People v. Castillo CA2/8

CourtListener 10131624CalctappOct 8, 2024

Full text

Filed 10/8/24 P. v. Castillo CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B328791

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA155907
v.

BRITNEY CASTILLO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.

Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and David F. Glassman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
SUMMARY
Defendant Britney Castillo pled nolo contendere to one
count of carrying a concealed, unregistered firearm in her car in
violation of Penal Code section 25400, subdivision (a)(1).
(Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) After her
plea but before sentencing, the United States Supreme Court
decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022)
597 U.S. 1 (Bruen). Bruen held New York’s firearms licensing
scheme was constitutionally invalid for requiring an applicant to
show “proper cause” to get a concealed carry license; along the
way, Bruen noted California’s “good cause” requirement was also
unconstitutional. The day after the Bruen decision, the
California Attorney General issued a legal alert instructing local
officials not to require proof of good cause for issuing a concealed
carry permit.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the count of which she
was convicted on the ground the licensing statute was
unconstitutional. The trial court denied her motion. Now she
appeals, contending her conviction should be reversed because
the statutory scheme upon which her plea was based is facially
invalid under the Second Amendment.
We conclude, as other Courts of Appeal have done, that
defendant has standing to make a facial challenge to the
statutory scheme on which her conviction was based. On the
merits, we likewise join other Courts of Appeal that have
concluded, in similar circumstances, that the “good cause”
requirement is severable, and the statutory scheme then in effect
was not otherwise facially unconstitutional by virtue of its use of
the term “may issue” a license rather than “shall issue” a license.
Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction.

2
FACTS
On October 9, 2021, defendant was a passenger in her car,
driven by her companion who brandished and fired a gun at a
motorist. During a later search of the car, police found
two firearms and ammunition hidden behind the glove
compartment. Defendant and her companion were arrested.
On June 10, 2022, defendant pled no contest to a violation
of section 25400, subdivision (a)(1), which prohibits carrying a
firearm that is capable of being concealed upon the person within
a vehicle that is under the person’s control or direction.
Defendant’s sentencing was put over for six months to allow her
to satisfy conditions under which the charge would be reduced to
a misdemeanor; if she did not complete those requirements, she
would be sentenced to two years of formal probation with
conditions.
On June 23, 2022, the Bruen decision was issued, and on
December 12, 2022, defendant filed her motion to dismiss, which
the trial court denied. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the
trial court’s January 25, 2023 judgment.
DISCUSSION
We begin by noting that our discussion is directed to the
licensing statutes in effect when defendant was convicted. Since
that time, the Legislature has amended the statutes in several
ways, including use of the term “shall issue” instead of “may
issue,” and elimination of “good cause” and “good moral
character” requirements. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 26150,
subds. (a)(1)-(2) & (b), as amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 249, § 10,
eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)

3
1. Standing
Respondent contends at some length that defendant does
not have standing to challenge California’s firearm licensing
scheme. We disagree.
An extended discussion of respondent’s contention is
unnecessary. Respondent fails to describe the applicable
principle, and likewise fails to cite any California case post-Bruen
that finds a defendant lacks standing to bring a facial challenge
to California’s firearm statutes. Nor does respondent make any
effort to explain why the post-Bruen California cases that find
defendants have standing to bring facial challenges are mistaken.
The relevant principle was established in a different
context in Smith v. Cahoon (1931) 283 U.S. 553 (Smith). The
high court stated: “[T]he principle is well established that when
a statute, valid upon its face, requires the issue of a license or
certificate as a condition precedent to carrying on a business or
following a vocation, one who is within the terms of the statute,
but has failed to make the required application, is not at liberty
to complain because of his anticipation of improper or invalid
action in administration. [Citations.] This principle, however, is
not applicable where a statute is invalid upon its face and an
attempt is made to enforce its penalties in violation of
constitutional right.” (Id. at p. 562.)
Defendant brings only a facial challenge to the statutory
scheme under which she was convicted. Under the Smith
principle, defendant was not required to apply for a license in
order to challenge the statutory scheme on its face. California
courts deciding the issue post-Bruen agree. (See In re D.L. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 144, 156 (D.L.) [juvenile defendant who did not
apply for a public carry license had standing “because he is

4
challenging the facial constitutionality of a criminal statute
under which he has been convicted”]; see also People v. Mosqueda
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 403 (Mosqueda) [“agree[ing] with our
judicial peers” that defendants charged with unlawfully carrying
a concealed firearm “had standing to raise the defense by
demurrer”]; In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 902, 912–
913 & fn. 16 [juvenile defendant charged with carrying a loaded
firearm not registered to him had standing to raise a facial
challenge to the statute under which he was convicted].) For an
extended analysis of the standing issue, see D.L., at pages 156–
161.
2. The Merits
a. Bruen
Several California cases describe the Bruen decision in
detail. (See, e.g., D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 150–153.)
We give an abbreviated description here.
Bruen held “that when the Second Amendment’s plain text
covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively
protects that conduct.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 17.) “The
government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the
individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’ ” (Id. at p. 24.)
Applying this standard, Bruen concluded New York’s
“proper cause” requirement was unconstitutional. (Bruen, supra,
597 U.S. at p. 39.) The court found the plain text of the Second
Amendment “presumptively guarantees petitioners . . . a right to
‘bear’ arms in public for self-defense.” (Bruen, at p. 33.) After an
extensive historical analysis, the court found the government did

5
not meet its burden to identify “an American tradition justifying
the State’s proper-cause requirement. The Second Amendment
guaranteed to ‘all Americans’ the right to bear commonly used
arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined
restrictions.” (Id. at p. 70.) “Apart from a few late-19th-century
outlier jurisdictions, American governments simply have
not broadly prohibited the public carry of commonly used
firearms for personal defense,” or required “law-abiding,
responsible citizens” to demonstrate a special need for self-
defense. (Ibid.)
It was clear from Bruen that California’s “analogue[]” to the
“proper cause” standard—the “good cause” requirement in former
section 26150—is also unconstitutional. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S.
at p. 15 & fn. 2.)
b. The statutory framework and severability
California’s statutory framework regulating firearms is
“ ‘multifaceted’ ”; the concealed carry licensing scheme in effect at
the time is described in detail in D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pages 153–155. The Mosqueda case provides a brief summary:
“Carrying a concealed handgun in public, whether loaded or
unloaded, is generally prohibited unless the individual obtains a
license. [Citation.] The county sheriff or chief of police ‘may
issue’ a license to carry a concealed handgun upon proof that
‘good cause’ exists for issuing the license. [Citations, including
former § 26150.] The applicant must be fingerprinted and pass a
background check and must also prove that he or she is of ‘good
moral character,’ resides or works in the issuing county or city,
and has completed a firearm safety course.” (Mosqueda, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)

6
While Bruen invalidated the “good cause” requirement,
California Courts of Appeal have thus far held the good cause
requirement is severable from the remainder of the licensing
framework. The principles of severability and their application to
the concealed carry licensing scheme are described in detail in
D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pages 162–164. Briefly stated,
there is a presumption in favor of severability of an
unconstitutional provision of a statute. (Id. at p. 162.) In the
absence of language confirming or prohibiting severability, the
criteria are whether a provision is grammatically, functionally,
and volitionally separable. (Id. at p. 163.) (Volitional
separability refers to whether the Legislature would have
adopted the remainder of the statute if it had foreseen the partial
invalidation of the statute. (Ibid.))
We agree with D.L.’s severability analysis, and need not
repeat it here because defendant does not challenge the point,
except to claim that the severability doctrine “may not be applied
retroactively to save a conviction.” By this, defendant apparently
means that in criminal cases, the severability doctrine cannot be
applied if the statute was unconstitutional on its face when the
crime was committed. We disagree. D.L., like this case, involved
a pre-Bruen conviction, and rejected the same contention. (D.L.,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–165.)
Defendant relies on Smith, supra, 283 U.S. 553. Smith, the
reader will recall, held that a criminal defendant may bring a
facial challenge to an unconstitutional licensing statute even if he
or she never applied for a license. (Id. at p. 562.) Smith also held
that the statute’s severability or savings clause did not matter,
because “no line of severance is indicated in the terms of the Act”
(id. at p. 563), and “until such separation has been accomplished

7
by judicial decision, the statute remains with its inclusive
purport, and those concerned in its application have no means of
knowing definitely what eventually will be eliminated and what
will be left” (id. at pp. 563–564).
Smith does not help defendant here. The defendant in
Smith was a private carrier for hire, charged with operating
without having obtained a certificate of public convenience and
necessity, and without having paid the required tax. (Smith,
supra, 283 U.S. at p. 556.) The statute, containing those and
many other regulatory requirements, such as a schedule of tariffs
and the giving of a bond (id. at pp. 557–560), made no distinction
between common carriers and a private carrier like the defendant
(id. at p. 562). The court observed that “[s]uch a scheme of
regulation of the business of a private carrier, such as the
[defendant] is manifestly beyond the power of the State.” (Id. at
p. 563.) A severance “so as to afford one scheme for common
carriers and another for private carriers . . . would be to make the
statute, until such severance was determined by competent
authority, void for uncertainty.” (Id. at p. 564.) Further: “It is
idle to say that one could take a statute of this sort, establishing
requirements binding upon private and common carriers alike,
and divide its terms so as to make a valid scheme applicable to
private carriers.” (Ibid.)
In short, in Smith “no line of severance is indicated in the
terms of the Act.” (Smith, supra, 283 U.S. at p. 563.) We agree
with D.L.’s summary: In Smith, “[t]here really was no way to
know ‘what eventually [would] be eliminated and what [would] be
left’ after eliminating the unconstitutional aspects of the law
[Smith, at p. 564], because the requirements of the lawful and
unconstitutional aspects of it were intertwined and not

8
functionally or volitionally severable. Here, unlike Smith, a valid
firearm licensing framework remains even if the ‘good cause’
requirement is severed.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 164,
first and fourth brackets added.)
Defendant also cites In re Porterfield (1946) 28 Cal.2d 91,
telling us that Porterfield “[c]iting Smith, . . . rejected the same
retroactive severance argument.” Defendant tells us nothing
about the ordinance in Porterfield or why it was invalidated, and
we will not lengthen this opinion by responding to arguments not
made.
c. The statute’s “may issue” provision
That brings us to the principal point of defendant’s
argument. Defendant contends that even when we sever the
“good cause” requirement, the remainder of the statute is
unconstitutional because of the “may issue” language. Defendant
tells us it is “unnecessary . . . to address the validity of the three
surviving criteria.” (Those criteria were good moral character,
residency and a course of training.) That is because, according to
defendant, the statute’s “may issue” language “provides licensing
authorities discretion to issue or not issue a license even when the
applicant has satisfied all the enumerated criteria.” We do not
agree.
Defendant relies on Gifford v. City of Los Angeles (2001)
88 Cal.App.4th 801, 805, where the court stated that the
predecessor statute to section 26150 “gives ‘extremely broad
discretion’ to the sheriff concerning the issuance of concealed
weapons licenses [citation] and ‘explicitly grants discretion to the
issuing officer to issue or not issue a license to applicants meeting
the minimum statutory requirements.’ ” Gifford concerned the
licensing authority’s discretion as it relates to the “good cause”

9
requirement, and the other cases cited in Gifford or cited by
defendant appear to do so as well, or to be otherwise off the
point.1 None of them stands for the proposition that the “may
issue” language alone confers unfettered discretion on the
licensing authorities. Indeed, Gifford involved a stipulated
judgment in which the Los Angeles Police Department stated
that it “ ‘recognizes that [the statute] requires the issuance of
licenses to persons of good character who have good cause to
carry a concealed firearm for the defense of themselves or others
or in pursuing their livelihood.’ ” (Gifford, at p. 803; see id. at
p. 806 [“Nothing in the judgment requires the Police Department

1 Gifford quoted Erdelyi v. O’Brien (9th Cir. 1982) 680 F.2d
61, which affirmed the denial of a concealed-carry license to an
employee of a licensed private investigator. (Erdelyi, at pp. 62–
63; see id. at pp. 63–64 “[w]here state law gives the issuing
authority broad discretion to grant or deny license applications in
a closely regulated field,” initial applicants had no property right
in concealed weapons licenses; nor did the applicant have a
liberty interest].) Defendant also cites Nichols v. County of Santa
Clara (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1236, which refers to a sheriff’s
“extremely broad discretion” concerning issuance of concealed
carry licenses (id. at p. 1241; see id. at p. 1239 [sheriff had
discretion to revoke the license of the president of a weapons
manufacturer without a “ ‘due process hearing,’ ” because licensee
had no protected property or other interest in such a license]);
and CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 656 (Public Records
Act required disclosure of applications of persons who had
applied for a concealed weapon permit; “[i]f the press and the
public are precluded from learning the names of concealed
weapons’ licensees and the reasons claimed in support of the
licenses, there will be no method by which the public can
ascertain whether the law is being properly applied or carried out
in an evenhanded manner”).

10
to renew the licenses . . . without a current showing of good
cause.”].)
More importantly, defendant fails entirely to discuss or
attempt to distinguish the precedent that is precisely on point:
Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 399. Mosqueda observed that
the Bruen majority did not hold that “may issue” laws are facially
unconstitutional, and “[w]hether a ‘may issue’ regime operated as
a ‘shall issue’ regime was an issue for an as-applied challenge,
not a facial challenge.” (Mosqueda, at p. 412.) We agree with
that analysis.
By way of background, Bruen observed that “the vast
majority of States—43 by our count—are ‘shall issue’
jurisdictions, where authorities must issue concealed-carry
licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold
requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to
deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.
Meanwhile, only six States and the District of Columbia have
‘may issue’ licensing laws, under which authorities have
discretion to deny concealed-carry licenses even when the
applicant satisfies the statutory criteria, usually because the
applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the
relevant license.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at pp. 13–15,
fn. omitted.)
In a footnote identifying the 43 “shall issue” jurisdictions,
the court observed that three other states (Connecticut,
Delaware, and Rhode Island) “have discretionary criteria but
appear to operate like ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions. [Citations.]
Although Connecticut officials have discretion to deny a
concealed-carry permit to anyone who is not a ‘suitable person,’
[citation], the ‘suitable person’ standard precludes permits only to

11
those ‘individuals whose conduct has shown them to be lacking
the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted
with a weapon.’ [Citation.] As for Delaware, the State has thus
far processed 5,680 license applications and renewals in fiscal
year 2022 and has denied only 112. [Citation.] . . . Finally,
Rhode Island has a suitability requirement, [citation], but the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has flatly denied that the
‘[d]emonstration of a proper showing of need’ is a component of
that requirement.” (Bruen, 597 U.S. at p. 13, fn. 1.)
We agree with Mosqueda’s conclusion: “The Bruen court’s
citation to these statutes as ‘shall issue’ statutes demonstrated
the court was not facially condemning licensing schemes based
solely on their use of ‘may issue’ language or the exercise of
discretion. The court’s language that these jurisdictions ‘appear
to operate like “shall-issue” jurisdictions’ (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S.
at p. 13, fn. 1) indicates that, unless it can be determined from
the face of the provision, whether a licensing scheme vests an
amount of discretion in licensing authorities that exceeds what
the Second Amendment allows is an issue best decided in as-
applied challenges, not facial challenges. This is because the
argument of whether discretion was unlawfully exercised would
not apply in all circumstances.” (Mosqueda, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 413; see also D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 166 [“D.L.’s new argument concerning the ‘may issue’ language
. . . is an ‘as applied’ constitutional challenge and not a facial
challenge because the argument would not apply in all
circumstances. . . . Rather, it would only apply where the sheriff
or police chief refused to issue a license without articulating a
reason for the rejection.”].)

12
Defendant insists that Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring
opinion in Bruen “condemned” California’s may-issue licensing
scheme “even without a ‘good cause’ in the picture.” We do not
see it that way. Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately “to
underscore two important points about the limits of the Court’s
decision.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 79 (conc. opn. of
Kavanaugh, J.).) One of those points was that the high court’s
decision “does not prohibit States from imposing licensing
requirements for carrying a handgun for self-defense.” (Ibid.)
Justice Kavanaugh summarized this point by stating, “Going
forward, therefore, the 43 States that employ objective shall-issue
licensing regimes for carrying handguns for self-defense may
continue to do so. Likewise, the 6 States including New York
potentially affected by today’s decision may continue to require
licenses for carrying handguns for self-defense so long as those
States employ objective licensing requirements like those used by
the 43 shall-issue States.” (Id. at p. 80, italics added.)2
In short, Justice Kavanaugh condemned “unchanneled
discretion for licensing officials and the special-need
requirement” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 79 (conc. opn. of
Kavanaugh, J.)), but he did not equate every “may issue” statute
with “unchanneled discretion.”
Defendant brought only a facial challenge to California’s
concealed-carry licensing statutes. “ ‘ “To support a
determination of facial unconstitutionality, voiding the statute as

2 Justice Kavanaugh’s second point was that, as the majority
stated, the Second Amendment “ ‘is neither a regulatory
straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check,’ ” and allows a
variety of gun regulations. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 80
(conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.)

13
a whole,” ’ ” defendant “ ‘ “must demonstrate that the act’s
provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with
applicable constitutional prohibitions.” ’ ” (Tobe v. City of Santa
Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.) That is not the case here.
We note one other point. Defendant mentions in passing
that the licensing statute “needs to . . . delete the good moral
character criterion” and that good moral character is “an issue
not raised in Bruen,” citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of California
(1957) 353 U.S. 252, 263 (“the term, by itself, is unusually
ambiguous” and “can be defined in an almost unlimited number
of ways”). Defendant does not elaborate or present the point as a
separate issue, and as we have mentioned, specifically stated that
it is “unnecessary . . . to address the validity of the three
surviving criteria,” one of which was good moral character.
We may consider the point forfeited. “An appellant must
‘[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading
summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and,
if possible, by citation of authority.’ [Citations.] Failure to
provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in
the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.” (Pizarro v.
Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) In any event, even
assuming for the sake of argument that the good moral character
requirement was “not consistent with the nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation and is unconstitutional,” we agree
with Mosqueda that it is severable “for the same reasons the good
cause provision is grammatically, functionally, and volitionally
severable.” (Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 411.)
Accordingly, we reach the same conclusion as Mosqueda:
“Because section 26150’s ‘good cause’ and ‘good moral character’
requirements are severable, and because Bruen did not facially

14
invalidate the statute’s ‘may issue’ provision, section 26150 does
not facially violate the Second Amendment. Since the statute is a
valid licensing provision and provides a valid means for citizens
to exercise their right under Bruen to possess a handgun in
public for self-defense, [defendant’s] Second Amendment rights
are not violated when the state enforces that provision
criminally.” (Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

15

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.