P v. Bogus CA4/1

CourtListener 10277378CalctappNov 19, 2024

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Filed 11/19/24 P v. Bogus CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082118

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE408655)

LORENZO BOGUS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Lorenzo Bogus guilty of second-degree murder (Pen.

Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)), and unlawful possession of ammunition by a prohibited person
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true all the alleged firearm
enhancements for the murder charge, including that he personally used
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a) & 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally discharged
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and caused great bodily injury and death with a

firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).2 The trial court sentenced Bogus to 55 years
to life in state prison. Bogus contends on appeal that the trial court erred
when it imposed the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(d), and
stayed the lesser enhancements under subdivisions (b) and (c) of that section

and under section 12022.5(a).3 Specifically, he contends that the court
should have stricken those lesser enhancements because the Supreme Court’s
holding in People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118 (Gonzalez), which
requires that lesser firearm enhancements be imposed and stayed rather
than stricken, is no longer controlling in light of subsequent developments in
the law. We conclude that we remain bound by Gonzalez and therefore affirm
the judgment.
Section 12022.5(a) provides for a sentence enhancement for personal
use of a firearm in the attempted commission of any felony. Section 12022.53

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We generally refer to subdivisions of sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 in
abbreviated form, e.g., section 12022.53(d), or simply by subdivision when the
statutory reference is obvious.
3 We grant Bogus’s September 13, 2024 motion for leave to file a
supplemental brief. The clerk is directed to file the supplemental brief
accompanying the motion.
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sets forth escalating and consecutive penalties “beyond that imposed for the
substantive crime[] for use of a firearm in the commission of specified
felonies[.]” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) Section 12022.53(f)
provides that “[o]nly one additional term of imprisonment under this section
shall be imposed per person for each crime[,]” and if more than one
enhancement is found true, the court must impose “the enhancement that
provides the longest term of imprisonment.” Section 12022.53(f) also
provides that a section 12022.5 firearm enhancement “shall not be imposed
on a person in addition to an enhancement imposed pursuant to this section.”
In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court in 2008 held that when a section
12022.53 enhancement is imposed, “the remaining section 12022.53 firearm
enhancements and any section 12022.5 firearm enhancements that were
found true for the same crime must be imposed and then stayed.” (Gonzalez,
at p. 1123.) Construing the word “impose” in section 12022.53(f) to mean
“impose and then execute,” the court concluded the statute “directs that only
one enhancement may be imposed and then executed per person for each
crime, and allows a trial court to impose and then stay all other prohibited
enhancements.” (Gonzalez, at p. 1127.)
Bogus argues that the holding of Gonzalez has since been undermined
by 2018 amendments to section 12022.53, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado) and People v. McDavid (2024)
15 Cal.5th 1015 (McDavid), and amendments to California Rules of Court,
rule 4.447 (rule 4.447). Section 12022.53(h), as amended effective January 1,
2018, provides: “The court may, in the interest of justice pursuant to Section
1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement
otherwise required to be imposed by this section. The authority provided by

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this subdivision applies to any resentencing that may occur pursuant to any

other law.”4 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2, italics added.)
In Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, the Supreme Court held that a trial
court has the authority to strike a greater section 12022.53(d) enhancement
and impose a lesser, uncharged section 12022.53 enhancement instead.
(Tirado, at pp. 696, 701.) The court explained that section 12022.53(h) gives
trial courts the discretion to strike or dismiss a greater charged section
12022.53 enhancement, and that section 12022.53, subdivision (j) gives them
the discretion to impose a lesser, uncharged section 12022.53 enhancement
where the accusatory pleading alleged, and the jury found true, facts
supporting the enhancement. (Tirado, at pp. 694–695, 697.)
In McDavid, the Supreme Court extended its reasoning in Tirado to
hold that trial courts also have discretion to strike a section 12022.53
enhancement, and then impose a “lesser included, uncharged enhancement
authorized elsewhere in the Penal Code”—such as under section 12022.5(a).
(McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1021.)
Rule 4.447 provides, in relevant part: “Except pursuant to section
1385(c), a court may not strike or dismiss an enhancement solely because
imposition of the term is prohibited by law or exceeds limitations on the
imposition of multiple enhancements. Instead, the court must: [¶] (1) Impose

4 Section 1385 provides: “[A] judge or magistrate may, either on motion
of the court or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in
furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd.
(a).) Section 1385 further provides that where “the court has the authority
pursuant to subdivision (a) to strike or dismiss an enhancement, the court
may instead strike the additional punishment for that enhancement in the
furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (c) requires, in
relevant part, that the court to dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, “except if dismissal of that enhancement is
prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c).)
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a sentence for the aggregate term of imprisonment computed without
reference to those prohibitions or limitations; and [¶] (2) Stay execution of the
part of the term that is prohibited or exceeds the applicable limitation. The
stay will become permanent once the defendant finishes serving the part of
the sentence that has not been stayed.” In other words, rule 4.447 allows a
trial court to stay execution of an enhancement to avoid violating a statutory
prohibition or exceeding a statutory limitation, while preserving the
possibility of imposing the stayed portion should a reversal on appeal reduce
the unstayed portion of the sentence. (See Advisory Com. com., Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.447.)
Bogus argues that because of the 2018 amendment to section
12022.53(h) and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tirado and McDavid, the
trial court had discretion to strike his section 12022.53(d) enhancement and
impose a lesser firearm enhancement. While we do not disagree, we also do
not see how that undermines the holding in Gonzalez, as Bogus contends. In
Gonzalez, the Supreme Court held that in situations where lesser firearm
enhancements are found true, but punishment cannot be imposed under the
prohibition in section 12022.53(f), those lesser enhancements should be
imposed and stayed. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1122–1123.) Tirado,
McDavid, and amended section 12022.53(h) are all consistent with that
holding. The 2018 amendment to section 12022.53(h) gave courts “the
flexibility to impose lighter sentences in appropriate circumstances” (Tirado,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 702), but left intact the courts’ discretion to decline to
do so. Neither Tirado nor McDavid expressly or impliedly overruled
Gonzalez, and we therefore remain bound to follow the holding that
enhancements prohibited under section 12022.53(f) must be imposed and
stayed. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1122, 1129–1130; see Auto Equity

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Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [“Under the doctrine of
stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to
follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction.”].)
Moreover, we must presume that the Legislature was aware of
Gonzalez’s interpretation of section 12022.53(f) when it amended section
12022.53(h) in 2018—but the Legislature left section 12022.53(f) unchanged.
(See People v. May (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1009 [Legislature “is
presumed to know the law[,]” and its inaction in amending a statute despite
cases interpreting it leads the conclusion that the Legislature agrees with the
interpretation].) If the Legislature intended to overrule the Supreme Court’s
holding in Gonzalez and disapprove its interpretation of the word “imposed”
as used in section 12022.53(f), it could have included language to that effect
when it amended the statute.
Bogus further argues that because rule 4.447 was modified in 2022 to
state that a court cannot strike an enhancement “solely because imposition”
would violate a statutory prohibition, that somehow the reasoning in
Gonzalez is no longer sound. Bogus cites to cases holding that defendants
cannot be convicted of both a greater offense and its necessarily included
lesser offense. (See, e.g., People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736
[judicially created rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily
included offenses]; People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 [“A defendant
who commits a battery may not be convicted of both battery and assault,
because ‘[a]n assault is a necessary element of battery, and it is impossible to
commit battery without assaulting the victim.’ ”].) This judicially created
rule, Bogus contends, gave the trial court another basis for striking the lesser
section 12022.5 and 12022.53 enhancements, which means that the court did

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not have to rely solely on the statutory prohibition in section 12022.53(h) to
strike the enhancements.
This reasoning falls short, however, because Bogus points to no
authority extending the rule on lesser included offenses to lesser included
enhancements. Section 12022.53(f) explicitly contemplates that “more than
one enhancement per person” may be found true, and provides a procedure
for a court to deal with that scenario. Case law has also recognized that rules
pertaining to multiple convictions do not apply to enhancement allegations.
(See, e.g., People v. Manning (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 88, 90–91 [holding that the
multiple convictions bar did not prohibit true findings on both a greater
section 12022.5 enhancement allegation and its lesser section 12022,
subdivision (a) enhancement allegation].)
Furthermore, as explained above, just because rule 4.447 could have
allowed the trial court to strike the lesser firearm enhancements does not
mean the court was required to. And to the extent Bogus is arguing that rule
4.447 contradicts the holding in Gonzalez, even assuming there was a
conflict, we must follow the Supreme Court’s rulings over rules adopted by
the Judicial Council. (See, e.g., Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1337, 1352 [“We also have disapproved rules and procedures adopted by the
Courts of Appeal . . ., as well as rules adopted by the Judicial Council.”].)
For these reasons, we conclude that Bogus has not shown that his
sentence was unauthorized.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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