CourtListener 10260182•People v. Carachure CA4/3
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Filed 11/4/24 P. v. Carachure CA4/3
Opinion after recalling remittitur
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G059817
v. (Super. Ct. No. 13CF2054)
ARMANDO ANDRES OPINION
CARACHURE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
A jury found defendant Armando Andres Carachure guilty of first
degree murder and active participation in a gang. The jury also found true a
gang-murder special circumstance allegation and a gang enhancement. The
jury did not find true a weapon enhancement (a knife). The trial court
imposed a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Carachure later filed a petition for relief under Penal Code
1
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The trial court denied the petition at
the prima facie stage, finding that the gang-murder special circumstance
precluded Carachure from obtaining relief as a matter of law.
The California Supreme Court subsequently held that a jury’s
true finding on a gang-murder special circumstance allegation does not
preclude a defendant from obtaining relief under section 1172.6 as a matter
of law. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 460–461 (Curiel).)
Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Carachure’s
section 1172.6 petition. On remand, the court is directed to issue an order to
show cause (OSC) and to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, Carachure was a member of a gang. A witness saw
Carachure and one or two other young males chasing a rival gang member
through a park. The rival gang member was stabbed in the back numerous
times, which resulted in his death.
1
Assembly Bill No. 200 (Reg. Sess. 2021–2022) has since
renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
For clarity, we will generally refer to section 1172.6 in this opinion. All
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
In 2014, the People filed an information charging Carachure with
murder and active participation in a criminal street gang. The People further
charged a gang-murder special circumstance allegation, a gang sentencing
enhancement, and a personal use of a weapon enhancement. The People
further alleged two prison priors.
In 2015, the jury found Carachure guilty of first degree murder
and active gang participation. The jury found true the gang-murder special
circumstance allegation and the gang enhancement. The jury did not find
true the personal use of a weapon enhancement. The trial court found true
the prison priors and sentenced Carachure to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.
In 2016, Carachure challenged a jury instruction and a parole
revocation fine on appeal. This court affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Carachure (Oct. 14, 2016, G051613) [nonpub. opn.] (Carachure I).)
In 2019, following legislative changes to the murder statutes (§§
188, 189) Carachure filed a section 1172.6 petition.
In 2020, the trial court denied the petition at the prima facie
stage. The court found the gang-murder special circumstance precluded
Carachure from relief as a matter of law.
In 2021, Carachure’s appointed counsel filed a no-issue brief. (See
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) This court affirmed. (People v.
Carachure (Jul 21, 2021, G059817) [nonpub. opn.] (Carachure II).)
In 2024, following the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, Carachure filed a motion to recall the
remittitur. Receiving no opposition from the Attorney General, this court
recalled the remittitur and requested further briefing.
3
II.
DISCUSSION
Based on the California Supreme Court’s recent Curiel decision,
Carachure claims the trial court erred by denying his section 1172.6 petition
at the prima facie stage. We agree.
“This is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.” (See
People v. Murillo (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 160, 167.) In this discussion, we will:
A) review relevant principles of law; B) summarize Carachure’s record of
conviction; and C) analyze the relevant laws as applied to the facts.
A. Principles of Law
Generally, a person may be liable for a crime as a perpetrator or
as an aider and abettor. (§ 31.) An aider and abettor can be held liable for
crimes that were intentionally aided and abetted (target offenses); an aider
and abettor could also be held liable for any crimes that were not intended
but were reasonably foreseeable (nontarget offenses). (People v. Laster (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1462–1463.)
Liability for intentional, target offenses is known as “direct” aider
and abettor liability; liability for unintentional, nontarget offenses was
formerly known as “‘the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine.’”
(People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055.)
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §
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1, subd. (f); accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.) The
Legislature amended the relevant murder statutes: “Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal
in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to
a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).) The Legislature effectively eliminated the natural and probable
2
consequences doctrine, while preserving direct aider and abettor liability.
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.)
The Legislature further added former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6), which provides a procedure for persons convicted of “murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” to seek vacatur of the
conviction and resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “[T]he process begins with
the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for
eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that ‘[t]he petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to [Penal Code] [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’
the effective date of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).” (People v.
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The sentencing court must then
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or
she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)–(c); accord, Strong, at p. 708.)
A trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6 is
“limited.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) “‘“[T]he court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
2
The Legislature further amended the felony-murder rule (§ 189,
subds. (e), (f)), but the felony-murder rule is not at issue in this appeal.
5
or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.”’” (Ibid.) At the prima facie stage, “the trial court should not
decide unresolved factual issues that involve credibility determinations or
weighing of evidence. Rather, it should decide such issues only after issuing
an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.” (People v.
Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 811–812, fn. omitted.)
A trial court may rely on the record of conviction to determine
whether a prima facie showing has been rebutted. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 970.) The record of conviction “allow[s] the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.)
However, not all documents comprising the record of conviction are sufficient
to rebut a petitioner’s factual allegations. For example, while an appellate
opinion is part of the record of conviction, the probative value of such opinion
on the prima facie inquiry is “case specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that an
appellate opinion might not supply all answers.’” (Id. at p. 972.) 3
“‘If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that
the [petitioner] is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition.’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 450.) But if the petitioner has met
the prima facie burden, “the trial court must issue an order to show cause
and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and
to resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.” (People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853; accord, § 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
3
Additionally, since Lewis was decided, the Legislature has
further limited the portions of an appellate opinion that may be considered in
an 1172.6 proceeding. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
.
6
B. The Record of Conviction
During Carachure’s trial, the court instructed the jury on direct
aiding and abetting, in part, as follows: “A person may be guilty of a crime in
two ways. One, he or she may have directly committed the crime. I will call
that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted the
perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. [¶] A person is guilty of a
crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the
perpetrator.” The instruction stated: “Someone aids and abets a crime if he
or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically
intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate
the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”
The trial court also instructed on the (now defunct) natural and
probable consequences doctrine regarding murder liability: “Before you may
decide whether the defendant is guilty of Murder or Manslaughter, you must
decide whether he is guilty of Assault and/or Battery. [¶] To prove that the
defendant is guilty of Murder or Manslaughter, the People must prove that:
[¶] 1. The defendant is guilty of Assault and/or Battery, [¶] 2. During the
commission of Assault and/or Battery a coparticipant in that Assault and/or
Battery committed the crime of Murder or Voluntary Manslaughter. [¶] AND
[¶] 3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have known that the commission of the Murder or Voluntary
Manslaughter was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of
the Assault and/or Battery.”
The trial court further instructed on the gang-murder special
circumstance: “If you decide that the defendant is guilty of First degree
Murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you consider the special
circumstance of Murder Committed for Criminal Street Gang Purpose . . . ,
7
you must decide whether defendant acted with the intent to kill. [¶] In order
to prove this special circumstance for a defendant who is not the actual killer
but who is guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor, the People
must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.”
At the prima facie hearing regarding Carachure’s section 1172.6
petition, the trial court relied on the jury’s true finding on the gang-murder
special circumstance allegation to deny the petition “because that
circumstance requires the defendant intentionally killed the victim.”
C. Analysis and Application
A jury’s true finding on a gang-murder special circumstance
allegation does not preclude a petitioner from relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 460–461.) In Curiel, a jury
convicted defendant Curiel of first degree murder and active gang
participation. The jury found true a gang-murder special circumstance
allegation and a gang enhancement. Curiel later filed a section 1172.6
petition, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage. The trial court
reasoned that the jury’s intent to kill finding as part of the gang-murder
special circumstance allegation precluded relief. (Curiel, at p. 440.)
The Supreme Court disagreed: “The jury’s finding of intent to kill
does not, itself, conclusively establish that Curiel is ineligible for relief.
Curiel’s allegation [in the petition] that he could not currently be convicted of
murder because of the changes in substantive law enacted by Senate Bill
1437 put at issue all the elements of murder under current law. Murder
liability as [a direct] aider and abettor requires both a sufficient mens rea
and a sufficient actus reus. A finding of intent to kill, viewed in isolation,
establishes neither.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441.)
8
Here, in Carachure’s section 1172.6 petition, he averred: “1. A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] 2a. At trial, I was convicted
of 1st or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] . . . [¶] 3. I could not now be
convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code
§§ 188 and 189, effective January 1,2019.”
Under the prima facie test—accepting what is asserted in
Carachure’s section 1172.6 petition as true—he is entitled to relief. (See
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The record of conviction further supports
Carachure’s averments. That is, at Carachure’s trial, the court instructed on
the jury on the (now defunct) natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Nevertheless, the trial court denied Carachure’s section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage because the court reasoned that the jury’s
finding of an intent to kill as part of the gang-murder special circumstance
allegation made Carachure ineligible for relief as a matter of law. But that
rationale has since been squarely rejected by the California Supreme Court.
(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441; see also Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Thus, the trial court erred when it summarily denied Carachure’s
section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. On remand, we direct the
court to issue an OSC and to conduct an evidentiary hearing, as provided for
in the statute. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d).)
The Attorney General argues the jury found Carachure guilty as
a direct aider and abettor, rather than under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The Attorney Generals’ argument relies on the jury’s
9
guilty verdict on the first degree murder charge, which found Carachure
acted with the mental state of premeditation and deliberation. We disagree.
“Except for strict liability offenses, every crime has two
components: (1) an act or omission, sometimes called the actus reus; and (2) a
necessary mental state, sometimes called the mens rea. [Citations.] This
principle applies to aiding and abetting liability as well as direct liability. An
aider and abettor must do something and have a certain mental state.”
(People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.)
“Thus, proof of [direct] aider and abettor liability requires proof
in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime
committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—
knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist
in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the
crime.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.)
Here, the jury’s verdict on the first degree murder charge, and its
true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance plainly establishes that
the jury found Carachure intended to kill and he acted with premeditation
and deliberation (the mens rea). But the first degree murder verdict and the
gang-murder special circumstance do not establish—as a matter of law—that
Carachure directly aided and abetted the murders (the actus reus).
In other words, without weighing the evidence, it is possible
Carachure intended to kill, and acted with premeditation and deliberation,
but he did not directly “‘aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate’” the
target crimes of murder (rather than the target crime of assault and/or
battery under the natural and probable consequences theory). (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 446, 441 [“Murder liability as an aider and abettor
10
requires both a sufficient mens rea and a sufficient actus reus. A finding of
intent to kill, viewed in isolation, establishes neither”].) This is particularly
true in this case because the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, which is no longer a viable theory of murder liability.
We further note that Curiel was also convicted of first degree
murder, but the Supreme Court did not find that Curiel’s first degree murder
verdict precluded relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 447 [Curiel “alleged that he had been convicted of first
degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”].)
The Attorney General also argues that our 2016 decision in
Carachure’s initial appeal, which rejected an instructional error claim under
People v. Chiu ( 2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, bars Carachure’s current claim of relief
under section 1172.6 under the law of the case doctrine. (See Carachure I,
supra, G051613.) We disagree.
“‘The law of the case doctrine holds that when an appellate
opinion states a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that
principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to through
its subsequent progress in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal.’”
(People v. Cooper (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 500, 524.)
“‘“The principal reason for the doctrine is judicial economy.”’”
(People v. Cooper, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 524.) “‘The doctrine will not be
applied, however, when such application leads to an unjust result. Because
the law of the case doctrine “is merely one of procedure and does not go to the
jurisdiction of the court [citations], the doctrine will not be adhered to where
its application will result in an unjust decision, e.g., where . . . the controlling
rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between
the first and second appellate determinations.”’” (Id. at p. 525, italics added.)
11
Here, at the time of Carachure’s first appeal in 2016, the natural
and probable consequences doctrine was still a viable theory of murder
liability. (See Carachure I, supra, G051613.) But in 2019, the Legislature
significantly altered the laws regarding murder liability through the
enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437. And since then, our Supreme Court has
further clarified the laws regarding accomplice liability in the wake of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (See, e.g., Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441
[“The jury’s finding of intent to kill does not, itself, conclusively establish that
Curiel is ineligible for relief”]; People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989 [“To
suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense”].)
In short, given the significant intervening changes to the laws
concerning murder liability since the time of our earlier nonpublished
decision in 2016, both as to the relevant statutes (§§ 188, 189), and as to
relevant case law, we find that the law of the case doctrine does not apply.
(See People v. Cooper, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 525 [the law of the case
doctrine does not apply “‘“where . . . the controlling rules of law have been
altered or clarified” since the earlier appeal”’”].)
To reiterate and conclude, the jury’s true finding on the gang-
murder special circumstance and the first degree murder verdict do not
establish as a matter of law that Carachure both “had the requisite intent”
(the mens rea), and he “engaged in the requisite acts” (the actus reus), to
prove he directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder. (See People v.
Duchine, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 815.) And since the jury was instructed
on the (now defunct) natural and probable consequences doctrine, the section
1172.6 petition cannot be denied at the prima facie stage as a matter of law.
12
III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Carachure’s petition at the prima
facie stage is reversed. On remand, the court is directed to issue an OSC and
to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
MOORE, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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