CourtListener 10272515•People v. Garcia CA4/3
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Filed 11/12/24 P. v. Garcia CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063919
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1801882)
HUMBERTO GARCIA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, F. Paul Dickerson, III, Judge. Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Humberto Garcia, as charged, of two counts of
committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years of age in
violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (section 288(a)). The jury
found to be true allegations that Garcia took advantage of a position of trust
and confidence to commit the crimes. The trial court sentenced Garcia to the
low term of three years on count 1 and a concurrent term of three years on
count 2.
Garcia challenges his conviction on the ground the trial court
erred by receiving into evidence five pornographic images and the names of
pornography websites found on his cell phone. He argues that evidence was
inadmissible because it was of uncharged conduct, was irrelevant, and was
offered to attack his character. He also argues that evidence, if relevant,
should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352.
We conclude (1) the evidence of the pornographic images and
pornography website names was relevant to prove the intent required for a
conviction under section 288(a) and (2) the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding not to exclude that evidence under Evidence Code
section 352. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2010, when Jane Doe Y.P. (Jane Doe) was about nine years
old, she, her mother, and three siblings were living in a studio unit on
Garcia’s property. Garcia, who was 61 at the time of trial, lived with his
family in a separate one-story house on the property. Jane Doe’s family lived
in the studio unit for about three years.
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Jane Doe’s family and Garcia’s family became close and often
spent time together in Garcia’s house. Jane Doe frequently went to Garcia’s
house to play with Garcia’s children, whom Jane Doe referred to as her
cousins.
Although Jane Doe got along well with Garcia’s children, she did
not get along with Garcia because he “would do things that . . . should not
have happened,” such as kissing her on the lips. The first time he kissed her
on the lips was in the hallway of his house. The kisses would last a few
minutes, and Jane Doe could feel Garcia’s tongue on her tongue. The kisses
made Jane Doe feel “gross,” but if she asked Garcia to stop, he “would just
keep going.” Sometimes Jane Doe tried to push Garcia, but when she did, he
would hold her or grab her shoulders.
Garcia often kissed Jane Doe, probably more than 10 times. She
believed she was 10 or 11 years old when the kissing occurred. Garcia told
Jane Doe “everything will be okay, . . . no one needs to know.” That made
Jane Doe feel “[n]ot good.”
On one occasion, when Jane Doe felt sick, Garcia took her to the
kitchen where he gave her a pill. While in the kitchen, Garcia slightly moved
Jane Doe’s tank top, and touched and kissed her breast. Jane Doe felt
“gross.” She did not tell Garcia’s children because she “didn’t know how to
say it.” She did not tell her mother because she “didn’t know how to tell her”
and “didn’t know how to bring it up.” Jane Doe was scared that Garcia would
do something worse to her. Jane Doe’s mother did notice, however, that Jane
always wanted to be with her when they were at Garcia’s house.
When Jane Doe was about 13 years old, she and her family
moved out of the studio on Garcia’s property and into an apartment. When
Garcia and his family would visit, Jane Doe tried to stay away from him.
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When nobody was around, Garcia would ask Jane Doe to come over to him,
but she would refuse.
While in middle school, Jane Doe began cutting herself because
her mother was struggling and because of what Garcia had done to her. The
school noticed Jane Doe’s cuts and contacted her mother. Later, at home,
Jane Doe and her mother talked for several hours about why Jane Doe was
cutting herself. Jane Doe talked about missing her father and about her
grandmother’s death. At the end of the conversation, Jane Doe, in tears, told
her mother about what Garcia had done to her. Jane Doe’s mother contacted
the police. Two police officers went to their home, and Jane Doe’s Mother
told them about her conversation with Jane Doe.
Police seized Garcia’s cell phone pursuant to a search warrant. A
search of the cell phone uncovered 45 pornographic images and the names of
11 pornography websites visited by Garcia. The website names were:
18inhd.com; 18schoolgirlz.com; 18yoga.com; Freeteen.com;
Teenmassageporn.com; teenporntuber.net; EXXXextrasmall.com;
18andabused.com; Teenmassageporn.com; Smallteensbigcocks.com; and
Horny18years.com. The girls on many of the images appeared to include
minors or adult woman made to appear underage. Five of the 45 images
were received into evidence as exhibits 6-11 after the models’ eyes and
private parts had been blacked out.
A search of Garcia’s home uncovered a VHS tape entitled “Teen
Nymphos No. 7.” A photograph of the VHS tape was received into evidence
as exhibit A. The tape itself was not received into evidence; instead, the
investigating police sergeant testified to its contents. The sergeant testified
the VHS had four scenes depicting pornographic acts and each scene involved
a young woman made to appear underage.
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DISCUSSION
I.
BACKGROUND
Before trial commenced, the court and counsel discussed in
chambers admission of the pornographic images and pornography website
names found on Garcia’s cell phone. On the record, the trial court ruled the
website names would be received into evidence under Evidence Code section
1101, subdivision (b) because they were relevant to Garcia’s intent, that, is
“he’s interested in little girls.” The court declined to exclude evidence of the
website names under Evidence Code section 352 because they were not
“especially inflammatory, given the nature of the conduct in this case,” it
would not take “an undue consumption of time for the officer to testify,” and
the evidence was “extremely probative versus the prejudicial effect it would
have on [Garcia].”
The prosecutor explained he had selected five out of the 45
pornographic images to show to the jury. Defense counsel objected because it
could not be proven the girls in the images were underage and the
prosecution had dropped the counts of possession of child pornography. After
examining the images, the court ruled the images would be received into
evidence under Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (b) because the
models appeared to be “prepubescent to just barely pubescent girls” and
looked “almost exactly like the victim in this case.” The images were relevant
to show what Garcia “is attracted to.”
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The court ruled the five images were not made inadmissible by
Evidence Code section 352 because, the court explained: “I don’t think this
will take, again, an undue consumption of time. He was looking at these
during the time that he was committing the acts, so they’re close in time.
And it’s highly probative. I don’t think its prejudicial at all, really.”
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY
ADMITTING THE PORNOGRAPHY EVIDENCE
A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review
Character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove a
defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)
However, evidence of an uncharged crime or other act is admissible when
relevant to prove some fact, such as motive or intent, other than the
defendant’s disposition to commit such an act. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (b).)
“The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged
offense) is required in order to prove intent.” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7
Cal.4th 380, 402 (Ewoldt).) “In order to be admissible to prove intent, the
uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that
the defendant ‘“probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.”
[Citations.]’” (Ibid.)
If evidence of uncharged conduct is sufficiently similar to the
charged crimes to be relevant to prove the defendant’s intent, then the trial
court must consider whether to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code
section 352. (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328.)
Rulings made under Evidence Code section 1101 and 352 are
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Foster, supra, 50
Cal.4th at p. 1328.) We “do not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it was
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arbitrary, capricious, or made in a ‘“patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327,
358.)
B. The Pornography Evidence Was Admissible to Prove Intent
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the five
pornographic images and the pornography website names were admissible
under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) as evidence relevant to
proving intent. The intent to sexually arouse either the defendant or the
victim is an essential element of a violation of section 288(a). (People v.
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 488.) “If [the] intent of the act, although it may
have the outward appearance of innocence, is to arouse. . . the lust, the
passion or the sexual desire of the perpetrator it stands condemned by the
statute. . . .” (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444.)
The prosecution must prove all necessary elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 5; People v.
Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 72.) Garcia pleaded not guilty to all charges.
“Defendant’s intent to violate section 288 was put at issue when he pleaded
not guilty to the crimes charged” (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864
(Memro)), unless he took some action to narrow the prosecution’s burden of
proof (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 857-858). Garcia does not
assert or cite to anyplace in the record to show he took some action to narrow
the prosecution’s burden of proof.
The five images and the website names were relevant to prove
that Garcia kissed and touched Jane Doe with the lascivious intent required
to convict under section 288(a). The images depicted pornographic scenes
involving underage females or females made to appear underage. The trial
court, after examining the images, found the models “look like prepubescent
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to just barely pubescent girls. I would put them at . . . 13, 11 to 13.” The
website names suggest they offer pornographic videos involving females who
are, or made to appear to be, 18 years of age or younger. From the images
and website names, a reasonable inference could be drawn that Garcia was
sexually attracted to and sexually aroused by underage, prepubescent girls,
and, therefore, Garcia kissed and touched Jane Doe with the intent of
becoming sexually aroused, and not for an innocent purpose.
Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th 786 is on point. In Memro, the
California Supreme Court concluded that magazines and photographs
depicting clothed and unclothed males ranging in age from prepubescent to
young adult were admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision
(b) to show the defendant’s intent to molest a young boy in violation of section
288(a). (Memro at p. 864.) “Although not all were sexually explicit in the
abstract, the photographs, presented in the context of defendant’s possession
of them, yielded evidence from which the jury could infer that he had a sexual
attraction to young boys and intended to act on that attraction. [Citation.]
The photographs of young boys were admissible as probative of defendant’s
intent to do a lewd or lascivious act with [the victim].” (Id. at pp. 864-865; see
People v. Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 519 [“Evidence that defendant
possessed child pornography, and that the day before the murder he printed
out a story involving an adult male having sex with young children, was
probative of defendant’s intent to commit lewd acts on the young murder
victim in this case”].) In the present case, the five images and website names
were similarly probative of Garcia’s intent to commit lewd acts on Jane Doe.
Garcia attempts to distinguish Memro by arguing the prosecution
used the five images and websites names as a basis for attacking his
character. The record does not support that argument. To the contrary, the
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prosecutor argued in closing that the evidence of pornography “goes to his
sexual interest in underage girls.”
Moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that the
evidence that Garcia “possessed and viewed pornography of what appeared to
be underaged girls” could be considered only “for the limited purpose of
deciding whether: A, the defendant acted with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of himself or
the child; or B, the defendant’s acts were not the result of mistake or
accident.” The court also instructed the jury: (1) it could consider the
pornography evidence “only if the People have proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the acts”; (2) not to
conclude from the pornography evidence “the defendant has a bad character
or is disposed to commit crime”; (3) if the jury did conclude that Garcia did
“commit[] the acts” the jury’s “conclusion is only one factor to consider, along
with all the other evidence”; and (4) the pornography evidence “is not
sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of Penal Code section
288(a). . . .”
These limiting instructions, which we presume the jury
understood and followed (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 426),
“minimized any danger that the jury would rely upon the evidence for an
improper purpose” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1120).
Garcia argues intent was not a material issue at trial because he
did not dispute that the alleged conduct, if proven, would in itself establish a
lascivious intent. He cites to Ewoldt for the proposition that evidence of
uncharged misconduct is inadmissible to prove intent in cases in which, due
to the nature of the charged conduct, lascivious intent “could not reasonably
be disputed.” (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 406.) In Ewoldt, the victim
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testified that the defendant repeatedly molested her by fondling her breasts
and genitals and forcing her to touch his penis. (Ibid.) Garcia’s conduct,
though punishable under section 288(a), was not as egregious. The conduct
involved here—kissing and one instance of touching Jane Doe’s chest—was of
such nature that if proven would not place completely beyond dispute the
element of Garcia’s intent.
Garcia argues the images and website names were irrelevant
because no proof was presented to show that men who possess child
pornography will molest children. The inference to be drawn from the five
images and website names was that Garcia was sexually attracted to young,
prepubescent girls and therefore kissed and touched Jane Does with the
intent to achieve sexual arousal.
C. Evidence Code Section 352 Did Not Make the Pornography Evidence
Inadmissible
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by declining to exclude
the five images and website names under Evidence Code section 352. The
trial court in its discretion may exclude otherwise relevant under Evidence
section 352 if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission will “necessitate undue consumption of
time” or will “create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “Unless the dangers of
undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption “‘substantially outweigh’”
the probative value of relevant evidence, a[n] [Evidence Code] section 352
objection should fail.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439, italics
added.)
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“‘Prejudice for purposes of Evidence Code section 352 means
evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant with
very little effect on issues, not evidence that is probative of a defendant’s
guilt.” (People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1048.)
As we have explained, the five images and the website names
were highly probative of Garcia’s intent in kissing and touching Jane Doe.
Intent was an element of the offense of violating section 288(a) which the
prosecution was required to prove. Only five out of 45 images were received
into evidence, parts of the images were blacked out, and the investigating
sergeant testified only to the website names. While there was the risk that
admission of the pornography evidence might evoke an emotional bias
against Garcia, that risk did not substantially outweigh the probative value
of the evidence.
The California Supreme Court in Memro addressed the same
Evidence Code section 352 issue with respect to the magazines and
photographs admitted in that case and concluded: “To be sure, some of this
material showed young boys in sexually graphic poses. It would undoubtedly
be disturbing to most people. But we cannot say that it was substantially
more prejudicial than probative, for its value in establishing defendant’s
intent to violate section 288 was substantial. The court balanced the items’
evidentiary worth against their potential to cause prejudice and determined
that the former substantially outweighed the latter. Its decision was
reasonable.” (Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 865.)
The trial court here conducted the same balancing test as in
Memro and its decision was likewise reasonable. In addition, the jury was
given limiting instructions, and “‘[a] limiting instruction can ameliorate
[Evidence Code] section 352 prejudice by eliminating the danger the jury
11
could consider the evidence for an improper purpose.’” (People v. Gonzalez
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 409.)
Garcia argues admission of the pornography evidence created a
substantial danger of confusing or misleading the jury by leading it to believe
it had to determine whether the images and websites constituted child
pornography. While there is always a risk the evidence of uncharged conduct
may confuse or mislead the jury (People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274,
284), such risk in the present case did not substantially outweigh the
probative value of the pornography evidence. The images were relevant,
without a finding they constituted child pornography, because they at least
depicted females made to look underage. During closing argument, Garcia’s
counsel emphasized to the jury that Garcia was not being charged with
possession of child pornography, no evidence was presented of the ages of the
models in the images, and the pornography evidence was a distraction tactic
and irrelevant. The prosecutor told the jury specifically that Garcia was
charged only with two counts of violating section 288(a).
Further, the trial court’s limiting instructions “eliminated any
danger ‘of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’” (People v.
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 26). “We presume the jury followed these
instructions.” (Ibid.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
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