People v. Holder CA2/2

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Filed 11/5/24 P. v. Holder CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B328849

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA475908)
v.

ERIC RONALD HOLDER, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Eric Holder appeals the judgment entered following a jury
trial in which he was convicted of the first degree murder of
Ermias Asghedom (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1), two
counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664/192,
subd. (a); counts 2 & 4), two counts of assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 3 & 5), and one count of possession of a
firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6). The jury found
true the firearm and great bodily injury enhancement
allegations. Appellant’s sentence of 60 years to life includes a
consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion
when it sustained the prosecution’s objection to a portion of
defense counsel’s closing argument which purported to describe
what appellant was thinking and feeling prior to the shooting.
Appellant asserts the erroneous limitation on his closing
argument violated his federal constitutional right to present a
defense. Appellant further argues the trial court
misapprehended the recently amended statutory scheme, and
thereby abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss the 25-
year-to-life firearm enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c). We disagree on both points, and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ermias Asghedom was a member of the Rolling Sixties
gang who eventually rose to stardom as the rap musician “Nipsey
Hussle.” Following his success as a rap artist, Asghedom
invested his money in the South Central Los Angeles community
where he grew up, purchasing a strip mall that had long been a

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
popular place for people in the neighborhood to congregate. The
mall was in “the heart of South Central” as well as Rolling Sixties
territory.
Asghedom leased a portion of the property to commercial
tenants, while operating other businesses himself, including The
Marathon clothing store. Asghedom’s brother, Sam, ran the day-
to-day operations of The Marathon, and Herman Douglas, a
former Rolling Sixties gang member known as “Cowboy,” worked
for Asghedom at the store. Asghedom visited The Marathon daily
when he was in town, and people in the community were
accustomed to seeing him there. He regularly took photographs
with fans and spoke with his employees in the store or in the
parking lot.
Appellant grew up in South Central Los Angeles and knew
both Asghedom and Douglas. He was also a member of the
Rolling Sixties, known in the gang as “Shitty” or “Shitty Cuz.”
Bryannita Nicholson met appellant in February 2019, when
appellant was living with his uncle in Long Beach. Appellant
lived next door to the building Nicholson was preparing to move
into, and they quickly became friends, seeing each other about
every other day. In the first week after they met, Nicholson went
to a music studio in the Long Beach home of appellant’s cousin,
where appellant was recording rap music. Nicholson saw
appellant’s cousin hand him a long silver semiautomatic gun,
which appellant placed in the front of his waistband. A few days
later, Nicholson went to appellant’s house and saw a gray
revolver with duct tape on the handle on the sofa next him. He
quickly put it away when she asked about it. After that,
Nicholson noticed appellant carrying a black semiautomatic

3
handgun “just about” every time she saw him. Appellant told
Nicholson he carried a gun for protection.
Appellant called Nicholson on Sunday, March 31, 2019, and
asked if she wanted to hang out and get something to eat.
Nicholson picked appellant up in Long Beach around 1:30 p.m.,
and appellant suggested they drive to Los Angeles. Appellant
directed Nicholson to a street near The Marathon and had her
stop the car. Appellant got out and greeted “a whole bunch of
dudes.” Nicholson could not hear what was said, but it appeared
friendly. Appellant returned to the car less than two minutes
later.
From there, appellant had Nicholson drive to the strip
mall. Asghedom had just arrived and was standing in the center
of the parking lot in front of The Marathon, talking with Douglas
and Evan McKenzie, who was known as “Rimpau.” As Nicholson
pulled into the parking lot, she recognized Asghedom and told
appellant she wanted to take a picture with him. When
Asghedom saw Nicholson’s car, he asked McKenzie, “ ‘Is that
Shitty?’ ” McKenzie said, “Yeah,” and Asghedom said out loud to
himself, “ ‘Oh, I wonder how this is going to go down.’ ”
Appellant got out of the car and went into Master Burger,
at one end of the L-shaped strip mall. He then walked over and
greeted Asghedom, McKenzie, and Douglas, shaking hands with
each of them. Asghedom said to appellant, “ ‘Hey, man, what’s
up? You know, where you been bro?’ ” Appellant responded, “ ‘I
been gone.’ ” Asghedom then said, “ ‘Man, you know, they got
some paperwork on you, you know. I haven’t read it, you know,

4
like, you my bro. You know, like, you need to maybe take care of
that, you know.’ ”2
Douglas described the conversation as one between friends.
There was no tension, and Asghedom spoke respectfully to
appellant. According to Douglas, Asghedom was looking out for
appellant, suggesting he should clarify the rumors that
paperwork existed on him for appellant’s own sake; he was not
accusing appellant of cooperating with authorities. Appellant
responded by dismissing the notion that he had cooperated with
police, stating, “ ‘They be hatin’ on me. . . . It’s some bullshit.”
While Asghedom and appellant were speaking, Nicholson
got out of her car and approached the group, hoping to take a
picture with Asghedom. She only heard fragments of the
conversation, but it seemed like appellant was trying to clarify an
allegation that he had snitched in the past. Appellant did not
appear angry or upset, his tone of voice was normal, and
Nicholson sensed no animosity between the two men during their
conversation. Asghedom was “chill” toward appellant, but
seemed to be “trying to brush him off so he [could] leave. Like, he
didn’t really want to talk.”
Nicholson took a picture with Asghedom and returned to
her car while appellant remained with Asghedom and the other
men. Before leaving, appellant shook hands with Asghedom,
Douglas, and McKenzie. Appellant returned to the Master
Burger for his order, and then walked back to the group of men in

2 Douglas explained that “paperwork” refers to
documentation demonstrating that someone has cooperated with
law enforcement, such as police reports or court transcripts.
“Paperwork” may also be used to disprove rumors or allegations
of such cooperation.

5
the parking lot. Before returning to Nicholson’s vehicle,
appellant shook hands with everyone except Asghedom, who was
engaged in another conversation.
After appellant and Nicholson left, Asghedom remained in
the strip mall parking lot, talking with Douglas, McKenzie, and
others. Kerry Lathan and his nephew, Shermi Villanueva,
arrived and joined the conversation. Douglas went inside to eat
his lunch. When Douglas left the parking lot, Asghedom was in a
good mood, and nothing seemed out of the ordinary.
Upon returning to the car, appellant ate some of his food
and then told Nicholson to pull out of the parking lot and drive
around the block. As Nicholson drove, appellant began loading a
black semiautomatic handgun. They passed in front of the strip
mall again, and appellant pointed the gun at the passenger side
window toward the mall. Nicholson told him to put the gun
down. Appellant put the weapon at his side and continued eating
his food. Appellant directed Nicholson to stop in an alley next to
Master Burger. He put on a red shirt and resumed eating as he
sat in the vehicle. Then appellant said to Nicholson, “ ‘Wait.
Don’t go nowhere. I’ll be back.’ ” He did not seem angry or upset.
Appellant got out of the car and walked down the alley toward
the strip mall.
As he approached Asghedom, appellant said to him,
“ ‘You’re through.’ ” Appellant then opened fire with two
handguns, a semiautomatic and a revolver, shooting Asghedom
11 times. Asghedom collapsed to the ground and later died as a
result of multiple gunshot wounds. Appellant also shot Lathan in
the back. Following the shooting, Lathan was only able to walk
with a walker, and a few weeks later he suffered a stroke that
left him confined to a wheelchair. Appellant shot Villanueva in

6
the abdomen, but the bullet struck Villanueva’s belt buckle and
did not penetrate his body.
After the shooting, appellant kicked Asghedom in the head
before fleeing the scene. Appellant ran back to Nicholson’s car
with a gun in each hand, one chrome and one black. He got in,
and in a loud voice ordered Nicholson to drive away. Nicholson
asked appellant what had happened, and he responded, “ ‘You
talk too much. I ought to slap you.’ ”
DISCUSSION
I. By Sustaining the People’s Objection to
Portions of Defense Counsel’s Closing
Argument, the Trial Court Neither Abused Its
Discretion Nor Violated Appellant’s
Constitutional Right to Assert a Defense
Appellant contends the trial court erroneously limited his
defense counsel’s closing argument, thereby abusing its discretion
and violating appellant’s federal constitutional right to present
his defense. We disagree.
A. Relevant proceedings
Defense counsel began his closing argument by admitting
that appellant shot and killed Asghedom. He argued, however,
that the killing constituted voluntary manslaughter and not
murder because appellant acted in the heat of passion after
publicly being called a snitch by Asghedom, the famous rapper
known as Nipsey Hussle. “Nipsey Hussle,” defense counsel
asserted, “already had a confrontational state of mind,” as
evidenced by his statement, “ ‘I wonder how this is going to
unfold’ ” when he saw appellant in the parking lot. Appellant, by
contrast, had “an innocent state of mind. . . . [H]e’s thinking,
okay. I’m not in the gang anymore. I’m not active, but I’m not

7
going to snub them.” Counsel continued, “Think about
[appellant’s] state of mind at this point, you know. . . . [¶] So
[appellant’s] state of mind is thinking what’s going on, you know.
I’m in this group. I’m surrounded by these guys, the Rolling
Sixties. I grew up with them in the neighborhood, and now
Nipsey Hussle is outing me as a snitch.”
Defense counsel then told the jury that “someone with
Nipsey Hussle’s status and knowledge of growing up in the
Rolling Sixties would know that this was a serious accusation
with serious possible consequences to [appellant].” Such
consequences include “[e]verything from getting beat up to
getting killed.” “So [appellant] tries to figure out what it is that
Nipsey’s⎯what is Nipsey’s motive. What is his motivation.”
At this point, the prosecutor requested a sidebar and
objected to defense counsel’s argument on the ground that
counsel was purporting to tell the jury what his client was
thinking, even though appellant did not testify and there was no
other evidence about what was going through his mind. Defense
counsel responded that he was simply drawing reasonable
inferences from the evidence based on what a reasonable person
would be thinking under these circumstances. The trial court
told defense counsel he could talk about what a reasonable
person would be thinking, “but you can’t say [appellant] thought
it because there’s no testimony that [appellant] thought it.”
Defense counsel resumed his argument: “This was a
serious accusation. [Appellant] took it serious as it was. He
knows the consequences of being called a snitch in this manner.”
Asserting that Nipsey Hussle’s refusal to respond to appellant’s
requests for details about the paperwork prevented appellant
from clearing his name, defense counsel argued:

8
“So a person, a reasonable person, under those
circumstances may conclude this is just Nipsey Hussle calling me
a snitch. I know there’s no paperwork out there. He’s not giving
me any details. This is just something that he’s passing around
in the neighborhood, right. . . . It’s just Nipsey Hussle that’s
saying this, this accusation against him putting a snitch jacket
on him. This is a provocation that stirs up rage and powerful
emotions. A swirling around the head, rage that he would do this
in public in the heart of Rolling Sixties territory in a complex that
he owns when he just⎯when [appellant] just came there to buy
food. [¶] Confusion. Why is he doing this? What’s his motive?
What is he talking about? Frustration. Refuses to give him any
names or any details.”
The prosecutor reasserted the same objection, and the court
held another sidebar. Defense counsel insisted he had followed
the court’s admonition by referring to the “reasonable person’s”
response to being called a snitch. Noting that counsel had
mentioned his client in the same breath as the reasonable person,
the trial court stated:
“You have to walk a fine line in the use of the evidence, and
the inferences from that evidence and not say what [appellant]
thought. It sounds as if . . . you’re saying my client or [appellant]
thought this based upon that. . . . What’s the reasonable person
going to think under those circumstances, that’s fine. But you
got to walk that fine line.” The court added, “It kind of sounded
like your client is saying what⎯what is happening to me. And
you’ve indicated that’s not what you meant, but that’s how it
sounded to me. What is⎯what is [appellant] thinking. But
you’re saying it’s the⎯you’re just talking about the average
person thinking, correct?” Defense counsel confirmed that was

9
what he was doing, and the court said, “All right. Just make that
clear. We don’t have an issue.”
Defense counsel continued:
“So consider how you would feel as a reasonable person if
you just come around and then all of a sudden you’re being called
a snitch, and then when you press for details the person gets
irritated with you because you keep asking them to explain what
they’re talking about. And they brush you off and that [sic] you
need to go somewhere. You would think that this is Nipsey
Hussle making up this rumor about me. . . . [¶] . . . So you
would think that he’s putting a bounty on me. He’s outing me as
a snitch. This is Nipsey Hussle making it up. [No one else there
said] anything. . . . This was just Nipsey Hussle’s doing.
“So this is a provocation. This would stir up a range of
powerful emotions swirling around the reasonable person’s head
in the same or similar circumstances. Some of the emotions
would be rage. You’d be enraged that he would do this to you in
public in the heart of Rolling Sixties territory in a complex that
he owns in front of other people when you just came to get some
food.
“Confusion. You don’t know what he’s talking about. He’s
not giving you any details. Why is he doing this to me?
“Frustration. Refusing to give you any names, any details
so that you could get this supposed paperwork and clear your
name.
“Humiliation. Doing this in front of [others].
“And fear for your life and safety.
“Nipsey Hussle carries a lot of weight. What if he calls you
a snitch in a song and names you? These are the things that you
would be considering as to why he’s doing this in this public

10
manner. Now, if he was just looking out for you and trying to
warn you about this rumor, why not walk you over to the side
and say, hey, this is what I heard. You might want to go take
care of it, you know. I’m just looking out for you. You better
watch your back. No. Didn’t do that. He did it in front of four
other people.”
Defense counsel went on to tell the jury that just nine
minutes after this serious life-threatening provocation, while
acting in the heat of passion, appellant shot and killed
Asghedom. Nine minutes, counsel emphasized, is not enough
time to reflect after such a provocation. It is not a cooling off
period. Counsel then outlined the jury instructions regarding
heat of passion and discussed how they applied to appellant’s
actions in this case.
Defense counsel concluded, “So I wanted you to see all of
the circumstances that led up to March 31st to see that
[appellant] had no animus and that it was this provocation by
Mr. Asghedom that caused [appellant] to become so enraged that
he acted rashly without reflecting, without a cooling off period,
and that this was voluntary manslaughter in a heat of passion.”
B. The trial court properly limited defense counsel’s
closing argument
“Criminal defendants enjoy a constitutional right to have
counsel present closing argument to the trier of fact.” (People v.
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 147 (Simon); Herring v. New York
(1975) 422 U.S. 853, 858 [45 L.Ed.2d 593, 95 S.Ct. 2550] [“There
can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic
element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial”].)
This right, however, is subject to the trial court’s “broad
discretion to control the duration and scope of closing

11
arguments.” (Simon, at p. 147; People v. Edwards (2013) 57
Cal.4th 658, 743; (§ 1044 [it is the duty of the trial court to limit
“the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters”].)
“We review a trial court’s decision to limit defense counsel
closing argument for abuse of discretion.” (Simon, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 147.) “While counsel is accorded ‘great latitude at
argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes can
properly be drawn from the evidence [citation],’ counsel may not
assume or state facts not in evidence [citation] or mischaracterize
the evidence [citation].” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73,
133–134; People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 494; People v.
Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 102 [“It is axiomatic that counsel
may not state or assume facts in argument that are not in
evidence”].) Moreover, a trial court may prohibit an argument by
counsel if there is “no substantial evidence” to support it. (People
v. Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1388; People v. Modesto
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 708 [“defendant’s failure to take the stand
does not entitle his attorney to engage in purely speculative
argument, substituting his own testimony for that of the
defendant in order to insulate the theory of the defense from the
scrutiny of cross-examination”].)
Here, the trial court properly sustained the prosecution’s
objections to the portions of defense counsel’s closing argument
that purported to tell the jury what appellant was thinking or
feeling before he shot Asghedom. Appellant did not testify, and
no other evidence about what appellant was thinking or feeling
prior to the shooting was presented to the jury. Thus, the
inferences about appellant’s specific thoughts and feelings that
defense counsel purported to draw were not based on the
evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

12
limiting that portion of counsel’s argument. (People v. Valencia
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 284 [counsel may not “ ‘argue facts or
inferences not based on the evidence presented’ ”].)
Appellant’s reliance on People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th
147 (Tafoya) and People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107
(Farnam) to support his claim that the trial court abused its
discretion is misplaced.
In Tafoya, the defendant asserted that the prosecutor had
assumed facts and misstated the evidence in closing argument by
contradicting the defendant’s testimony and stating that the
defendant was personally armed in the commission of the offense.
(Tafoya, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 181.) Our Supreme Court
rejected defendant’s claim on the ground that other evidence
showed that “defendant had the gun on his lap as [he] drove
away from [the victim’s] house.” (Ibid.) The court held that “no
other witness so testified to [defendant’s] version of events,” and
“the prosecution’s argument that defendant was armed during
the getaway was consistent with the evidence and not improper.”
(Ibid.) Here, unlike Tafoya, there was no evidence whatsoever to
support the inferences counsel was attempting to draw when he
told the jury what appellant was thinking and feeling before the
shooting. The trial court thus properly limited defense counsel’s
argument in this regard.
Farnum is equally unavailing to appellant. In that case,
defendant argued the prosecutor had misled the jury by
mischaracterizing the evidence and improperly drawing an
inference on the issue of premeditation and deliberation.
(Farnum, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 169.) Our Supreme Court
recounted the evidence presented at trial which supported the
prosecutor’s inference and rejected defendant’s claim, stating,

13
“On this record, we cannot say that the prosecutor acted
improperly in presenting her theory of premeditation and
deliberation.” (Id. at p. 170.)
By contrast, in the instant case defense counsel did not
frame his closing argument in terms of what appellant could or
may have been thinking based on the evidence. Instead, counsel
purported to tell the jury what appellant had actually been
thinking and feeling before he shot Asghedom. In the absence of
any evidence about appellant’s personal state of mind, the
argument was impermissible, and the trial court properly limited
it.
Appellant further asserts that defense counsel “was
literally prohibited from mentioning his client’s name” and was
forced to “inject ‘reasonable person’ into every sentence” to avoid
further interruptions. He thus contends the “limitation on
counsel’s argument deprived appellant of his right to have
counsel argue both objective and subjective provocation.” Not so.
The trial court acts within its discretion when its limitation
on defense counsel’s argument does not prevent the defendant
from conveying his primary defense. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 149 [no abuse of discretion where trial court’s restriction on
defense argument did not prevent counsel from making central
arguments to jury].) Significantly, appellant’s jury was never
informed of the nature of the prosecutor’s objection to defense
counsel’s argument, much less the trial court’s ruling on the
objection. The trial court did not order defense counsel’s
statements about appellant’s thoughts and feelings stricken, nor
did the court admonish the jury to disregard those remarks. The
jury therefore heard and considered defense counsel’s arguments
attributing specific thoughts and feelings to appellant, including:

14
(1) Why would the great Nipsey Hussle call me a snitch in public?
“I’m not involved in [the gang] lifestyle anymore.” “What’s going
on?” (2) “So [appellant] tries to figure out what . . . is Nipsey’s
motive. What is his motivation.” (3) “This was a serious
accusation. [Appellant] took it serious as it was. He knows the
consequences of being called a snitch in this manner.” (4) “This is
a provocation that stirs up rage and powerful emotions. A
swirling around the head, rage that [Nipsey Hussle] would do
this in public in the heart of Rolling Sixties territory in a complex
that he owns . . . when [appellant] just came there to buy food.”
Defense counsel concluded his argument by telling the jury,
“[Appellant] had no animus and . . . it was this provocation by
Mr. Asghedom that caused my client to become so enraged that
he acted rashly without reflecting, without a cooling off period.”
Apart from relating appellant’s specific thoughts and
feelings to the jury, defense counsel argued at length that a
reasonable person would have reacted with passion rather than
reason to being accused of snitching by Asghedom in front of
other gang members. These allusions to the “reasonable person”
in defense counsel’s argument unmistakably referred to appellant
and his mental state at the time of the shooting.
In short, nothing in the trial court’s rulings prevented
appellant from arguing objective and subjective provocation to
the jury, or from clearly articulating the defense theory that
“appellant acted in the heat of passion as a result of being
publicly called a snitch” by “the famous, the great Nipsey
Hussle.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
prohibiting defense counsel from telling the jury what appellant
was thinking and feeling at the time of the shooting to explain
appellant’s conduct.

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II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Declining to Dismiss the 25-Year-to-Life
Firearm Enhancement Under Section 1385,
Subdivision (c)
Appellant contends that based on the substantial
mitigation evidence of childhood trauma and severe mental
illness, the trial court’s refusal to strike the 25-year-to-life
firearm enhancement constituted an abuse of discretion. We
disagree.
A. Relevant proceedings
Prior to sentencing, appellant filed a sentencing
memorandum in which he asked the trial court to impose a
sentence of 25 years to life on count 1, and impose and stay the
sentences on all other counts and enhancements. The People’s
sentencing memorandum requested a total sentence of 60 years
to life.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had read
and considered appellant’s probation report and the sentencing
memoranda submitted by the parties. The court heard two
victim impact statements who spoke of the devastating effect the
killing of Asghedom had had on them personally and on the
community.
Defense counsel reminded the trial court that appellant
was 29 years old at the time of the murder, and had no criminal
history other than a conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, for which he had been placed on probation. He also
presented evidence of appellant’s childhood trauma and severe
mental illness. The mitigation evidence included an eight-page
report by Dr. Carole Lieberman, a forensic psychiatrist who had
evaluated appellant over six hours, reviewed his psychiatric

16
records, and interviewed appellant’s father. Defense counsel also
read into the record a letter from appellant’s father, addressing
appellant’s difficult childhood and severe mental health
condition, including a diagnosis of auditory schizophrenia and the
multiple unsuccessful interventions to eliminate the persistent
auditory hallucinations appellant suffered. Finally, defense
counsel made a statement to the court detailing appellant’s
childhood trauma from physical and emotional abuse, neglect,
and insufficient resources to provide adequate food and basic
healthcare. Counsel explained these conditions persisted
throughout appellant’s childhood and adolescence. Counsel
described in detail appellant’s severe mental health deterioration
that coincided with multiple serious head injuries from car
accidents and physical attacks on appellant. Counsel also
detailed the numerous, but ultimately unsuccessful treatments,
psychiatric interventions, and medications employed in
attempting to treat appellant’s “acute disorders of hearing voices,
depression, hallucinations, and paranoia.”
Defense counsel reiterated his request that the trial court
“exercise its discretion to not impose the 25 year to life firearm
enhancement” under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), but to
sentence appellant to 25 years to life on count 1, impose
concurrent sentences on the other counts, and not impose the
firearm enhancements on those counts. Alternatively, counsel
asked the court to impose a consecutive term of three years on
count 3 for a maximum sentence of 28 years to life.
The People reiterated their request to sentence appellant to
a term of 60 years to life, noting the high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, and callousness appellant exhibited in killing
Asghedom, and the devastating impact the murder had on the

17
community. Reminding the court that after Asghedom suffered
11 gunshot wounds, appellant walked over and kicked him in the
head before fleeing the scene, the prosecutor declared that none
of appellant’s social history, including his mental health issues
and other struggles in his life, “comes close to justifying what
[appellant] did to a defenseless Ermias Asghedom on that Sunday
afternoon.”
Before imposing sentence, the court stated:
“This court is ever mindful of its responsibility to not only
listen to and evaluate the mitigation presented by the defense
including the letter from Dr. Lieberman which the court has
considered.
“The court has also considered the position of the People.
To the extent . . . the defense was asking this court to dismiss any
enhancements, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that to do so would endanger public safety. Principally the court
looked at not only the one but the two guns that [appellant] used
in the killing of Mr. Asghedom as well as the shooting of
Mr. Lathan, and Mr. Villanueva.
“However, the sentence that the court is about to
pronounce, I am very mindful of what was presented as to
[appellant’s] mental health history. I’m also mindful of the
devastation caused to the victims and their families. So I think
this sentence balances both.”
The trial court then sentenced appellant to a term of 60
years to life in prison, consisting of 25 years to life on count 1, a
consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and a consecutive middle
term of three years on count 3, plus consecutive terms of four
years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5) and three years

18
for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).3
The court recommended to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation that appellant “be housed in a facility that would
address his mental health needs.”
B. Applicable law
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 added
subdivision (c) to section 1385 to provide: “Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1).) “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of
the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.”4 (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); see People v. Sek (2022) 74

3 In addition, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of
seven years on count 5, and imposed and stayed sentence on
counts 2, 4, and 6.
4 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) identifies nine mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) through (I):
“(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a
discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (a) of Section 745.

19
Cal.App.5th 657, 674 [Senate Bill No. 81 “amended section 1385
to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding
whether to strike enhancements . . . in the interest of justice”].)
The statute specifically defines “endanger public safety” to mean
“there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement
would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 721.)
We review questions regarding the statutory interpretation
of section 1385 de novo. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,
1032 (Walker); John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95
[questions of statutory construction reviewed de novo].) In

“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
“(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization
or childhood trauma.
“(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.
“(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed
the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.
“(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old.
“(I) Though a firearm was used in the current offense, it
was inoperable or unloaded.”

20
Walker, our Supreme Court considered the words of the
Legislature’s mandate in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), that the
presence of any of the mitigating circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (A) through (I) must be afforded “great weight”
and “ ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.’ ” (Walker, at pp. 1034–1036.)
Our Supreme Court’s examination led it to conclude
“section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s mandate to give ‘great weight’
to enumerated mitigating circumstances requires a sentencing
court to ‘engage[ ] in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on
the enumerated mitigating factors.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1034, quoting People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087,
1096, review dismissed.) As the high court explained, this means
that if the sentencing court “does not conclude that dismissal
would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances
strongly favor dismissing the enhancement.” (Walker, at
p. 1036.)
The presence of one or more mitigating circumstances thus
does not automatically require dismissal of an enhancement.
Rather, “if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement
‘would endanger public safety,’ then the court need not consider
the listed mitigating circumstances” under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), subparagraphs (A) through (I). (People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296; People v. Mazur (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 438, 445, review dismissed.)
Even in the absence of a finding that dismissal of an
enhancement will endanger public safety, “ ‘the ultimate question
before the trial court remains whether it is in the furtherance of
justice to dismiss an enhancement [citation] and this ‘furtherance

21
of justice’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)) inquiry requires a trial court’s
ongoing exercise of ‘discretion’ (id., subd. (c)(2)). Thus,
notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial
courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on
circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of
justice” inquiry.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033, quoting
People v. Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1098 & 1099, rev.
dism.)
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s finding
that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety
as well as its ultimate determination that dismissal would not be
in furtherance of justice. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 298 [“we review for abuse of discretion the trial
court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (a)”]; People v. Garcia (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 848, 851 [superior court’s finding that sentence
reduction would endanger public safety reviewed for abuse of
discretion].) Under that deferential standard, we will not set
aside the trial court’s decision unless we find it to be “ ‘so
erroneous that it “falls outside the bounds of reason.” [Citations.]
A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of
discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of discretion will be
“established by ‘a showing the trial court exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605–606.)

22
C. The trial court’s remarks at sentencing show that it
properly understood and did not abuse its discretion in
declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (c)
Appellant acknowledges the trial court was aware of its
discretion to dismiss the firearm enhancement. However, he
asserts “it is not clear that the court was aware of the new
statutory scheme [following Senate Bill No. 81’s amendments to
section 1385], the factors to be considered, and the requirement
that it give great weight to the strong evidence in mitigation.”
Appellant argues that because the court misapprehended the
relevant statutory scheme, it abused its discretion when it
declined to dismiss the 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement in
the face of undisputed evidence of severe mental illness and
childhood trauma. (See People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,
774 [“ ‘ “[a] court which is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers [cannot] exercise that ‘informed
discretion’ ” ’ ”].) We disagree.
To prove the trial court abused its discretion by
misapprehending the scope of its sentencing discretion, it is
appellant’s burden to “affirmatively demonstrate[ ]” such a
misunderstanding. (People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
709, 724; People v. Davis (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 168, 172 [to prove
an abuse of discretion on this basis, a defendant must
“affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion”].) Appellant, however, points to nothing in
the record to support his claim that the trial court misunderstood
or failed to “exercise[ ] its discretion in accordance with the
recently amended law.” And his reliance on “a silent record is

23
insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion.” (Coleman, at p. 725.)
Indeed, contrary to appellant’s claim, the record here
affirmatively shows the trial court fully understood and properly
exercised its discretion when it declined to dismiss the firearm
enhancement. Highlighting the evidence that appellant used not
one, but two guns in his violent attack which killed Asghedom
and wounded Lathan and Villanueva, the court declared its
finding “by clear and convincing evidence” that dismissal of any
enhancements in this case “would endanger public safety.”
Although this finding relieved the court of the duty to give great
weight to appellant’s evidence in mitigation under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) (People v. Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 445), the court’s remarks show that it nevertheless did place
great weight on appellant’s mitigating evidence. The court
emphasized its responsibility to consider and evaluate the
mitigation evidence presented by the defense, particularly the
evidence of appellant’s history of mental illness, and it indicated
that the sentence it was about to pronounce balanced appellant’s
mitigating evidence with the devastation appellant had caused to
the victims and their families. Finally, the court took appellant’s
mitigation evidence into account when it recommended to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that appellant “be
housed in a facility that would address his mental health needs.”
Although the court never expressly found dismissal of the
enhancement would not be in the furtherance of justice, we
presume the court was aware of and complied with section 1385,
subdivision (c)(1)’s mandate to “dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so.” And where, as here, “the
record is silent [citation], or ‘[w]here the record demonstrates

24
that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an
impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we
shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled
differently in the first instance.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 378.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.

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