CourtListener 10127111•People v. He CA4/3
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Filed 9/30/24 P. v. He CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063487
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI19003095)
YIZHI HE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Debra Harris, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, Warren Williams and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Yizhi He was convicted by jury of vehicular
manslaughter and reckless driving. Her sole contention on appeal is that the
trial court erred in imposing the midterm sentence for her crimes. Defendant
argues the lower term was required under Penal Code section 1170 because
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she was only 25 years old at the time of her offenses. Although that section
creates a presumption in favor of the lower term for youthful offenders, there
is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that
sentencing defendant to the lower term would defeat the ends of justice.
Therefore, we affirm her sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the night of January 26, 2019, defendant was stopped and
ticketed by the California Highway Patrol for driving her Porsche 109 mph on
Interstate 15, just north of Barstow. About an hour later, while driving
approximately 103 mph on the same highway in San Bernardino County,
defendant collided with a Nissan Sentra, causing it to rollover and crash. The
force of the collision killed the Sentra’s front passenger and left its driver in a
vegetative state. It also shook up their seven-year-old granddaughter, who
was riding in the backseat, although she did not sustain any serious physical
injuries. Defendant, then age 25, also escaped injury during the crash.
At trial, defendant was charged with second degree murder,
vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence, and reckless driving causing
serious injury. The jury acquitted her of murder but found her guilty of the
other two offenses. At sentencing, the court imposed the midterm sentence of
four years on the manslaughter count, plus a consecutive term of one third
the midterm on the reckless driving count, for a total prison term of four
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All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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years and eight months. Because defendant’s presentence credits exceeded
that term, she was released from custody and placed on parole.
DISCUSSION
Relying on the fact she was only 25 years old at the time of her
crimes, defendant argues the trial court should have sentenced her to the
lower term, not the midterm, on each count. The argument is based on
defendant’s belief that the trial court did not find any aggravating
circumstances applicable to rebut the presumption in favor of the lower term.
However, as we explain below, the record indicates otherwise. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Before sentencing, the probation officer filed a report with the
trial court that listed three aggravating circumstances: 1) defendant’s crimes
involved great bodily harm; 2) her victims were particularly vulnerable; and
3) her conduct indicates a serious danger to society. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1)(3), (b)(1).) The report also listed one factor in mitigation, that
being defendant’s lack of a prior criminal record. (Id., rule 4.423(b)(1).)
However, the report further noted that before the instant case arose,
defendant was cited in Nevada for driving 95 mph in a 65 mph zone.
When contacted by the probation officer, defendant said she did
not want to talk about her crimes without first talking to her attorney.
However, she said she was hoping to be released from custody without parole
supervision because she did not want to be restricted in terms of working or
going to school. Defendant also provided information about her personal life
and her work history, but she did not to mention anything about the victims
in this case.
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The probation officer interpreted that to mean defendant was not
remorseful for her offenses. Given defendant’s apparent lack of remorse, as
well as the severe harm her crimes caused, the probation officer believed she
deserved an extended prison commitment. But, in light of how defendant’s
case was charged, the highest term the probation officer could recommend
was four years and eight months, representing the midterm on the
manslaughter count and one third the midterm on the reckless driving count.
The prosecution advocated for a greater sentence in its
sentencing brief. While acknowledging defendant’s lack of a prior criminal
record, the prosecution argued the upper term of six years was warranted on
the manslaughter count because defendant had previously been cited for
speeding, and she was eligible for consecutive sentencing. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(7), (c).)
In defendant’s sentencing brief, counsel urged the court to impose
the lower term of two years on the manslaughter count and to stay sentence
on the reckless driving count under section 654. In fact, defense counsel
argued the lower term was mandated under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)
because defendant was under the age of 26 at the time of her offenses.
In support of this argument, defense counsel not only quoted
extensively from section 1170, he also included a research article that
suggests the lack of brain development may contribute to the higher risk of
accidents among young drivers. However, the article defines young drivers as
aged 16-24, and it states that most people reach full brain maturation around
the age of 25, which is how old defendant was when this case arose.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court said it had read the
probation report and the parties’ sentencing briefs. In regard to the
prosecution’s request for the upper term, the court explained it could not
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impose that term because no aggravating circumstances were pled and
proven at trial. The court also appeared to accept defense counsel’s
representation that, despite being reluctant to talk to the probation officer,
defendant was actually remorseful for the suffering she had caused her
victims.
Nevertheless, the court did not believe the lower term was
appropriate in this case. In announcing its intent to impose the midterm
sentence, the court cited the vulnerability of the victims to defendant’s
crimes. That prompted defense counsel to ask if the court was “mak[ing] a
finding that there was an aggravating factor of [victim] vulnerability?” The
court responded, “I’m just noting there are no aggravating factors. I’m just
noting factors that I found where I’m not imposing the low term.” Defense
counsel said he understood, and with that, the court sentenced defendant to
the midterm of four years on the manslaughter count, plus one third the
midterm, i.e., eight months, on the reckless driving count.
II.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In challenging the trial court’s sentencing decision, defendant
relies on the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), which became
effective on January 1, 2022, over a year and a half before she was sentenced
in July 2023. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.3.) “Based on those amendments, a
trial court may impose no greater than a middle term sentence unless it
relies on aggravating factors that (with the exception of prior convictions in a
certified record) have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt or
stipulated to by the defendant[.] (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3).)” (People v.
Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 904.)
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Furthermore, as set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
“unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the
lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission
of the offense: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The person . . . was a youth [defined as a person
under the age of 26] at the time of the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6).)
This provision creates a presumption in favor of the lower prison
term for youthful offenders. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 426-
430; People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.) However, if the
sentencing court determines there are aggravating factors present that
overcome the presumption, it is free to impose the midterm sentence. (People
v. Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 904-906.) And, in so doing, the
court is not required to make an express finding that imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (Id. at p. 906, fn. 14.)
In reviewing the trial court’s sentencing decision in this case, we
must also keep in mind, “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to
be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in
favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130,
1133.) As the appealing party, it is defendant’s burden to demonstrate error
and resulting prejudice. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.)
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Forfeiture
As a preliminary matter, respondent contends defendant forfeited
her right to challenge imposition of her midterm sentence by failing to invoke
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section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) at the sentencing hearing. However, in
advocating for the lower term in her sentencing brief, defendant not only
emphasized and quoted extensively from that provision, she also attached a
research article in support of her claim that youth was a contributing factor
to her crimes. Under these circumstances, we presume the trial court was
aware defendant was seeking to benefit from that provision. (See People v.
Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 905.) Therefore, the forfeiture rule
does not apply, and we will proceed to the merits. (See In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 881 [the forfeiture rule is intended to encourage parties to
bring issues to the attention of the trial court so that it has the opportunity to
rule on them].)
B. The Merits
Defendant asserts imposition of the lower term was required
under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) because the trial court “expressly
[found] that there were no aggravating circumstances that might have
arguably justified departure from the statutory preference for the low term
for youthful offenders.” We disagree.
The trial court did expressly find that there were no aggravating
circumstances present to justify the imposition of the upper term, which is
what the prosecution had requested. As the trial court properly recognized,
an upper term sentence generally may not be imposed unless aggravating
factors were pled and proven, and in this case, none were.
However, that is a separate issue from whether aggravating
factors existed so as to overcome the presumption for the lower term in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). Unlike the aggravating factors needed to
impose the upper term, the aggravating factors required to impose the
midterm need not be found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury.
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(People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 202-205.) Rather, they need
only be established by a preponderance of the evidence by the trial judge.
(Ibid.; People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 928–929.)
In this case, the trial judge’s explanation for imposing the
midterm sentence was not well developed in the record. After the judge
alluded to the victims’ vulnerability, defense counsel asked if she was making
a finding as to that aggravating factor. The judge replied, “I’m just noting
there are no aggravating factors. I’m just noting factors that I found where
I’m not imposing the low term.”
At first blush, these back-to-back statements seem to be
somewhat contradictory. However, we must remember they were made after
the trial judge had already determined that no aggravating factors had been
pled and proven to justify the prosecution’s request for the upper term
sentence. It appears the judge was merely reiterating that point when she
stated, “I’m just noting there are no aggravating factors.”
Having determined there were no aggravating factors available
to justify imposition of the upper term, the judge then turned to the next
issue, namely, whether to impose the lower term or the midterm sentence. In
that regard, the judge wanted to make a record of the factors she was relying
on for “not imposing the low term.” Although the judge noted but one factor—
the victims’ vulnerability—that was enough to overcome the presumption for
the lower term in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) and to impose the midterm
sentence. (See People v. Quintanilla (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 406, 413
[“‘California courts have long held that a single factor in aggravation is
sufficient to justify a sentencing choice’”].)
Defendant does not challenge the applicability of that
aggravating factor to her crimes. Rather, her entire appeal is premised on the
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assumption that the trial judge did not find any aggravating circumstances
that could be used to overcome the presumption for the lower term sentence.
Because the record indicates otherwise, there is no basis to disturb her
sentence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
MOTOIKE, J.
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