People v. Nunez CA2/1

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Filed 11/22/24 P. v. Nunez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B330442
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA496144)
v.

JOSE ANGEL NUNEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
A jury convicted defendant Jose Angel Nunez of first degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 for fatally shooting Juan
Leon at Leon’s home in South Los Angeles. Nunez does not deny
that he killed Leon. Instead, he testified that Leon was his friend
and that the shooting was an accident. Nunez contends we must
reverse his conviction because there was no substantial evidence
that he acted with premeditation and deliberation, and because
the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on
voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory. We
disagree and affirm, as we explain below.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On May 6, 2021, Nunez and his girlfriend, Sandy T., took a
train from their home in San Bernardino to Los Angeles. Leon
picked them up and drove them to another location where Nunez
had left his white Porsche SUV. Nunez and Sandy drove back to
Leon’s home in the SUV, arriving at around 5:30 p.m. According
to Sandy, Nunez and Leon were friends, and they “smok[ed] weed
and wax” together that afternoon. There was a gun on Leon’s
table, and Sandy saw Leon playing with it or handling it. Around
6:50 p.m., the three went out to get food, returning about 20
minutes later.
Later that evening, a neighbor, Javier B., was sitting in the
driver’s seat of his van, which was parked on the street outside
Leon’s home, when Nunez left the house and walked toward the
white SUV. The SUV was double-parked on the street near
Javier’s van, and Nunez asked Javier if the SUV was in his way.

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

2
Javier said it was not. Nunez opened the door of the SUV, took
out an object, and went back inside. Javier was not paying close
attention and did not see what the object was.
Soon afterward, Sandy was in the restroom and heard
Nunez and Leon arguing. Sandy “was really high” at the time
and was not paying attention to the conversation, so she did not
remember what they were arguing about. Sandy acknowledged
telling police that Nunez and Leon “always fight,” but she did not
believe the fights were serious. As she was walking out of the
bathroom, Sandy heard a loud noise like a gunshot. She saw
Leon’s body lying on the floor. Nunez ran out the door, and
Sandy followed.
Javier was still sitting in his van outside the house as these
events took place. He heard the gunshot and saw Nunez and
Sandy run out of the house. Sandy was unable to open the door
of the SUV until Nunez helped open it. Nunez then walked
toward Javier and said in Spanish, “You didn’t see anything.”
Nunez had a black semiautomatic pistol in his hand and,
although he did not point it at Javier, “he made me know that he
had a weapon” by making a motion with it. Javier interpreted
the statement as “a clear threat to my life.”
Javier testified that “[b]etween five and ten minutes”
passed from the time Nunez first went out to the car until he
heard the gunshot. Time stamps on surveillance videos from a
nearby home indicated that the first encounter between Nunez
and Javier took place at 7:57 p.m., and that Nunez came out of
the house after the shooting at 8:03 p.m. After Nunez drove
away, Javier called 911.
Police officers arrived at the scene and found Leon lying
face down and unresponsive on the floor of the living room with a

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pool of blood around his head. They also found a single nine-
millimeter casing on the floor. A medical examiner determined
that Leon died of a single gunshot to the head fired from
intermediate range. The bullet struck Leon on the right posterior
side of his head, traveled upward and toward the front and left,
and exited on the left posterior side.
Detectives recovered Leon’s cellphone and were able to
extract some data from it, including a video showing Leon’s table
with two firearms on it. Metadata for the video showed a time
stamp of 6:45 p.m. on May 6, 2021, about one hour before the
shooting. A detective testified that the video had most likely
been created at the time indicated by the time stamp, but
because officers had been able to access only part of the data on
the phone, it was possible that the video had been created earlier
and was merely accessed, modified, or sent to the phone at
6:45 p.m.
Nunez testified in his own defense. He stated that he and
Leon were friends and hung out three or four times a week.
According to Nunez, when he arrived at Leon’s house, he saw one
of the two guns from Leon’s phone video sitting on his table. It
was a black handgun with a golden handle. He did not see the
other gun depicted in the video. Nunez, Leon, and Sandy left the
house twice that afternoon—first to pick up Nunez’s SUV from a
friend’s house, and then to get food at a Burger King. When they
returned, they continued hanging out. Then Nunez picked up the
gun from Leon’s table while Leon was digging through a drawer
looking for something. Nunez testified that he picked the gun up
because “[i]t . . . intrigued me . . . . It looked nice.” At first,
Nunez was holding the gun in his open palms. Then he tried to
grab it in one hand. His finger inadvertently went in the trigger

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well, and the gun went off: “I guess I squeezed a little too hard.”
Nunez did not remember whether the hammer was pulled back
when he picked up the gun. The noise from the gunshot startled
Nunez, and he turned and saw Leon lying on the floor.
Nunez testified that he did not call 911 because he was
“scared” and “really didn’t know what to do.” He had “had
incidents with officers” in the past and was afraid they would not
believe him if he told them that the shooting was an accident. He
acknowledged that he told Javier “you didn’t see anything,” but
claimed he said it as a question, in the hope that Javier might
have witnessed the shooting through the front door and would be
able to corroborate his story. He denied that he used the gun to
try to intimidate Javier. Nunez drove away, “just trying to get
away from there.” He testified that he threw the gun in a
dumpster nearby as he drove away, and did not remember where
he went after that, but eventually went back home. In the days
afterward, he never told Sandy or anyone else what happened.
A police detective testified that the gun in the video that
Nunez identified as the one with which he shot Leon appeared to
be a Beretta. According to the detective, a Beretta has two
different firing positions. When the hammer is cocked, it
requires about five pounds of pressure on the trigger to fire.
When the hammer is not cocked, the gun can still fire, but it
requires between eight and 14 pounds of pressure on the trigger
to do so. The Beretta depicted in the video from Leon’s phone did
not have the hammer cocked. The other pistol depicted in the
video was a Glock. The detective stated that the Beretta depicted
in the video appeared to be a nine-millimeter, the same size as
the casing found at the scene of the shooting, but the detective
could not say what caliber the Glock was. Police were unable to

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recover either gun in their investigation, nor did they find any
magazines for either weapon.
The People charged Nunez with one count of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of dissuading a witness
by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)).2 The court instructed the
jury on first and second degree murder, involuntary
manslaughter, and excusable accidental homicide, but not
voluntary manslaughter. The jury found Nunez guilty as
charged, and found that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)) in the commission of both offenses. The court
sentenced Nunez to an aggregate term of 32 years to life in
prison, consisting of 25 years to life for murder plus four years for
the firearm enhancement, and an additional three years for
dissuading a witness.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Conviction of
First Degree Murder
Nunez contends we must reverse his conviction for first
degree murder because there was insufficient evidence that he
acted deliberately and with premeditation in killing Leon. We
disagree.
“Our task in deciding a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is a well-established one. ‘[W]e review the whole record
in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that

2 The information also charged Nunez with one count of
possession of a firearm in violation of probation (§ 29815, subd.
(a)), but the trial court dismissed that count before trial upon a
motion by the prosecution.

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is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. . . .’ [Citation.] ‘ “An appellate court must
accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise.
[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th
792, 811-812.)
The People charged Nunez with first degree murder on the
theory that the killing of Leon was “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated.” (§ 189, subd. (a).) The seminal case interpreting
those terms is People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, in which
our Supreme Court set out three categories of evidence relevant
to a finding of premeditation and deliberation. These are
evidence of planning, or “facts about how and what [the]
defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the
defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and
explicable as intended to result in, the killing”; motive, or “facts
about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the
victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to
kill the victim”; and the manner of the killing, or in other words,
“facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could
infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting
that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
‘preconceived design’ to take his victim’s life in a particular way.”
(Id. at pp. 26-27, italics omitted.)
As to motive, one could certainly claim the argument that
Sandy overheard shortly before she heard the gunshot was what
motivated Nunez to kill Leon. But the People eschew any such
claim and do not attempt to identify or supply any motive. The
prosecution conceded during closing arguments that, “[a]s

7
individuals, we want to know why did Mr. Nunez shoot Mr. Leon.
You’re not going to get that answer,” and that the question of
motive was “a question that will remain unanswered.” On
appeal, the Attorney General likewise does not assert the
argument overheard by Sandy is substantial evidence of motive,
nor does he point to any other evidence suggesting motive.
We are not bound by this concession. But we need not
independently determine whether there was substantial evidence
of motive as it is unnecessary to do so. Anderson “ ‘did not
refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the
substantive law of murder in any way.’ ” (People v. Koontz (2002)
27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081, quoting People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th
489, 517.) The Anderson “factors need not be present in any
particular combination to find substantial evidence of
premeditation and deliberation.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35
Cal.4th 514, 543.) Motive and the other “Anderson factors are
not an exhaustive list of evidence that could support a finding of
premeditation and deliberation[, and] the reviewing court need
not accord them any particular weight.” (People v. Solomon,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 813, citing People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th
1117, 1125.)
Substantial evidence supported “ ‘an inference that the
killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of
considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 812.)
Minutes before the shooting, Nunez went out to his SUV, picked
up an item, and returned to the house. When we review for
substantial evidence, we “ ‘ “must accept logical inferences that
the jury might have drawn from the evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 811.)
A jury could reasonably find that the item he retrieved from the

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car was the murder weapon,3 and that Nunez waited until Sandy
left to go to the restroom, then shot and killed Leon.
Alternatively, if Nunez did not retrieve the murder weapon from
the car and used the Beretta (which appears already to have been
inside the home), this would not undermine the jury’s finding of
premeditation and deliberation. Our Supreme Court has noted
that “ ‘ “[p]remeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief
interval. ‘The test is not time, but reflection. “Thoughts may
follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]”
(Id. at p. 812.) The jury could reasonably infer Nunez had to cock
the weapon before pulling the trigger, or exert considerable and
sustained pressure to fire the uncocked weapon at Leon, and that
he waited until Sandy left the room to shoot Leon. Regardless of
which gun Nunez used, there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s conclusion that he acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation.
Nunez also contends the prosecutor “[d]iluted [t]he [j]ury’s
[u]nderstanding [o]f [t]he [p]rosecution’s [b]urden [o]f [p]roof” by
drawing an improper analogy between the premeditation and
deliberation required for first degree murder and the decision to
proceed when driving a car at a stop sign or stoplight. Nunez
does not argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
making this statement. Instead, he raises the issue as part of his
argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for
premeditation and deliberation. We fail to understand how the

3 Nunez testified that he shot Leon with the Beretta
depicted in the video recovered from Leon’s cellphone, but there
was no physical evidence linking the Beretta to the shooting.

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prosecutor’s comments were relevant to this issue. As we noted
above, when we review for substantial evidence, we consider
whether the prosecution produced evidence “ ‘from which a
reasonable [jury] could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt’ ” (People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 811, italics added), not whether the prosecutor’s argument
misled the jury that actually decided the case.
In any case, we see nothing improper in the prosecutor’s
argument. The prosecutor asked the jury, “So what is
premeditation and deliberation? We do it in everyday decisions.
When we see these signs, a stop sign and stop lights, we look to
the left, we look to the right, we decide if it’s safe to enter, and
then we go forward. We are premeditating and we’re
deliberating our actions. That split second is all it takes, and
that’s what the law tells us.” This statement accurately reflects
the principle that “ ‘ “[p]remeditation and deliberation can occur
in a brief interval” ’ ” (People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 812), and, as Nunez acknowledges, courts have rejected
challenges by defendants to the use of similar analogies
comparing decisions made while driving to the concept of
premeditation and deliberation. (E.g., People v. Avila (2009) 46
Cal.4th 680, 714-715; People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055,
1084-1087.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Instruct
the Jury on Voluntary Manslaughter
Nunez contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury on voluntary manslaughter on the theory that he killed
Leon in the heat of passion. Nunez did not request such an
instruction at trial, nor did he base his defense on a heat of
passion theory, but he argues the trial court nevertheless had a

10
duty sua sponte to instruct the jury on that theory. We disagree,
as there was no substantial evidence to support an instruction for
voluntary manslaughter.
“In a murder case, trial courts are obligated to instruct the
jury on defenses supported by substantial evidence that could
lead to conviction of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, even where the defendant objects, or is not, as a
matter of trial strategy, relying on such a defense.” (People v.
Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 541.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ in this
context is ‘ “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable
[persons] could . . . conclude[]” ’ that the lesser offense, but not
the greater, was committed. [Citations.]” (People v. Breverman
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, disapproved on another ground in
People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7)
Voluntary manslaughter is “a lesser necessarily included
offense of intentional murder” (People v. Breverman, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 154) in which a defendant intentionally kills but
lacks malice either because he “ ‘acts in a “sudden quarrel or heat
of passion” (§ 192, subd. (a)), or . . . kills in “unreasonable self-
defense”—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act
in self-defense [citations].’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 153-154.)
“Heat of passion arises when ‘at the time of the killing, the
reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to
such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of
average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and
reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.)
Nunez argues that an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter was required because of Sandy’s testimony that
she heard Nunez and Leon arguing just before Nunez fired the

11
gun. We disagree. Sandy testified that she was in the restroom
just before the shooting occurred. She acknowledged telling
police that Nunez and Leon “always fight” and “that’s how they
are,” but she did not claim to have heard the contents of any
argument just before the shooting, and nothing in her testimony
suggests she perceived it as more severe than the arguments they
“always” engaged in.
Apart from Sandy’s testimony, no other evidence
introduced at trial indicated that Nunez and Leon argued or
fought just before the shooting. Nunez himself denied such an
argument took place, and claimed he never engaged in anything
more than “little, small quarrels” with Leon. Javier, who heard
the gunshot from his position in his van in the street near Leon’s
house, testified that he did not hear any yelling or arguing from
inside the house. Nor did the surveillance video footage, which
captured Nunez, Leon, and Sandy going in and out of the house
more than once, show any signs of disharmony among them.
In short, there was no evidence that Leon did anything to
provoke Nunez to “ ‘passion to such an extent as would cause the
ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly
and without deliberation and reflection.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201.) The trial court did not err
by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter under a
heat of passion theory.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

KLATCHKO, J.*

* Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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