kidnapping to commit rape render him ineligible for relief under
section 1172.75, subdivision (a), an issue neither party raises.

2 Whether section 1172.75 applies when the original
sentencing court stayed a section 667.5 subdivision (b)
enhancement is currently pending in our high court. (See, e.g.,
People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 [holding inter alia
§ 1172.75 applicable to sentence enhancements regardless of
whether the original trial court stayed the enhancement], review
granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987; People v. Mayberry (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 665, 672 [same], review granted Aug. 14, 2024,
S285853; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276
[same], review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547; People v.
Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 309 [same], review
granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189; People v. Rhodius (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 38 [holding § 1172.75 applies only to executed
sentence enhancements], review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.)

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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded for new
sentencing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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