People v. Ortega CA5

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Filed 9/24/24 P. v. Ortega CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086704
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SF020708A)
v.

VICTOR FUENTES ORTEGA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. J. Eric
Bradshaw, Judge.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and R. Todd
Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant and defendant Victor Fuentes Ortega (defendant) was charged with
firearm and narcotics offenses. After his suppression motion was denied, defendant
pleaded no contest to felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to two years in
prison.
On appeal from the judgment, his appellate counsel filed a brief that summarized
the facts with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to
independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant
filed a letter brief raising several issues. This court requested further briefing from the
parties about the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. We review the court’s
ruling, address the parties’ contentions, and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Around 4:00 a.m. on February 22, 2022, Officer Kinkade was on patrol in Shafter.
He was in uniform and driving a marked car by himself in the area of Parkdale Way and
Spruce Park Way.
Kinkade testified that he saw a vehicle parked on Manor Grove Drive, southwest
of his position. The area was dark, but Kinkade could see the front of the subject vehicle
because the headlights went on, then off, and then on again. Kinkade turned onto Manor
Grove Drive and drove toward the vehicle. As he drove closer, he saw a person walk
away from the vehicle. The person was dressed entirely in black and was walking
westbound toward an adjacent construction site. The area was “a new housing
development,” approximately 11 miles from the city.

1 The following facts are from the evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence. Shafter Police Officer Storm Kinkade, who conducted the traffic stop
and search, was the only witness.

2.
Kinkade testified there was a load of “unsecured lumber” on top of the subject
vehicle, without any ropes or tie-downs to the vehicle’s roof. Kinkade was concerned the
lumber could have been stolen since the vehicle was parked next to the construction site.
Kinkade testified the vehicle performed a U-turn and drove away. Kinkade was
driving behind it, and he saw the vehicle’s rear bumper had a “blank dealership plate with
a logo” without any identifying information.
The Traffic Stop
Kinkade testified that he decided to conduct a traffic stop based on his
observations that the vehicle did not have any license plate, the person walking outside
the vehicle, the unsecured lumber on top of the vehicle, and to investigate whether the
lumber was stolen from the construction site. At 4:02 a.m., he activated his patrol car’s
signal lights, and the vehicle pulled over to the right side of the road and stopped. The
traffic stop occurred on Manor Grove Drive, just south of Cotton Creek, and next to an
empty field.
Kinkade approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and spoke to the driver and
only occupant, identified as defendant. Kinkade asked defendant for his driver’s license
and to step out of his vehicle. Kinkade testified he asked defendant to get out of his
vehicle for safety reasons because they were in an isolated area, he had seen an individual
walking by the vehicle, and he did not know if there were other patrol units in the area.
Defendant got out of the vehicle and presented his driver’s license. Kinkade
testified they walked to his patrol car and stood at the driver’s side front bumper.
Defendant was not in restraints and Kinkade did not tell him that he was under arrest.
At 4:05 a.m., Kinkade ran a warrant check on defendant’s driver’s license.
Kincade was advised there were no warrants for defendant, and he was not on probation
or parole.

3.
Defendant Admits the Lumber was Stolen
Kinkade testified he did not advise defendant of the warnings pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Kinkade asked defendant whether the wood on top of
his vehicle was stolen. Defendant said he purchased the wood earlier. Kinkade asked
defendant not to lie, asked if he stole the wood, and said that people had to work hard to
pay for it. Defendant said he knew that because he was a gardener. Kinkade told
defendant not to lie and again asked if the wood was stolen. Defendant said, “ ‘Yes, sir.
It was a stupid idea.’ ”
Kinkade testified that after defendant admitted the wood was stolen, he arrested
defendant, put him in handcuffs, and placed him in the back of his patrol car.
Search of Defendant’s Vehicle
Kinkade testified that after defendant was arrested, he searched defendant’s
vehicle to determine if any other items were stolen from the construction site. Under a
foam cushion on the driver’s seat, Kinkade found a loaded Glock-style handgun in a
holster. There was a plastic baggie on the rear floorboard that contained apparent
methamphetamine.
After he conducted the search, Kinkade went back to his patrol car and advised
defendant of the Miranda warnings. Kinkade advised other units to look for the
second suspect who he saw by subject vehicle, but no one was located.
Kinkade testified he found the firearm about eight to 10 minutes after the
beginning of the traffic stop. The police department’s records showed that at 5:10 a.m.,
Kinkade reported to the dispatcher that he found the firearm in defendant’s vehicle.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 24, 2022, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Kern
County charging defendant with count 1, unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,
subd. (a)); count 2, felon in possession of a firearm, a nine-millimeter handgun (Pen.

4.
Code,2 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); count 3, possession of .22-caliber ammunition (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1)); and count 4, misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); with one prior strike conviction.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
On September 19, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to
section 1538.5, and argued Kinkade conducted an illegal detention and search of his
vehicle, illegally seized the firearm and other evidence from inside his vehicle, and
moved for exclusion of the evidence and defendant’s statements.
On September 30, 2022, the prosecution filed opposition and argued Kinkade’s
stop of defendant’s vehicle was legal, the detention was reasonable, and the evidence was
not subject to exclusion.
The Trial Court’s Hearing on the Motion
On October 4, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s suppression
motion. The parties stipulated the incident involved a warrantless search and seizure.
The court stated the burden shifted to the prosecution to justify the warrantless detention
and search. Kinkade was the only witness and testified as set forth above.
After the testimony, defense counsel argued Kinkade illegally detained defendant
without probable cause because he conducted the traffic stop to investigate the possibility
the lumber was stolen, he did not stop him for a traffic violation, he ordered defendant to
get out of his vehicle, and he took his driver’s license. Counsel argued Kinkade should
have advised defendant of the Miranda warnings before asking any questions, and
Kinkade’s search of the vehicle was the result of the illegal detention and questioning.
The prosecutor argued there was a valid traffic violation because defendant was
driving a vehicle without a license plate. The prosecutor asserted that defendant’s claim

2 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

5.
of a noncoercive Miranda violation had to be raised at trial, and not as part of a
section 1538.5 motion to exclude evidence.
Defense counsel replied there was no valid traffic violation to justify the stop, the
police records showed defendant was held for an hour, and that meant he was subject to a
lengthy detention.
The Trial Court’s Denial of the Suppression Motion
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied defendant’s suppression
motion.

“Given that testimony by [Kinkade], I believe that does establish
specific facts which the officer articulated, those being both the timing and
it being four o’clock in the morning. The timing as well as the location of
where [defendant] was in the vehicle as well as that wood being unsecured
on top of the vehicle, those are specific facts articulated by [Kinkade]
which would give rise to a justifiable detention. The officer stops the
vehicle, detains the defendant, talks to the defendant.

“I do believe that the evidence shows that the conversation between
[defendant] and the officer was not a custodial interrogation. This Court’s
belief as to it not being a custodial interrogation would not be binding on
the trial Court. That issue can be raised again at the trial court.

“Based on what I’ve heard, the officer talked to [defendant].
[D]efendant admitted that the wood on top of the vehicle was, in fact,
stolen, giving rise to probable cause to arrest [defendant], which the officer
did. And then [defendant’s] vehicle was searched both incident to arrest as
well as the officer having probable cause to search the vehicle. Given the
totality of the circumstances that were previously noted in the record that
the officer testified to relating to wood and the location, being the
construction site, for those reasons the motion is denied.” (Italics added.)
PLEA AND SENTENCE
Defendant did not file a renewed suppression motion. Instead, on February 1,
2023, defendant pleaded no contest to count 2, felon in possession of a firearm, and
admitted the prior strike conviction, pursuant to a negotiated disposition for the dismissal
of the prior strike conviction and an indicated midterm of two years. The trial court

6.
granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges and an unrelated case,
subject to a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.3
On July 20, 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea
and conducted the sentencing hearing.4 The court granted defendant’s request to dismiss
the prior strike conviction and imposed the midterm of two years, consistent with the
negotiated disposition.
On August 8, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s
denial of his motions to suppress and to withdraw his plea. Counsel’s request for a
certificate of probable cause was denied.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, defendant’s counsel filed a Wende brief with this court. We
requested the parties file supplemental briefs on the trial court’s ruling on the suppression
motion in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision about the validity of investigatory
detentions in People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032 (Flores).5 Defendant also filed a
letter brief challenging the denial of his suppression motion.

3 “A Harvey waiver permits the sentencing court to consider the facts underlying
dismissed counts and enhancements when determining the appropriate disposition for the
offense or offenses of which the defendant stands convicted.” (People v. Munoz (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 160, 167.)
4 Prior to the court’s imposition of sentence, defendant moved to withdraw his plea.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, and defendant testified he only entered
his plea because his attorney told him that the conviction would be dismissed on appeal.
Defense counsel also testified at the hearing, and stated he simply explained appellate
procedures to defendant and there were some issues arising from the suppression motion,
but he never told defendant that he would win on appeal. The court denied defendant’s
motion to withdraw, and he has not raised any issues on that order in this appeal.
5 The factual statement in the People’s responsive letter brief is from both the
preliminary hearing evidence and the evidentiary hearing on defendant’s suppression
motion. The People note that when defendant entered his plea, the parties stipulated that
the preliminary hearing established the factual basis for the plea. The sole issue before
this court, however, is whether the trial court should have granted defendant’s
suppression motion. The evidentiary hearing on that motion was held after the

7.
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to
that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on
the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.) “In doing so we do not consider each
fact in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider “the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture.” ’ ” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)
I. Appellant Was Not Unlawfully Detained
Defendant argues Kinkade lacked any reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and
detain him under the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Flores. The People respond that
Kinkade relied on specific and articulable facts to conduct the traffic stop and brief
detention based on the unsecured lumber on top of defendant’s vehicle, the person
walking away from the vehicle, the vehicle’s flashing headlights, its location next to a
new construction site, and the lack of any license information on the vehicle.
A. Traffic Stops
“ ‘As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the
police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.’ ” (People v.
Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 564.) “A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is
pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and
passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.”
(Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333 (Arizona).)
“Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s

preliminary hearing, but the parties did not invite the court to rely on the preliminary
hearing evidence to decide the issue.

8.
registration and proof of insurance.” (Rodriguez v. U.S. (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355
(Rodriguez); In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 142.)
“ ‘Once a vehicle has been detained in a valid traffic stop, police officers may
order the driver and passengers out of the car pending completion of the stop without
violating the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 743
(Evans); Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at pp. 355–356.) The driver’s voluntary
relinquishment of his or her identification does not constitute a seizure as long as the
encounter is consensual under the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Leath (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.)
“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop
… do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” (Arizona, supra, 555
U.S. at p. 333.)
B. Investigatory Detentions
An officer may detain someone to conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the
officer “ ‘has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’ ” (People
v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 241; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30.) The officer
must have “ ‘ “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.” [Citations.] “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create
reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is
necessary for probable cause.” [Citations.] [¶] Because it is a “less demanding”
standard, “reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in
quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.” [Citation.] The
standard “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” [Citation.] Courts “cannot
reasonably demand scientific certainty … where none exists.” [Citation.] Rather, they

9.
must permit officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior.” ’ ” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1041.)
“’[A]n investigatory detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 659, 671.) “ ‘The possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the
officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed,
the principal function of [police] investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and
establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal .…’ ” (People v. Souza (1994) 9
Cal.4th 224, 233 (Souza); People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 146–147.)
“What is required is not the absence of innocent explanation, but the existence of
‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 373.)
“There is no set time limit for a permissible investigative stop; the question is
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96,
101–102.) Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to justify a detention is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the circumstances. (Souza,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.)
C. Souza and Flores
There are two cases relevant to the validity of the investigatory detention of
defendant. In Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th 224, the court upheld an investigative detention
where an officer was on patrol at 3:00 a.m. in a residential neighborhood where
burglaries and drug activity were common. The officer noticed the defendant and another
person standing near a car parked at the curb, almost in complete darkness. The officer
pulled behind the parked car and activated his spotlight. Immediately, two other people
in the car bent down toward the floorboard area. The defendant ran away, but was
apprehended and searched, and found in possession of contraband. (Id. at p. 228.)

10.
Souza held the totality of the circumstances justified the defendant’s detention:
“From these circumstances—the area’s reputation for criminal activity, the presence of
two people near a parked car very late at night and in total darkness, and evasive conduct
not only by [the] defendant but by the two occupants of the parked car …—[the officer]
reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot.” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 240.)
In Flores, the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion and held the
defendant’s suppression motion should have been granted because officers who
conducted an investigatory detention lacked the articulatable and reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 1038.) The officers were on a nighttime patrol in an area considered to be a “ ‘known
narcotic[s] area[]’ and ‘gang hangout.’ ” As they drove by a cul-de-sac, the officers saw
the defendant standing alone by a Nissan parked at a red curb. The defendant looked at
the officers, walked to the back of the Nissan, and then “ ‘ducked’ ” behind it. The
officers parked behind the Nissan and stayed inside their patrol car. The defendant stood
up behind the Nissan and seemed to make a stretching motion with one arm, then
disappeared from sight. A few seconds later, the defendant raised his head, then again
went out of sight. The officers got out of their patrol car and approached him. The
defendant was bent over and facing away from the officers, and his hands were near his
right shoe. After being ordered to stand up twice, the defendant finally complied and
followed their directions to put his hands behind his head, and he was placed in
handcuffs. (Id. at pp. 1038–1039.)
At the suppression hearing in Flores, an officer testified he detained the defendant
because he believed the defendant acted suspiciously by trying to conceal himself from
the police, and then bending down and pretending to tie his shoe. The officer believed
the defendant was loitering for the use or sale of narcotics, based on the area and the
defendant’s behavior. During a patdown search, an officer hit a key fob in the

11.
defendant’s pocket that activated the lights on the Nissan. The officer looked into the
Nissan with a flashlight and saw a drug pipe. In response to questions, the defendant said
the Nissan belonged to him and his identification was inside. The officer opened the
Nissan, retrieved defendant’s wallet, looked inside it, and found suspected
methamphetamine. A revolver was also found in the car. (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 1039.)
Flores held defendant’s behavior, along with his presence in a high crime area at
night, “did not provide a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that [the
defendant] was doing something illegal.” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.)

“[The defendant’s] apparent pretext of tying his shoe, combined with
his repeatedly ducking down behind the car, could reasonably be construed
as ‘odd’ and noteworthy behavior, particularly when done in reaction to the
sight of a uniformed police officer. [Citations.] Nonetheless, it bears
emphasis that the standard to justify a detention is not satisfied simply
because a person’s behavior is ‘odd.’ A mere deviation from perceived
social convention does not automatically signal criminal behavior. The
particular conduct relied upon must, when considered in the totality of
circumstances, support a reasonable suspicion that the person to be detained
is, or is about to be, engaged in activity ‘relating to crime.’ [Citations.]

“The fact that [the defendant] was present in a ‘known narcotic[s]
area[],’ where the officer had arrested someone for drug-related crimes the
night before, does not tip the scales in favor of detention. Notably, [the
officer] did not see [the defendant] engage in any conduct suggesting he
was there to buy or sell drugs or was otherwise involved in illegal conduct.
He did not see [the defendant] interact with anyone, or retrieve or hide
anything. [Citations.] He did not see anyone in the immediate vicinity. No
one had called for help or to report a crime in progress. The hour was not
particularly late. Although the officer testified that he suspected [the
defendant] of ‘loitering,’ he did not see [the defendant] standing in that
location for more than a few moments before the officers pulled up in their
patrol car. When [the officer] approached on foot, he saw [the defendant]
moving his hands near his feet. But the officer did not say [the defendant]
appeared to hide or discard anything. Rather, he opined that [the defendant]
was ‘pretend[ing] to tie his shoe.’ [The officer] testified that the Nissan was
parked at a red curb. But he did not explain how [the defendant’s] presence

12.
next to an illegally parked car justified a detention under the totality of the
circumstances.” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 1045–1046.)
Flores contrasted the circumstances of the defendant’s detention with the
circumstances in Souza, where the court properly found articulable facts to support a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in that case. (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 1048.) By comparison, Flores concluded the totality of the circumstances failed to
support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant in this case “was loitering for the
purpose of committing a narcotics offense (as the officer suspected) or was otherwise
engaged in ‘ “criminal activity.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1045.)
In reaching this conclusion, Flores explained that its holding did not leave officers
“without the means to follow up on behavior they view as calling for additional
investigation. [The defendant] was present in a high crime area and repeatedly tried to
avoid being seen by, or engaging with, the police. Those facts are certainly noteworthy.
The officers would have been well within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment to
continue to watch [the defendant] as he stood on the street .… They were entitled to
approach [the defendant] and engage him in consensual conversation. They could have
asked if he needed assistance, or had himself noted anything out of the ordinary in the
vicinity. If they made additional observations while doing so, those observations may
have changed the calculus. But [the defendant’s] mere refusal to cooperate ‘d[id] not
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.’ ”
(Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1049.)
“To be clear, officers may observe what people do in public places. They may
consider what they see in plain view and determine whether what they observe merits
further observation, inquiry, or intervention. They may approach people in public,
engage them in consensual conversation, and take note of their appearance and behavior.
Nervous behavior and attempts to conceal oneself may provide relevant context. But

13.
before officers may detain someone they must be able to articulate a legally cognizable
reason to infringe on that person’s liberty.” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1051.)
D. Analysis
Defendant argues that, as in Flores, the trial court herein improperly found the
officer’s detention of defendant was reasonable simply based on the location, time of day,
and defendant’s “odd behavior” of “placing unsecured wood on top of his car.”
Defendant argues his behavior did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
because he did not flee when the patrol car approached, he “simply went about his
business,” and the “odd” behavior involving the lumber was insufficient to justify a
detention.
To the contrary, the undisputed record establishes Kinkade had two separate
justifications to conduct the traffic stop.
Vehicle Code Violations
Kinkade had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based on his
undisputed observations that defendant committed two traffic violations. Defendant’s
vehicle only had a blank dealership logo on the rear bumper, and it did not display license
plates or other identifying information. “Absence of license plates provides reasonable
suspicion that the driver is violating the law. Unless there are other circumstances that
dispel that suspicion, that resolve any ambiguities in the legal status of the vehicle’s
conformance with applicable laws, the officer may stop the vehicle and investigate
without violating the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights.” (People v. Dotson (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 1045, 1052; Veh. Code, § 5200.)
Defendant was also operating a vehicle that was “not safely loaded, and which
presents an immediate safety hazard” because of the lumber on the vehicle’s roof that was
not tied down or secured (Veh. Code, § 24002), and the vehicle was not “loaded as to
prevent any of its contents or load … from dropping … or otherwise escaping from the
vehicle” while being driven (Veh. Code, § 23114, subd. (a)).

14.
Reasonable Suspicion of Theft of the Lumber
Kinkade also had a reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop to investigate
the possible commercial burglary of the construction site and theft of the unsecured
lumber on top of the vehicle.
In contrast to Flores, Kinkade did not conduct the investigatory detention simply
based on the vehicle’s presence in a dark area in the early morning hours, unspecified
furtive behavior, or the “odd” occurrence of the flashing headlights. (Flores, supra, 15
Cal.5th at pp. 1045–1046, 1049.)
Instead, Kinkade had a particularized, reasonable, and articulable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory detention of defendant’s vehicle based upon his observations
before he conducted the traffic stop—that people connected to that vehicle may have
been involved in theft of lumber from the construction site. The vehicle was parked at
the construction site at 4:00 a.m.; it was an isolated location; there was lumber loaded on
top of the vehicle that was not secured; someone inside the vehicle flashed the headlights
off and on; a person in black clothing walked from the vehicle and toward the
construction site; and the fact that the lumber was on top of the vehicle and not tied down
may have meant the theft was still in process. (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229; People
v. Britton (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118–1119.)
Kinkade observed more than behavior that amounted to “mere deviation[s] from
perceived social convention[s].” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1045.) Neither the
vehicle nor the person who walked away from it engaged in “headlong flight” (id. at
p. 1048), but the totality of the circumstances established that Kinkade’s traffic stop of
the vehicle and investigatory detention of defendant were based on particularized,
reasonable, and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. As required by Flores, Kinkade
observed, in plain view, specific conduct that suggested the people connected to the
vehicle were “otherwise involved in illegal conduct” at a late hour and in an isolated area,

15.
consisting of entering the construction site and stealing the lumber. (Id. at pp. 1045–
1047, 1049.)
II. Defendant Was Not Subject to an Unlawful Custodial Interrogation
We next address whether Kinkade’s questions to defendant constituted an unlawful
custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda advisements.
A. Custodial Interrogation
Miranda advisements are required only when a person is subject to custodial
interrogation. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 647–648.) “Custodial” means
“any situation in which ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” (Id. at p. 648.)
“[T]he temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop
or Terry stop [citation] does not constitute Miranda custody.” (Maryland v. Shatzer
(2010) 559 U.S. 98, 113.)
An officer’s explanation to the driver as to why he was pulled over, and requesting
identification and registration, qualify as the type of ordinary questions an officer is
allowed to conduct during a traffic stop. (Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. 348, 355; People v.
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 980–981.) “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop … do not convert the encounter into something other
than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of
the stop.” (Arizona, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 333; People v. Felix (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
439, 448–449.)
Similarly, a custodial interrogation does not occur where an officer detains a
suspect for investigation, and the questioning is limited to the purpose of identifying a
suspect or “to obtain [sufficient] information confirming or dispelling the officer’s
suspicions.” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180; People v. Clair (1992) 2
Cal.4th 629, 679–680.)

16.
B. Analysis
Kinkade’s traffic stop and investigatory detention of defendant did not become an
unlawful custodial arrest, and defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation in the
absence of Miranda advisements.
First, Kinkade validly asked defendant for his driver’s license given the traffic
violation of driving a vehicle without license plates. His requests for defendant to get out
of his vehicle and stand next to the patrol car were also reasonable under the
circumstances. Kinkade had seen the vehicle’s flashing headlights, someone walk away
from the vehicle, and the vehicle perform a U-turn, leading to the reasonable suspicion
that defendant was the person operating the vehicle, a second person was on foot and
possibly loaded the lumber onto the top of the vehicle, and that second person could still
be in the area. Kinkade was alone in a dark, new construction area, and he was not sure if
another patrol car was in the vicinity. Kinkade’s request for defendant to get out of his
own car and stand by the patrol vehicle was appropriate under these circumstances and
did not amount to a custodial arrest. They were standing on the street and defendant was
not restrained in any way. (Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 743.)
Kinkade’s initial questions to defendant did not unduly prolong either the traffic
stop or the investigatory detention. Kinkade activated his patrol car’s signal lights at
4:02 a.m. Kinkade ran the warrant check on defendant’s license at 4:05 a.m. Kinkade’s
questions were aimed at dispelling the articulable and reasonable suspicions raised by his
observations of the unsecured lumber on the roof of defendant’s vehicle, the flashing
headlights, and the person in dark clothing who walked away from the vehicle.
Kinkade’s questions to defendant about whether the lumber was stolen, while
defendant was standing on the street and not restrained in any way, did not unlawfully
extend the duration of defendant’s detention or turn the traffic stop into a custodial
interrogation or result in involuntary statements. “[P]olice expressions of suspicion, with
no other evidence of a restraint on the person’s freedom of movement, are not necessarily

17.
sufficient to convert voluntary presence at an interview into custody.” (People v. Moore
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 402 [police question to the defendant, if he “burglarize[d] the
house,” did not constitute custodial interrogation]; People v. Potter (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 528, 541 [police did not engage in custodial interrogation when the
defendant was told that he was suspected of molesting his daughter].) In addition,
officers may urge a person to tell the truth and, in the absence of improper threats or
promises, such a statement is not coercive. (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405,
444.) We have said that officers may “exhort a suspect to tell the truth and repeatedly
express that they believe a suspect is lying” and doing so, without more, does not amount
to coercion or make any response involuntary. (People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749,
791, People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 919.)
III. Defendant’s Vehicle Was Lawfully Searched
Kinkade had probable cause to arrest defendant when he admitted the lumber on
top of his vehicle was stolen. At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that there
was no warrant for the search of defendant’s vehicle, but disagreed as to whether Kinkade
lawfully conducted the search and found the weapon and the narcotics.
“Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable, therefore illegal, under
the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few carefully delineated exceptions.” (People v.
Vasquez (1983) 138 Cal.App.3d 995, 1000; People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943,
950.) The trial court found two relevant exceptions applicable in this case: a search
incident to arrest and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
A. Search Incident to Arrest
A search incident to a lawful arrest exception “derives from interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.”
(Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 338 (Gant).)
There is a “two-part rule under which an automobile search incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest is constitutional (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the

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vehicle during the search, or (2) if the police have reason to believe that the vehicle
contains ‘evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.’ ” (Davis v. U.S. (2011) 564 U.S. 229,
234–235, italics added; Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 351.) The warrantless search will be
upheld if either prong is satisfied. (People v. Johnson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1035
(Johnson).)
The first prong of this test cannot be satisfied if the defendant has already been
handcuffed and taken into custody, or is otherwise restrained by the police and unable to
access the car, at the time of the search. (Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 745–746.)
To justify the search under the second prong, the officers must have a reasonable belief
that evidence of the offense of arrest is located within the car. (Id. at pp. 750–751.) “[A]
reasonable belief to search for evidence of the offense of arrest exists when the nature of
the offense, considered in conjunction with the particular facts of the case, gives rise to a
degree of suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited intrusions such as
investigatory stops.” (Id. at p. 751.)
“In either of these situations, Gant provides the generalized authority to search the
entire passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein incident to arrest.”
(People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 555.) When neither justification is
present, “a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a
warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.” (Gant,
supra, 556 U.S. at p. 351.)
B. The Automobile Exception
The trial court also found the automobile exception to the warrant requirement was
applicable to Kinkade’s search. “Under the automobile exception, police who have
probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal
activity or contraband may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the vehicle in
which the evidence might be found. [Citations.] Such a search ‘is not unreasonable if
based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not

19.
actually been obtained.’ ” (Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 753; Johnson, supra, 21
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1034–1035.)
“Probable cause exists when, considering the totality of the circumstances, the
‘known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.…’ ”
(Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1034–1035.) “ ‘If probable cause justifies the
search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and
its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’ ” (Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th
at p. 753; People v. Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 950–951.)
C. Analysis
The trial court correctly found Kinkade’s search of the vehicle was valid because it
was incident to defendant’s arrest. The search did not qualify under Gant’s first test
because defendant had been handcuffed, taken into custody, and placed in the backseat of
Kinkade’s patrol car. Under Gant’s second test, however, Kinkade’s search was valid
incident to defendant’s arrest for his admitted theft of the lumber from the adjacent
construction site, because Kinkade had a reasonable belief there was additional evidence
in the vehicle consisting of construction materials that were smaller than the stack of
lumber and thus capable of being placed inside the vehicle. (Evans, supra, 200
Cal.App.4th at p. 751.)
For the same reasons, the trial court also correctly found that Kinkade’s search of
defendant’s vehicle was lawful under the automobile exception. Defendant admitted the
lumber on top of his vehicle was stolen, thus establishing probable cause that his vehicle
could contain other items stolen from the construction site. In addition, Kinkade had seen
a second person walking from defendant’s vehicle to the construction site shortly before
defendant conducted the U-turn. Such undisputed facts established probable cause to
believe defendant had an accomplice who assisted in taking the lumber and placing it on
the roof of his vehicle, and other stolen items also could be in the vehicle.

20.
IV. Defendant’s Letter Brief
We now address the issues that defendant raised in his letter brief. Defendant did
not testify at the suppression hearing, but argues his suppression motion should have been
granted based on his unsworn narrative account of the incident that he stated in his letter
brief, as follows: defendant was a gardener, he was out early to get ready for his first job,
his dog was with him, he stopped at the construction site because he had to use the
portable toilet, he spoke to the construction site’s security guard and asked for permission
to use it, the guard said it was okay, defendant used the portable toilet, and he returned to
his vehicle and drove away. Defendant states he never took anything from the
construction site, and he did not have a gun in his vehicle. Defendant believes the person
who Kinkade saw by his vehicle was actually the security guard from the construction
site.
Defendant further asserts he was “yanked out” of his vehicle and never asked to
get out. After he was questioned, he was placed in the officer’s patrol car “along with my
dog.” Defendant states he never gave permission for anyone to search his vehicle, and he
never had a gun. Defendant complains that he asked for fingerprints to be taken from the
gun because there was no proof he touched it. He asked for the officer’s vest and dash
cameras, but found out the officer did not have any from the traffic stop. He also asked
to locate the security guard from the construction site, but the person was never found.
Defendant claims he was never asked to explain what happened that day.
Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing, this version of the incident
was not introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing, and Kinkade’s testimony
was admitted without dispute. Moreover, defendant’s account does not undermine
Kinkade’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and decision to conduct an
investigatory detention because “ ‘[t]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not
deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
Indeed, the principal function of [police] investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity

21.
and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal .…’ ” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 233.)
After independent review of the record, we find that no reasonably arguable
factual or legal issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

22.

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