In re D.S. CA2/6

CourtListener 10275128CalctappNov 15, 2024

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Filed 11/15/24 In re D.S. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re D.S., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B332259
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. FJ58010)
Law. (Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D.S. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a
wardship petition alleging possession of a handgun by a minor.
(Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 602; Pen. Code, § 29610, subd. (a).) He

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless otherwise stated.
contends the juvenile court erroneously denied his suppression
motion pursuant to section 700.1. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During the evening on November 30, 2022, Officer Farias
and two others from the Los Angeles Police Department were on
patrol in a gang “stronghold.” Farias had been previously
involved in “multiple firearm[] arrests” in the area. He observed
a vehicle partially blocking a street, making it difficult for cars to
get by. The vehicle also lacked a front license plate, a violation of
the Vehicle Code. Farias saw “a lot of smoke coming from inside
the vehicle.” There were two people inside the vehicle, a driver
and a passenger.
“Upon seeing [them]” Farias saw the passenger “kind of
awkwardly tuck down, like slide down the seat.” The passenger
slid down “just enough for [Farias] to barely be able to see his
head.” Farias then stepped out of his patrol car because “it
caught [his] attention” and he believed the passenger possibly
had “contraband or something.” He believed the passenger was
attempting to hide, stating, “Upon seeing the police, . . . people
don’t usually slide down trying to conceal themselves.” He said
it was “rare” for someone to “try to actually conceal themselves
from us.” At the motion to suppress hearing Farias identified the
passenger as D.S.
Farias immediately smelled “freshly smoked marijuana”
when he exited the patrol car. He and another officer approached
the passenger side of the vehicle, and Farias illuminated the
inside of the vehicle. Farias said D.S.’s hands “appeared to be
shaking, like he was nervous.” He asked D.S. to step out of the
vehicle. As soon as D.S. stepped out Farias immediately saw a
firearm on the floorboard on the passenger side where D.S.’s feet

2
had been. Farias said he “was able to see [the firearm] clear as
day.” Another officer conducted a pat down of D.S. and located
what felt “like loose rounds” in his pocket.
In denying the motion to suppress, the juvenile court
indicated that it had listened to Officer Farias’s testimony and
watched his body-worn camera video. It stated, “I do think it was
a routine stop with a basis to do so with the no license plate and
the partial blocking of the road.” D.S. then admitted the charge.
The court sustained the section 602 petition, declared the offense
a misdemeanor, declared D.S. a ward of the court, and placed him
on home probation.
DISCUSSION
D.S. contends he was detained before Farias ordered him to
exit the vehicle and that the juvenile court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because there were insufficient articulable
facts to justify the detention. As a passenger in a parked vehicle,
D.S. contends there was no indication he had engaged in criminal
activity. He also argues the stop was pretextual and that his
“nervousness” cannot furnish reasonable suspicion. The Attorney
General concedes D.S. was detained but contends he forfeited this
argument and that reasonable suspicion justified the detention.
We conclude there was no forfeiture. To preserve his
argument that his detention was unlawful, D.S had to “point out
specific inadequacies” in the warrantless search. (People v.
Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 135.) D.S. did that in the
underlying proceedings. In his written motion he contended that
his detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion that a
detained person is involved in criminal activity. And in their
written opposition the People countered there was reasonable

3
suspicion. We conclude D.S. sufficiently preserved his claim that
the detention was unlawful.
In reviewing the denial of D.S.’s suppression motion, we
defer to the juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence. (In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136,
142.) Substantial evidence must be “ ‘ “reasonable, credible, and
of solid value.” ’ ” (People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926,
937.) ‘ “We exercise our independent judgment in determining
whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v. Silveria
and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.) We also consider that
“experienced police officers develop an ability to perceive the
unusual and suspicious, and [courts] recognize the right and duty
of officers to make reasonable investigation of such activities.”
(People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477.)
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. (U.S.
Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9.)
However, an officer may conduct a brief investigative stop when
the officer has reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable
facts, that criminal activity may be afoot. (Terry, at p. 22.) “ ‘The
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.
[Citation.]’ ” (People v. Durazo (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728, 735.)
“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that,
considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide
some objective manifestation that the person detained may be
involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th
224, 231 (Souza).)

4
“[T]he lack of a front license plate has long been recognized
as a legitimate basis for a traffic stop.” (People v. Saunders
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1136; see also Veh. Code, § 5200, subd.
(a).) Once a vehicle is stopped, a passenger may also be lawfully
ordered to exit the vehicle. (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434
U.S. 106, 109-111; People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 564
(Lomax).)
We conclude the detention here was lawful. Officer Farias
observed D.S. sitting in the passenger seat of a parked vehicle
lacking a front license plate that partially blocked a street,
impeding traffic. Farias saw smoke emanating from the vehicle
and smelled marijuana. Although D.S. was not the driver of the
vehicle, D.S. “awkwardly” slid down in his seat when Farias
looked at him. Based on his training and experience, Farias
believed D.S. was attempting to conceal himself. Farias had
reasonable suspicion to detain D.S. based on the totality of these
circumstances.2
D.S. maintains the lack of a front license plate was a mere
“pretext” for detaining him based on a “hunch that a Latino man
was involved in criminal gang activity.” We are not persuaded.
A vehicle stop justified by probable cause is not invalidated if the
officers have a subjective motivation to investigate another crime.
(Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 810-813; Lomax,

2 Once D.S. exited the vehicle to comply with Farias’s
request, Farias saw the handgun in plain view which then gave
him probable cause to arrest D.S. (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p.
564.) D.S. challenges the seizure of the gun only on the theory
that it was the “fruit” of an illegal detention, and does not
challenge his arrest.

5
supra, 49 Cal.4th at 564.) The facts articulated by Farias,
including D.S.’s concealment, like “flight in response to the
appearance of a uniformed officer or a marked patrol car,” is
“behavior that police may legitimately regard as suspicious” that
can further establish reasonable suspicion for a detention.
(Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 227.) “Law enforcement officers
may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that “might well elude an
untrained person.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45
Cal.4th 295, 299.)
We are not oblivious to D.S.’s claim that nervous behavior,
especially by members of minority communities who may
experience police violence or racial profiling, cannot give rise to
reasonable suspicion. But here D.S.’s act of sliding down in his
seat to conceal his presence is not the same thing as nervous
behavior. In our view, D.S.’s act of sliding down in his seat was
an act of concealment and but one factor relied on by Farias.
Considered collectively with the other facts articulated by Farias,
we conclude there was reasonable suspicion to suspect D.S. of
criminal activity. Moreover, commonplace indicators of nervous
behavior, such as shaking hands, occurred after D.S. slid down in
his seat. This behavior occurred after Farias had lawfully
detained D.S. when he approached the passenger window and
illuminated the inside of the vehicle.
Unlike the defendant’s behavior in People v. Flores (2024)
15 Cal.5th 1032, 1045, D.S.’s conduct was not a “mere deviation
from perceived social convention” automatically signaling
criminal behavior. Rather, Farias testified about specific facts
supported by substantial evidence. Those facts included D.S.

6
sitting in an illegally parked vehicle without a front license plate,
smoke and the smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle,
and D.S. “awkwardly” sliding down in his seat when he saw
Officer Farias. Unlike the detaining officer in Flores, Farias did
not “fail[] to articulate ‘more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1047.) “[C]onsidered in the totality of circumstances,” the facts
here furnished the “ ‘minimal level of objective justification’ ” for
Farias to reasonably suspect that criminal activity was afoot and
detain D.S. (Id. at pp. 1045, 1049.) The court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (orders denying motion to suppress and
sustaining section 602 petition) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

7
Sabina A. Helton and Christina L. Hill, Judges

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Alice Newman and Dee A. Hayashi, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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