CourtListener 10274226•People v. Patel CA2/8
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Filed 11/14/24 P. v. Patel CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B334888
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA069048)
v.
PAWAN PATEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Richard H. Kirschner, Judge. Affirmed.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Pawan Patel appeals from the
denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95). Defendant requests remand
for a new evidentiary hearing because the trial court failed to
obtain a valid waiver of his presence. We conclude any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2013, defendant pled no contest to one count of
attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), § 664) and
three counts of robbery (§ 211). As part of his plea, defendant
admitted he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in
the commission of the attempted murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).
Defendant was sentenced to a 30-year prison term, calculated as
follows: a high term of nine years for the attempted murder, plus
a consecutive 20-year term for the personal firearm use
enhancement, and a consecutive one-year term (one-third the
midterm) on one count of robbery (the other robbery count terms
were run concurrently). Defendant was awarded 1,120 days
(974 actual, 146 conduct) of presentence custody credits.
After defendant’s conviction, the Legislature passed
two pieces of legislation amending the law regarding liability for
murder and attempted murder: Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) which became effective January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4) and Senate Bill 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) which
became effective January 1, 2022 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2).
On July 26, 2022, defendant filed, with the assistance of
counsel, a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6. The parties filed briefs. The trial court found
defendant had demonstrated a prima facie case, issued an order
to show cause and set an evidentiary hearing.
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The evidentiary hearing was held September 12, 2023.
Defendant was represented by counsel but not present, either in
person or via Webex. Defense counsel said, “He is waiving his
appearance. He is in state prison.” Nothing further was stated
on the record regarding defendant’s waiver of his right to appear
at the hearing. The record also does not contain a written waiver
signed by defendant.
Neither party presented new evidence at the hearing.
Defendant conceded the admissibility of the preliminary hearing
transcript as evidence which the court could consider. The court
said it had reviewed the record of conviction, including the
preliminary hearing testimony and the transcript of the plea.
The trial court denied defendant’s petition finding the People had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual
shooter and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder and
therefore not eligible for relief as a matter of law. The court
pointed out that defendant admitted, during the plea process,
that he personally discharged a firearm during the commission of
the attempted murder and the balance of the record
demonstrated there was only one shooter.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all
critical stages of a criminal proceeding. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The state constitutional right
to be present is generally deemed to be “coextensive with the
federal due process right.” (People v. Basler (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57.) Sentencing and resentencing hearings
are considered critical stages. (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th
404, 508 (Nieves); People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453;
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People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 300.) Several courts
have concluded an evidentiary hearing on a resentencing petition
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 qualifies as a critical stage
in a criminal proceeding. (See, e.g., People v. Quan (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 524, 534 (Quan); Basler, at p. 58.) We agree.
A criminal defendant may waive his right to be present
“provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
(People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 633.) Penal Code
section 977, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part that a
defendant’s waiver of the right to be “physically or remotely
present may be in writing and filed with the court or, with the
court’s consent, may be entered personally by the defendant or by
the defendant’s counsel of record.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) A waiver
made by a defendant’s counsel is valid if counsel states “on the
record that the defendant [was] advised of the right to be
physically or remotely present for the hearing at issue, has
waived that right, and [has] agree[d] that notice to [counsel] that
the defendant’s physical or remote presence is required at a
future date” shall be notice to the defendant. (Ibid.)
The parties agree the record does not include evidence of
defendant having made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver of his right to be present at the evidentiary hearing on his
petition. While defendant may have knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to appear in discussions with his counsel, the
record fails to contain an adequate recitation of it in accordance
with Penal Code section 977.
Error by the court in failing to take a proper waiver of the
right to be present is subject to harmless error analysis. (People
v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532–533 [constitutional error
“pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the
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harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23”].) We conclude
any error by the court in failing to take a proper waiver of
defendant’s right to be present at the evidentiary hearing was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
It was defendant’s burden to establish his absence at the
evidentiary hearing was prejudicial. (People v. Blacksher (2011)
52 Cal.4th 769, 799; accord, Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 536.) Defendant has not done so.
Defendant, relying on Quan, said it cannot be determined
whether his absence at the hearing was harmless “in light of the
twin purposes of [his] right to be present at the hearing—to
potentially offer testimony or evidence upon hearing the
prosecution’s case, and to assist counsel.” (Quan, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 536.) Defendant did not identify any
additional evidence he could have testified to had he been present
at the hearing, only that he may have been able to assist counsel
or assess the prosecution’s case and decide whether to testify.
Defendant also says the preliminary hearing testimony does not
establish lack of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt because
that evidence may not have been challenged for tactical reasons.
We are not persuaded. Quan is distinguishable. The
defendant there was convicted under a felony murder theory.
(Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 526–527.) At the evidentiary
hearing, the prosecutor argued the defendant’s guilt under a
felony murder theory and an implied malice murder theory. (Id.
at p. 530.) More significantly, there was no admission by Quan
that he had personally used the murder weapon in the
commission of the crimes.
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In contrast, defendant here expressly admitted as part of
his plea that he personally used and discharged a firearm in the
commission of the attempted murder. The testimony at the
preliminary hearing demonstrated there was only one gunman
involved in the attempted murder. There is nothing in the record
to indicate defendant was not the direct perpetrator and the
actual shooter in the attempted murder of the victim. The record
demonstrates that defendant’s absence at the evidentiary hearing
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Nieves, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 509 [court’s failure to take proper waiver for
restitution hearing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where
there was “nothing in the record to indicate” the defendant could
have “added any significant information about her inability to
pay beyond that presented by defense counsel”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Pawan Patel’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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