People v. Reyes CA2/1

CourtListener 10274320CalctappNov 14, 2024

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Filed 11/14/24 P. v. Reyes CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B336589

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA047462)
v.

JOSE ALBERTO REYES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Reversed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________
Defendant Jose Alberto Reyes is serving a prison sentence
of 55 years to life for an attempted murder he committed when he
was 17 years old. He filed a petition to recall his sentence and to
be resentenced under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d).1
The court determined that Reyes was not eligible for relief under
that statute and denied the petition without considering its
merits. We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2005, a jury convicted Reyes of premeditated attempted
murder. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a).) The jury also
found true certain firearm and gang allegations. (§§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(A), 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e)(1).)
In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found that Reyes had a
prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12.) The
court sentenced him to prison for 55 years to life. We affirmed
the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Reyes
(Apr. 2, 2007, B187941).)
On December 15, 2023, Reyes filed a petition to recall
his sentence and be resentenced pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) and People v. Heard (2002) 83 Cal.App.5th
608 (Heard).
In his petition, Reyes states that he was 17 years old when
he committed his crime and that he has served at least 15 years
of his 55 years to life sentence. Reyes alleged the following
additional facts under subdivision (d)(2) of section 1170: (1) He
“committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant”; and
(2) he had “performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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the potential for rehabilitation, including, but [not] limited to,
availing [himself] of rehabilitation, educational or vocational
programs, using self-study for self-improvement, and/or showing
evidence of remorse.”
On December 27, 2023, the court denied Reyes’s petition
without considering its merits. The court, citing People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), explained that
the availability of a “youth offender parole hearing” under
section 3051 had the effect of “ ‘overriding’ or ‘superseding’ ”
any right Reyes had to relief under section 1170, subdivision (d).2
Reyes filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) permits “a defendant
who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” (LWOP)
and who “has been incarcerated for at least 15 years” to petition
the sentencing court to recall his sentence and be resentenced.
As Reyes did here, the defendant must allege at least one
additional fact from among a list of alternative allegations
described in subdivision (d)(2) of section 1170.3 “If the court

2 Section 3051 established youth offender parole hearings
for eligible juvenile offenders “to ensure they will have a
meaningful opportunity for release no more than 25 years into
their incarceration.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)
3 Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), the defendant
must allege “that one of the following is true: [¶] (A) The
defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and
abetting murder provisions of law[;] [¶] (B) The defendant does

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finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more
of the [allegations made pursuant to subdivision (d)(2) of
section 1170] is true, the court shall recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and hold a hearing to resentence
the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not
previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence,
if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1170,
subd. (d)(5).)
Section 1170, subdivision (d), applies by its terms
to defendants who were “sentenced to [LWOP].” (§ 1170,
subd. (d)(1).) The parties agree, however, as do we, that a
sentence of 55 years to life for a 17-year-old is the functional
equivalent of LWOP (see People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th
349, 369), and depriving Reyes of the right to petition for relief
under section 1170, subdivision (d), would deny him equal
protection of the laws. (See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 629, 633–634; People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435,
454 (Sorto).) Moreover, the availability of youth offender parole
hearings under section 3051 does not render a juvenile offender
ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d). (Heard,

not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony
crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims
prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for
recall[;] [¶] (C) The defendant committed the offense with at least
one adult codefendant[; and] [¶] (D) The defendant has performed
acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for
rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves
of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those
programs have been available at their classification level and
facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing
evidence of remorse.”

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supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 629, 633–634; Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 454.) The Sorto court addressed and rejected
an argument that these conclusions are inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin. (Sorto, supra, at
pp. 447–448.) There is no contrary authority. Accordingly,
the court erred in denying his petition without considering its
merits.4

4 After the Attorney General filed his respondent’s brief
conceding the merits of Reyes’s appeal, Reyes filed a motion
for an order that the cause be submitted without oral argument.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.886(a)(1).) The Attorney General
agreed to waive oral argument and not to oppose the motion.
We granted the motion.

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DISPOSITION
The court’s order denying appellant’s petition to recall
his sentence under section 1170, subdivision (d) is reversed.
The court shall conduct further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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