CourtListener 10124549•People v. Saddozai CA1/5
Full text
Filed 9/24/24 P. v. Saddozai CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168408
v.
SHIKEB SADDOZAI, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No.
16-NF001414A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Shikeb Saddozai appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of
his resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1172.6, which
he asserts requires vacatur of his conviction for attempted
murder.1 His appellate counsel filed a brief identifying no issues
as grounds for relief, complying with the procedure established in
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, 231-232
(Delgadillo). Saddozai then filed a supplemental brief raising a
variety of issues. Because his contentions lack merit, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
A.
To be convicted of murder, a jury must ordinarily find that
the defendant acted with the requisite mental state, known as
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
“ ‘malice aforethought.’ ” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172,
1181 (Chun), quoting § 187, subd. (a).) Prior to 2019, however,
under an exception known as the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, a “ ‘ “person who knowingly aids and
abets [the] criminal conduct [of another person] is guilty of not
only the intended crime . . . but also of any other crime the [other
person] actually commits . . . that is a natural and probable
consequence of the intended crime.” ’ ” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59
Cal.4th 155, 161; see also People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
449 (Curiel).) In addition, the felony murder rule provided an
exception that made “a killing while committing certain felonies
murder without the necessity of further examining the
defendant’s mental state.” (Chun, at p. 1182.)
In 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 ((2017-2018 Reg. Sess.),
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) raised the level of culpability required for
murder liability to be imposed under these theories. (See Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1.) It amended the definition of malice
in section 188 to provide that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§
188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) The bill also
amended section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, to
limit murder liability based on felony murder or a natural and
probable consequences theory to a person who: (1) was the actual
killer; (2) though not the actual killer, acted “with the intent to
kill” and “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer” in the
commission of first degree murder; or (3) was “a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Section 1172.6 provides a procedural mechanism by which
defendants who believe they could not be convicted of murder or
attempted murder under the amended versions of sections 188
2
and 189 may petition the trial court for relief. As relevant here,
it provides that a “person convicted of . . . attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” may file a
petition to vacate that conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The individual may file a
petition if three conditions are met: “(1) A complaint, information,
or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2)
The petitioner was convicted of . . . attempted murder . . .
following a trial . . . at which the petitioner could have been
convicted of . . . attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could
not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§
1172.6, subd. (a).) The petition must include a declaration that
the petitioner is eligible for relief based on the requirements set
forth in subdivision (a), the superior court case number and year
of the conviction, and a statement indicating whether the
petitioner requests the appointment of counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(b)(1).)
If the petitioner has complied with these requirements, the
court appoints counsel (if requested), receives briefing from the
parties, and determines whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c); see Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 450.) If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the burden is on
the prosecution to prove that the petitioner is ineligible for relief.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d); Curiel, at p. 450.) If the petition and the
record of conviction establish conclusively that the petitioner is
not eligible for relief, however, the trial court may dismiss the
petition for failure to make out a prima facie case. (Curiel, at pp.
460, 463.)
3
B.
The conviction at issue in this appeal relates to an incident
in which Saddozai stalked, burglarized, and attempted to murder
his ex-girlfriend, Jane Doe. (See People v. Saddozai (Mar. 16,
2021, A154894) [nonpub. opn.].) Angry that Doe had ended their
relationship, he broke into her apartment and waited for her to
come home, at which point he chased her with a knife, yelling
“ ‘I’m gonna get you.’ ” (Ibid.) Saddozai pursued Doe out of her
apartment, to the building’s leasing office, where she took refuge.
(Ibid.) When Saddozai was unable to force the door open, he ran
to the apartment complex’s pool, where another resident saw him
holding a knife and heard him repeatedly say, “ ‘I want to kill the
bitch.’ ” (Ibid.)
In June 2017, a jury convicted Saddozai of attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd.
(a)); first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)); stalking (§ 646.9,
subd. (a)); misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd.
(a)(1)); misdemeanor possession of burglar’s tools (§ 466); and
misdemeanor battery of a person the defendant formerly dated (§
243, subd. (e)(1)). (People v. Saddozai, supra, A154894.) The jury
also found true an allegation that Saddozai personally used a
deadly weapon—a knife—during the commission of the crime of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).
C.
Saddozai filed a section 1172.6 petition alleging that the
information filed against him had allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a natural and probable consequences theory, that
he was convicted of attempted murder before 2019, and could not
now be convicted of attempted murder because of the 2019
amendments to sections 188 and 189. Saddozai also requested
appointment of counsel.
4
Saddozai was initially represented by appointed defense
counsel Jai Gohel, who filed a brief in reply to the People’s
opposition to the petition. Based on a breakdown in
communication between Saddozai and his attorney, the court
subsequently granted a motion for substitution of counsel under
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The court then
ordered that a new attorney be appointed to represent Saddozai
in the section 1172.6 petition.
After attorney Brian C. McComas was appointed to
represent him, Saddozai made another Marsden motion, which
the court denied. Saddozai then sought to represent himself
under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, but the court
denied his motion. During the same hearing, he unsuccessfully
moved to disqualify the judge, Lisa Novak, based on bias under
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Saddozai later made
another Marsden motion, which the court again denied.
At the hearing on his section 1172.6 petition, Saddozai was
represented by McComas. Saddozai personally moved, again
unsuccessfully, to disqualify the judge, Elizabeth K. Lee, under
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.
In denying his section 1172.6 petition, the court concluded
that Saddozai had not established a prima facie case for relief.
The court reasoned that the jury was instructed on neither felony
murder nor the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and
the only theory of attempted murder presented to the jury
remains valid under current law. The court further reasoned
that the verdict forms established that Saddozai was the actual
perpetrator of the attempted murder, that the jury found him
guilty of “attempted, willful, deliberate[,] and premeditated
deadly murder,” and the jury also found he used a deadly or
dangerous weapon (a knife) in committing that crime. As a
result, the court determined, “the record establishes that he acted
5
with the intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation when
he attempted to murder Jane Doe with a knife.”
DISCUSSION
Where, as here, the petitioner has filed a supplemental
brief in compliance with the procedures established in Delgadillo,
we issue an opinion addressing the arguments presented in that
brief. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We
independently review the trial court’s determination that
Saddozai did not make a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief under section 1172.6. (See People v. Morales (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 1120, 1131.) We likewise review de novo the other
legal questions presented in Saddozai’s supplemental brief. (See,
e.g., People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 870.) Applying these
standards, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Saddozai’s
section 1172.6 petition.
A.
Eligibility for Relief Under Section 1172.6
Saddozai contends that because the allegations in his
petition sufficed to establish a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6, the trial court erred in dismissing his petition. He
argues that, in dismissing his petition, the trial court improperly
engaged in fact finding. We disagree.
In assessing whether a petitioner has made out a prima
facie case under section 1172.6, the trial court may consider
whether the allegations in the petition are refuted by the record
of conviction. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The record of
conviction includes the court’s own documents, such as the clerk’s
transcript, trial court minutes, jury instructions, verdict forms,
and prior appellate opinions. (See, e.g., People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1232; People v. Maldonado (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1269; People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
389, 395, fn. 4.) Jury findings are “generally preclusive” in
6
section 1172.6 petitions. (Curiel, at pp. 453-454.) The trial court
may dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing if the
petition, together with the record of conviction, conclusively
establishes that the defendant is not eligible for relief. (Id., at p.
450.)
The trial court here correctly determined that Saddozai’s
attempted murder conviction was not based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. The verdict form indicates the
jury found him guilty of “Attempted Willful, Deliberate, And
Premeditated Murder” in violation of sections 664 and 187,
subdivision (a), as alleged in count one of the information. Count
one of the operative information alleged that Saddozai “did
unlawfully and with malice aforethought” attempt to murder
Doe, thereby committing “Attempted Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Murder.” And, the verdict form indicates that the
jury found true the allegation that Saddozai “personally used a
deadly or dangerous weapon . . . [a] [k]nife . . . during the
commission of the crime of Attempted Willful, Deliberate[,] and
Premeditated Murder.” (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
Further, neither the jury instructions nor the prosecution’s
closing argument relied on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine for attempted murder. Because the trial
court relied on the jury instructions, but they were not included
in the record on appeal, we take judicial notice of the portion of
the clerk’s transcript and reporter’s transcript containing the jury
instructions in the record of Saddozai’s direct appeal (A154894).
The court instructed the jury that “[t]o prove that the defendant
is guilty of attempted murder, the People must prove that: [¶] . . .
[t]he defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step
toward killing another person” and “[t]he defendant intended to
kill that person.” (CALCRIM No. 600.) Likewise, the People
argued Saddozai had the intent to kill Doe and took at least one
step toward doing so based on his arming himself with a knife,
7
his statement to a bystander that he was going to kill her, and
his pursuit of Doe and other actions. The jury thus necessarily
found that Saddozai intended to kill Doe and personally used a
knife to attempt to kill her; Saddozai was convicted of attempted
murder based on his own actions and mental state, rather than
his participation in another person’s criminal act.
Saddozai asserts there were “plausible factual scenarios” in
which he “did not have the specific intent to kill or malice,” but
the jury’s verdict necessarily excludes any such scenarios.
Saddozai additionally contends that, in denying his
petition, the trial court relied on evidence not heard by the jury.
But this mischaracterizes the trial court’s determination, which
relied only on the record of conviction.
In sum, because Saddozai could not have been convicted
based on a natural and probable consequences theory, the trial
court properly dismissed his petition. (See People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
B.
Claims of Judicial Bias
Saddozai raises both statutory and constitutional claims
concerning bias by Judges Novak and Lee, who presided over
proceedings related to his section 1172.6 petition. Neither set of
claims has merit.
First, Saddozai challenges the denial of his motions under
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to disqualify the judges for
bias. Saddozai has forfeited his statutory argument, however, by
failing to file a timely petition for writ of mandate—the sole
method for obtaining review of denial of a disqualification motion.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Nieves (2021) 11
Cal.5th 404, 498, fn. 13 (Nieves).)
8
Second, Saddozai argues that the denial of his motions
violated his due process right to a fair and impartial judge. To
succeed on his due process claim, he must show a constitutionally
intolerable probability that the judge was actually biased—a
standard met only in extreme circumstances. (People v. Freeman
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 996, 1001, 1005.) The question is whether
the record reflects an intolerable possibility that the judge had an
interest in the outcome of Saddozai’s proceeding, such as a
pecuniary interest, personal interest based on a relationship to a
party, or a discriminatory prejudice. (See Nieves, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 499.) Based on the record here, Saddozai has not
come close to meeting this standard.
Saddozai concedes that he had no prior relationship with
either judge. He complains that Judge Lee muted his
microphone and cut him off while he was speaking. But the
record reflects that Saddozai was represented by counsel at the
time, and Judge Lee muted Saddozai’s microphone because “he
[was] not willing to listen to the Court and hear what the Court
ha[d] to say,” he was “talking over . . . his counsel,” and “the court
reporter [was] asking for one at a time.”
Finally, the fact that the prosecution successfully
challenged another judge does not suggest that the judges who
rejected Saddozai’s challenges were biased against him. Even
assuming the rulings were erroneous, mistaken rulings alone do
not establish judicial bias. (See People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th
1053, 1110.)
9
C.
Challenges Relating to Saddozai’s Trial and Arrest
Saddozai raises numerous claims of error relating to his
original trial and arrest by police.2 But relief under section
1172.6 is limited to cases in which the defendant “could
not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January
1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Assertions of trial
error or challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial are
not cognizable in this appeal. (See People v. Farfan (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 942, 947 (Farfan).)
2 Saddozai contends that his conviction was the result of
false, coerced, and biased testimony; juror misconduct; and
discrimination and misconduct by the police, prosecution, trial
judge, and court-appointed defense investigator. He argues that
evidence was improperly excluded; other evidence was
improperly admitted; potentially exculpatory evidence was not
collected, preserved, or disclosed; and the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. He asserts that his trial
and direct appeal counsel were ineffective. He seeks to challenge
the trial court’s decision to allow the victim to proceed under a
pseudonym, as well as the court’s denial of his motion for a new
trial based on evidence not presented to the jury. He argues his
trial was unlawful because he was not indicted by a grand jury.
He also contends that the police used unlawful and excessive
force against him during his arrest and illegally seized his cell
phone. And he claims a variety of trial errors in the context of
his arguments that his section 1172.6 counsel provided
ineffective assistance in failing to pursue them as a basis for
resentencing relief.
10
D.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims as to Saddozai’s
Section 1172.6 Petition
Saddozai contends that he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance from the attorneys representing him in his
section 1172.6 petition in the trial court and in this appeal. We
disagree.
Our Supreme Court has held that a defendant in an appeal
from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition does not have a
constitutional right to counsel. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 222, 226-227; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973.)
Because Saddozai has a statutory right to the appointment of
counsel (see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3)), however, we assume without
deciding that he also has a statutory right to competent counsel.
(Cf. In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 780.)
To establish ineffectiveness of counsel, Saddozai must show
that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the
attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense, depriving
him of a fair trial. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687.)
Here, Saddozai’s attorneys’ omission of arguments
unrelated to the 2019 amendments to sections 188 and 189 did
not constitute deficient performance because such arguments are
not cognizable in a section 1172.6 petition. (See § 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3); People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1122-
1123; Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) Similarly lacking
in merit is Saddozai’s argument that his appellate counsel’s
preparation of the appellate record was inadequate because he
declined to conduct an independent fact investigation aimed at
“impeach[ing]” the case presented by the prosecution at trial.
Further, contrary to Saddozai’s contention, his counsel’s
determination that there are no arguable issues and filing of a
11
no-issues brief did not create a conflict of interest. (See
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 222; People v. Wende (1979) 25
Cal.3d 436, 442 & fn. 3, disapproved of on other grounds by In re
Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952.) Similarly, we reject Saddozai’s
argument that the trial court erred in failing to take action in
response to his appointed counsel’s purported conflict of interest.
Finally, even assuming his attorneys were deficient in some
way, Saddozai’s ineffective assistance claim would fail because he
is unable to establish prejudice. As we have explained, he is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, and the outcome would
have been no different absent the alleged mistakes by his
attorneys. For the same reason, Saddozai’s appellate counsel was
not ineffective for declining to brief ineffective assistance of
counsel claims concerning the attorneys who litigated his section
1172.6 petition in trial court.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the petition is affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.
P. v. Saddozai (A168408)
12
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.