People v. Cooper CA4/2

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Filed 11/12/24 P. v. Cooper CA4/2
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E081754

v. (Super.Ct.No. BAF2200250)

DANTE TRIMELL COOPER, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Rene Navarro, Judge.

Affirmed.

Lizbeth Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and James

H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Dante Trimell Cooper and J.W. are brothers. J.W. had

stored his belongings at defendant’s apartment. On March 2, 2022, while J.W. was

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packing up his belongings, he hit defendant on the head (two times) and ran to the

neighbor’s apartment. Defendant grabbed his gun, followed J.W. to the neighbor’s

apartment, and fired at him until the gun was empty. J.W. survived. Defendant was

convicted of, alter alia, willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder. (Pen.

Code,1 §§ 187, 664.) On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion for mistrial and

his motion for a judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1. We affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS

On March 2, 2022, while in the process of moving out of his Hemet apartment,

defendant ordered his brother (J.W.) to “get [his] shit outta here.” J.W. did not live in the

apartment, he “just [left his] things there.” The brothers’ relationship was “kind of

rocky.” As J.W. was retrieving his belongings, he asked defendant where his (J.W.’s) tax

refund or stimulus check was, and they started arguing. As the argument escalated,

defendant told J.W. to “get your life together.” J.W. responded, “‘I would, if I had my

money,’ and that’s where it got crazy.”

Defendant, grabbed a black nine-millimeter gun from a bag and held it at his side,

pointing down.2 When J.W. complained that defendant pulled out his gun every time the

two argued, defendant pointed the gun at J.W.’s chest. J.W. told defendant, “Put the gun

down. I’ll knock your ass out.” Defendant lowered the gun and put it in the bag, but kept

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 There is a “significant size disparity between the two” brothers. Defendant is
five feet 11 inches tall and 180 pounds, while J.W. is “approximately six two, maybe 280
pounds.”

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“it close to his leg.” As the two continued to argue, J.W. asked if defendant wanted a

particular table, adding, “You got everything else of mine.” J.W. walked toward the door

to leave, grabbed a pole (a three-foot table leg that he used for protection), turned around

“real quick to swing it,” and hit defendant in the head. Defendant started yelling,

dropped the bag, and began “squirming and going wild,” trying to grab for the bag. J.W.

struck defendant a second time, grabbed the bag, and ran to a neighbor’s apartment.

J.W. asked the neighbor, M.M., to call the police. Another neighbor, L.W., heard

the commotion, went outside, and saw J.W. at M.M.’s apartment. As defendant came out

of his apartment, L.W. described him as bloody, “very angry,” and smaller than J.W.

Defendant exclaimed, “‘He shot me in the face.’” Defendant first came out of his

apartment with nothing in hand, but then went back inside. Simultaneously, J.W. went

inside M.M.’s apartment, over M.M.’s objection. When defendant came outside again,

he “went after” J.W. with a gun; he looked “pissed.” Defendant fired shots into J.W.’s

chest from a range of “about 25 inches” while J.W. was standing in M.M.’s doorway.

J.W. ran into M.M.’s apartment and defendant followed, firing more shots at his brother.

M.M. never saw J.W. with a gun, but J.W. told him (M.M.) there was a gun inside the

bag. Police recovered a large pole, three projectiles, and a handgun in a bag from M.M.’s

apartment. Defendant’s apartment had a lot of blood.

Police arrived and spoke to J.W. who pointed to defendant and said, “‘That’s him

right there, the person who shot me.’” Defendant told an officer that he had been shot;

however, the officer had not observed anything to support such a claim. Rather,

defendant appeared to have suffered a blunt force injury. The officer overheard

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defendant tell the EMT medics that he had shot his brother until he “ran out of bullets”

and J.W. “fell over and covered himself.”3 Following his arrest, defendant agreed to

speak with detectives; his interview was played for the jury.

In the interview, defendant admitted shooting J.W.; however, he claimed that J.W.

attacked him as he slept in a chair. Defendant heard “a thud” and “thought” he had been

shot in the face.4 Believing that he was going to die, he thought, “I gotta try to kill [J.W.]

back.” He had two guns, a Glock that he kept in a bag by his side, and a .38 that he kept

in his closet. Defendant ran outside and saw J.W. at a neighbor’s door. When he heard

J.W. tell the neighbor, “sir, he just pulled a gun on me,” defendant ran back into his house

and retrieved his .38 from the closet. He went outside again, found J.W. at the neighbor’s

doorstep, and fired shots until the gun was empty. When the detective asked why he

went back and got a gun, defendant replied, “I was panicking, sir. He woke me up out of

a sleep, and I thought I was shot.” He added that he thought he was going to die and he

“gotta try to kill him back or something.”

After pointing out that J.W. had left defendant’s apartment, and there was no

longer an active threat, the interviewing detective noted that defendant “chased [J.W.]

3 The officer also testified that defendant “told medical staff that he owns two
firearms, although he had served 15 years in prison.” In response to this statement,
defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial.

4 Defendant later stated, “‘Cause I was asleep, and I just—you get hit in the face
with a pole, obviously, you—you don’t—you’re not gonna know. You just—all I just
hear is a thud, and I’m like blood squirting out. So I’m running out the house. . . . I don’t
know if before or after when I was running out, but I was screaming he shot me in the
face.”

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down.” The detective then stated, “You could’ve shut your door. You could’ve locked

your door, and you could’ve called police.” Defendant replied, “That’s true. But now,

what about the gun he took? ‘Cause I don’t know where that bag is at.” When the

detective emphasized that J.W. was gone, defendant explained, “But I didn’t start this. I

didn’t initiate it.” He justified his act of chasing down J.W. by pointing out that “cops

kill people for less.” When asked where he was aiming when he shot J.W., defendant

said, “I was just shooting, man. I wasn’t trying to shoot him in the head, face, man. It

wasn’t no particular area. I was just—seen him and just start squeezing, man, like ‘cause

I’m [go]nna die.”

J.W. suffered gunshots to the arm, chest, back, and abdominal areas. By

stipulation, the jury heard that defendant was convicted of a felony.

Following the close of evidence, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on

all counts, but in particular, the attempted murder charge under section 1118.1. The

defense argued there was no evidence of willful premeditation and deliberation. The trial

court denied the motion.

A jury convicted defendant of attempted murder (§§ 187, 664), assault with a

semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm

(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found that the attempted murder was willful,

premeditated and deliberate, and defendant personally and intentionally discharged a

firearm proximately causing great bodily injury to another person. Separately, the trial

court found that defendant had suffered a strike prior within the meaning of sections 667,

subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), that the attempted murder

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involved great violence, great bodily harm, the threat of great bodily harm and a high

degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1);

unlabeled rule references are to the Cal. Rules of Court), that defendant had been armed

with and used a firearm (rule 4.421(a)(2)), and that he had previously suffered a prison

prior (rule 4.421(b)(3)). He was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 39

years to life, plus 18 years four months.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Motion For Mistrial.

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

mistrial based on witness testimony that he had spent 15 years in prison.

1. Further background information.

Defendant was charged with felon in possession of a firearm. In a pretrial motion,

the prosecutor represented that he intended to “sanitize” the underlying felony during

trial. Defendant elected against testifying, and the parties stipulated that his prior felony

would be sanitized so that the jury would only learn that he “had previously been

convicted of a felony,” without making reference to the specific felony, how serious it

was, or how long he had served in prison. Notwithstanding the parties’ stipulation, one

of the officers, who rode in the ambulance with defendant, testified that he had heard

defendant tell medical staff that “he owns two firearms, although he had served 15 years

in prison.” Defense counsel objected and moved to strike the testimony. The court

sustained the objection, granted the motion, and directed the jury “to disregard the last

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answer by the witness in its entirety [and not] consider it at all in reaching any decision in

this case as to any of the issues.”

Defense counsel also moved for a mistrial based on the testimony that defendant

had served 15 years in prison. Counsel argued the testimony “deprives [defendant] of a

fair trial, and there is no way for [the jurors] to unhear that, and now they may think that

[he] is a bad and dangerous man, and if they were on the fence about these charges, they

would be inclined to convict [him] and hope for a high sentence for [him].” Although

counsel did not fault the People for the officer’s particular response, he asserted that “it

was gratuitous and intentional on the part of law enforcement and outrageous

misconduct.” The trial court denied the motion, explaining that the response was

gratuitous, but the court had sustained defendant’s objection, struck the answer in its

entirety, and admonished the jury to disregard it. The court stated that, without further

guidance, the jury would not know what a 15-year term means, and the court expects

jurors to follow the instruction to disregard the testimony.

Defense counsel unsuccessfully raised the issue again in a motion for new trial,

repeating his argument that the testimony prejudiced defendant because the jurors “heard

it, and it was impossible for [him] to receive a fair trial after that.” Citing People v.

Prysock (1982) 127 Cal.App.3rd 972 (Prysock), the trial court found that “any prejudice

that may have been had by the officer blurting it out was cured by the Court’s immediate

response to it.”

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2. Standard of review.

“‘“‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges

incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is

incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with

considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. . . .’ [Citation.] A motion for a

mistrial should be granted when ‘“‘a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair trial have

been irreparably damaged.’”’” [Citation.] “Although most cases involve prosecutorial or

juror misconduct as the basis for the motion, a witness’s volunteered statement can also

provide the basis for a finding of incurable prejudice.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People

v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 848.)

“The standard of review of a ruling denying a mistrial motion and a ruling denying

a new trial motion is the same: abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (People v. Rices (2017)

4 Cal.5th 49, 92.)

3. Analysis.

Defendant offers three reasons in support of his claim the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion for mistrial: (1) The length of the jury’s deliberations

compared to the length of the trial indicate the case was close. (2) The evidence of his

15-year prison term was not vague, evokes an emotional bias that has no bearing on the

issues, and gave the jury a reason to mistrust his claim of self-defense. (3) The court’s

reliance on Prysock was misplaced. As we explain, the court acted within its discretion

when it denied the mistrial motion and when it later denied a new trial on the same

grounds.

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Claiming the length of the jury’s deliberations indicates a close case, defendant

points to the amount of time the jury deliberated, compared to the amount of time it took

to hear the testimony (2 and a half hours for deliberations versus 5 hours for testimony).5

However, there is no reason to believe that the length of deliberations is an indication of

the closeness of a case. “[T]he length of the deliberations could . . . be reconciled with

the jury’s conscientious performance of its civic duty, rather than its difficulty in reaching

a decision.” (People v. Walker (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 432, 439 [six and a half-hour

deliberation following two and a half-hour presentation of evidence did not indicate that

the evidence was closely balanced].)

Next, defendant reasons the specific reference to defendant’s prison term—

15 years—was not vague, evoked an emotional bias that has no bearing on the issues, and

gave the jury a reason to mistrust his claim of self-defense. Not so. At its best, the claim

of self-defense was not compelling. While J.W. was the initial aggressor, he had

retreated, leaving defendant’s apartment. Nonetheless, after defendant confirmed J.W.’s

location outside, he (defendant) retrieved his gun and pursued J.W., instead of locking the

apartment door and calling the police. Moreover, the reference to defendant’s prison

term was an isolated remark by one witness that was stricken from the record, and the

trial court admonished the jury not to consider it for any purpose. (People v. Avila (2006)

38 Cal.4th 491, 574 [no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial motion after a witness

5 Defendant speculates on the amount of time the jury deliberated on its first day
by noting the record shows that deliberations began at 2:25 p.m., but does not indicate the
time they ended that day. On the next morning, deliberations began at 9:02 a.m., and 19
minutes later jurors indicated they had reached a verdict.

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mentioned the defendant recently getting out of prison because the court admonished the

jury not to consider it for any purpose]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 124-125

[where witness volunteered that defendant had been at Chino prison, no error in denying

mistrial because reference was isolated and prejudice curable by instruction].)

Finally, defendant challenges the trial court’s reliance on Prysock. Prior to

sentencing, defense counsel requested the court reconsider its decision not to give

defendant a new trial. In response, the court noted that it had immediately sustained the

objection to the officer’s testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it. It added, “One

further observation I would make. There usually is no prejudice if . . . there is a timely

objection and proper admonition is given to the jury. And so I would cite [Prysock] for

that proposition.” In Prysock, the objectionable testimony was the prosecutor’s statement

in closing argument that the codefendant had a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify,

but that if he “‘would have made any statement to the police admitting striking [the

victim], you[ would have] heard about it in court.’” (Prysock, supra, 127 Cal.App.3rd at

p. 997.) The court sustained the defense objection and directed the jury to disregard the

prosecutor’s argument referring to calling the codefendant to testify. (Id. at p. 998.) The

Court of Appeal held that “if the remark constituted misconduct, the prompt

admonishment cured any harm.” (Ibid.)

Defendant contends Prysock does not apply because “the inadmissible statement

there was the prosecution’s improper argument about the co-defendant,” and the stricken

argument “was not unduly prejudicial because it was 1) argument, and 2) it was not likely

[to] result in any emotional bias or something that would stick in the minds of the juror[s]

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such that the defendant’s chances of receiving a fair trial were irreparably damaged.”

Even if we assume the trial court’s reliance on Prysock was misplaced, we still conclude

the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial because,

as we later explain, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict. (People v. Dawkins

(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 991, 1004 [“A ‘ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not

be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any

theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the

considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion. [¶] . . . [¶] In

other words, it is judicial action, and not judicial reasoning or argument, which is the

subject of review; and, if the former be correct, we are not concerned with the faults of

the latter.’ [Citation.]”].)

B. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Section 1118.1 Motion.

At the close of evidence, defendant moved under section 1118.1 for an entry of

judgment of acquittal on all counts, but in particular the attempted murder charge. The

trial court denied defendant’s motion in its entirety; defendant appeals the court’s ruling

as to the attempted murder charge only.

1. Further background information.

In support of the section 1118.1 motion, defense counsel argued three paths to a

conviction on a lesser charge. First, he claimed that, at most, defendant should be

convicted of attempted second degree murder because the evidence was insufficient to

establish willful premeditation since defendant did not bring a gun to the fight, it “was

already at the property.” Second, counsel asserted they had made a case for imperfect

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self-defense and provocation which lowers the conviction to attempted voluntary

manslaughter. And finally, counsel contended they had proved “self-defense, which is a

complete defense to all of the offenses except for the felon in possession.” In response,

the prosecutor pointed out that defendant had told the police “very clearly that his intent

was to, quote, kill him back” and there is no evidence he feared “imminent danger.” The

prosecutor argued the evidence establishes premeditation and deliberation because

defendant went outside, then back into his apartment for the specific purpose of obtaining

his gun, instead of using his phone to call for help. Defense counsel replied by referring

to the definition of “deliberated” and “premeditation,” and argued defendant’s action is

“really the definition of an irrational and impulsive act rather than one involving a careful

weighing of considerations for or against his choice.”

The trial court found sufficient and substantial evidence to sustain a conviction on

appeal. It noted that “premeditation and deliberation can be made all in a split second . . .

depend[ing] on the nature of the evidence . . . and the action and conduct of the defendant

at the time of the commission of the offense.”

2. Standard of review.

A judgment of acquittal of a charge is mandatory “if the evidence then before the

court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense . . . on appeal.” (§ 1118.1.) A

section 1118.1 motion “‘weed[s] out as soon as possible those few instances in which the

prosecution fails to make even a prima facie case.’” (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th

182, 200.) Therefore, where “there is evidence from which an inference of guilt is

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justified a case will not be taken from the jury because an inference of innocence might

also be drawn therefrom.” (People v. Wescott (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 711, 714.)

In deciding a section 1118.1 motion, the trial court inquires “whether from the

evidence . . . including reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is substantial

evidence of the existence of every element of the offense charged.” (People v. Coffman

and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 89.) We review “the denial of a section 1118.1 motion

under the standard employed in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) Accordingly, “[w]e

review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine

whether there is evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value, such that a

reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This

inquiry does not require the reviewing court to ask itself whether it believes the evidence

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v.

Dalerio (2006) 144 Cal.App4th 775, 779-780.)

3. Applicable legal principles.

Attempted murder requires (1) a “specific intent to kill,” which is the equivalent of

express malice, and (2) a “direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended

killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623; see People v. Smith (2005)

37 Cal.4th 733, 739 [noting that intent to kill and express malice are, in essence “‘one

and the same’”].) Express malice is shown when the defendant “‘either desires the

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victim’s death, or knows to a substantial certainty that the victim’s death will occur.’”

(People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1217.) “[E]vidence of motive is often

probative of intent to kill,” but it “is not required to establish intent to kill.” (Smith, at

p. 741.) “One may [act] with or without a motive and still be found to have acted with

express malice.” (Id. at pp. 741-742.) Intent to kill may simply be “inferred from the

defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.” (Id. at p. 741.) For example, “the

act of purposefully firing a lethal weapon at another human being at close range, without

legal excuse, generally gives rise to an inference that the shooter acted with express

malice.” (Id. at p. 742)

“[A]ttempted murder is not divided into degrees, but the sentence can be enhanced

if the attempt to kill was committed with premeditation and deliberation.” (People v.

Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654.) In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15

(Anderson), the California Supreme Court articulated three factors relevant to

determining whether a defendant killed or attempted to kill with premeditation and

deliberation: (1) evidence of the defendant’s conduct prior to the killing—i.e. planning;

(2) evidence regarding a defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim

which could suggest a “motive” to kill; and (3) evidence about the nature of the killing.

(Id. at pp. 26-27.) These factors are not required to find deliberation and premeditation,

but remain useful in reviewing the evidence. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041,

1081.) “‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of

action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in advance.” (Id. at p. 1080.) “‘The process

of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. “The

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true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts

may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived

at quickly.”’” (Id. at p. 1080.) To summarize, a finding of deliberation and

premeditation requires the existence of “‘preexisting thought and reflection,’” of any

duration, “‘rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’” (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th

339, 354-355; see People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 813.)

A person does not act with malice if he sincerely but unreasonably believes in a

need to defend himself from the person he tries to kill, or acts in the heat of a passion

resulting from provocation he reasonably attributes to the victim. (People v. Rios (2000)

23 Cal.4th 450, 460; People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133 [“Two factors may

preclude the formation of malice and reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter: heat of

passion and unreasonable self-defense.”].) “‘No specific type of provocation is required,

and “the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any ‘“‘[v]iolent, intense,

high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion’”’”’” other than revenge, including fear. (People v.

Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1139 (Millbrook).)

To negate malice, passion must obscure a defendant’s reason “‘“‘to such an extent

as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and

without deliberation or reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.’”’”

(Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th. at p. 1137.) Imperfect self-defense requires an

actual if unreasonable belief in a need “‘to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or

great bodily injury.’” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773.) If there is some

evidence that a defendant charged with attempted murder was subject to such a passion,

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or sincerely perceived a need to defend himself, the prosecution must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion, and did not act with

an actual belief in the need to defend himself with deadly force. (People v. Rios (2000)

23 Cal.4th 450, 461-462; Millbrook, at pp. 1136-1137.) If the prosecution fails to bear

that burden, the defendant can be convicted only of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

4. Analysis.

Defendant argues the evidence does not support a finding that he acted with

premeditation and deliberation.

Contrary to his claims, we conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s

finding of premeditation and deliberation. First, the evidence is sufficient to show

defendant engaged in a level of planning prior to the shooting. Although defendant and

J.W. provided different versions of J.W.’s assault on defendant, they both agreed that

J.W. was the initial aggressor. J.W. testified that he hit defendant on the head two times

with a pole; defendant acknowledged (to the investigating detective) that he had been hit

in the face with a pole, but claimed he thought he had been shot. After hitting defendant,

J.W. took one of defendant’s guns, and went to a neighbor’s house, asking the neighbor

to call the police. Despite believing he had been shot in the face, defendant walked out of

his apartment to track J.W. Upon confirming J.W.’s location, defendant went back inside

his apartment, grabbed his other gun, pursued J.W., and fired at him until the gun was

empty. This evidence shows defendant engaged in a level of planning prior to the

shooting. (See People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471 [“That defendant armed

himself prior to the attack ‘supports the inference that he planned a violent encounter.’”];

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see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658 [“The act of planning—

involving deliberation and premeditation—requires nothing more than a ‘successive

thought[] of the mind.’”].) A reasonable jury could have concluded defendant’s conduct,

coupled with his statement that he thought he was going to die and he “gotta try to kill

[J.W.] back or something” established that defendant planned the attack immediately

before shooting J.W.

Second, as to motive, defendant was angry that J.W. had attacked him and thought

he was going to die. A reasonable jury could have interpreted defendant’s “demeanor” as

suggesting he arrived at the neighbor’s apartment with the objective of extracting revenge

on J.W. (See People v. Lunafelix (1985) 34 Cal.4th 614, 102 [“[T]he law does not

require that a[n] [attempted] first degree murderer have a ‘rational’ motive for killing.

Anger at the way the victim talked to him [citation] or any motive, ‘shallow and distorted

but, to the perpetrator, genuine’ may be sufficient.”].)

Finally, as to the nature of the shooting, defendant did not fire one shot; rather, he

unloaded his gun at J.W. who suffered shots to his arm, chest, back and abdominal areas.

(People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1287 [holding substantial evidence of

premeditation and deliberation existed because the “defendant was armed with a knife

and stabbed [victim] without provocation directly in the heart with enough force to

penetrate part of a rib and pierce entirely through the heart.”].)

Notwithstanding the above, defendant contends the evidence shows that he acted

with “an actual belief that he needed to defend himself from imminent great bodily injury

or death, specifically that [J.W.] still had a gun and was going to shoot him again.”

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Alternatively, he asserts there is substantial evidence that he acted in the heat of passion

in response to provocation—J.W. hitting him (defendant) on the head with a pole. We

conclude there is no evidence to support any circumstance that would have permitted

defendant to use deadly force against J.W.

It is uncontroverted that J.W. was the initial aggressor; however, he retreated, left

defendant’s apartment, and went to the neighbor’s apartment. In response to J.W.’s

attack, defendant did not lock the door to his apartment and call the police. Rather, he

pursued J.W. outside of his (defendant’s) apartment. As we previously stated, after

confirming J.W.’s location, defendant went back inside his apartment, retrieved his other

gun, ran back outside, confronted J.W., and fired shots until the gun was empty because

he “gotta try to kill him back or something.” When asked why he did not shut and lock

his door and call the police, defendant replied, ““But I didn’t start this. I didn’t initiate it.”

He justified his act of chasing down J.W. by pointing out that “cops kill people for less.”

Based on this evidence, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant was no longer

acting under the fear of imminent death/bodily injury or under the heat of passion, but for

revenge or punishment. (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 [passion for

revenge will not reduce murder to manslaughter].)

Since substantial evidence exists to support the crime of attempted murder, the

trial court properly denied defendant’s section 1118.1 motion for judgment of acquittal

and allowed the matter to go to the jury.

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III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER
J.

FIELDS
J.

19

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