People v. Yates CA2/2

CourtListener 10281446CalctappNov 21, 2024

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Filed 11/21/24 P. v. Yates CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B326359

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. ZM017426)
v.

DAVID YATES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael
Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________________________
David Yates appeals the order committing him as a
sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent
Predators Act (the SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s judgment that appellant qualifies as an SVP. We
disagree and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The predicate crimes
On April 14, 1982, when he was 18 years old, appellant
sexually assaulted a 16-year-old boy at knifepoint. A jury
convicted appellant on September 8, 1982, of two counts of oral
copulation by force (Pen. Code,1 § 288a, subd. (c)), two counts of
sodomy by force (§ 286, subd. (c)), and one count of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)).
On May 25, 1988, appellant sexually assaulted a 13-year-
old boy, threatening to shoot and kill the boy and members of his
family if he did not comply with appellant’s demands or told
anyone about the assault. On November 14, 1988, a jury
convicted appellant sodomy by use of force (§ 286, subd. (c)),
forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)), and committing a
forcible lewd act with a child (§ 288, subd. (b)).
B. The prior proceedings
On April 21, 2011, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed a petition to commit appellant as a sexually violent
predator under the SVPA. (People v. Yates (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th
474, 477 (Yates).) The matter was tried before a jury, which
returned a verdict finding appellant to be a sexually violent
predator as alleged in the petition. (Id. at p. 476.) On appeal

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
from that judgment, we reversed and remanded for a new trial.
(Id. at p. 488.)
Appellant waived his right to a jury, and following a bench
trial, the court determined that appellant qualifies as a sexually
violent predator under Welfare and Institutions Code
sections 6600 et seq. The trial court ordered appellant committed
to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an
indeterminate term.
C. Trial testimony
Two expert witnesses testified for the People: Dr. Charles
Flinton, a forensic psychologist working as a contractor on DSH’s
SVP evaluator panel, and Dr. Alette Coble-Temple, a consulting
psychologist for DSH.
Dr. Flinton interviewed appellant on July 6, 2021, and
reviewed documents provided by DSH and the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Appellant refused
another interview with Dr. Flinton in 2022. Dr. Coble-Temple
was assigned to evaluate appellant and completed two separate
reports in 2021 and 2022. She interviewed appellant once in
2021, but appellant refused a second interview in 2022. For both
the 2021 and 2022 evaluations, Dr. Coble-Temple reviewed
documents provided by DSH and CDCR, including documents
from Coalinga State Hospital and information regarding
appellant’s qualifying offenses.
Dr. Christopher Fisher, a clinical forensic psychologist,
testified as an expert for appellant. Dr. Fisher was hired in 2014
as the defense evaluator and wrote a number of reports between
2014 and 2022. As part of these evaluations, he met with
appellant five times in person, and twice over the phone. In
preparation for each evaluation, Dr. Fisher reviewed appellant’s

3
court, CDCR, and hospital records.
Four other witnesses testified on appellant’s behalf. Three
had contact with appellant in the course of their employment at
Coalinga. All three testified that appellant was a diligent and
reliable worker and had a good work ethic. He was always
courteous and cooperative and behaved appropriately in social
activities. His demeanor was friendly, and he was never
observed expressing anger or aggression toward any staff
members.
The fourth witness, William Thiel, testified as a release
plan witness for appellant. Thiel was 81 years old, living in
Clovis, California. He had been a patient at Coalinga for many
years until his release in February 2017. Before that, he had
been at Atascadero State Hospital, where he met appellant in the
late 1990’s. Thiel and appellant became friends, and following
Thiel’s release, he spoke with appellant every night on the phone.
Thiel believed that if appellant were released and lived with him,
appellant would have no trouble finding and keeping a job and
would be able to share household expenses. Thiel planned to
support appellant financially until appellant could get a job.
Thiel lived in a mobile home park for senior citizens. No children
lived in the park, but residents could have their grandchildren
visit and have gatherings and parties.
Appellant would live in the second bedroom of Thiel’s two-
bedroom mobile home. Thiel would not be telling appellant what
to do, but he would expect appellant to comply with all laws, and
make sure appellant registered as a sex offender in a timely
manner. During his time at Coalinga, Thiel participated in sex
offender treatment twice a week and found it helpful. Thiel was
aware that appellant had very strong feelings about not

4
discussing his past and was unwilling to participate in group
therapy. He acknowledged that tension and frustration would
arise between them whenever Thiel tried to encourage appellant
to get into treatment. Nevertheless, if appellant were released,
Thiel would encourage him to join Sex Offenders Anonymous,
and if appellant were willing to enter therapy in the community,
Thiel would assist him in finding a therapist.
DISCUSSION
Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Determination that Appellant Is a Sexually
Violent Predator
A. Relevant legal principles
1. The SVPA
As we explained in appellant’s prior appeal, “[t]he [SVPA]
allows for the involuntary civil commitment of certain offenders
following the completion of their prison terms who are found to be
sexually violent predators. [Citation.] An alleged SVP is entitled
to a jury trial, at which the People must prove three elements
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the person has suffered a
conviction of at least one qualifying ‘sexually violent offense,’
(2) the person has ‘a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the
person a danger to the health and safety of others,’ and (3) the
mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future
predatory acts of sexually violent criminal behavior if released
from custody. [Citations.]” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at
p. 477.)
The SVPA “requires the trier of fact to find that an SVP is
dangerous at the time of commitment”; that is, “he ‘currently’
suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder which prevents him
from controlling sexually violent behavior, and which ‘makes’ him

5
dangerous and ‘likely’ to reoffend.” (Hubbart v. Superior Court
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1162; Needham v. Superior Court (2024)
16 Cal.5th 333, 352; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(3).)
“The [SVPA] requires proof of a clear link between the second
and third elements; that is, the finding of future dangerousness
must be shown to derive from ‘a currently diagnosed mental
disorder characterized by the inability to control dangerous
sexual behavior.’ ” (Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.)
However, evidence of sexually violent behavior occurring while
the offender is in custody is not required. (§ 6600, subd. (d);
People v. McCloud (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1090.) And trial
courts consider a person’s prior convictions for sexually violent
crimes “ ‘ “solely for evidentiary purposes” to help establish . . .
current mental disorder and the likelihood of future violent sex
crimes.’ ” (People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225, 1232.)
2. Standard of review
We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an
SVPA commitment by applying the same substantial evidence
test used in criminal appeals. (People v. Orey (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 529, 560 (Orey); People v. McCloud, supra, 213
Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.) Under this familiar standard, we
examine the record “ ‘ “in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 277.) We resolve whether “ ‘any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In so doing, a
reviewing court ‘presumes in support of the judgment the

6
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’ ” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.)
“Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is warranted only if it
appears that ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the judgment].” ’ ” (Orey, at
p. 561, quoting People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that appellant is an SVP
At the conclusion of the trial, the court announced its
decision sustaining the petition: “Based upon the totality of the
evidence presented, the court finds that the evidence establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] is a sexually violent
predator within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code
section 6600, et seq.” Explaining its ruling, the trial court stated
it had found the testimony of the People’s experts, particularly
that of Dr. Flinton, “to be persuasive and credible.”
The trial court found that the People had carried their
burden of proving each of the required elements for an SVP
commitment beyond a reasonable doubt: “[1.] [Appellant] has
been convicted of committing sexually violent offenses against
one or more victims. [¶] [2.] [Appellant] has a diagnosed mental
disorder. [3.] As a result of that diagnosed mental disorder, he is
a danger to the health and safety of others because it is likely
that he will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal
behavior, and it is necessary to keep him in custody in a secured
facility to ensure the health and safety of others.”
Specifically, the court found that appellant had suffered
two qualifying convictions, noting there was no dispute as to that

7
element.2 The court went on to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant has a diagnosed mental disorder, observing that
all three experts, including appellant’s, diagnosed appellant with
a current mental disorder. The court further found that “as a
result of that diagnosed mental disorder, [appellant] is a danger
to the health and safety of others because it is . . . likely that he
will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.”
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
In 2022, Dr. Flinton diagnosed appellant as currently
suffering from other specified paraphilic disorder–coercion, with
features of sadism, non-consent and force. He based his
diagnosis on the high level of coercion in all three of appellant’s
sexual offenses3 and the fact that appellant continued to commit
sexual offenses after being caught and suffering adverse
consequences. Dr. Flinton also diagnosed appellant with
antisocial personality disorder, based on his long history of
antisocial and criminal behavior, which started before age 15 and
continued well past the age of 18.
During his only interview with Dr. Flinton, appellant
refused to discuss any of his offenses at length, he had no interest
in examining his criminal sexual behavior, and he had no
insights into his crimes. Appellant told Dr. Flinton he had never

2 Appellant does not challenge the qualifying convictions
finding on appeal. Rather, his sole argument is that substantial
evidence does not support “the existence of a diagnosed mental
disorder.”
3 In addition to the qualifying offenses in 1982 and 1988,
appellant was adjudicated as a minor for violation of section
288a, “Sex Perversion,” in 1979, and was committed to the
California Youth Authority.

8
participated in any treatment because he “never agree[d] with
[the] program.” He also denied that he had ever needed
treatment or that he ever had a mental disorder that predisposed
him to commit his offenses. Because appellant had not been in
an environment where he could act out since 1988 and had
refused to participate in any treatment or discuss his offenses,
Dr. Flinton relied on historical information to make his diagnosis.
Dr. Flinton gave appellant a score of seven on the Static
99R recidivism risk assessment.4 A score of seven represents a
risk of recidivism that is well above average. Although
appellant’s score would drop to five when he turned 60 in two
years, a score of five still reflects an above average risk of
reoffending. Dr. Flinton stated that appellant’s current Static
99R score indicates a recidivism risk of 27 percent over five years,
which puts appellant at a higher risk than most sex offenders.
And based on appellant’s history of predatory offenses, Dr.
Flinton believed that any future offense appellant committed
would be predatory.
Dr. Flinton also explained that appellant’s refusal to
participate in therapy or examine his offenses raised concerns
about whether he would reoffend. According to some studies,
appellant’s risk of reoffending would be cut in half if he
participated in and completed sex offender treatment, but he has
not done that. Based on appellant’s history and elevated risk of
recidivism, Dr. Flinton opined that appellant “continues to need

4 Dr. Flinton explained that the Static 99R is an actuarial
tool that scores an individual on 10 factors to predict the risk that
the individual will commit another sexual offense within five
years of release into the community.

9
custody and treatment.” Dr. Flinton concluded that appellant
meets the criteria for a sexually violent predator and is likely to
engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior if he is
released.
Dr. Coble-Temple diagnosed appellant with sexual sadism
and antisocial personality disorder. She explained that “[s]exual
sadism involves the sexual arousal or interest from [the]
psychological or physical suffering of victims.” In appellant’s
case, he engaged in multiple offenses beginning as a juvenile in
which he inflicted psychological torture by “causing his victims
severe psychological humiliation, forcing them into acts while
brandishing weapons and engaging in sodomy at knifepoint.”
Appellant’s criminal sexual acts involved “an escalation and
repetitive degree of violence, threats of violence, [and] increased
psychological torture,” which culminated in the “actual sexual
offense.” Dr. Coble-Temple thus found appellant fully met the
criteria for the sexual sadism diagnosis.
Dr. Coble-Temple also diagnosed appellant with antisocial
personality disorder based on his long history⎯starting before
age 15⎯of rule-breaking, impulsivity, and criminal behavior,
including sexual deviance. Appellant continued these behaviors
as an adult, violating the rights of others, demonstrating a lack of
remorse, and failing to take responsibility for the effect of his
actions on others. And he continued to engage in illegal conduct
despite being caught and prosecuted.
According to Dr. Coble-Temple, the research shows sexual
sadism disorder does not just disappear over time. She therefore
opined that appellant currently suffers from sexual sadism
disorder, despite the fact that his most recent offense occurred in
1988. Moreover, appellant had admitted having specific fantasies

10
while incarcerated, but has engaged in no treatment to manage
his symptoms, further supporting a current diagnosis of sexual
sadism. Dr. Coble-Temple explained that appellant’s diagnosed
antisocial personality disorder has not abated with age because it
continues to “impact[ ] and imped[e] his behavioral choices,
especially connected to his sexual deviance.”
Like Dr. Flinton, Dr. Coble-Temple scored appellant with a
seven on the Static 99R assessment. She also gave him a score of
14 on the Stable-2007, which assesses a sexual offender’s
dynamic risk factors for reoffending. Appellant’s score placed
him at the high level of risk. Based on his history of reoffending
within two months of his release from the 1982 offense, and then
again in 1988, Dr. Coble-Temple opined that appellant is
emotionally and volitionally impaired. In addition, Dr. Coble-
Temple believed any future sex offenses appellant committed
would be predatory because his past offenses were committed
against victims he had sought out, and he started relationships
with his victims for the purpose of engaging in sexually deviant
acts. She described appellant as “an individual who, when he has
had access to victims, he has engaged in deviance.” Dr. Coble-
Temple concluded that appellant needs to remain in custody in a
secured facility to ensure the health and safety of others due to
“his diagnos[e]s of sexual sadism and [antisocial personality
disorder] combined with his static and dynamic risk factors.”
The trial court noted that appellant’s expert, Dr. Fisher,
had diagnosed appellant with a pedophilic disorder but testified
he did not satisfy the second SVP criterion, because there was no

11
recent evidence of volitional impairment.5 The court stated it
was not persuaded by Dr. Fisher’s testimony, explaining that Dr.
Flinton had considered but rejected the pedophilic disorder
diagnosis because appellant’s qualifying offenses did not involve
prepubescent children. The court added that “Dr. Fisher
minimize[d] the results of the Static-99R, did not review all
available Coalinga records, and in some instances relied on
outdated research,” while “[i]n making their diagnoses, Dr.
Flinton and Dr. Coble-Temple considered many things, including
[appellant’s] past behavior, hospital records, Static-99R, Stable-
2007, past evaluator reports and interviews of and statements by
[appellant].”
“The testimony of one witness, if believed, may be sufficient
to prove any fact.” (People v. Rasmuson (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
1487, 1508; Evid. Code, § 411.) Moreover, a conflict in the
experts’ opinions does not render the evidence insufficient.
(People v. Flores (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 625, 632.) As the finder
of fact, the trial court was thus entitled to rely on the testimony
of the People’s experts while rejecting appellant’s expert’s
conclusions. (People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 831 [trial
court properly resolved conflict in expert testimony by crediting
the testimony of the People’s experts, whose “testimony
[constituted] substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that
appellant was likely to engage in sexually violent behavior”];
People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 466 [the credibility of

5 Dr. Fisher described the second criterion for an SVP
finding as a “diagnosed mental disorder that currently
predisposes an individual to acting out sexually and is
characterized by emotional or volitional impairment.”

12
the experts and their conclusions are matters to be resolved by
the fact finder].) We will neither reassess the credibility of the
experts nor reweigh the force of their conclusions. (People v.
Poulsom (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 501, 518 [the appellate court is
not free to reweigh or reinterpret the credibility of the experts,
and their conclusions are matters to be resolved by the jury].)
Appellant counters that where, as here, the government’s
experts’ opinions are based solely on historical information, past
behavior, and remote diagnoses, they cannot supply substantial
evidence to support an SVP commitment. He concedes that the
current weight of authority under the SVPA allows an SVP
commitment based on historical information without proof of any
recent overt act(s) or current or even somewhat recent symptoms
of a qualifying mental disorder. (See Orey, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th
at p. 563 [the assessment of whether a defendant is likely to
reoffend “ ‘must include consideration of his past behavior, his
attitude toward treatment and other risk factors applicable to the
facts of his case’ ”]; People v. Sumahit (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
347, 353 (Sumahit) [“The fact that defendant has not misbehaved
in a strictly controlled hospital environment does not prove he no
longer suffers from a mental disorder that poses a danger to
others”].) But appellant contends that these cases impermissibly
shift the burden of proof to the SVP defendant to prove he or she
is not an SVP. Appellant further asserts that because the
experts’ conclusions that appellant still suffers from a diagnosed
mental disorder were not based on any current indicia of sexual
deviance, violence or predatory behavior, but were founded on
guess, surmise and conjecture, those opinions do not constitute
substantial evidence.

13
The trial court rejected these arguments below as we do on
appeal. Specifically, the fact that appellant has not engaged in
any sexual misconduct or violent behavior while in a strictly
controlled hospital setting does not establish he no longer suffers
from a mental disorder that presents a danger to others outside
the institutional environment. (Orey, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
p. 563 [because defendant lacks access to female children, who
were his victims in the past, “his lack of outward signs of sexual
deviance is not dispositive of whether he is likely to reoffend if
released into society at large”]; Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th
at p. 353 [“defendant errs in supposing that he must presently
engage in overt manifestations of a sexually violent predator in
order to support an opinion that he still suffers from a mental
disorder affecting his ability to control his impulses. The fact
that defendant has not misbehaved in a strictly controlled
hospital environment does not prove he no longer suffers from a
mental disorder that poses a danger to others”].)
That the People’s experts were forced to rely more heavily
on historical information in diagnosing appellant does not show
their opinions were based on guess, surmise and conjecture.
Rather, the experts’ reliance on historical evidence and tests was
due entirely to appellant’s refusal to discuss his criminal offenses
with the experts or to engage in any treatment that might have
given him insight into what drove him to commit those offenses.
Under these circumstances, appellant may not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling or
the experts’ opinions. “ ‘The law has a strong interest in seeing to
it that litigants do not manipulate the system, especially where
to hold otherwise would permit them to “ ‘trifle with the courts.’ ”
[Citation.] Here, defendant fully cooperated with his own

14
psychologist, while denying the People’s doctors the opportunity
to interview him . . . . A sex offender cannot deny the state access
to the workings of his mind and then claim a lack of proof that he
has a “current” psychological disorder. Because he refused to be
interviewed by the state’s experts, who could have formed an
opinion as to his present dangerousness, defendant has forfeited
the claim that the state did not prove that he was currently
dangerous.’ ” (Orey, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 563, quoting
Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 353–354; see also In re
Mims (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 478, 489 [in the SVP context, “a
defendant who refuses to be interviewed by the state’s experts
cannot challenge a finding that he or she currently has a
psychological disorder”].)
The trial court placed particular emphasis on the fact that
appellant has consistently refused to participate in any form of
treatment. “[Appellant] has never expressed an interest in doing
the program. He’s never tried to do the program. [¶] He has
affirmatively stated that he will not do the program. This is not
a situation where [appellant] was trying to do the program but
could not progress in the program or complete it due [to] any
deficiencies in the program.” Appellant’s refusal to accept
treatment not only made it difficult to assess his sexual interests
and patterns and forced the People’s experts to rely more heavily
on historical information. It also supports the trial court’s
findings that appellant had gained no insight into why he
committed his crimes in the first place and that he “would not be
able to control his dangerous behavior by voluntary means if
released into the community.” (Orey, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
p. 563.)

15
As the court in Sumahit explained: “The availability of
treatment is at the heart of the SVPA. [Citation.] ‘Through
passage of the SVPA, California is one of several states to
hospitalize or otherwise attempt to treat troubled sexual
predators.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, one of the key factors which
must be weighed by the evaluators in determining whether a
sexual offender should be kept in medical confinement is ‘the
person’s progress, if any, in any mandatory SVPA treatment
program he or she has already undergone; [and] the person’s
expressed intent, if any, to seek out and submit to any necessary
treatment . . . .’ [Citation.] A patient’s refusal to cooperate in any
phase of treatment may therefore support a finding that he ‘is not
prepared to control his untreated dangerousness by voluntary
means if released unconditionally to the community.’ ” (Sumahit,
supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 354–355.)
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding in this case that appellant meets the criteria for
commitment as a sexually violent predator under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6600 et seq.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.

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