People v. Strouth CA4/1

CourtListener 10265739CalctappNov 5, 2024

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Filed 11/5/24 P. v. Strouth CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082822

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN344793)

DAVID STROUTH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David G. Brown, Judge. Affirmed.

Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, Britton B. Lacy, and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2017, a jury convicted David Strouth of second degree murder (Pen.

Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)). The jury also found true that Strouth personally
used a knife in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The
court sentenced Strouth to prison for an indeterminate term of 15-years-to-
life plus a one-year determinate term for the knife enhancement.
We affirmed the judgment against Strouth in an unpublished opinion.
(See People v. Strouth (Oct. 22, 2019, D073335).)
In 2023, Strouth filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.91,
subdivision (b), which the trial court denied. Strouth appeals, arguing the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying facts of Strouth’s offense are not pertinent for
resolution of the issues presented. Suffice it to say, Strouth stabbed the
victim to death and was convicted of second degree murder.
After his conviction, Strouth moved for a new trial wherein he argued
that it was undisputed at trial that he suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and thus, he could not form the requisite mens rea to
commit murder. The trial court disagreed, finding the jury was properly
instructed and substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict.
Strouth also brought a motion based on the Eighth Amendment that
his conviction should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. The court
denied this motion as well, but in doing so, considered Strouth’s military
service as well as his PTSD diagnosis.
The court subsequently sentenced Strouth to prison but not without
further discussion of the impact of PTSD on Strouth and his actions.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2
Almost six years later, Strouth brought a petition for resentencing
based on health conditions due to military service. (See § 1170.91, subd. (b).)
The prosecution opposed the petition, arguing that the trial court had
considered Strouth’s PTSD in ruling on the motion for new trial as well as
the motion to reduce Strouth’s murder conviction to manslaughter.
Additionally, the prosecution contended that the trial court took into account
Strouth’s PTSD when it sentenced him. Finally, the prosecutor argued that
Strouth’s 15-year-to-life prison term was not subject to resentencing under
section 1170.91 because that statute did not apply to indeterminate prison
terms. However, it is undisputed that the prosecution was relying on a
former version of section 1170.91 for that argument.
At the beginning of the hearing on the section 1170.91 petition, the
court indicated that its tentative ruling was to deny the petition because a
second degree murder conviction was not eligible for resentencing under the
statute. In response, Strouth’s counsel did not “dispute the court’s finding on
that issue” but urged the court to strike the one-year term based on the knife
enhancement in the interest of justice.
The prosecutor then indicated that Strouth was ineligible for
resentencing under section 1170.91, subdivision (c) because he committed a
homicide. She also noted that the trial court had considered Strouth’s mental
health issues in ruling on his two post-trial motions as well as during
sentencing. Additionally, the prosecutor maintained that the court should
not strike the one-year knife enhancement in the interest of justice because
Strouth would be “a danger to public safety and dismissal is not in the
furtherance of justice.”

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The court questioned if striking the one-year knife enhancement would
have any impact on Strouth’s sentence. The prosecutor answered:
“Your Honor, I just believe that it would be in the court’s
discretion, and as this court had indicated, this court is
looking to see what sort of impact it would have.

“Again, [defense counsel] had indicated that a lot in the law
has changed since he was sentenced, and it could further
continue to change. And so that enhancement could
essentially be something that we hold onto in the future if
the law does change. I believe that striking the knife
allegation because this court believes that well, one year
may not make a difference in a 15-years-to-life sentence is
not the proper way that this court should be looking at it.
This court should look at it as if striking that one-year
enhancement is in the interest of justice, and the people
believe that it is not as―The people believe that the
defendant is a danger to the community based on the facts
that came out at trial and this it is not in the interest of
justice to strike the enhancement.”

The court then confirmed with the prosecutor that the sentence that
Strouth received would “still be in play if the defendant was convicted today.”
Being assured that it was without objection by defense counsel, the court
denied the petition.
The court subsequently entered a written order stating in part:
“Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate life term in relation to Count
One, Murder in the second degree. As a result, this portion of his sentence is
not eligible for resentencing.”
Strouth timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Strouth raises two issues. First, he argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his petition because it misapplied the law. To this
end, Strouth contends the court relied on the former version of

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section 1170.91, which only applied to defendants serving determinative
sentences. (See People v. Stewart (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 416, 423-424;
former § 1170.91, subd. (b)(1)(A), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 523, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) Thus, he maintains the court did not understand the
current law, and therefore, it abused its discretion. (Cf. In re Large (2007)
41 Cal.4th 538, 550.)
Yet, Strouth admits that even under the current version of
section 1170.91, which was applicable to his petition, he is not entitled to
resentencing of his 15-year-to life sentence for second degree murder.
We agree.
In 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170.91, and restricted
eligibility for resentencing “by adding subdivision (c), a carve-out provision
stating that ‘[t]his section does not apply to a person convicted of, or having
one or more prior convictions for, an offense specified in clause (iv) of
paragraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of [s]ection 667 or an offense
requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of [s]ection 290.’ (§ 1170.91,
subd. (c).) These changes became effective on January 1, 2023.” (People v.
Sherman (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 325, 330.) Section 1170.91, subdivision (c),
also “applies to pending petitions for resentencing filed before
January 1, 2023, including those pending on appeal.” (Sherman, at p. 333.)
Strouth concedes that his murder conviction is a “ ‘super strike’ ” under
section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV) and thus his sentence for murder is
not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.91. Consequently, even if the
court improperly applied the former version of 1170.91 in denying Strouth’s
petition, there would be no reason to remand the matter because Strouth
concedes he is not entitled to any relief as to his 15-year-to-life sentence.

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However, Strouth provides this background to support his second
argument on appeal that remand is necessary so the court can correctly
determine, under the current version of 1170.91, whether the one-year knife
enhancement should be struck in the interest of justice. We are not
persuaded.
As a threshold matter, we do not find the record to clearly show that
the court applied the wrong version of section 1170.91. The court begins the
hearing on the petition by explaining to the parties that its “tentative is to
deny based on what appears the clear statement of the law that the
indeterminate life term, count 1, murder in the second degree is not eligible
pursuant to the statute for rehearing.” Although the court identifies the
sentence for second degree murder as indeterminate, its statement that the
sentence for the homicide crime is ineligible for resentencing is correct under
the current version of the statute. (See § 1170.91, subd. (c).) Strouth’s trial
counsel explicitly did not “dispute the court’s finding on that issue.” And the
prosecutor specifically referenced subdivision (c) of the subject statute and
stated that “I think we are all in agreement that the defendant is ineligible
for resentencing under this section as he has a current conviction for a
homicide offense.” Neither the court nor defense counsel disagreed with the
prosecutor’s statement. Thus, the record of the hearing strongly suggests
that everyone was on the same page about what version of section 1170.91
applied to Strouth’s petition.
Moreover, at the beginning of the hearing on the petition, defense
counsel informed the court that it had discretion to strike the one-year knife
enhancement: “I would say that 1170.91 was amended by SB1209 which took
effect [in] January 2023, and it does clearly say that the court, in the interest
of justice, could strike the knife allegation, and I would ask the court to do

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that.” The prosecutor directly replied to defense counsel’s argument,
asserting that it would not be “in the interest of justice” to strike the knife
enhancement “because [Strouth] would be a danger to the community.” The
prosecutor later reiterated that the interest of justice did not support striking
the enhancement: “His mental state and proximity to weapons show that he
is a danger to public safety and dismissal is not in the furtherance of justice.”
In response to the prosecutor’s argument, defense counsel again
referenced the interest of justice: “All I’m asking is in the interest of justice
based on who he is and how this happened and his lack of a record that you
strike the one-year knife enhancement.”
Then, when the court asked the prosecutor whether striking the one-
year knife allegation would have any impact, the prosecutor focused the court
on the relevant issue―should the court strike the enhancement in the
interest of justice:
“I believe that striking the knife allegation because this
court believes that well, one year may not make a
difference in a 15-years-to-life sentence is not the proper
way the court should be looking at it. This court should
look at it as if striking that one-year enhancement is in the
interests of justice, and the people believe that it is not
as―The people believe that the defendant is a danger to the
community based on the facts that came out at trial and
that it is not in the interest of justice to strike the
enhancement.”

Therefore, the record is clear that the prosecutor and defense counsel
repeatedly told the court it could strike the one-year knife enhancement in
the interest of justice and then argued why the court should or should not do
so. And although the court did not specifically refer to the interest of justice
in making its ruling, it did inquire whether, under the current law, Strouth
would be subject to the same one-year knife enhancement. After learning

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that was the case, the court then declined to strike the one-year
enhancement. The court therefore changed its approach in considering
whether to strike the enhancement from an evaluation of the impact of
striking the enhancement to assessing if Strouth would be subject to the
same enhancement had he committed his crime under existing law.
We observe that Strouth minimizes the extensive “in the interest of
justice” discussion at the hearing and tries to focus us on the court’s written
order that does not mention the one-year enhancement whatsoever.
However, the minute order does not diminish what occurred at the hearing
on the petition below. Indeed, we would be hard pressed to find a better
example of the parties explicitly arguing about whether an enhancement
should be stricken in the interest of justice and ensuring that the court
appropriately considered its discretion through that lens.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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