CourtListener 10273240•William Lyon Homes v. Steadfast Ins. Co. CA4/3
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Filed 11/13/24 William Lyon Homes v. Steadfast Ins. Co. CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
WILLIAM LYON HOMES, INC., et
al.,
G061834
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-
v. 01027345)
STEADFAST INSURANCE OPINION
COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed. Motion to Strike. Granted. Motion for
Leave. Denied as moot.
Newmeyer & Dillion, Gregory L. Dillion, John A. O’Hara and C.
Kendie Schlecht for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad and Melissa B. Whalen;
Sinnott, Puebla, Campagne & Curet, Randolph P. Sinnott and Winnie C.
Louie for Defendant and Appellant.
* * *
This is an insurance coverage dispute between William Lyon
Homes, Inc., and its former parent corporation, William Lyon Homes1
(collectively, Builder), on the one hand, and Steadfast Insurance Company
(Steadfast), on the other hand, relating to the interpretation of a Home
Builder’s Protective Insurance Policy issued by Steadfast to Builder (the
initial policy), and its two renewals.2 The trial court ruled against Builder on
its first amended complaint, against Steadfast on its cross-complaint, and
against Builder on its cross-complaint to Steadfast’s cross-complaint, and
then entered judgment in accordance with its pretrial rulings on multiple
dispositive motions and its decision following a bifurcated court trial. Both
parties appealed.
1
William Lyon Homes, Inc., is now owned by Taylor Morrison.
2
For convenience and to avoid confusion, we refer to the original
policy as the “initial policy” and the initial policy, together with the renewals,
as the “policies.” We also refer to the renewals as the “renewal policies.” By
using this terminology, we express no opinion on—and do not decide—
whether the initial policy and renewal policies constitute three separate
policies (as Steadfast contends) or a single policy (as Builder contends). Based
on our resolution of these appeals, we need not resolve that dispute.
2
Builder appeals the trial court’s ruling on the parties’ cross-
motions for summary adjudication3 that the self-insured retention (SIR)
aggregate set forth in an endorsement to the initial policy, which provided
that the SIR aggregate was “per project not per policy” (Per Project Aggregate
SIR), applied separately to each consecutive annual period under that policy
(and that the Per Project Aggregate SIRs in the two renewals also applied
annually). Builder also appeals the court’s order sustaining without leave to
amend Steadfast’s demurrer to Builder’s cross-complaint seeking an attorney
fee award under Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813 (Brandt fees)
for the fees it incurred to defend Steadfast’s cross-complaint for
recoupment/reimbursement of amounts Steadfast had paid to Builder.
We affirm the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ cross-motions
for summary adjudication and the resulting judgment against Builder on all
causes of action in its first amended complaint. We conclude, based on the
unambiguous policy language, that the annual reset provision applies to the
Per Project Aggregate SIR. We also affirm the court’s order sustaining
Steadfast’s demurrer to Builder’s cross-complaint for Brandt fees. Builder’s
cross-complaint was based solely on Steadfast’s filing of a cross-complaint
against Builder to recoup payments Steadfast had paid to Builder under the
policy, which Builder contended was retaliatory and without merit.
Steadfast’s filing of a cross-complaint to recoup some of the benefits it had
paid is privileged under Civil Code section 47 and, without more, cannot
support a claim for bad faith.
3
We refer to the parties’ motions for summary adjudication as
cross-motions even though they were not filed simultaneously because they
both sought adjudication of the same issue of duty/policy interpretation
raised in Builder’s first amended complaint.
3
As to Steadfast’s cross-appeal, Steadfast challenges the trial
court’s decision, following a bifurcated court trial on Steadfast’s cross-
complaint, that the policies did not prohibit Builder from using first-year
warranty repair costs it had paid in connection with its residential projects—
amounts that are excluded from coverage under the policies—to satisfy its
SIR amounts. Based on the unambiguous language of the policies, we agree
with the court’s conclusion. The policies did not specify that only covered
repair costs could be used to erode (or satisfy) the SIRs.
The judgment is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
FACTS RELATING TO THE POLICY
Builder developed and constructed numerous residential housing
projects in multiple states from 1999 through 2020. The close of escrow dates
for the homes in Builder’s projects typically spanned multiple years.
Builder purchased the initial policy from Steadfast in 2001. The
term was for 38 months, from November 1, 2001 through December 31, 2004.
The premium for the initial policy was approximately $15 million.
The initial policy consisted of the declarations page, the form
policy provisions, the schedule of forms and endorsements, and the
endorsements. Item 3 of the declarations page listed the limits of insurance
for each of the five coverage parts, A through E, that appear in Section 1 of
the initial policy form entitled “Coverages.” Coverage C covered sums Builder
was contractually obligated to pay as “‘repair costs’”4 for “‘construction
4
“‘Repair costs’” are defined in the policies as “the cost to repair
or replace a ‘construction defect[’ and] includes all cost[s] covered by the
‘Home Builder’s Limited Warranty’.”
4
defects’” under “‘Home Builders Limited Warranty’” agreements issued by
Builder. For Coverage C, the policies stated that “[t]his insurance does not
apply to: [¶] Normal Customer Service Expenses” (boldface omitted), which
included “[a]ny ‘repair costs’ for a ‘construction defect’ which first arises
within twelve (12) months of the first sale of a ‘home’.”5 For “Each Home –
Repair Cost – Coverage C,” the initial policy provided a limit of “[t]he sales
price of each home subject to a maximum of $2,500,000 [for] any one
structure.” Coverage D covered amounts Builder would become obligated to
pay as damages because of “‘property damage’” to “‘[Builder’s] work’.”
Coverage D was limited to “‘property damage’” to Builder’s work sold during
the initial policy period caused by a “‘construction occurrence’ that takes
place in the ‘coverage territory.’”6 The “Each Construction Occurrence Limit –
Coverage D” was $25,000,000.
Section IV of the initial policy is entitled “SELF INSURED
RETENTION.” (Boldface omitted.) Subdivision 1 of that section provides that
“[Steadfast’s] obligations under SECTION 1 – COVERAGES to pay damages
or ‘repair costs’ applies only to the amounts of damages or ‘repair costs’ in
excess of any ‘Self Insured Retention’ amounts stated in the Declarations.”
Subdivision 3 of Section IV of the initial policy addresses the
“‘Self Insured Retention’ Amounts.” Subdivision 3 defines two distinct types
5
“Normal Customer Service Expenses” is not defined in Section
IV – Definitions, but instead appears as a heading under Coverage C, Section
2 (Exclusions), subdivision (a) (Normal Customer Service Expenses).
6
Only Coverages C and D are at issue in this dispute. Coverage A
addressed bodily injury and property damage, Coverage B addressed personal
and advertising injury liability, and Coverage E addressed fungus-related
medical payments.
5
of SIR amounts in two, separate lettered subdivisions: First, subdivision 3(a)
defines an “Each Occurrence” SIR, which is “the most [Builder] will pay for
all ‘self insured retention’ amounts arising out of one ‘occurrence’, offense or
‘construction occurrence’ or any single loss involving any combination of
‘occurrence’, offense and ‘construction occurrence’.”7 (We refer to this type of
SIR as an “Each Occurrence SIR.”) Second, subdivision 3(b) defines the “Self-
Insured Retention Aggregate,” as “the most [Builder] will pay for all ‘self
insured retention’ amounts under this policy.” That subdivision states “[i]f no
value is shown, then the ‘self insured retention’ aggregate shall be
unlimited.” (We refer to this type of SIR aggregate as an “Aggregate All
Occurrences Per Policy SIR.”)
After the two indented subparagraphs (a) and (b) defining the
two types of SIR amounts, subdivision 3 includes a new paragraph (not
indented, but rather flush left and aligned with the main subdivision “3. ‘Self
Insured Retention’ Amounts”) containing the following language: “The ‘Self
Insured Retention’ amounts of this Coverage Part apply separately to each
consecutive annual period . . . .” (Italics added.) (We refer to this as the
“annual reset provision.”) The parties agree that the phrase “of this Coverage
Part” as used in Section IV refers only to that section pertaining to SIRs.
The payments Builder may use to satisfy its SIR obligations are
specified in the definitions section of the initial policy at Section VI,
subdivision 25. SIR is defined as “the amount you . . . must pay for: [¶] a. All
7
Construction occurrence is defined under the initial policy as
follows: “A ‘construction occurrence’ involving substantially similar damages
to ‘your work’ within the same project, phase, subdivision, community,
neighborhood or other similar local area and constructed under a common set
of contract documents by substantially the same subcontractors will be
considered a single ‘construction occurrence’.”
6
amounts which you become legally obligated to pay as damages or ‘repair
costs’ as defined in this policy; and [¶] b. The legal expenses, expert and other
witness expenses, court costs, bond premiums and such other usual and
incidental expenses attendant to claim and litigation costs.” (Boldface
omitted.) “‘Repair costs’” are defined in subdivision 23 of Section IV as “the
cost to repair or replace a ‘construction defect’. It includes all cost[s] covered
by the ‘Home Builder’s Limited Warranty’.”
Item 4 of the declarations page addressed the dollar amounts of
the SIRs. For the Each Occurrence SIR, the declarations page said “$SEE
ENDORSEMENT.” The endorsement that set the limits for Item 4 of the
declarations set the Each Occurrence SIR at $250,000. For the Aggregate All
Occurrences Per Policy SIR, the declarations page said “$N/A” which meant
the policy contained no aggregate, policy-wide SIR. There is no dispute that
“$N/A” meant that there was no applicable dollar amount because Builder did
not buy an aggregate, policy-wide SIR.
Although Builder did not purchase an Aggregate All Occurrences
Per Policy SIR, the endorsement to the initial policy added a different type of
SIR—the Per Project Aggregate SIR.
The endorsement to the initial policy stated the SIR applies to
“damages, defense costs and warranty and customer service costs of Builder
and/or trade contractor.” The endorsement was described in the schedule of
forms and endorsements as a “Manuscript Endorsement.”8 At the top, the
endorsement stated: “THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY.
8
The term “manuscript” in the insurance industry generally
refers to an insurance policy that is entirely nonstandard and drafted for the
particular risk taken. (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1074.)
7
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.” A box in the middle of the endorsement
states: “This endorsement modifies insurance provided by the following: [¶]
Home Builders Protective Insurance Policy Form.”
Builder and Steadfast renewed the policy twice. The first renewal
covered the second policy period, from December 31, 2004, through December
31, 2007, and the second renewal covered the third policy period, from
December 31, 2007, through December 31, 2010. These renewal policies
contained similar—but not identical—Per Project Aggregate SIR language.
The parties and the trial court treated the Per Project Aggregate SIR
language in the policies as materially the same despite the different language
used. For example, the initial policy endorsement stated “per project not per
policy”; the first renewal used the phrase “Per Project SIR Aggregate Stop”;
and the second renewal used the phrases “Per Project Self Insured Retention
Aggregate” and “Each Project Aggregate Self Insured Retention for
‘Construction Occurrences’.” But despite the somewhat differing terminology,
an important term did not change: Like the initial policy, both renewals
provided the SIR amounts in the policy apply separately to each consecutive
annual period.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A dispute arose between the parties after Builder submitted
multiple demands to Steadfast to reimburse it for amounts Builder claimed it
had overpaid for its SIRs under the policies. Builder filed its initial complaint
against Steadfast on October 22, 2018, alleging claims for breach of contract
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Builder
filed a first amended complaint on March 29, 2019, adding a cause of action
for declaratory relief. Builder alleged the initial policy and the two renewals
8
were one policy and that pursuant to the Per Project Aggregate SIR in the
initial policy, Builder was obligated “to pay only a single per project SIR for
each project and not multiple per project SIRs for later policy periods.”
Builder alleged Steadfast never notified it that the “‘per project not per
policy’” aggregate SIR language in the initial policy was changing in the
renewals, so that language must be read into both renewals.
Steadfast filed a cross-complaint against Builder on May 22,
2019, alleging multiple claims for declaratory relief–repair costs, declaratory
relief–annual SIR, declaratory relief–annual aggregate SIR,
restitution/unjust enrichment, money had and received, constructive trust
and recoupment. In its cross-complaint, Steadfast sought reimbursement of
amounts it had paid to Builder on account of non-covered first-year repair
costs that Builder had applied toward its SIR amounts. Steadfast took the
position Builder could not apply its first-year repair costs toward each of the
policies’ Each Occurrence SIRs.
Builder filed a motion for summary adjudication on its first
amended complaint on the issue of Steadfast’s duty to provide coverage to
Builder under the Per Project Aggregate SIR. Builder contended the phrase
“‘per project not per policy’” in the endorsement meant that for any project,
Builder would only have to meet the $500,000 SIR aggregate once—no matter
how long the initial policy (and the renewals) remained in effect. Steadfast
opposed the motion.
While the Builder’s motion for summary adjudication was under
submission, Steadfast filed its own motion for summary adjudication on the
first and third causes of action in Builder’s first amended complaint for
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, as well as certain of Steadfast’s affirmative defenses. Steadfast
9
sought summary adjudication that “the aggregate self-retention obligations of
[Builder] reset on a per annual period, per project basis in the policies issued
by [Steadfast].” Steadfast also sought summary adjudication on the issue of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Builder’s first
amended complaint. Builder opposed the motion.
The trial court denied Builder’s motion on October 26, 2020, and
granted Steadfast’s motion on December 30, 2020. The court determined the
“endorsement’s modification of ‘per project not per policy’ did not eliminate
the policy form’s provision that the aggregate applied separately on an
annual basis.” The court interpreted the endorsement to mean that the
$500,000 SIR aggregate was for each project, not for the entire policy. The
court reasoned that “[b]ecause the policy covered numerous projects, the
endorsement had to make the additional clarification that the SIR aggregate
was per project, not per policy.” The court reasoned that Builder’s
“interpretation would require the court to completely disregard the express
provisions of the policies.” Builder moved for leave to file a second amended
complaint and for a trial continuance, which the court denied.
The parties stipulated to bifurcate the remaining issues for trial
and to conduct the trial in two phases, including an initial court trial based
on briefing and argument from counsel only on stipulated issues and a second
phase, if necessary, on any remaining issues before the court or a jury. The
parties stipulated to nine issues to be decided by the court in phase one,
relating to six causes of action in Steadfast’s cross-complaint9 and Builder’s
second cause of action for declaratory relief in its first amended complaint.
9
Those six causes of action were for “(1) declaratory relief–repair
costs; (2) declaratory relief–annual SIR; (3) restitution/unjust enrichment; (4)
money had and received; (5) constructive trust . . . ; and (6) recoupment.”
10
Steadfast’s claims against Builder related to its contention that first-year
warranty repair costs that are expressly excluded from coverage could not be
used by Builder to satisfy or erode the Each Occurrence SIR under the
policies.
The trial on phase one took place over two days, and the court
issued its statement of decision on January 21, 2022. The court declined to
issue declaratory relief to Builder on its second cause of action. The court
ruled against Steadfast on its first and fourth through seventh causes of
action in its cross-complaint based on the court’s interpretation of the policies
to mean that first-year warranty repair costs could be applied by Builder to
satisfy the Each Occurrence SIR as to all three policy periods.
Meanwhile, Builder had sought and obtained leave to file a cross-
complaint to Steadfast’s cross-complaint to assert a claim for bad faith and
recovery of Brandt fees. Builder filed its cross-complaint on November 8,
2021. The court sustained Steadfast’s demurrer to the cross-complaint
without leave to amend on July 14, 2022, determining Builder had not
alleged that Steadfast mishandled any claims by Builder or wrongfully
withheld policy benefits, but rather Steadfast was suing for reimbursement of
amounts it paid under the policy under a reservation of rights, which is
conduct that cannot support a bad faith cause of action. As a result of the
ruling on the demurrer, which disposed of all remaining claims in the case,
the trial court vacated the second phase of the trial.
11
The court entered judgment on the entire action on August 16,
2022, denying both parties any affirmative relief.10 Both parties timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION11
I.
BUILDER’S APPEAL
A. The Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Adjudication on the Issue of Duty
Relating to the Per Project Aggregate SIR
Builder contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for
summary adjudication and granting Steadfast’s cross-motion for summary
adjudication on the issue of Steadfast’s duty as it pertains to the Per Project
Aggregate SIR. Specifically, Builder argues the Per Project Aggregate SIR
was a new, independent, and different aggregate feature that was not subject
to the annual reset provision of Section IV of the initial policy, and that the
language “per project not per policy” meant Builder would only have to meet
the aggregate SIR for a particular project once during the entire life of the
policy (and any renewals), even if homes within a particular project closed
escrow during future policy periods. Although we agree the Per Project
10
As reflected in the judgment, “[o]n January 8, 2021, the court
[had] ruled that declaratory relief on Steadfast’s third cause of action in its
cross-complaint was unnecessary and superfluous.”
11
The appellate briefing in this case was extensive,
understandably so considering the complexity of the background and legal
issues. Other than the arguments and evidence we declined to consider as a
result of our ruling on Steadfast’s motion to strike (addressed in Section I.B.
below), we have reviewed and considered all facts, issues and arguments
raised by the parties whether or not they are specifically addressed in this
opinion.
12
Aggregate SIR added via the endorsement was a new and different type of
aggregate SIR than what was stated in Item 4 of the declarations page of the
initial policy and in Section IV of the policy, we conclude the trial court
correctly determined it was subject to the annual reset provision.
1. Standard of Review and Rules of Policy Interpretation.
We review de novo the court’s rulings on the parties’ summary
adjudication motions regarding the interpretation of the provisions of a policy
of insurance on undisputed facts. (County of San Diego v. Ace Property &
Casualty Ins. Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 406, 414.)
Interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law, and the
policy language shall be given its “plain meaning or the meaning a layperson
would ordinarily attach to it.” (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11
Cal.4th 1, 18.) “‘Insurance policies are contracts and, therefore, are governed
in the first instance by the rules of construction applicable to contracts.’
[Citation.] ‘“Thus, ‘the mutual intention of the parties at the time the
contract is formed governs interpretation.’ [Citation.] If possible, we infer this
intent solely from the written provisions of the insurance policy. [Citation.] If
the policy language ‘is clear and explicit, it governs.’”’ [Citation.] ‘When
interpreting a policy provision, we must give its terms their “‘ordinary and
popular sense,’ unless ‘used by the parties in a technical sense or a special
meaning is given to them by usage.’” [Citation.] We must also interpret these
terms “in context” [citation], and give effect “to every part” of the policy with
“each clause helping to interpret the other.”’” (John’s Grill, Inc. v. The
Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1013.)
“‘A policy provision is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to
two or more reasonable constructions despite the plain meaning
of its terms within the context of the policy as a whole.’ [Citation.]
13
‘“The mere fact that a word or phrase in a policy may have multiple meanings
does not create an ambiguity.” [Citation.] Rather, the meaning of the word or
phrase must be considered in light of its context.’ [Citation.] ‘“If the terms are
ambiguous . . . , we interpret them to protect ‘“the objectively reasonable
expectations of the insured.”’ [Citations.] Only if these rules do not resolve a
claimed ambiguity do we resort to the rule that ambiguities are to be resolved
against the insurer.”’” (John’s Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Financial Services
Group, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1014.)
Here, both parties asserted in their cross-motions for summary
adjudication that the policies are unambiguous and should be interpreted
based on their plain language.
2. The Per Project Aggregate SIR Applied Separately to Each
Consecutive Annual Period under the Policies.
The issue raised by Builder on appeal is whether the annual
reset provision in Section IV applies to the Per Project Aggregate SIR added
to the policy by the endorsement. We conclude it does.
A SIR “‘refers to a specific sum or percentage of loss that is the
insured’s initial responsibility and must be satisfied before there is any
coverage under the policy.’” (Forecast Homes, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1471 (Forecast Homes).) As explained by Builder in its
trial brief filed in the underlying action, “the [Home Builders Protective]
policy requires the builder to promptly respond to pre-litigation defect claims
by homeowners and to perform warranty work at its own expense up to the
amount of the self-insured retention (‘SIR’) listed in the policy. The SIR is a
dollar amount specified in an insurance policy that is to be paid by the
insured (Plaintiffs) before the insurer (Steadfast) is required to provide
insurance coverage and respond to a claim or loss.” An aggregate SIR
14
provision limits the insured’s risk in the event of several covered events, such
that payments made by the insured are aggregated until the aggregate limit
is exhausted. “Thereafter, the insurance will cover any additional claims from
dollar one.” (General Star Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 1586, 1594.) A SIR aggregate is for the “benefit of the insured.”
(Ibid.) “An aggregation feature . . . can therefore be expected to cost an
additional premium amount.” (Ibid.)
In reviewing the entirety of the policy—including the
declarations page, applicable SIR endorsement, and form policy provisions—
we agree with Builder that the Per Project Aggregate SIR added a new and
different SIR aggregation feature to the initial policy. However, we disagree
with Builder that the form policy provisions pertaining to SIRs do not apply
to the Per Project Aggregate SIR and that the phrase “per project and not per
policy” means, as Builder contends, that for any one project, the Per Project
Aggregate SIR applies only once, regardless of whether claims for a
particular project extend into future policy periods. Builder reaches this
conclusion based on its erroneous assumption that the annual reset provision
cannot apply to SIRs added by endorsement that are not specifically listed in
Section IV, unless the endorsement states the form policy provisions continue
to apply. As Builder points out, the endorsement did not specifically state
that the Per Project Aggregate SIR was an annual aggregate SIR. It simply
stated a dollar amount that would apply “per project not per policy.”
Builder’s argument fails to consider the function of an
endorsement that modifies—but does not contradict—a policy. “[A]n
endorsement is an amendment to or modification of an existing policy of
insurance. It is not a separate contract of insurance. Standing alone, an
endorsement means nothing. ‘Endorsements on an insurance policy form a
15
part of the insurance contract [citation], and the policy of insurance with the
endorsements and riders thereon must be construed together as a whole
[citation].’ [Citation.] ‘Conditions stated in the policy as such apply to the
endorsement.’” (Adams v. Explorer Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 438, 451,
italics added.) “‘[I]f there is a conflict in meaning between an endorsement
and the body of the policy, the endorsement controls.’” (Venoco, Inc. v. Gulf
Underwriters Ins. Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 750, 766.)
Builder acknowledges in its opening brief that the policy form
governs an insured’s SIR obligations to the extent they have not been
modified by an endorsement. As explained below, however, although the
endorsement added a new (per project) aggregate SIR, it did not alter the
terms of the policy form regarding the insured’s SIR obligations under the
policy or create any conflict between the endorsement and the policy. It did
not create a conflict between the endorsement and the policy because the
declarations page clearly stated the Aggregate All Occurrences Per Policy SIR
was “$N/A”; i.e., not applicable.
In effect, the endorsement added the Per Project Aggregate SIR
to the policy as a new type of aggregate SIR. Item 4 of the declarations page
referred to the endorsement that specified the amount of the Each
Occurrence SIR and added a Per Project Aggregate SIR. Section IV of the
policy form applied to all SIRs “of this Coverage Part.” Because conditions
stated in a policy apply to an endorsement, the annual reset provision in that
Coverage Part applied to the Per Project Aggregate SIR. Like the initial
policy, the two renewals contained per project aggregate SIRs that reset each
year.
By arguing that the phrase “per project not per policy” means
that once the aggregate SIR is met for any one project, it is satisfied for all
16
eternity, Builder is attempting to create a conflict between the endorsement,
the declarations page, and the form policy provisions where none exists.
Builder contends the annual reset provision in Section IV conflicts with the
endorsement. It does not. Builder’s interpretation of the phrase “not per
policy” is out of context and fails to consider the entire initial policy as it
pertained to SIRs. An aggregate SIR that applies “per project not per policy”
logically means it applies “per project,” and not to all SIR amounts for “all
occurrences.” In other words, an aggregate SIR that applies “per project” and
“not per policy” distinguishes itself from the inapplicable Aggregate All
Occurrences Per Policy SIR.12
Builder argues SIRs are considered a limitation or restriction on
coverage and, therefore, the language must be strictly construed against
Steadfast. Builder relies on Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 52, Pennsylvania General Ins. Co. v. American
Safety Indemnity Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1515, and Delgado v. Heritage
Life Ins. Co. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 262, among other cases, for this
proposition. Builder’s argument is misplaced because the Per Project
Aggregate SIR, when considered together with the declarations page and
form policy provisions, is clear and unambiguous as to its meaning and
application. We therefore do not construe the language in favor of Builder; we
simply apply the plain meaning of the policy language. (Delgado v. Heritage
Life Ins. Co., supra, at p. 271; see Forecast Homes, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at
12
Notably, Builder acknowledged in its opening brief that the
language in Section IV, subdivision 3(b) clarified that the Aggregate All
Occurrences Per Policy SIR would apply to “all SIR amounts due under the
Policy or on a ‘per policy’ basis.” Similarly, Builder defined the all occurrences
SIR aggregate that was made expressly not applicable to the policy as a
“Aggregate All Occurrences Per Policy SIR” in its briefing. (Italics added.)
17
pp. 1475–1476 [rejecting insured’s contention that unambiguous SIR
endorsement is subject to heightened level of scrutiny and must be
interpreted narrowly and strictly against insurer].) Only in cases where the
ambiguity “cannot be eliminated by the language and context of the policy
[do] we invoke the principle that ambiguities are construed against the party
who caused the uncertainty—the insurer—in order to protect the insured’s
reasonable expectations of coverage.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., supra, at p. 58.) “‘We will not adopt a strained or absurd
interpretation to create an ambiguity where none exists. The policy terms
must be construed in the context of the whole policy and the circumstances of
the case and cannot be deemed ambiguous in the abstract.’” (Forecast Homes,
supra, at p. 1475.)
Although Builder is correct that Steadfast could have included
language directly in the endorsement that the Per Project Aggregate SIR
applied annually,13 its failure to do so did not create an ambiguity or
inconsistency regarding whether the annual reset provision in Section IV
applied. Contrary to Builder’s contention, the phrase “per project not per
policy” logically means the $500,000 cap applies to claims involving each
project, rather than all claims against Builder across all projects. As
13
The endorsement to the second renewal is notably different in
this respect. The endorsement replaced Section IV of the policy regarding
SIRs to, among other things, specifically list and describe the Per Project
Aggregate SIR. In addition, the language in Section IV stating that the SIRs
apply separately to each consecutive annual period was broadened to refer to
SIR amounts “of this policy” rather than “of this Coverage Part.”
18
explained by the trial court, this language does not modify the explicit
sentence stating that the SIR resets each year.14
We also reject Builder’s contention that interpreting the Per
Project Aggregate SIR to apply annually would render the $250,000 Each
Occurrence SIR created by the same endorsement “mere surplusage.” Builder
argues the term “construction occurrence” should be interpreted to apply on a
project-wide basis, so any Per Project Aggregate SIR that applies annually
would be unnecessary. We disagree with Builder’s interpretation of the
policies’ definition of “construction occurrence,” which explicitly and
unambiguously makes it possible for there to be multiple occurrences on any
one project. The policies define “‘construction occurrence’” for Coverage C as
“an event or happening including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions.” A construction
occurrence involving “substantially similar damages” to the Builder’s work
within the same project by substantially the same subcontractors will be
considered a single “‘construction occurrence.’” This language makes clear
that where a construction occurrence happens that does not involve
“substantially similar damages” to the Builder’s work within the same project
“by substantially the same subcontractors,” there will be more than one
construction occurrence, each subject to the $250,000 per occurrence SIR.
14
In light of our interpretation of the phrase “per project not per
policy” in the endorsement to the initial policy and our conclusion that the
Per Project Aggregate SIR applied annually during the initial policy period,
we need not address Builder’s contention that the Per Project Aggregate SIR
(as interpreted by Builder to apply only once) carried over to the second and
third policy periods, and any effort by Steadfast to change the policy by
removing the “per project not per policy” language was ineffectual because
Steadfast did not give Builder notice it was doing so.
19
And that is precisely why having a $500,000 Per Project Aggregate SIR could
provide an additional benefit to Builder.
In sum, the Each Occurrence SIR was just that—a $250,000
annual cap for each separate occurrence or construction occurrence. The Per
Project Aggregate SIR in the endorsement capped Builder’s annual risk per
project at $500,000 under the initial policy, $1 million for each annual period
under the second renewal period, and $3 million for each annual period under
the third renewal period.
Notably, Builder did not contend in the trial court, and does not
contend now, that the meaning of “per project not per policy” is ambiguous.
Rather, Builder contends the trial court simply misapplied legal principles of
policy interpretation. Nevertheless, Builder asks us to consider evidence of
Steadfast’s intent when it wrote Builder’s policy regarding the meaning of the
Per Project Aggregate SIR. Builder points to excerpts from a letter written by
a Steadfast executive to a different insured that are referenced in an
unpublished order from the Central District of California in a case by that
other insured against Steadfast, Van Daele Development Corp. v. Steadfast
Insurance Company (C.D.Cal., Sept. 26, 2014, No. EDCV 12-01294) (Van
Daele).15 Builder contends this extrinsic evidence shows Steadfast interpreted
the same “per project not per policy” term in Builder’s policy in the same way
that Builder now asks us to interpret it. We find this argument unpersuasive.
First, we have concluded—as the trial court found, and as the
parties both argued in seeking summary adjudication—that the policies are
not ambiguous. “Although parol evidence may be admissible to determine
15
In ruling on the parties’ motions for summary adjudication, the
trial court took judicial notice of the Van Daele order at the request of both
parties.
20
whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous [citation], it is not admissible
if it contradicts a clear and explicit policy provision.” (Hervey v. Mercury
Casualty Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 954, 961.) Here, the meaning of the Per
Project Aggregate SIR in the context of the entire policy is not ambiguous.
Second, even setting aside this fundamental rule of parol
evidence, Builder has not shown how a statement made by one of Steadfast’s
executives as part of a letter that was cited in an unpublished order by a trial
court in a different case, involving different parties and a different policy, is
relevant here—particularly where that other policy did not include the “per
project not per policy” language that is at issue here.16
Finally, we disagree with Builder’s argument that if we conclude,
as the trial court did, that the annual reset provision applies to the Per
Project Aggregate SIR amount, then “[Builder] will effectively end up with an
SIR obligation that reinstates annually but which limits the SIR amount it
must [meet] each year for ‘all’ SIRs.” Builder’s argument is based on its
assumption that the annual reset provision is part of subdivision 3(b) of
Section IV (i.e., the Aggregate All Occurrences Per Policy SIR). It is not. The
annual reset provision expressly applies to all SIR amounts of “this Coverage
Part,” not just to the Aggregate All Occurrences Per Policy SIR.
We conclude the trial court correctly determined the language
that the SIR amounts of Article IV “apply separately to each consecutive
16
The court in Van Daele determined the letter from Steadfast
did not demonstrate the policies’ unambiguous terms were “reasonably
susceptible to Van Daele’s reading of them,” but instead went to the issue of
intent. Further, the letter from Steadfast was sent to Van Daele after the
policy was already issued and, like here, Steadfast’s purported intent with
respect to how an aggregate per project SIR would work did not comport with
the actual terms of the policy purchased by Van Daele.
21
annual period” applied to the new Per Project Aggregate SIR added by the
endorsement.
B. Steadfast’s Motion to Strike Builder’s Evidence Submitted in Reply
In its appellant’s reply brief, Builder attempted to provide this
court with deposition testimony that was not before the trial court on the
motions for summary adjudication. It contends it did so for the purpose of
refuting Steadfast’s argument that, under the definition of “construction
occurrences” in the policy, there could be multiple construction occurrences
on a single project.17 Steadfast moved to strike the new evidence.18 Builder
opposed Steadfast’s motion to strike the evidence, and Steadfast attempted to
file a reply to Builder’s opposition.19 We grant Steadfast’s motion to strike
and decline to consider the new evidence. Our review of an order granting or
17
According to Builder, the deposition testimony was offered to
show the parties’ “course of dealing or usage of trade or . . . course of
performance” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1856, subdivision
(c), i.e., “how [Builder] and Steadfast adjusters administered and applied the
SIRs in their normal course of dealing and that Steadfast’s employees never
argued in administering the Policy that multiple construction occurrence
SIRs or multiple project aggregate SIRs applied for damages to each
component on a home on a single project.”
18
Steadfast also moved to strike evidence submitted by Builder in
connection with its cross-respondents’ brief. Builder does not oppose this
aspect of the motion to strike, acknowledging Steadfast made a reasonable
argument to strike it because it is “cumulative of other admitted testimony
and evidence and is not necessary to support the defenses argued in Cross-
Respondents’ Brief.”
19
Reply briefs on motions are not authorized by the California
Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54, subd. (a).) Therefore, we did
not consider Steadfast’s reply in response to Builder’s opposition to the
motion to strike.
22
denying a summary adjudication motion is limited to the facts before the trial
court when it ruled on the motion. (Mireskandari v. Edwards Wildman
Palmer LLP (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 247, 264.) Further, Steadfast’s argument
was in response to Builder’s argument in its opening brief that interpreting
the Per Project Aggregate SIR to apply annually would render the Each
Occurrence SIR mere surplusage. Steadfast was not raising a new issue in its
respondent’s brief but rather referring to the policy language defining what
constitutes a “construction occurrence” under the policy to refute Builder’s
argument. Steadfast’s legal argument regarding the meaning of the policy,
and its use of hypothetical examples, did not open the door for Builder to
inject evidence on appeal that was not before the trial court. Steadfast’s
motion to strike is therefore granted, and its motion for leave to file a
supplemental brief is denied as moot.
C. Builder’s Cross-Complaint Failed to State a Cause of Action for Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Next, Builder appeals the trial court’s order sustaining
Steadfast’s demurrer to Builder’s cross-complaint and ruling that California
law does not permit recovery of Brandt fees when an insurer prosecutes a
cross-complaint to claw back policy benefits already paid.
“‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the
operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action under any legal theory.’ [Citation.] ‘“‘“We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . We also consider
matters which may be judicially noticed.” . . . Further, we give the complaint
a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context.’”’” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768.)
23
When the trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to
amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be
cured by amendment. (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v.
Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) “‘We affirm the
judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of
the trial court’s stated reasons. [Citation.]’” (Entezampour v. North Orange
County Community College Dist. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 832, 837.)
Steadfast’s cross-complaint against Builder involved whether
Builder could apply repair costs that first arose within the first 12 months
after a home is sold (first-year warranty repair costs), which are excluded
from coverage under the policies, to satisfy its Each Occurrence SIR.
Steadfast alleged it had reimbursed Builder for these amounts under a
reservation of rights. Steadfast sought reimbursement of these amounts it
had paid to the Builder, which Steadfast alleged exceeded $13 million.20
In its cross-complaint to Steadfast’s cross-complaint, Builder
alleged Steadfast and Builder had reached an accord and satisfaction
regarding the issue raised in Steadfast’s cross-complaint and that Steadfast
had reimbursed Builder most of what it was owed pursuant to an agreement
and without reserving any rights. Builder argued Steadfast had reneged on
the agreement, and its cross-complaint for reimbursement therefore was in
bad faith, unreasonable and improper. Among other things, Builder alleged
Steadfast had breached its duty by “[u]nreasonably withholding policy
benefits from [Builder].” Builder alleged that as a result of Steadfast’s bad
20
At trial, the court decided against Steadfast on its cross-
complaint, ruling that first-year warranty repair costs could be applied to
erode the SIR amounts under each policy.
24
faith conduct, Builder had incurred attorney fees and costs “to obtain,
vindicate and retain benefits under the Policy.”
In sustaining Steadfast’s demurrer to Builder’s cross-complaint
without leave to amend, the trial court ruled as follows:
“Here, the Cross-Complaint alleged that Steadfast fully and
thoroughly investigated and analyzed the issue of whether first year repair
costs eroded [Builder’s] SIR obligations after [Builder] submitted their
claims, decided that those costs did erode [Builder’s] SIR obligations, and
that [Builder was] entitled to reimbursement. . . . With [Builder’s] approval,
Steadfast promptly reimbursed 50% of the overpayments and would conduct
an audit of the other 50%. . . . After the initial few audits, the parties agreed
to settle. And pursuant to the settlement, Steadfast paid 97.5% of the claimed
amounts. . . . There are no allegations that Steadfast mishandled the claims
process or delayed in paying what [Builder] was owed. The Cross-Complaint
states that Steadfast unreasonably withheld policy benefits. . . . However, the
Cross-Complaint equated Steadfast’s Cross-Complaint against [Builder] to
recover payment of benefits as withholding policy benefits. . . . The bad faith
claim is essentially based on Steadfast’s decision to file a cross-complaint
against [Builder] to recover what it previously paid. . . . Such a claim is not
supported by any authority. There is no reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained without
leave to amend.”
On appeal, Builder argues the trial court adopted an overly
restrictive view of California case law regarding when Brandt fees are
allowed and that it had sufficiently alleged Steadfast’s cross-complaint was a
retaliatory cross-complaint filed when Steadfast was aware it had no right to
25
claw back the payments. We disagree and conclude the demurrer was
properly sustained without leave to amend.
Attorney fees generally are not recoverable in an action except
where a contract or statute provides otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) In
Brandt v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 813, the California Supreme
Court established an insured’s right to recover attorney fees in a bad faith
action against the insurer. (Id. at p. 819.) The fees recovered “may not exceed
the amount attributable to the attorney’s efforts to obtain the rejected
payment due on the insurance contract. Fees attributable to obtaining any
portion of the plaintiff’s award which exceeds the amount due under the
policy are not recoverable.” (Ibid.) The policy behind Brandt is to compensate
the insured for the cost of hiring an attorney to recover policy benefits. (Ibid.)
The amount of fees incurred to obtain an award of compensatory damages for
bad faith or punitive damages cannot be included in a Brandt fee award. (Id.
at pp. 819–820.)
“[A] bad faith claim against an insurer for initiating litigation
against the insured fails as a matter of law when the insured does not
contend the insurer acted unreasonably in investigating or paying the
underlying insurance claim.” (Old Republic Ins. Co. v. FSR Brokerage, Inc.
(2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 666, 669–670.) Where, as here, the insured’s “theory of
bad faith rests squarely on the allegations in [the insured’s pleading]
alone . . . these allegations fall within the protection of the absolute privilege
found in Civil Code section 47.” (Id. at p. 687.)
Builder relies on a federal district court opinion, Hous. Cas. Co. v.
Cibus US LLC (S.D.Cal., Aug. 23, 2023, No. 19cv828e) 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis
26
148766 (Houston),21 for the proposition that there is no distinction between
attorney fees incurred to obtain coverage benefits where an insurer denies
coverage and attorney fees incurred to retain coverage benefits when an
insurer tries to recoup them. As the Houston court pointed out, however,
cases like this one and Old Republic Ins. Co. v. FSR Brokerage, Inc., supra,
80 Cal.App.4th 666, where “the insured asserted a bad faith claim against its
insurer for filing a complaint . . . but it did not contend that the insurer
otherwise acted unreasonably in investigating, handling, or failing to pay the
underlying insurance claim” are distinguishable and barred by the litigation
privilege. (Houston, supra, 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis 148766, p. *5, fn. 4, italics
added.) In Houston, unlike here, the insured had premised its theory of bad
faith “on [the insurer’s] unreasonable coverage positions and biased
investigation into the claim, which resulted in the initiation of the
declaratory and recoupment action.” (Ibid.)
Here, Builder’s cross-complaint seeking recovery of Brandt fees
was based solely on Steadfast filing an allegedly retaliatory cross-
complaint;22 in other words, the tort alleged by Builder is the lawsuit for
reimbursement. Builder did not allege it incurred any attorney fees to obtain
benefits due under the policy (Brandt v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p.
21
The Houston case is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
22
Builder confirmed multiple times in its opposition to
Steadfast’s demurrer that its bad faith claim arose from Steadfast’s filing and
prosecution of the cross-complaint, which forced Builder to incur attorney
fees to retain the benefits Steadfast had paid to it. For instance, Builder
argued the cross-complaint sought “damages based on Steadfast’s attempts to
unreasonably deny [Builder] policy benefits through its wrongful and invalid
clawback claims.” (Italics added.) Builder also argued it sought “attorneys’
fees incurred to defend and defeat Steadfast’s clawback claims in order to
retain [Builder’s] policy benefits.”
27
819; see CACI No. 2350), that it incurred damages due to unreasonable
actions by Steadfast in investigating or paying the underlying claim before it
initiated the cross-complaint against Builder, or that there has been post-
litigation bad faith conduct by Steadfast that has damaged Builder.
Therefore, the cross-complaint failed to state a viable cause of action.23
II.
STEADFAST’S APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST STEADFAST
ON ITS CROSS-COMPLAINT
The issue on Steadfast’s cross-appeal is a purely legal one:
Whether Builder could use first-year warranty repair costs, which are
specifically excluded from coverage under the policies, to satisfy its SIR
obligations. The trial court determined it could. Steadfast contends this was
error as to the two renewal policies24 because the policies expressly provided
there was no insurance coverage for those costs, and the court’s order
contravened general principles of contract interpretation and failed to give
effect to every provision in the policies.
23
As Builder acknowledges, its inability to assert a bad faith
claim against Steadfast arising from the filing of Steadfast’s cross-complaint
does not necessarily leave Builder without a remedy. (See Silberg v. Anderson
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212, 215 [claim for malicious prosecution exception to
litigation privilege].) We offer no opinion on the merits of such an action or
whether Builder’s allegations would be sufficient to state such a cause of
action.
24
Steadfast agreed at trial that Builder was able to apply first-
year warranty repair costs under the initial policy based on the following
language in that policy’s SIR endorsement: “SIR applies to damages, defense
costs and warranty and customer service costs of Builder and/or trade
contractor.” That language was not included in any endorsement to either of
the two renewal policies.
28
We disagree. Both the initial and renewal policies defined “‘Self
Insured Retention’” to include “[a]ll amounts which [Builder] become[s]
legally obligated to pay as damages or ‘repair costs’ as defined in this
policy. . . .” Although worded slightly differently, the term “‘repair costs’” is
defined in the policies as the costs to repair or replace a construction defect,
including all costs covered by the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty. The
parties do not dispute that first-year warranty repair costs were costs covered
by the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty.
Steadfast contends that the phrase “repair costs,” as used in the
SIR provision, meant only covered repair costs, and that by using excluded
repair costs to satisfy its SIRs, Builder gained more insurance coverage than
the parties bargained for, a result that would contravene well-established
principles of contract interpretation. The problem with this argument is that
it ignores the language of the policies: The policies did not state that only
covered repair costs could be used to satisfy the SIR amounts. And to the
extent there is any ambiguity as to whether only covered repair costs could be
used to erode the SIRs, it must be construed in favor of Builder. (Delgado v.
Heritage Life Ins. Co., supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 271.)
In further support of its argument that amounts excluded from
coverage cannot be used to erode the SIR amounts under the policies,
Steadfast points to the definition of SIRs found in case law, including this
court’s decision in Forecast Homes, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1466. In Forecast
Homes, we explained “‘[l]iability insurance policies often contain a
“deductible” or a “self-insured retention” (SIR) requiring the insured to bear a
portion of a loss otherwise covered by the policy.’” (Id. at pp. 1473–1474, italics
added.) We went on to explain that SIR “‘refers to a specific sum or
percentage of loss that is the insured’s initial responsibility and must be
29
satisfied before there is any coverage under the policy.’” (Id. at p. 1474.) The
problem with Steadfast’s argument is that the language it cited from our
opinion in Forecast Homes was simply a generalized description of how SIRs
typically function. It certainly does not stand for the proposition that,
irrespective of the express language of a policy, only amounts otherwise
covered under a policy may be used to erode SIRs. The rights and obligations
of the parties with respect to SIRs in a particular policy are governed by the
policy language itself, which is a contract between the parties. Indeed, we
held in Forecast Homes that “an SIR, like any insurance provision, must be
enforced according to its plain terms.” (Id. at p. 1475.) Steadfast could have
specified in the definition of SIRs included in the policies it issued to Builder
that only covered repair costs could be applied to satisfy the SIRs. It included
no such limitation in the policies.
Finally, Steadfast points to the endorsement in the initial policy
to support its position that the only reason Builder could use first-year
warranty repair costs to erode the SIR in the initial policy term was because
the endorsement modified the policy. The SIR endorsement provided as
follows: “SIR applies to damages, defense costs and warranty and customer
service costs of Builder and/or trade contractor.” Steadfast argues the
endorsement, not the form policy language, allowed Builder to apply
“customer service costs,” which Steadfast equates with first-year warranty
costs, to its SIR, and that interpreting the second and third policies as
permitting Builder to apply first-year warranty repair costs to its SIRs
renders language in the initial policy’s SIR endorsement superfluous. We
disagree. First, as explained above, one need look no further than the policies’
provisions defining SIRs and “repair costs” to conclude Builder was not
precluded from applying uncovered first-year warranty repair costs to satisfy
30
the SIR amounts. The endorsement does not change the policies in that
regard, and any alleged ambiguity regarding whether the parties intended to
allow Builder to use excluded first-year warranty costs to satisfy its SIR
amounts during the term of the initial policy, but not in the second and third
policy periods, must be resolved against Steadfast.
As a result of our conclusion that the trial court properly
interpreted the policies to permit Builder to apply first-year warranty repair
costs to satisfy its SIR amounts, we need not remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings on Builder’s affirmative defenses to Steadfast’s
cross-complaint.25
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party is
to bear their own costs on appeal.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
DELANEY, J.
25
In issuing its statement of decision following the bifurcated
court trial, the trial court concluded it did not need to address any of the
issues raised regarding Builder’s affirmative defenses in light of its
conclusion that Steadfast was not entitled to any relief pursuant to any of its
claims in its cross-complaint.
31
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