CourtListener 10125440•People v. Stackhouse CA2/4
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Filed 9/26/24 P. v. Stackhouse CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B328852
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA158039)
v.
LAWRENCE STACKHOUSE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Barhoma Law, Matthew Barhoma, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Lawrence
Stackhouse of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187(a); count 1)1
and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800(a)(1); count 2).
The jury found true the allegation defendant personally used a
firearm during the commission of the murder (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)).
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on
imperfect self-defense. He also contends the court erred in
excluding from trial his threat to sue a Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Deputy for “putting a case on him.” We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
Defendant shot and killed Andrew Bender on December 6,
2021. Bender’s mechanic, Michael Harrell, witnessed the
shooting.
Harrell worked with Marlon Johnson Senior (“Big Zip”) and
lived in a trailer located behind Big Zip’s house in Compton.
Several of Big Zip’s family members resided in the house with
him, including his son, Marlon Johnson Junior (“Little Zip”),
Little Zip’s half-brother, Marlow Johnson, and Big Zip’s niece,
Sharikah Mister.2 The house was located in an area claimed by
the Kelly Park Crips gang.
1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal
Code.
2 For clarity, we refer to the Johnsons by their monikers or first
names.
2
Bender, the victim, was Little Zip’s cousin. Bender was
affiliated with the Neighborhood Crips gang. He was around 50
years old at the time of the shooting.
1. Harrell’s Testimony
At trial, Harrell provided the testimony that follows
concerning defendant’s confrontation with Bender and the
shooting.
a. Confrontation the Prior Day
On December 5, 2021, Bender drove to Harrell’s residence
to have work done on his SUV. Harrell and Bender were
acquaintances. Around noon, Bender drove Harrell to get parts
for the SUV. Before leaving Harrell’s residence, a young man
known to be a Kelly Park Crips gang member walked up to
Bender in the driveway and said, “I heard you killed my father.”
Bender responded, “I didn’t kill your father, but I was in the car
with the [men] that did.” Bender then stated, “But that’s past me
now. I’m moving forward. I don’t want to talk about that no
more.”
While driving to the store in Bender’s SUV, Harrell
watched as Bender retrieved a small, semiautomatic gun out of
the center console. Harrell asked Bender what was wrong.
Bender replied, “[T]here is nothing going on,” and he put the gun
to the side of the seat.
Harrell and Bender drove back to Harrell’s residence where
they saw defendant and defendant’s Dodge Charger parked in the
driveway. Harrell had never met defendant, but heard he was an
Old-Time Gangster in the Kelly Park Crips gang. Several Kelly
Park Crips gang members were talking outside the home.
3
Harrell saw defendant speaking with Mister in the driveway
while he and Bender walked to the backyard. Bender left the
backyard, returned to his SUV in the driveway, and retrieved his
gun. He walked past defendant and Mister, “kind of staring at
[defendant], mad[-]dogging him.” Bender’s gun was at his side,
pointed down. Harrell went inside the house to tell Big Zip there
was a problem outside. When Harrell went back outside, Mister
told him Bender was “trippin. He’s trippen [sic].” Harrell told
defendant he “better watch [his] back.”
Defendant pulled a gun from his waistband, laid it on the
hood of his vehicle, and said, “[T]hat [man] don’t like me.”
Defendant’s gun appeared to be a .40 or .45 semiautomatic pistol.
Angry with the situation, defendant got in his car and drove
away. Bender stayed in the backyard waiting for Harrell to
resume working on his SUV.
b. Shooting of Bender
Around 8:00 a.m. the following day, Bender woke Harrell
up so that he could continue working on Bender’s SUV. Bender
sat on a pile of bricks as Harrell worked under the vehicle, his
feet hanging out from the front end. Due to police activity in the
area around 8:15 a.m., Bender decided to “put his gun up” by
placing it in a plastic tub under clothes behind a truck in the
driveway.
Around 8:30 a.m., Harrell heard the sound of defendant’s
Dodge Charger and looked west toward the street. He saw
defendant’s vehicle drive past the house and make a U-turn.
Harrell sat up from under Bender’s SUV as defendant parked in
front of the driveway. Defendant got out of his car, and Harrell
saw “that he had a gun.” Harrell watched as Bender began
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running away from where he was sitting. As Bender “stepped on
the driveway” to run away, defendant shot him once in the back.
Harrell testified that once he had been shot, Bender
“turned around, put his hands up, and [defendant] walked him
down and shot him” three more times in the stomach and chest
from a distance of three-to-four feet. Bender did not have
anything in his hands at the time and looked at defendant “in
shock.” Defendant shot Bender as Bender was backing away.
Harrell asked defendant, “[W]hat the fuck are you doing,
man[?]” Defendant responded, “You all right,” which Harrell
understood as a direction to say nothing about what he
witnessed. Defendant left in his car.
After defendant left, Bender told Marlow, who had just
walked out of the house, “[G]et my gun and shoot that [man].”
Marlow retrieved Bender’s gun and walked into the middle of the
street but was stopped by Harrell. Harrell called 911 and told an
operator he saw the shooter. He later told the operator he “didn’t
get a chance to see” the shooter out of concern Marlow would
perceive him as a “snitch.”
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Kaluhiwa arrived at
the scene and saw paramedics transporting Bender to a hospital.
Bender died during emergency surgery. A medical examiner who
performed Bender’s autopsy testified that three of the four
gunshot wounds Bender sustained were fatal.
2. Police Investigation
About three months after the shooting, Harrell provided a
statement to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Sergeant
Chow. Harrell identified defendant as the shooter from a six-
pack photographic lineup.
5
In August 2022, defendant was arrested at his mother’s
house. A search of a car defendant was seen driving the day of
his arrest revealed a .9-millimeter Luger.
Law enforcement searched defendant’s home the same
month. Officers found a bulletproof vest and ski mask. Inside
the ski mask was a .9-millimeter semiautomatic firearm. Officers
also located two .9-millimeter magazines inside a black backpack
and closet. A search of defendant’s Dodge Charger, which was
parked inside his garage, revealed a deed transferring his house
to his wife. Officers impounded the Dodge Charger.
Based on GPS information extracted from defendant’s
vehicle, the vehicle was in the South Los Angeles County area,
where Compton is located, on the day and at the time of the
murder (between 7:59 a.m. and 8:26 a.m.). Cell phone data from
the phone retrieved from defendant during his arrest indicated
the phone used two cell towers near the scene of the shooting on
December 5 and 6, 2021.
3. Gang Affiliation
Detective Arthur Garcia opined that “defendant is an active
gang member from the Kelly Park [ ] Crips” based on defendant’s
text messages, transcripts of an interview with Mister, and a
transcript of a call defendant made while in jail. Detective
Garcia further opined that whenever a gang member is
disrespected and does not “do anything, it’s going to affect the
way that they stand in the gang.” The gang member “would be
viewed as someone who’s weak, who’s not down for the hood.”
6
4. Jailhouse Calls
On August 31, 2022, after the preliminary hearing at which
Harrell testified, defendant called his wife. During the call,
defendant made multiple comments about Harrell telling the
truth. Defendant also admitted he could not “be mad at
[Harrell]” for testifying at the preliminary hearing. While in
custody on October 27, 2022, defendant made a phone call to his
friend. During the call, his friend implied defendant was a
“Compton Crip,” and defendant did not deny it.
B. Defense Evidence
Defendant’s theory at trial was based on an alibi.
Defendant’s parents (his mother and stepfather) testified that
defendant had a seizure the day before the shooting and was
unable to leave his home on the day of the shooting.
Defendant’s parents said they drove to defendant’s home on
December 5, 2021, around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. and spent the night.
“A little bit after 8 o’clock” the next morning, defendant’s mother
woke up to let a man from an alarm company into defendant’s
home. Defendant’s mother testified defendant was at home while
the man worked “[a]ll day long.”
Defendant’s stepfather testified the alarm company
employee arrived “around 7:45, 8 o’clock, 8:30.” He testified the
work lasted about two or three hours.
Defendant’s parents testified they were having breakfast
with defendant, his wife, and son, when defendant exhibited
troubling symptoms. They said defendant appeared to be
unconscious at times and was slouching and drooling, and
defendant exhibited these symptoms for approximately eight
hours. Defendant’s parents said they did not see defendant leave
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home that day. According to defendant’s mother, defendant did
not go to the hospital because he had issues with seizures and his
wife knew how to treat them.
The alarm company employee also testified. The employee
testified he arrived at defendant’s home at 8:50 a.m. on December
6, 2021. The employee saw defendant and his family eating
breakfast when he arrived. Defendant appeared to be under the
weather. The employee did not see defendant leave the home.
C. Information, Verdict, and Sentencing
Defendant was charged with premeditated murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 2). On count 1, the information further alleged
defendant personally used a handgun in the commission of
murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Trial commenced in December 2022. A jury convicted
defendant as charged and found the enhancement allegation
true. On count 1, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder.
Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder,
plus a consecutive four-year term for the firearm enhancement.
Defendant was also sentenced to a consecutive two-year term for
felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. No Error in Failing to Instruct the Jury on
Voluntary Manslaughter Based on Imperfect Self-
Defense
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on the
8
doctrine of imperfect self-defense. He argues the failure to
instruct on imperfect self-defense amounted to an incomplete
instruction on the requisite element of malice. We disagree.
1. Additional Background
At the close of evidence, the trial court and parties
discussed proposed jury instructions. Defense counsel objected to
one instruction on the suppression of evidence (CALJIC No. 2.06),
and agreed to all other instructions. The prosecution requested
removing the term “manslaughter” from the title of CALJIC
No. 8.74 (“Unanimous Agreement as to Offense—First or Second
Degree Murder or Manslaughter”) to avoid confusing the jury.
Defendant did not object to this request or ask for a voluntary
manslaughter instruction.
The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.10 on
murder as follows:
“Defendant is accused in Count 1 of having
committed the crime of murder, a violation of section
187 of the Penal Code. [¶] Every person who
unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought, is guilty of the crime of murder in
violation of Penal Code section 187. [¶] In order to
prove this crime, each of the following elements must
be proved: [¶] 1. A human being was killed; [¶] 2. The
killing was unlawful; and [¶] 3. The killing was done
with malice aforethought.”
The jury was also instructed on first and second
degree murder and the duty to determine the degree of
murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.20, 8.30, 8.70-8.71, 8.74).
9
2. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) First degree murder is
perpetrated by “any [ ] kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing.” (§ 189, subd. (a).) The word “willful”
means intentional, “deliberate” refers to the “‘weighing of
considerations for and against the proposed course of action,’”
and “premeditated” relates to thinking before acting. (People v.
Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 440; see CALJIC No. 8.20.)
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice aforethought. (§ 192.) California law recognizes
several circumstances under which malice may be negated, and
the offense limited to manslaughter, even if the defendant
harbors an intent to kill. (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450,
460.) One such circumstance occurs whenever a person kills in
imperfect self-defense. (Ibid.)
“Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the
trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another person because
the defendant actually but unreasonably, believed he was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant
is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be
convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.” (In
re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771 (Christian S.); accord,
People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1116.) Imperfect self-
defense requires the defendant’s fear to be of “‘imminent danger
to life or great bodily injury. “‘[T]he peril must appear to the
defendant as immediate and present and not prospective or even
in the near future.’”’” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227,
270.)
10
A trial court must instruct the jury not only on the crime
with which the defendant is charged, but also on any lesser
offense that is both included in the offense charged and shown
by the evidence to have been committed. (People v. Barton
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 190.) But this sua sponte duty does not
require instructing the jury on “the panoply of all possible lesser
included offenses.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175,
215.) Rather, “‘“such instructions are required whenever
evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is
‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury.”’” (Ibid.,
italics added.) In other words, a defendant charged with murder
is entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense “if there is
substantial evidence to support the theory.” (People v. Schuller
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 253 (Schuller).)
Substantial evidence is evidence of solid probative value,
viewed in context of the entire record, which “‘“‘a reasonable jury
could find persuasive.’”’” (People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362,
366 (Licas); see People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149
[substantial evidence refers to evidence that “maintains its
credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it
addresses has been justly determined”].)
Given how California has chosen to structure the
relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter, a trial
court’s failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense amounts to an
incomplete instruction on malice and is therefore subject to
Chapman review for constitutional error. (See People v. Wilkins
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 348–350 [Chapman review applies to
“incomplete” or “misleading” instructions on elements of crime].)
We review de novo the trial court’s failure to instruct on a
lesser included offense. (Licas, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 366.)
11
3. Insufficient Evidence Supported the Voluntary
Manslaughter Instruction
Defendant contends substantial evidence supports the
finding he shot Bender in imperfect self-defense.3 We disagree.
The evidence adduced at trial unequivocally demonstrates
defendant shot Bender with intent to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation. The day before the shooting,
Bender “mad-dogged” defendant in front of defendant’s fellow
Kelly Park Crips gang members. Defendant angrily pulled out
his gun after the confrontation and left the residence. The
following morning, defendant drove by Harrell’s residence, made
a U-turn on the street, and parked his car in front of the
driveway. Defendant proceeded to get out of his car armed with a
handgun, approached Bender, and shot him in the back as
Bender ran away from defendant. Defendant persisted even after
Bender turned around to surrender with hands in the air,
unarmed. From three-to-four feet away, defendant pointed his
gun at Bender and shot him three more times.
These circumstances amply demonstrate premeditation,
deliberation, and an intent to kill. (See People v. Potts (2019) 6
Cal.5th 1012, 1028 (Potts) [number and location of wounds
inflicted on victim suggested killing was premeditated and
deliberate]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 578
(Manriquez) [premeditation and deliberation present where
3 Defendant did not raise this claim at trial. Nevertheless, the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on any lesser
offenses if substantial evidence supported doing so. (See People v.
Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 33, fn. 6 [“Silence cannot
constitute a forfeiture of an argument [if] the trial court violate[s] its
sua sponte obligation to instruct on a lesser included offense”].)
12
“defendant, armed with a concealed firearm, left his room at the
motel, angrily confronted victim, and fired several times,
inflicting multiple wounds to the victim’s chest”].)
Even assuming defendant harbored no intent to kill Bender
when firing the initial shot in the back, defendant willfully and
deliberately, and with premeditation, fired three additional shots
at Bender in close proximity after Bender’s surrender. (See
Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 577 [“‘[t]he process of
premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended
period of time. “The true test is not the duration of time as much
as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each
other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be
arrived at quickly”’”].)
The evidence also established defendant’s motive to kill
Bender. Defendant, an Old-Time Gangster in the Kelly Park
Crips, had been disrespected the day before when Bender “mad-
dogged” him at Harrell’s residence. Defendant had ample motive
for retribution the following morning when he drove by Harrell’s
residence and saw Bender unarmed.
Defendant points to no direct evidence he actually believed
he needed to act in self-defense in response to an imminent
danger to life or great bodily injury. His alibi defense was
premised on him not being the shooter or even at the scene of the
crime. In calls from jail, defendant never claimed to have felt any
fear on the day of the shooting. Instead, defendant admitted to
his wife that Harrell’s testimony about the shooting was truthful
and that he could not “be mad at [Harrell].”
Nor do the circumstances reasonably lead to an inference
defendant harbored such a belief when he shot Bender.
Defendant was armed the moment he ambushed Bender, who
13
was unarmed throughout the shooting. That Bender and
defendant had an armed confrontation the day before does not
reasonably suggest Bender posed a danger to defendant at the
time he opened fire on Bender. It was defendant—not Bender—
who initiated the deadly confrontation. (See Christian S., supra,
7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1 [“the imperfect self-defense doctrine
cannot be invoked” by a defendant “who, through his own
wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the
commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which
his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified”]; accord,
People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 134 [defendant “initiated
[the] aggressive interactions,” the victim “was unarmed,” and
“there is no evidence [defendant] ever told anyone that he had
acted out of fear”].)
Defendant now contends he “act[ed] in what he believed to
be defense of his own safety” because Bender ran for his gun
before defendant shot him. Defendant misconstrues the
evidence. Bender began to run up the driveway once defendant
got out of his car with a gun. Bender did not have a gun in his
possession when defendant ambushed him, when he surrendered
to defendant, or any time thereafter.
Because the imperfect self-defense theory was not
supported by substantial evidence, the trial court did not have a
sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. As the
trial court did not err, there is no need to analyze whether such
an error was harmless.
Throughout his appellate opening brief, defendant relies
heavily upon Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th 237, to argue that the
imperfect self-defense theory applies to his case. Schuller is
distinguishable. In Schuller, the defendant testified he shot the
14
victim, fearing for his life after the victim tried to stab and shoot
him with his own gun. (Id. at pp. 246–247.) The defendant
testified he fired additional shots because he was “‘scared’” after
the victim yelled, “‘You f’d up’,” and pushed himself off the
ground without hesitation. The defendant said he suffered from
delusions causing him to perceive the victim as a continuing
threat. (Ibid.)
No similar scenario was presented in this case. Defendant
marshalled no evidence demonstrating his fear of immediate
harm or death or that Bender was armed before defendant
repeatedly shot him. Defendant’s reliance on Schuller is
misplaced.
B. Exclusion of Defendant’s Statement to Law
Enforcement
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding his statement to Sergeant Chow about suing him for
“putting a case on him.” Defendant avers the statement could
have rebutted the prosecution’s evidence that he was the shooter,
particularly his admission during jailhouse calls that Harrell’s
testimony was truthful. We find no error or prejudice under the
relevant standard.
1. Additional Background
Just before trial, Sergeant Chow went into lockup to
photograph defendant’s tattoos. The incident was recorded, and
the video footage was seen by the prosecution and defense.
According to the prosecution, defendant appeared
“confrontational and aggressive” during the interaction, telling
Sergeant Chow “he was going to sue him. He was going to come
15
after him and his wife.” Defendant pumped out his chest during
the interaction, which Sergeant Chow interpreted as a threat.
The next day before jury selection, the prosecution notified the
trial court of the incident. Defense trial counsel agreed defendant
appeared angry during the confrontation, and perhaps defendant
stated he would sue Sergeant Chow after trial for “putting a case”
on him, but he did not interpret the statement as a threat. The
trial court found the incident between defendant and Sergeant
Chow not relevant to the trial.
During the prosecution’s rebuttal case, the prosecution
presented two recorded jailhouse calls in which defendant told his
wife he could not be mad at Harrell’s testimony because he
“basically told the truth.” Defendant did not present a
surrebuttal. The next day, defense trial counsel requested
permission to recall Sergeant Chow and question him about the
lockup incident with defendant. Counsel argued the line of
questioning about defendant’s statement to Sergeant Chow was
relevant because it shed light on “defendant’s state of mind,” and
that “he never admitted being the shooter.” The trial court
denied the request, finding “absolutely no connection” between
defendant’s statement to Sergeant Chow and his state of mind
when making the calls to his wife one year earlier and three
years earlier during the crime.
2. Governing Law and Standard of Review
No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence. (Evid.
Code, § 350.) Relevant evidence is defined as “having any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.)
“‘“The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends, ‘logically,
16
naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material facts
such as identity, intent, or motive.”’” (People v. Nelson (2008) 43
Cal.4th 1242, 1266, quoting People v. Wilson (2006) 38 Cal.4th
1237, 1245.) In other words, evidence is relevant if it pertains to
an issue in the case and has some logical tendency to prove the
matter at issue.
A trial court’s discretionary ruling will not be overturned
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion resulting in a
miscarriage of justice. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th
258, 266.) When exercising its discretion, the court must adhere
to applicable legal criteria and must not act arbitrarily. (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55
Cal.4th 747, 773 [a ruling constituting an abuse of discretion “has
been described as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it’”].)
3. No Abuse of Discretion
At trial, defendant argued his statement to Sergeant Chow
was relevant because it revealed his state of mind at the time of
the jailhouse calls and rebutted the prosecution’s evidence offered
to prove he was the shooter. The trial court rejected this
argument and upheld its decision to exclude the evidence as
irrelevant, finding “absolutely no connection” between
defendant’s statement to Sergeant Chow and defendant’s state of
mind when he made the calls to his wife a year earlier and three
years earlier during the crime. We conclude the trial court
properly exercised its discretion.
Defendant failed to make an adequate offer of proof
regarding the relevance of his threat to sue the officer in relation
to his state of mind during the jailhouse calls. (See People v.
17
Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1333 [“‘It is the burden of the
proponent of evidence to establish its relevance through an offer
of proof or otherwise’”].) The threat did not address the phone
calls or disprove the fact that defendant made the statements to
his wife. It also did not show the statements were taken out of
context or lacked credibility.
At most, the threat of litigation was minimally relevant to
defendant’s state of mind. There may have been different
reasons for the threat, made shortly before trial. For example,
defendant may have been trying to intimidate Sergeant Chow
before he testified against defendant, or he may have been
displeased with Sergeant Chow’s visit to take pictures of his
tattoos. As the trial court reasoned, any relevance between
defendant’s statement and what occurred years prior was
tenuous and significantly outweighed by the amount of time
required to explain the meaning and relevance of the statement.
(See People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 406 [upholding
exclusion of testimony about codefendants spending time at a
home with weapons, vehicles, and disguises months before the
crime, as it was “tenuous at best” and outweighed by undue
consumption of time].)
4. Any Error Was Harmless
Even assuming that it was error for the trial court to
exclude defendant’s statement to Sergeant Chow, the error is
subject to review under the Watson standard. Under this
standard, we assess “‘whether there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to
[the] defendant’ had the errors not occurred.” (People v. Camacho
18
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 109; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.)
Applying that standard here, we conclude any error was
harmless because even if the statement had been admitted, it
would have been a minor point compared to the overwhelming
evidence of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
Defendant argues it is reasonably probable he would have
obtained a more favorable result, with at least one juror reaching
a different conclusion regarding his guilt, had his statement been
admitted. Admitting defendant’s statement into evidence may
have only hurt his case, casting defendant in a negative light by
showing him threatening an officer.
Defendant also argues that excluding the statement
infringed on his constitutional right to present a complete
defense. The trial court did not preclude defendant from proving
he was not the shooter. To the contrary, defendant presented
evidence at trial that he was not present at the shooting and
could not have been the shooter. Excluding evidence on a
subsidiary point did not impair his right to present a complete
defense. (See People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1064
[“‘excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does
not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense’”].)
Defendant had ample opportunity to rebut the prosecution’s
evidence, but the jury found his alibi unconvincing.
Given the significant evidence against him, it is not
reasonably probable the statement would have changed the jury’s
verdict if it was admitted. Thus, any error by the trial court was
harmless.
19
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MORI, J
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
COLLINS, J.
20
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