CourtListener 10282431•People v. Hawkins CA3
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Filed 11/22/24 P. v. Hawkins CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099732
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23FE004375)
v.
KET THEODORE HAWKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Following the denial of his request for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to
Penal Code section 1001.36,1 defendant Ket Theodore Hawkins pled no contest to the
unlawful possession of cocaine for sale. Hawkins now appeals the denial of his diversion
request, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by finding Hawkins’ mental health
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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disorder was not a significant factor in the commission of his crime and, thus, ineligible
for diversion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In March 2023, law enforcement found Hawkins in possession of 26.73 grams of
cocaine and 331 fentanyl pills. The People charged Hawkins with possession of cocaine
and fentanyl for the purpose of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). Hawkins pled not
guilty and filed a request for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36.
The People opposed the request.
In support of his request, Hawkins included main jail mental health assessments
conducted in June 2023, which indicated Hawkins suffered from adjustment disorder
with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. Hawkins reported that his cousin had recently
been killed in a car accident; he also recently lost his brother and another cousin. He was
having trouble sleeping and thought maybe “God” was sending him a message to “ ‘clean
up’ ” his life. The treatment plan identified Hawkins’ target symptoms as “[l]ow mood,
grief, and trouble sleeping.” The goals were to “[m]aintain safety [and] improve mood.”
Hawkins also relied on a crisis assessment conducted in August 2023. Hawkins
reported to the provider that he was having “flashbacks, nightmares, crying spells, [and]
intrusive thoughts about past trauma.” Hawkins was feeling “deep sadness” about losing
friends and family and being in jail. He reported “pacing, racing thoughts, and
fidgeting.”
In the portion of the crisis assessment titled “[c]ircumstances leading to current
crisis” Hawkins’ care provider wrote “[c]lient was likely experiencing mental health
symptoms while committing a crime; client is now incarcerated.” The crisis assessment
concluded with the following diagnoses: major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, “[o]pioid use, unspecified with unspecified opioid-induced disorder,” and
cannabis use unspecified.
2
In support of his petition for mental health diversion, Hawkins also relied on a
psychodiagnostic assessment conducted in July 2017, by Jared Maloff, PsyD, QME (the
Maloff Report). That assessment was conducted in conjunction with a motion to
withdraw from a plea agreement and was deemed “necessary in order to determine
[Hawkins’] ability to adequately maintain attention and concentration and comprehend
detailed verbally administered data.” In his report, Maloff noted Hawkins had trouble
sitting still and opined this was consistent with Hawkins’ “history of [attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder].” Maloff also observed that testing “indicate[d] the presence of an
intellectual disability.”
In their opposition to Hawkins’ petition, the People argued that “[s]elling drugs is
not a function of his mental illness.” In support of their argument, the People noted the
amount of drugs Hawkins had in his possession at the time of his arrest, along with
$3,520 in cash. In addition, they noted, Hawkins was previously convicted of marijuana
sales.
At the hearing on Hawkins’ petition, the trial court asked the parties to speak to the
“nexus” between any mental health disorder Hawkins may have and the crime he
committed. In response, Hawkins’ counsel asked the court to consider the big picture:
the prior attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) diagnosis along with the current
diagnoses for adjustment disorder and opioid-use disorder. In that context, counsel
argued, “a person addicted to a substance, . . . will often sell that same substance in a way
to feed their habit.” The court acknowledged that people will often buy a drug in bulk,
selling some to offset their cost but consuming the remainder on their own. Counsel went
on to argue that Hawkins’ opioid possession was a result of his opioid-use disorder. And
the cocaine, he argued, was likely being used by Hawkins to self-medicate his ADHD.
The trial court was not persuaded. The court expressed empathy for Hawkins’
addiction but noted Hawkins was not just using drugs; based on the amount of drugs and
cash found in his possession, he was “trafficking in narcotics.” The amount of drugs, and
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the more than $3,000 in cash was “consistent with someone who is selling narcotics.”
Based on that evidence, the court found Hawkins was not selling drugs to feed his habit,
he was selling drugs to make money, and selling drugs was not a function of his addiction
or mental health diagnoses.
After the trial court denied his petition for mental health diversion, Hawkins pled
no contest to the unlawful possession of cocaine for the purpose of sale. The court
subsequently sentenced Hawkins to two years in county jail and awarded him 397 days of
custody credit.
Hawkins filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1001.36
“As presently enacted, section 1001.36, subdivision (b) provides that a defendant
is eligible for pretrial diversion if two criteria are met. First, the defendant has been
diagnosed with a mental disorder, . . . , within the last five years by a qualified mental
health expert. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Second, the ‘defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
‘If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal
factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.’
(Ibid.)
“If a defendant meets these eligibility requirements, the court also must find that
the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following
criteria: ‘(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms
of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would
respond to mental health treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and
waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant agrees to
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comply with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . . [¶] [and] (4) The defendant will
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if
treated in the community.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)” (People v. Graham (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795.)
B. Standard of Review
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health diversion is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion . . . . [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] ‘A court abuses its discretion when it
makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1147.) The fact that reasonable minds may differ as to the appropriate resolution of an
issue does not signal an abuse of discretion. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 655.)
It is the defendant’s burden to establish abuse of discretion. (People v. Pacheco (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 207, 213.)
C. Analysis
Hawkins contends the trial court’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. We disagree.
To grant pretrial diversion, the trial court must conclude a defendant’s mental
disorder substantially contributed to his or her involvement in the commission of the
offense. (People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 592.) “[W]hen determining
whether a defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offense for purposes of mental health diversion, section 1001.36 broadly permits
the trial court to consider ‘any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited
to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, statements by the
defendant's mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by
qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent
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with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense.’ ” (Id. at p. 591,
italics omitted.)
Here, Hawkins offered three documents in support of his petition: the main jail
mental health assessment, the crisis assessment, and the Maloff Report.2 These
documents reflect Hawkins’ diagnoses of anxiety, depression, ADHD, and drug addiction.
The Maloff Report also suggests Hawkins may have an intellectual disability. None of
these reports conclude that any of Hawkins’ mental health disorders were a substantial
factor in the commission of his crime. Indeed, counsel presented no evidence that any of
Hawkins’ mental health disorders significantly contributed to the commission of his
crime. Rather, counsel argued that people with drug addictions often sell drugs to
support their addiction (which the trial court acknowledged was often true) and people
with ADHD sometimes self-medicate with street drugs.
On the other hand, the record does contain evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion that Hawkins was selling drugs to make money. First, this was not Hawkins’
first conviction for selling drugs. More importantly, as the trial court found, the amount
of drugs in Hawkins’ possession exceeded an amount intended for personal use. And
given the amount of cash in Hawkins’ possession, it was not unreasonable for the trial
court to conclude Hawkins was not selling the drugs just to sustain his habit, but as a way
to make money.3
2 The Maloff Report is not even relevant. Section 1001.36 limits relevant mental
health disorder diagnoses to those made within five years of a defendant’s criminal
offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) The Maloff Report was created in July 2017, more
than five years before Hawkins was arrested for the confinement offense. We consider it
here for the sake of argument only because even with the Maloff Report, Hawkins failed
to carry his burden on appeal.
3 We also note Hawkins does not cite to any authority on appeal supporting his
claim that selling drugs to support a drug addiction renders him eligible for section
1001.36 mental health diversion.
6
In sum, the trial court’s decision to deny Hawkins’ petition for mental health
diversion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. It was supported by substantial evidence
and was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion.4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
4 In his opening brief, Hawkins raises the issue of his suitability for mental health
diversion. The trial court expressly did not rule on the question of suitability, having
found Hawkins ineligible. Because we affirm the trial court’s ruling on eligibility, we
will not address Hawkins’ suitability claims.
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