CourtListener 10277373•People v. Ramos CA2/2
Full text
Filed 11/19/24 P. v. Ramos CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B330371
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA111946)
v.
ANGEL ALEXIS RAMOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Suzette Clover, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Charles Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Angel Alexis Ramos
was charged with possession for sale of a controlled substance.
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.) It was further alleged that the
offense involved a large quantity of contraband as defined by
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(10).
Following a court trial, defendant was found guilty as
charged and sentenced to the low term of two years in county jail.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. He argues that
(1) the trial court did not adequately advise him when he waived
his right to a jury trial, and (2) the trial court should have
suppressed certain statements made to the police. (Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).)
We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 3, 2021, six Glendale Police Department officers
executed a search warrant for room 302 at a Travelodge motel.
Officers had followed an unidentified male from a “controlled
buy” to that room of the motel. The officers knocked on the door
and identified themselves as law enforcement. They saw
movement inside the room through the peephole and tried to
open the door with a keycard. After approximately one minute,
the officers opened the door to the room and found three men
lying on the floor. Defendant was lying closest to the bathroom.
Officers ordered the men to exit and proceeded to search the
room.
The toilet was running in the bathroom and, in the bottom
of the toilet bowl, officers discovered a pile of blue fentanyl pills.
A suitcase sat atop the bed closest to the entry door. Inside the
suitcase was clothing, fentanyl in pill and powder form, black tar
heroin, methamphetamine, $8,600 in cash, and two cell phones
among other items. Under that bed were multiple baggies of
methamphetamine and black tar heroin as well as fentanyl.
2
On a nightstand beside the bed, officers found a wallet with
$554 in cash and a baggie with blue fentanyl pills. A cell phone
was on the table in the living area of the room. By the window
overlooking the parking lot was a suitcase with handwritten
“pay-and-owe sheets” listing sales transactions as well as
packaging material with custom symbols on them.
Police also searched two cars in the motel parking lot—a
Honda and a Mazda. There was no evidence found in the Honda.
But inside the Mazda, police found baggies, a scale, and a motel
receipt for a Travelodge motel at another location.
Detectives questioned each of the three men to attempt to
determine who owned the items found in the motel room.
Defendant acknowledged that clothing from the suitcase, the
cash, and the wallet belonged to him. He denied that any of the
drugs belonged to him.
Police later arrested the three men and took them to the
police department jail. Detectives spoke with defendant in an
interview room at the prebooking area of the jail. Defendant said
that he had been in the motel for a couple days. He again denied
that any of the drugs in the motel room belonged to him but, at
this interview, defendant acknowledged seeing the drugs in his
suitcase previously; he claimed that the blue pills in the wallet
belonged to his girlfriend. Defendant also told police that the
cellphone on the living room table was his and that there might
be text messages with his girlfriend about buying drugs for her.
Defendant said that he never used drugs except for marijuana
and that the Honda in the parking lot was his car.
Detective Dylan Montes testified to his opinion that the
drugs discovered in the motel room were possessed for the
purpose of sale. He based this opinion on “the variety of
narcotics, the amount of narcotics located, the amount of cash
found, digital scales, packaging, and pay-and-owe sheets.”
3
The drugs were tested to be 51.3 grams of white solid
substance containing fentanyl, 25.05 grams of powder and solid
substance containing fentanyl, fentanyl tablets, 24.19 grams of
crystalline solid substance and powder containing
methamphetamine, 1.99 grams of crystalline solid substance and
powder containing methamphetamine, and a total of 45.85 grams
of solid substance containing heroin.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial
Defendant contends that he did not make a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a trial by jury
because the trial court’s waiver colloquy was constitutionally
deficient.
A. Relevant background
On February 14, 2023, after defense counsel filed a motion
to suppress evidence, the parties discussed waiving a jury trial;
defense counsel informed the prosecution that she had discussed
the waiver with defendant. The trial court delayed addressing
the jury waiver issue at defense counsel’s request.
On March 9, 2023, the parties informed the trial court of
their intent to waive a jury trial, and the following colloquy
ensued:
“[The Court]: My understanding is that Mr. Ramos and the
People are going to both waive the right to a jury
trial; is that right?
“[Defense counsel]: That’s correct.
“[Prosecutor]: That’s correct, your Honor.
“[The Court]: Ms. Young [the prosecutor], would you please
advise him and take the jury trial waiver from Mr. Ramos.
“[Prosecutor]: Thank you, your honor. [¶] Mr. Ramos,
good morning. You have the right to a jury trial where 12
members of the community would be asked to sit in judgment of
4
your case. [¶] During that jury trial you would have the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to use the free
subpoena power of the court at no cost to you; the right to testify
on your behalf if you chose to; conversely, you would have the
right not to testify, which is known as the privilege against self-
incrimination. [¶] Do you understand those rights and waive
and give up your right to have a trial by jury?
“[Defendant]: Yes.
“[The Court]: And, counsel, do you join?
“[The Defendant]: Yes.
“[Prosecutor]: People join in the jury waiver.
“[The Court]: Okay. The court is going to find that
Mr. Ramos has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his right to a jury trial in this case. [¶] And the People
also join in that jury trial waiver.”
B. Relevant law
Under the federal Constitution and our state Constitution,
a criminal defendant has a right to a jury trial. (People v.
Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) Waiver of
this right is permitted under both Constitutions. (Duncan v.
Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 158; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)
However, in a criminal case, such waiver is permitted only with
“the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the
defendant and the defendant’s counsel.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16;
People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753 (Morelos).)
“To be valid, a defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury
must . . . be ‘knowing and intelligent, that is, “‘“made with a full
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”’”’” (People v.
Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1071–1072 (Weaver); People v.
Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305.) “‘[W]hether or not there is an
intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an
5
accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each
case.’” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166.)
The California Supreme Court has offered “some general
guidance to help ensure that a defendant’s jury trial waiver is
knowing and intelligent, and to facilitate the resolution of a
challenge to a jury waiver on appeal. [The court] recommend[ed]
that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a
jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily
limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of
the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may
participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously
agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives
the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt
or innocence. . . . [T]he trial judge [should] take additional steps
as appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant
comprehends what the jury trial right entails [such as] by asking
the defendant directly if he or she understands or has any
questions about the right being waived.” (Sivongxxay, supra,
3 Cal.5th at pp. 169–170.) The recommended colloquy is
advisory, and “not intended to limit trial courts to a narrow or
rigid colloquy.” (Id. at p. 170.)
In other words, “a trial court’s adaptation of or departure
from the recommended colloquy in an individual case will not
necessarily render an ensuing jury waiver invalid.” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170.) Indeed, there is “no duty on the trial
court to inquire into the waiver of a jury trial by defendant unless
the trial judge had some reason . . . to think that defendant did
not understand the nature of the waiver.” (People v. Langdon
(1959) 52 Cal.2d 425, 432–433; see also People v.
Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d 307, 311.)
We review the totality of the circumstances to determine if
a defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial. (Sivongxxay,
6
supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 166–167.) Factors evidencing the knowing
and voluntary nature of such a waiver include: (1) the assistance
of counsel, (2) whether the defendant initiated the request for a
court trial, (3) the advisements given, (4) the defendant’s
response to the advisements, and (5) the defendant’s prior
experience with the criminal justice system. (Id. at pp. 167–168.)
Our review is de novo. (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th
1653, 1660.)
C. Analysis
Here, the totality of the circumstances “establish[es] a
sound and ‘affirmative[]’ basis [citation] to conclude” that
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury
trial. (Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 759.) Defendant had
plenty of time to contemplate a waiver, at least from
February 14, 2023, when it was first mentioned on the record,
until the March 9, 2023, waiver. Also, he had assistance of
counsel and a translator, and the parties initiated the waiver
request. The prosecution advised defendant that a jury consists
of 12 members of the community and that during a jury trial, he
would have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to
issue subpoenas at no cost to him, and to choose whether to
testify. When asked if he understood his rights and wished to
waive and give up his right to a jury trial, he answered, “Yes.”
That the advisement did not track all of Sivongxxay’s advisory
recommendations does not, as defendant contends, render his
waiver unconstitutionally deficient as a matter of law. “Viewed
holistically,” defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 168; see also
Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 756–758.)
Urging us to reverse, defendant argues that there is
insufficient affirmative evidence that his waiver was knowing
and intelligent. He asserts that there is no record of discussions
7
with defense counsel about the waiver, there was no written jury
waiver as in Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1056, and the trial court
made no follow-up inquiries as was done in Morelos. We are not
convinced.
As set forth above, the record confirms that defense counsel
discussed the jury waiver with defendant. (See People v. Daniels
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 996–997 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.)
[within the totality of relevant circumstances assessment is the
fact of representation by counsel and references to discussions
between counsel and defendant].) In fact, the parties were ready
to address the jury waiver at least as early as February 14, 2023.
Furthermore, case law does not support defendant’s
proposition that a trial court must provide a written, signed
waiver. While the defendant in Weaver did have a signed waiver,
it was not dispositive of the issue in that case. Thus, the
Supreme Court turned to the trial court’s verbal advisements to
evaluate the validity of the defendant’s jury waiver. (Weaver,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1074.) In other words, while a signed
waiver may be helpful to a reviewing court, Weaver does not hold
that a signed waiver is required in every case to document a jury
waiver. So long as the record demonstrates that the defendant
was aware of his waiver, which he was in this case, the waiver
stands.
Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial
court must conduct a follow-up inquiry during a waiver colloquy.
At the risk of sounding redundant, so long as the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates that defendant understood the scope
of his waiver, the waiver stands.
Morelos does not hold otherwise. In that case, there was
good reason for the trial court to ask multiple follow-up questions
regarding a waiver: The defendant was representing himself and
sought to waive a jury for both the guilt and penalty phases of
8
trial. (Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 753.) Under those
circumstances, the trial court appropriately followed through
with Sivongxxay’s recommendation to “take additional steps as
appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant
comprehends what the jury trial right entails.” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) Those circumstances are simply not
present in the instant case.
Defendant’s reliance upon People v. Jones (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 420 (Jones) and People v. Blancett (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1200 (Blancett) is misplaced.
In Jones, the prosecutor took a jury waiver from the
defendant without explaining any mechanics of a jury trial.
(Jones, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.) “Nothing in the record
suggest[ed] that [the defendant] was aware that a jury is
comprised of individuals drawn from the community,” and “the
trial court did not advise [the defendant] as to the specific rights
she would be giving up or inquire if her attorney explained those
rights to her[.]” (Ibid.)
Similarly, in Blancett, the colloquy regarding waiver of the
right to a jury trial was “barebones.” (Blancett, supra,
15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1206.) It was unclear from the record
whether the defendant had even the fundamental awareness
“that he was entitled to a jury trial.” (Ibid.)
Here, in contrast, the record shows that defense counsel
discussed the waiver with defendant (People v. Daniels, supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 999 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“Courts
generally rely on counsel to transmit to defendants critical
information about whether to waive the jury trial right and the
consequences of waiving it”]), and the waiver colloquy included
advisements as to the basic mechanics of a jury trial. Moreover,
defendant’s decision was not hastily made with the help of newly
appointed counsel. Rather, defense counsel had represented
9
defendant at least since the preliminary hearing three months
earlier, he discussed the waiver with defense counsel, and he was
advised of the basic mechanics of jury trial before entering his
waiver. In short, the trial court had no reason to suspect that
defendant misunderstood his rights or the consequences of his
waiver.
II. Admission into evidence of statements made by defendant
before he was given his Miranda warnings
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting
his statements to the police at the motel because the statements
were obtained in violation of Miranda.
A. Relevant proceedings
1. Defendant’s conversation with detectives at the
motel
At approximately 1:36 p.m., Detective Montes questioned
defendant in the hallway outside of the motel room with
Detective Ivan Cornejo assisting as a translator. The interview
later continued inside the motel room. Detective Cornejo
recorded the interview with a department-issued body-worn
camera, and a transcript with translations was admitted at trial.
Defendant’s handcuffs were removed. Detective Montes
testified that he “asked Detective Cornejo to remove the
handcuffs” because defendant “was not under arrest at that time,
and I wanted the chance to speak with him.” The prosecution
asked, “You made the decision not to Mirandize him before you
spoke to him,” and the detective answered, “Correct.” When
asked why, Detective Montes explained, “Again, he was just
detained at that time. So I wanted—my goal was to attempt to
identify whose belongings were whose and what role each person
had in the room.”
Defendant provided his name and birthdate, and then
stated that the suitcase on the bed and the wallet on the
10
nightstand belonged to him. He came to the United States nine
months ago, and had been in the motel room for two or three
days, but would usually stay at his girlfriend’s home. He said
that he knew one of the other men from
construction work and came to the motel room that day to share a
meal.
Defendant denied knowing about the drugs in his suitcase,
but said that the money police found was his savings. He denied
using or selling any drugs, except for occasional use of marijuana.
Detectives asked defendant to tell the truth.
Defendant insisted that the drugs were not his and that he
did not know who owned the drugs. He admitted ownership of
the cell phone on the table and the black Honda in the motel
parking lot.
2. Defendant’s motion to suppress
Prior to the commencement of trial, defense counsel filed a
motion to suppress defendant’s statement at the motel on the
basis that it was obtained in violation of defendant’s Miranda
rights because he was in custody and subjected to interrogation.
Following argument, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to
suppress. The court determined that detectives asked
“preliminary” questions during a “preliminary investigation” that
did not violate Miranda. To the extent that the detectives’
questions went beyond the permissible scope of questioning, the
trial court stated that defendant did not answer those questions
or provide substantive answers, “so there’s nothing to suppress.”
B. Relevant law
Under Miranda, police officers must advise a person of
specific Fifth Amendment rights before obtaining any statements
during a “‘custodial interrogation.’” (People v. Farnam (2002)
28 Cal.4th 107, 180 (Farnam).) “Custodial interrogation” means
that law enforcement initiated questioning “after a person has
11
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.” (California v. Beheler (1983)
463 U.S. 1121, 1123.)
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether
a suspect was in custody are: (1) whether the suspect was
formally arrested; (2) the length of the detention; (3) the location
of the interrogation; (4) the officer-suspect ratio; and (5) the
demeanor of the officer and nature of the questioning. (People v.
Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753.) When determining
whether a suspect was in custody, “it is the totality of
circumstances that is relevant; ‘no one factor is dispositive.’
[Citation.]” (Forster, supra, at p. 1754.)
A person who is temporarily detained and subject to
investigatory questioning is not necessarily in custody for
purposes of Miranda. (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420,
439–440 (Berkemer); People v. Forster, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1754.) The term “‘custody’” generally does not include a
temporary detention where an officer asks a moderate number of
questions to determine a person’s identity and to try to obtain
information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.
(Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 180.) Indeed, Miranda itself
held that “[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in
the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. . . . In such
situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of
in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.” (Miranda,
supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 477–478.)
This investigatory exception to Miranda applies, for
example, “[w]here an individual has been detained incident to a
search warrant, and officers’ questioning stays within the bounds
of questioning permitted during a [Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392
12
U.S. 1 (Terry)] stop.” (United States v. Davis (9th Cir. 2008) 530
F.3d 1069, 1081.)
Whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes is
an objective test. (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370,
1400.) Determining whether a defendant was in custody within
the meaning of Miranda is a mixed question of law and fact.
(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.) “When reviewing a
trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo
custodial interrogation, an appellate court must ‘apply a
deferential substantial evidence standard’ [citation] to the trial
court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether,
given those circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the]
defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning
and leave’ [citation].” (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 1400; Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 178.)
C. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant was detained
pursuant to a search warrant and the officers’ questions were
limited to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the
officers’ suspicions about what they found in the motel room. In
other words, defendant was not in custody at the time the officers
spoke to him at the motel.
Defendant contends that he was subjected to a custodial
interrogation that required a Miranda warning because a
reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the
questioning and the questions sought to elicit incriminating
responses. In fact, according to defendant, the prosecution
conceded the custody issue at trial. He is mistaken.
The prosecution did not concede the Miranda custody issue,
expressly arguing that the “custodial situation did not rise to a
13
level of interrogation at the motel.” The prosecution merely chose
not to dispute that “a reasonable person would not feel free to
leave under those circumstances” at the motel. This, however, is
of no moment because whether a person is in custody under
Miranda “‘is not whether a reasonable person would believe he
was not free to leave, but rather whether such a person would
believe he was in police custody of the degree associated with
formal arrest.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pilster (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403, fn. 1); see also United States v.
Pelayo–Ruelas (8th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 589, 592 [rejecting
Miranda challenge on grounds that defendant was not free to
leave during brief Terry stop]; United States v. Swanson (6th Cir.
2003) 341 F.3d 524, 529 [holding defendant not subject to
custodial interrogation, although not free to leave during
questioning, because restraint was not akin to formal arrest].)
Indeed, a person is not free to leave during a Terry stop or a
traffic stop but, as the United States Supreme Court explained,
Miranda warnings are not required given the “nonthreatening”
or “noncoercive” nature of such stops. (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S.
at p. 440; Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 113 (Shatzer).)
The questioning of defendant at the motel was likewise
nonthreatening and noncoercive in nature.
Although six officers arrived to execute the search warrant,
only Detectives Cornejo and Montes interviewed defendant.
Detective Cornejo assisted as a translator while Detective Montes
asked questions. The detectives removed the handcuffs and
repeatedly said that defendant was detained but not under
arrest. Nothing in the transcript suggests that the detectives
were aggressive, confrontational, or accusatory with their
questioning. They only asked questions that were investigative
in nature and did not become threatening when defendant gave
14
evasive responses. And the questioning was not sustained or
prolonged in duration, lasting approximately nine minutes.
On appeal, defendant argues that the interview required a
Miranda warning because the detectives asked questions that
sought to elicit incriminating responses about who possessed the
drugs found in the motel room. Defendant seems to be referring
to the “booking exception” to custodial interrogations, which
allows police to ask questions when booking a suspect without a
Miranda warning unless the questions are reasonably likely to
evoke an incriminating response. (People v. Elizalde (2015)
61 Cal.4th 523, 535–537; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)
446 U.S. 291, 300; People v. Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
70, 86–87; People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 811.)
Defendant presents no authority or reason for extending
the booking exception to these circumstances—to those detained
incident to a search warrant. To be sure, the United States
Supreme Court and California Supreme Court allow an officer to
ask a detainee “a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling
the officer’s suspicions.” (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 439; see
also Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 180.)
Defendant further contends that his statements were
involuntary and inadmissible under Miranda because detectives
urged him to incriminate himself by saying, “‘tell the truth’” and
“‘the more you help us, the more we can help you.’” But it is well-
settled that “‘mere advice or exhortation by the police that it
would be better for the accused to tell the truth when
unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a
subsequent confession involuntary.’” (People v. Holloway (2004)
33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) And here, the detectives asked defendant to
consider the benefit of being truthful without making any threats
or promises.
15
Finally, there is no evidence that the detectives deliberately
attempted to undermine Miranda. (People v. Krebs (2019)
8 Cal.5th 265, 312; see also Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S.
600, 605–606 (Seibert) [the interrogating officer “testified that he
made a ‘conscious decision’ to withhold Miranda warnings, thus
resorting to an interrogation technique he had been taught:
question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the
question ‘until I get the answer that she’s already provided
once’”].) As set forth above, all Detective Montes wanted was to
“identify whose belongings were whose and what role each person
had in the room.” The detective’s explanation reveals only that
Detective Montes could have, but did not, provide a Miranda
warning at the time. This is not a Miranda violation. (People v.
Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 312 [“simply because an officer could
have given an advisement earlier is not enough to show that he
delayed ‘in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda
warning’”].)
“Unlike Seibert, there is no evidence here that the officers
were ‘following a policy of disregarding the teaching of Miranda.’”
(People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 478.)
Because the totality of these circumstances shows that
defendant’s interview was not the type of “aggressive,
confrontational, accusatory, coercive, or sustained” questioning
that would require a Miranda warning (People v. Davidson (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 966, 973), the trial court’s finding that the
interview was “preliminary” is supported by substantial evidence.
(Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 178; People v. Ochoa, supra,
19 Cal.4th at p. 402.) It follows that defendant’s statements were
properly admitted at trial.
D. Harmless error
Even if the trial court had erred, which it did not, any such
error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
16
(Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [applying
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 harmless error
standard to admission of involuntary confession].) Hours after
his initial interview at the motel, defendant was arrested, and
detectives interviewed him at the police department jail. At that
point, detectives advised defendant of his Miranda rights—before
his second interview. As defendant gave admissible, post-
Miranda statements that were more detailed than those given at
the motel, any error in admitting defendant’s earlier statements
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Oregon v. Elstad
(1985) 470 U.S. 298, 318 (Elstad).)
III. Admission into evidence of defendant’s statements at the
police department following a waiver of his Fifth Amendment
rights
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his
subsequent post-Miranda statements at the police department
jail because they were obtained during an unconstitutional “two-
step interrogation” and “the midstream Miranda warning did not
effectively apprise [him] of his rights[.]”
A. Relevant background
Sometime after 4:00 p.m., detectives spoke with defendant
in an interview room at the prebooking area of the police
department’s jail. Detective Cornejo’s body-worn camera
recorded the interview and a transcript with translations was
admitted at trial.
Defendant confirmed his last name; then Detective Cornejo
read the Miranda warnings to defendant in Spanish. Defendant
answered “Yes” to each Miranda question and began answering
questions.
He reaffirmed his earlier statements that he had been in
the motel room for a couple days and that his property included
the suitcase on the bed, the cell phone on the table, the wallet,
17
and the cash inside the suitcase and wallet. He maintained that
the drugs were not his and that, while he saw the drugs in there,
he did not know who put them in his suitcase. He hinted that
one of the other men could have done so, saying that he generally
leaves his suitcase in the motel room and that he uses only a
backpack when he goes to retrieve clothes from his girlfriend’s
house.
Defendant then asked detectives, “what is going to happen
here” and “what’s going to happen to us right now?” When
detectives said that they were “asking questions” as “part of the
process,” defendant replied, “Yes, because since they are
questions, supposedly an attorney has to be present.” When
asked if he wanted an attorney, he said, “well, if I’m detained,
well yes. Because I wasn’t told the reason why I was being
detained. When they came, they didn’t say, ‘hey, we have a
warrant.’”
Detective Cornejo asked, “I asked you four questions right?”
Defendant said, “Yes, yes, yes, yes.” The detective then said,
“And you said you understood.” Defendant then replied, “No, I
did understand, I did understand.” Despite defendant’s
admission that he understood his rights, Detective Cornejo went
on to ensure that defendant understood his right to counsel:
“And one of the questions . . . ‘if you want an attorney, but don’t
have the money to pay for one, an attorney will be appointed to
you, before questioning.’ Do you understand that? And you said
yes, right?” Defendant answered, “Yes,” but expressed some
doubt, asking “Can this be questioning,” and then saying, “Well, I
thought questioning was something else. Because had you told
me . . . . [¶] . . . Because I can, I can say something.” Defendant
then remarked that he had not incriminated himself: “I haven’t
said anything”, and “No, no, I mean, I don’t have anything bad, or
anything but . . . .”
18
Defendant also revealed some knowledge about police
ruses, saying, “And if I don’t have an attorney present, you
[plural] can say whatever you [plural] want.” The detective
pointed out that the interview was being recorded, and then
asked defendant, “So . . . do you want an attorney?” Defendant’s
responses was equivocal: “I don’t know, I don’t know, I, well, like
I said, I have nothing to . . . .” The detective tried to clarify, as
follows:
“[Detective]: Yeah, do you want an attorney or do you want
to continue talking?
“[Defendant]: No, no, no, yes, yes, all right.
“[Detective]: So . . . do you want, do you want . . . ?
“[Defendant]: Yes, yes.
“[Detective]: We are no[t] forcing you to say anything.
“[Defendant]: No, no, no, no, all right.
“[Detective]: Do you want to continue talking?
“[Defendant]: No, yes, yes.”
Defendant then continued answering the detectives’
questions without any further mention of an attorney.
Defendant went on to say that he did not sell drugs, but
that his girlfriend sometimes asks him to buy pills for her. He
bought 15 pills for her two days ago from the internet; those were
the blue pills found in his wallet. When detectives pointed out
that similar blue pills had been found in his suitcase and in the
toilet, defendant disclaimed any knowledge of them.
The trial court found that defendant’s statements at the jail
were admissible. It determined that “the Miranda warnings
were correctly given” and that detectives responded appropriately
by rereading the Miranda warning when defendant asked about
an attorney.
The trial court also rejected defendant’s contention that
detectives used an improper two-step interrogation, finding “a
19
considerable break in the questioning between the hotel room
and the police station.” There was a break, in the trial court’s
view, in the “causal timeframe”— “It wasn’t the same
environment. It took time . . . to get from the hotel to the police
station.”
B. Relevant law
A waiver of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights under
Miranda must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” (People
v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 648; Davis v. United States (1994)
512 U.S. 452, 458.) “In general, if a custodial suspect, having
heard and understood a full explanation of his or her Miranda
rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to
talk, he or she has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived them.” (People v. Cunningham (2015)
61 Cal.4th 609, 642.) A waiver may be “inferred from the
defendant’s words and actions.” (Ibid.)
“In contrast, a suspect’s invocation of Miranda rights must
be ‘unambiguous[ ]’ from the perspective of a reasonable officer.”
(People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 417.) “If the suspect’s
statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for
counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.”
(Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 461–462.) Officers
may ask questions “to clarify whether or not he actually wants an
attorney.” (Id. at p. 461.)
Generally, the “subsequent administration of Miranda
warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned
statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that
precluded admission of the earlier statement.” (Elstad, supra,
470 U.S. at p. 318.) The United States Supreme Court carved out
a narrow exception in Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at page 622 for
two-step interrogation procedures where officers withhold
Miranda warnings until after the suspect confesses as part of a
20
deliberate plan to undermine Miranda’s effectiveness. (Seibert,
supra, 542 U.S. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.); United
States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 [“This
narrower test—that excludes confessions made after a deliberate,
objectively ineffective mid-stream warning—represents Seibert’s
holding”].) “In situations where the two-step strategy was not
deliberately employed, Elstad continues to govern the
admissibility of postwarning statements.” (United States v.
Williams, supra, 435 F.3d at p. 1158.)
C. Analysis
No two-step interrogation procedure
Defendant contends that detectives utilized the
unconstitutional two-step interrogation procedure prohibited by
Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600. We are not convinced. Seibert only
applies when a suspect provided an unwarned statement
obtained in violation of Miranda. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at
p. 604; see Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318.) Here, as set forth
above, defendant’s statements at the motel were not obtained in
violation of Miranda; thus, Seibert is not implicated.
Furthermore, as set forth above, there is no evidence that
the detectives deliberately attempted to undermine Miranda.
(People v. Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 312; Seibert, supra,
542 U.S. at pp. 605–606.)
It follows that defendant’s objection to the Miranda
advisement because “there was no break in custody” between the
hotel and the police station fails.
For the sake of completeness, we note that there was, as
the trial court found, “a considerable break” between the two
interviews. The first interview occurred in the hallway at the
motel and continued in the motel room. The second interview
and Miranda warning occurred hours later in an interview room
at the prebooking area of the police department jail. This
21
“substantial break in time and circumstances between the
prewarning statement and the Miranda warning . . . allow[ed]
the accused to distinguish the two contexts and appreciate that
the interrogation has taken a new turn.” (Seibert, supra,
542 U.S. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of Kennedy J.).) A reasonable
person in defendant’s shoes would have seen the interrogation at
the police department jail as a markedly “new and distinct
experience” from the questioning at the motel, whereby “the
Miranda warning[] could have made sense as presenting a
genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier admission.”
(Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 615–616.)
Defendant contends that the break between the two
interviews was insufficient because the police custody of
defendant was unbroken and, under Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. 98,
a fresh Miranda warning at the jail was insufficient as a matter
of law. Defendant’s proposition is unfounded.
Shatzer addressed a violation of the rule from Edwards v.
Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477. (Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at
pp. 115–116.) Under Edwards, “once a suspect in custody
invokes his Miranda right to counsel, his or her subsequent
statements to police are presumed involuntary and inadmissible
if obtained pursuant to an ‘encounter [initiated by the police] in
the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in
custody).’ [Citation.]” (People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007,
1023; see also People v. Bridgeford (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 887,
890 [“Under Shatzer, law enforcement must wait 14 days before
it may resume questioning (absent initiation by the suspect or
with the presence of counsel) after a suspect has invoked his or
her right to counsel and is released from custody”].)
Here, as set forth above, defendant was not in custody at
the motel; thus, no Miranda advisement was required. Further,
as set forth above, the break between the motel interview and jail
22
interview was sufficient. Shatzer is inapplicable here—defendant
never invoked his right to counsel.
Next, defendant suggests that he may not have been aware
that his detention changed to an arrest despite there being no
dispute that police arrested him and transported him to the
police department jail. This is not supported by the record.
Defendant seems to rely on a portion of the transcribed
testimony of the jail interview where he asked detectives, “what
is going to happen here” and “what’s going to happen to us right
now?” To the extent defendant is complaining that police never
told him that they were executing a warrant at the motel and not
about his postarrest detention at the jail, that has nothing to do
with the adequacy of the Miranda advisement.
The dialogue then shifted to defendant’s understanding of
his right to counsel. The exchanges between Detective Montes
and defendant, set forth in detail above, reinforce the
effectiveness of the Miranda warning, as defendant was aware of
his right to counsel and was deliberating whether to invoke it.
Despite being repeatedly advised of his rights and engaging
in a discussion with detectives regarding whether to invoke his
right to counsel, defendant ultimately continued answering the
detectives’ questions without any further mention of an attorney.
The totality of these circumstances indicate that defendant
understood his Miranda rights and that his decision to waive
them was “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.” (People v. Molano, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 648.)
That the second interview covered similar grounds as the
first interview does not change the analysis. The content of the
second interview overlapped with the first at the motel, but in the
second interview, detectives pursued specific information about
defendant’s role and knowledge about the apparent drug sales.
23
For example, the detective interrogated him about the drugs in
his suitcase, who owned them, and how they got in there. In
contrast to the motel interview, where detectives did not
challenge defendant, the detectives pressed him at the jail
interview for specific details and focused on inconsistencies in his
story. They also inquired about his cell phone— who used his
phone and what sort of messages they might find on it—and
about the blue pills in his wallet. As a result, defendant
expanded on his earlier answers and admitted that he saw the
drugs in his suitcase and that the blue pills in his wallet were
taken from his girlfriend. And, any overlap in the two interviews
does not overwhelm all the other indicators that defendant’s
waiver of rights was voluntary.
D. Harmless error
Even if the trial court had erred, which it did not, any such
error in admitting defendant’s statements would have been
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v. Fulminante,
supra, 499 U.S. at p. 310.) There was ample evidence supporting
the conviction. Officers found a variety of drugs throughout the
motel room, as well as cash and pay-and-owe sheets. They also
found defendant lying next to the bathroom with the toilet
running and pills in the toilet bowl, in an apparent attempt to
destroy them. These circumstances sufficiently support a finding
that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs. (See
People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1276, 1284 [observing
criminal liability for possession of controlled substance for sale
may be based on theory of constructive possession]; People v.
Saldana (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 443, 454–455 [same].)
Considering the quantity and variety of drugs, the pay-and-
owe sheets, the specialized drug packaging, the amount of cash,
and the detective’s opinion that the drugs were possessed for sale,
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the drugs were
24
possessed with an intent to sell. (See People v. Harris (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 371, 374 [“Intent to sell may be established by
circumstantial evidence”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_______________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
25
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.